SENATE. Amendment to the Constitution. ment. But if the people knew and would see all the points tending to one extreme line, they would take care to inquire whether, in endeavoring to avoid a weather shore, they had not forgotten the lee one. If the people are to have a master, Mr. President, it is indifferent whether they are to be bowed down by an insolent individual oligarchy, or a proud and haughty aristocracy of States, if, in the change of masters, the only change that is experienced is a change of habits. NOVEMBER, 1803. them without even a moment's jealousy. The State he represented was once considered a large State, the increase of others in population however had rendered it properly belonging to neither class; it was an intermediate State; but from the natural progression of the Union it must be ranked among the small States. In this view then he could speak dispassionately, and the small States could not with reason be apprehensive that a State, which must speedily take rank among them, could be indifferent to their rights if there were the least cause for apprehension. But where, sir, is the danger of letting the choice ultimately go to the Legislatures? If there is danger it is certainly wrong to send it to any Le- He had moved for the insertion of three instead gislature; yet we find the Constitution admits of of five, with this precise and special intention, considerable Legislative authority in the organi- that the people themselves should have the power zation of various Constitutional powers; the fact of electing the President and Vice President; carries with it some evidence of the principles of and that intrigues should be thereby forever frusthat instrument. What is the purport of this trated. The intention of the Convention was amendment but to cut off a part of that solemn that the election of the chief officers of the Govcompact, the result of four long months' delibera-ernment should come as immediately from the tion, where low ambition or the pride of States people as was practicable, and that the Legislature never found admission, and where disinterested should possess the power only in such an exipatriotism and the light of virtue only found ac-gency as accident might give birth to, but which cess? But, sir, there are motives operating in this body, and promoting this amendment, which, though not prominent, are powerful; it is said, if you do not alter the Constitution, the people called Federalists will send a Vice President into that chair; and this, in truth, is the pivot upon which the whole turns. When we were as Republicans out of power, did we not reprobate such conduct? Shall we then do as they did? Shall we revive party heat? No, he hoped not; but that, by a just and mild policy, we should evince that we would do as we would be done by. they had considered as likely to occur. Had it not been for these considerations, the large States never would have given up the advantages which they held in point of numbers. If the number five were to be continued, and the House of Representatives made the last resort, he would undertake to say that four times out of five the choice would devolve upon them. Diminish the number to three, and the compromise of two and two between the opposing parties, which has heretofore prevailed, will be superseded by an opposition of one on each side for President, and a third be The question was immediatly taken, on the re-tween both for Vice President. The question of port and carried-yeas 20, nays 11. Mr. ADAMS said, that though he had voted for the amendment, he disapproved of the alteration from five to three. He felt, however, though a representative of a large State, a deep interest in this question. Was there no champion of the small States to stand up in that House and vindicate their rights? Mr. DAYTON was not here as champion of the small States; but, as the representative of one of them, he was ready to enter his protest against being delivered over bound hand and foot to four or five of the large States. The gentleman from South Carolina had offered arguments on the subject irrefutable. The little portion of influence left us he has demonstrated to be now about to be taken away, and the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. ADAMS,) after aiding the effort with his vote, has taken mercy upon us, and after he has helped to knock us down, asks us why we do not stand up for ourselves. small and large State interests is not at all involved in this question; it is a mere matter of imagination; and if it were at all real, it would perhaps be found to operate differently from what is supposed. There are many of the States, which are now small in reference to their population, which must already feel the influence, if any exists, of their being very soon likely to become large States. Georgia, Tennessee, and Kentucky, were of this description; in less than ten years these States will be larger than many now called large States, and their circumstances alone would be a sufficient guard against those dangers apprehended. He would be one of the last to doubt the virtue and the wisdom which framed the present Constitution; but, like other gentlemen, he was aware of the fallibility of the wisest of mankind; the founders of that Constitution had taught him the important lesson, for they had provided in that instrument a remedy for their own inexperience or fallibility; and time has in this instance, as in Mr. S. SMITH was not surprised to find those numerous others, proved their uncommon wisdom, who were members of the old Congress, in which for evils have arisen whch though they could not the subject of large and small States was frequently foresee, they have provided the means to correct agitated, familiar with the subject of those days. them: they could not have foreseen the danger Under the present Constitution he had been ten to which the country was exposed at the late years in Congress and had never heard the sub-election; they could not have believed, that at ject agitated, nor the least ground given for any apprehension on this subject; he had seen the small States possess all the advantages secured to so short a distance from the foundation of the Constitution, the country escaped from a civil war only from the prevalence of that kind temper, and magnanimity in the Legislature, which prevailed in the Convention itself. And shall we not do all that is in our power to avoid the recurrence of similar danger? Had the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. BUTLER) been present at this critical period, he would have felt, as many of his friends felt, a serious and restless anxiety. Two candidates before the House-party spirit high; the one determined to support the candidate upon whom public affection and confidence had unequivocally centered; the other seeking to place in the Executive Chair, not a candidate of their original choice, but a candidate through whom they wished to retain at least a share of power; unsuccessful in that effort, bringing forward a proposition to create a President; and how? By a law to be passed for the purpose, and in which the person was to be named, leaving the votes and choice of the people out of consideration altogether. Had this been effected, what other result would follow but civil war? Without pretending to be in the counsels of either party on that occasion, he believed that civil war was seriously apprehended, and so much so, that he felt perfectly convinced, that had a choice been made in the way proposed, and a person could be found to accept it, that his head would not have remained on his shoulders for twenty-four hours afterwards. Dangers of this kind he was solicitous to avoid; and by that mild and benignant mode provided by the Constitution, that of amendment to the Constitution. not. Mr. HILLHOUSE. In avoiding rocks he feared we were steering for quicksands. The evils that are past we know; those that may arrive we know The object proposed is to provide against a storm, a phenomenon not rare or unfrequent in Republics. You are called upon to act upon a calculation that all the States in the Union will vote for the same persons, or that each of two parties opposed in politics will have an individual candidate. Suppose the two candidates who had the highest votes on the late election had been the champions of two opposite parties, and that neither would recede, what then would be the consequence; according to the gentleman from Maryland, a civil war! When men are bent on a favorite pursuit, they are too apt to shut out all consequences which do not bear out their object. Thus gentlemen can very well discover the danger they have escaped, but they do not perceive that the opposition of two powerful candidates gives, besides the hazard of civil war, the hazard of placing one of them on a permanent throne. The First Magistracy of this nation is an object capable of exciting ambition; and no doubt it would one day or other be sought after by dangerous and enterprising men. It was to place a check upon this ambition that the Constitution provided a competitor for the Chief Magistrate, and declared that both should not be chosen from the same State. Here also was a guard against State pride, and this guard you wish to take away; and what will be the consequence? Instead of two or three or five, you will have as many candidates as there are States in the Union. SENATE. By voting for two persons without designation, the States stood a double chance of a majority, besides the chance of a majority of all the States in the House of Representatives. For once or twice there may be such an organization of party as will secure for a conspicuous character the majority of votes. But that character cannot live always. The evil of the last election will recur, and be greater, because the whole field will be to range in. He hoped this amendment would not be hastily adopted. The subsisting mode was the result of much deliberation and solemn compromise, after having long agitated the Convention. It is now attacked by party; whatever gentlemen may say to the contrary; the gentleman from South Carolinia has confessed it. If gentlemen will suffer themselves to look forward without passion, great good may come from the present mode; men of each of the parties may hold the two principal offices of the Government; they will be checks upon each other: our Government is composed of checks; and let us preserve it from party spirit, which has been tyrannical in all ages. These checks take off the fiery edge of persecution. Would not one of a different party placed in that chair tend to check and preserve in temper the over-heated zeal of party? he would conduct himself with firmness because of the minor party; he would take care that the majority should have justice, but he would also guard the minority from oppression. If we cannot destroy party we ought to place every check upon it. If the present amendment pass, nine out of ten times the election will go to the other House, and then the only difference will be that you had a comedy the last time, and you'll have a tragedy the next. Though it was impossible to prevent party altogether, much more when population and luxury increase, and corruption and vice with them, it was prudent to preserve as many checks against it as was practicable. He had been long in Congress and saw the conflicting interests of large and small States operate; the time may not be remote when party will adopt new designations; federal and republican parties have had their day, their designations will not last long, and the ground of difference between parties will not be the same that it has been; new names and new views will be taken; it has been the course in all nations. There has not yet been a rotation of offices in which the small States could look for their share, but the time may, it will come when the small will wrestle with the large States for their rights. Each State has felt that though its limits were not so extensive as others, its rights were not disregarded. Suffer this confidence to be done away, and you may bid adieu to it; three or four large States will take upon them in rotation to nominate the Executive, and the second officer also. This will be felt. A fanciful difference in politics is the bugbear of party now, because no other, no real cause of difference has subsisted. But remedy will create a real disease. States like individuals may say we will be of no party, and whenever this shall happen blood will follow SENATE. Amendment to the Constitution. NOVEMBER, 1803. Mr. BRADLEY moved an adjournment. The shape. He would, in order to render the report motion was agreed to. THURSDAY, November 24. Mr. COCKE gave notice that he would, to-morrow, ask leave to bring in a bill to make further appropriations for the purpose of extinguishing the Indian claims in the States of Tennessee and Kentucky. AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION. The consideration of the report on the amendment to the Constitution being taken up; the amendment as directed to be printed on the preceding day, was taken up, and read, as follows: Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress as sembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That the following amendment be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as a part of the said Constitution, viz: In all future elections of President and Vice President, the Electors shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and, in distinct ballots, the person voted for as Vice President, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. The person voted for as President having a majority of the votes of all the Electors appointed, shall be the President, and if no person have such majority, then from the three highest on the list, of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose the President in the manner directed by the Constitution. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President, shall be Vice President; and in case of an equal number of votes for two or more persons for the Vice President, they being the highest on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President from those having such equal number, in the manner directed by the Constitution; but no person Constitutionally ineligible to the office of President, shall be eligible to that of the President of the United States. Mr. BRADLEY did not approve of the amendment, as it now stood; he could not see why the Vice President should not be chosen by a majority, as well as the President. He considered the possibility of the Vice President becoming President by any casualty, as a good reason for both being chosen by the same ratio of numbers. If it should be carried as the amendment now stands, the of fice of Vice President would be hawked about at market, and given as change for votes for the Presidency. And what would be the effect?-that it might so happen that a citizen chosen only for the office of Vice President might, by the death of the President, though chosen only by a plurality, become President, and hold the office for three years eleven months and thirty days. He did not approve of many arguments which he had heard on the preceding day, and however disposed to concur in the principle of designation for the two offices, he could not give it his vote in the present more congenial with his wishes, move to strike out the following words beginning with the words shall, in the thirteenth line, to Constitution, in the eighteenth. The motion was seconded. Mr. TRACY opposed the striking out, as not in order, it being an amendment to an amendment already received by the House. He thought howand then any part might be amended. ever it would be in order to reconcile the whole, The PRESIDENT said that the motion for amending the amendment was not in order; but if the member from Vermont, or any other gentleman of the majority on the question yesterday, chose to move for a recommittal, or even to refer the report to a select committee, it would be in order. Mr. BRADLEY said that he held it to be a sound truth that in legislating we ought not to be afraid of using words to express our meaning as far as language could go; he thought that there was a which if suffered to go abroad would be attended deficiency of words and a deficiency of meaning, by great inconvenience. He would move for the reference of the report to a select committee, and that they be instructed to insert in the room of the words he before proposed to omit, the words, "if such number be the majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest ou the list the Senate shall choose the Vice President." He would also move that the committee be intenth line, the following words: "But in choosing structed to insert after the word President, in the the President the votes shall be taken by States, the Representatives from each State having one vote; and there shall be two-thirds of the representation of the States to form a quorum." Mr. WRIGHT, to give the gentleman an opportunity to discuss his subject, as one of the majority on the question of yesterday, moved for a reconsideration of the whole report. Mr. BRADLEY was not disposed to favor reconsideration; the custom he took was borrowed from the town-meetings to the Eastward; if this practice were to be pursued, we should be called upon at the end of a session to reconsider the proceedings of the first, and reduce the Senate even below a New England town-meeting. Mr. ADAMS had no objection to a recommitment, as he considered that one or two further alterations were extremely necessary. He could foresee a probable case which he thought ought to be provided against; and one or two simple expressions would answer the end. He could conceive no election to take place under the form proposed, and the election of a Chief Magistrate was not in his mind a matter of small moment. He would suppose that there should not be three persons voted for; or that, though three or more should be voted for, that none should have an actual majority. What would your situation be then? He would suppose another case, that there were two who should have the highest, and yet an equal number of votes, and that there were to be a third and fourth who should have equal numbers also-how could the three highest be found in this case, when the third and fourth persons were equally high in votes? Mr. TAYLOR was against the recommittal, because he had no doubt that the ingenuity of gentlemen would, upon amendment in a committee, discover new defects and motives for amendment. The gentleman from Vermont (Mr. BRADLEY) had however stated a new idea; the Constitution does not require a majority in the choice of a Vice President, after the choice of President shall have been made, but says "in every case, after the choice of a President, the person having the greatest number of votes shall be the Vice President"-purposely omitting "a majority of the whole," as in the case of the President; but the gentleman, who disapproves of amending, wishes to carry amendment farther and to render the difficulty more difficult. He would oppose recommitment, for if this new principle were necessary the gentleman could introduce it in the shape of a new amendment to the Constitution. With respect to the simple expressions which the gentleman from Massachusetts proposed to insert, and which appeared to him to promise with so much facility such great advantages, he should be glad to see them introduced. But he thought that in one case as well as in the other, of those which he had suggested as necessary to provide against, no difficulty whatever existed. For it appeared plain enough to him that if only two had the highest numbers and equal, that one of the two would be preferred to an extension of choice to a third who had not an equal number of votes, and that the selection of one of the two would be in fact a choice from one of the three highest; so in the case of the third and fourth, though they might have also an equal number of votes, he could perceive no difficulty; if there were even four of them, the choice out of any three of the four would be a correct choice. Mr. DAYTON-Gentlemen appear to forget that the Chair has decided that no words can be introduced into the amendment already adopted, and consequently that a recommitment is the only course left. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TAYLOR) objects to the proposition of the gentleman from Vermont, (Mr. BRADLEY,) upon the ground that it seems too sacred to touch it, as there exists already a different principle in the Constitution; but though he considers it too sacred, he nevertheless recommends as a remedy the introduction of a new resolution separably and in opposition to that sacred principle. We have been hitherto trammelled by incongruous rules, but here an amendment is proposed to be got rid of by a side wind. Mr. TRACY Could not see why a Vice President should not be chosen by a majority instead of a plurality as well as President-he was for the recommitment. Mr. S. SMITH supposed that if the motion of the gentleman from Vermont should be lost, it would be then in order to move a reconsideration. He could not see, with that gentleman, anything exceptionable in town-meetings, nor could he discover that town-meetings in New England were SENATE. more exceptionable than elsewhere, unless there was anything specially wrong transacted at them. The practice of reconsideration was familiar in all Legislative bodies; and it was in the nature of legislation that it should be so; for new knowledge as well as new circumstances render it necessary to reconsider and revive long established laws. The motion for referring to a select committee was then lost-yeas 15, nays 16. Mr. WRIGHT then renewed his motion for a reconsideration. Mr. BUTLER disapproved of the rule of the House which authorized this mode of reconsideration in so loose a way; he thought that no subject discussed should be reconsidered without an unanimous vote; if that practice was pursued it would prevent a great abuse and waste of time. In the present mode it matters not whether it is a thin or a full House; any member of the majority has the House at his mercy. Mr. TRACY did not comprehend the meaning of the gentleman in demanding a reconsiderationdid he mean to reconsider the whole day's work? Mr. S. SMITH said his colleague meant, as he meant, to reconsider the amendment made yesterday to the report of the committee. Mr. TRACY did not suppose that the House was to reconsider the rule of order as to the majority; nor six or seven other motions; but unless the gentleman specifies the subject to be reconsidered, the motion will necessarily comprehend the whole day's work. Mr. DAYTON understood it to be confined to the amendment of the resolution. Mr. PLUMER requested the motion to be committed to writing; which was done, and the motion was carried. Mr. BRADLEY then renewed his motion as before, for striking out and inserting after the 13th line; this amendment he thought of great importance, as under the Constitution as it now stands the Vice President must be a person of the highest respectability, well known, and of established reputation throughout the United States; but if the discriminating principle prevails without some precautions such as the amendment proposed, that assurance would be lost; and he should not be surprised to hear of as many candidates for Vice President as there are States, as the votes for President would be offered in truck for votes for Vice President, and an enterprising character might employ his emissaries through all the States to purchase them, and your amendment lays the foundation for intrigues. He was desirous that he who is to be set up as candidate for the Vice President should as at present be equally respectable, or that there should be none that at least he should be the second man in the nation; adopt the designating principle, without the most guarded precautions, and you lose that assurance. Mr. HILLHOUSE accorded with the gentleman's amendment, as it naturally grows out of the principles of the report. There was not a word in the Constitution about voting for the Vice President, no vote in fact is given for such an office; the al teration to designation alters the whole thing; and as the gentlemen has expressed, will send the Vice President's office into market to be handed about as change for the candidate supported by larger States; he would prefer leaving the choice of President and Vice President at once to the larger States than take it in this way. In calm times any government may work well, but he wished in calm times to provide against storm. If we designate any, then designate both and on equal terms. NOVEMBER, 1803. Senate shall in like manner choose the Vice President; but in choosing the Vice President, the votes shall be taken by States, the Senators from each State having one vote. A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the States; and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a of this State in Congress, shall find that the aforesaid choice. And in case the Senators and Representatives amendment is not conformable to the sentiments of a Constitutional majority of both branches of the National same as to meet the sentiments of such majority. Legislature, they are hereby requested so to modify the Provided, however, That any amendment which may be agreed on, shall oblige the Electors to designate the person they desire to be President, from the one whom they desire to be Vice President. Resolved, That his Excellency the Governor be requested forthwith to transmit the same to the Supreme Executives of the several States." Which resolves have been communicated by the Supreme Executive of the State of Vermont to the Supreme Executive of this Commonwealth. Resolved, That the Legislature of this Commonwealth have a high sense of the wisdom and patriotism of the Legislature of the State of Vermont, and accord with them in the opinion, that it is expedient that the Constitution of the United States be amended in the Legislature of the State of Vermont. Mr. WRIGHT's object was the discriminating principle, or the designating principle in its most simple and efficacious form; but this by no means authorized the abridging of the rights of the small States; nor could it be shown in argument that the designating principle would have such an effect. The provision that not more than one of the two candidates should be voted for in the several States, showed that the lesser States were equally guarded with the rest: upon the incidental election in the House of Representatives the same guardianship of the smaller States was conspicuous-the Union was the result of a fair compromise, and the designation in no way departs from it. The amendment proposed, so far as it went to decide the choice of Vice President by a majority instead of a plurality, as the Constitution now stands, he approved, as it was the principle most consonant with the spirit of representative democracy, that no officer should be elected but by a majority; as it now stands, admitting a choice by a plurality, there were contrary principles received. He saw no difficulty in the event of an election of Vice Pre-Governor be and he is hereby requested to communicate sident not being made, as it might be done by this House. The idea he acknowledged he had borrowed from the resolutions of March 4, 1800, passed by the Legislature of Massachusetts, and forwarded to their representatives in Congress; the recommendation of an alteration in this part of the Constitution originated in Vermont, but was adopted and forwarded by Massachusetts. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. IN SENATE, Feb. 28th, 1800. Whereas the Legislature of the State of Vermont, on the fifth day of November, last, passed two resolves in the words following, viz: "STATE OF VERMONT. In General Assembly Nov. 5, 1799. Resolved, That the Senators and Representatives of this State in the Congress of the United States be, and they hereby are, requested to use their best endeavors that Congress propose to the Legislatures of the several States the following amendment to the Constitution of the United States, viz: That the Electors of President and Vice President in giving in their votes, shall respectively distinguish the person whom they desire to be President from the one they desire to be Vice President, by annexing the word President or Vice President, as the case may require, to the proper name voted for; and the person having the greatest number of votes for Vice President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors chosen, shall be Vice President; and if there be no choice, and two or more persons shall have the highest number of votes, and those equal, the Senate shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for Vice President; and if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list, the manner contemplated in the aforesaid resolves of the tives of this State in the Congress of the United States Resolved, further That the Senators and Representabe and they are hereby requested to adopt the necessary measures to effect the amendment aforesaid. Resolved, further, That his Honor the Lieutenant the foregoing resolves to the Supreme Executive of the The propriety of this House choosing its Presisident he considered as perfectly conformable to the principles of the Constitution. The House of Representatives never vote by States but when the election of President devolves upon them; the Senate never; but he did not see why it should not be so in the event of a non-election of Vice President by the want of a majority. As to the number from which the choice was to be made, he cared not whether it were three or five-he considered the principle of designation as everything, and the number but as trimmings to the cloth. He would recommend it to the gentleman from Vermont so to alter his amendment as to render an election in the House the resort, in the defect of a majority; he was for the choice being made not in the numerical capacity of the members, but by States. in the House of Representatives by States, as a |