My colleague (Mr. EUSTIS) has stated to the House that, in the year 1797, the Legislature of Massachusetts voted to instruct the Senators and to request the Representatives of that State in Congress, to propose an alteration of the Constitution similar to that now proposed. A gentleman from New York (Mr. THOMAS) has informed us that a similar vote passed in the Legislature of that State. As these two statements are the only answers (if such they can be considered) to the various arguments which have this day been adduced in opposition to the resolution, and as the gentlemen who have made them appear to consider these votes of the State Legislatures obligatory upon the members of the House who now represent those States, I beg leave to state as succinctly as possible some of the reasons which wil! induce me to vote against the resolution.

An amendment of the Constitution must be sanctioned not only by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, but must be ratified by three-fourths of the State Legislatures. The Constitution considers these different Assemblies as entirely independent of each other. They must act with perfect independence upon this subject, or this provision of the Constitution is virtually destroyed. Most certainly the resolution of a State Legislature, in 1797, ought not to control the votes of members of this House in 1803. It is, I conceive, not only their right, but their duty to decide upon this question with the most perfect independence of opinion.

It has been already urged that the Constitutional mode of electing the President and Vice President is admirably calculated to disappoint intrigue and prevent corruption. Should an aspiring and dangerous faction obtain the ascendency in this country, this mode of election affords the means of counteracting its influence, of checking its control. For although such a party will make the greatest exertions to elect that leader who may chance to be the idol of the day, while the Electors are obliged to vote for two candidates, without designating which is intended, those Electors who are not devoted to the interest of the ruling faction will exercise a preference of great importance, they will select the candidate least exceptionable.

The article, which this resolution proposes to alter, has always been considered as the great barrier and shield of the smaller States against the encroachments of the large. By the present mode of election, provided it is effected by the Electors, each State has its due proportion of influence. If it be decided by the House of Representatives, the Constitution has put the States upon the ground of perfect equality. But, if the proposed alteration takes place, it will undermine the very basis of the Confederacy; it will throw the whole power, in this most important election, into the hands of a few States exclusively. With the present population five States may, by combination, exclude the other twelve from all participation in the choice. It will be totally impossible, by any precaution whatever, to prevent such a combination.

H. OF R.

The situation of the States forming the Federal Constitution, and the nature of the compact itself, furnish strong evidence of the policy of the article under consideration. It was absolutely necessary that some of the rights of the individual States should be secured for the interest and safety of all. This Constitution, to use the language of the Convention who framed it, "was the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable." Upon no other principle is it possible to account for that article of the Constitution which provides for the representation of slaves. This article operates with peculiar inequality in the Northern and Eastern States.

The representation of slaves adds thirteen members to this House in the present Congress, and eighteen Electors of President and Vice President at the next election. Yet the whole of New England contains but thirteen hundred and thirtyone slaves. Massachusetts and Vermont have none.

The New England States have submitted to this inequality, sensible of the extreme danger of tampering with the Constitution. But, if it is to be altered, justice requires that the article authorizing the representation of slaves should be the first to receive amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I know that the objections to the article proposed to be altered are plausible-they are popular; but I am confident that, upon close examination of the different modes of electing our First Magistrate which have been proposed, none will be found to combine so many advantages as that prescribed by the Constitution. The Journal of the Convention evinces that this was a subject of long discussion and mature deliberation. It was devised by a most illustrious assembly of sages and patriots; it was adopted at a time when the heat of party had not influenced the country; shall we then, at a time when party feelings animate all parts of the Union, shall we destroy one of the firmest pillars of our political fabric? I trust, sir, we shall not venture into the boundless region of hypothesis, that we shall not alter one of the fundamental principles of the Federal Constitution.

Mr. J. C. SMITH rose and observed, that the friends of the resolution had been so occupied with its details, he feared they had lost sight of its principle. And he was not a little confirmed in this suspicion, from their profound silence on the present occasion. But as he felt so, he could not but express a faint hope that a Constitutional majority of the House would not be found to yield their assent to the proposition. Mr. S. said, it was worthy of remark that no alteration had yet been made in the national compact. Of the eleven articles subjoined to the Constitution as amendments, ten were mere declarations of certain rights, not materially affected by that instrument, and which had their origin in State jealousy, and the remaining one was intended only to settle the construction of an article in the Constitution which had before been considered of doubtful im

port; he alluded to the amendment respecting the suability of States.

It had been repeatedly acknowledged, Mr. S. said, by gentlemen on all sides of the House, that the Constitution of the United States was an affair of compromise-the result of a spirit of amity and mutual concession. But was there a gentleman on that floor who could inform what were the precise terms to that compromise? What sacrifices were made? What equivalents were given? If so, he would thank him to state to the House what mighty bcon was accorded to the eastern section of the nation in return for that remarkable provision of the Constitution, which permits slaves to become a basis of representation in that House, and which indeed renders them no inefficient agents even in the choice of the Chief Magistrate himself. For his part, Mr. S. said, he would confess he knew not what recompense could have been adequate to so extraordinary a concession. In truth, neither he nor any other member present could declare the exact manner in which the jarring interests, the conflicting claims of the several States, were adjusted in Convention. It, therefore, became a matter not only of delicacy but of extreme hazard, to touch the instrument with ever so slight a hand, lest the arrangement, thus happily made, should be broken down and destroyed.

Mr. S. said, he had ever understood the smaller States were, in Convention, peculiarly tenacious of that particular provision in the Constitution which was now proposed to be modified. The reasons were apparent and they had been so clearly and forcibly stated by the gentleman who had preceded him, that it was quite unnecessary for him to detain the House upon that point. The consequence of those States, in the election of President, was thereby, in some measure, preserved; they were enabled, in some degree, to counteract any combination which might be formed between four or five of the larger States to keep the office of Chief Magistrate in perpetual rotation among themselves. But, Mr. S. said, cogent as these reasons were, he apprehended they were not the only object of the provision. He said, it was no doubt desirable that the Executive power of the Government should be vested in an individual; but the Convention must have perceived, as indeed it was very obvious, that such an office in an elective Government must become a prodigious lure to ambition; that as the power, the patronage, the duration, and the emoluments of the office were augmented, in the same proportion would be the violence of competition between rival candidates, in the same proportion would the order and tranquillity of the nation be endangered at the return of every election. This evil, so formidable in its nature, if not rescinded, is at least mitigated by the existing provision of the Constitution. For, while it effectually secures to the nation an eventual choice, it places it wholly beyond the reach of any candidate to calculate confidently on the issue of his pretensions. Such an uncertainty, arising not from the casualties incident to ordinary elections, but from the circum

OCTOBER, 1803.

stance that even a majority of the electoral votes may not ultimately secure the office, must ever form a powerful check to corrupt or ambitious views. The aspiring demagogue, willing to barter wealth for distinction, would hardly be induced to lavish his treasures upon so hazardous an experiment. And even the man in possession of the office would scarcely be tempted to use unworthy means to retain it, when its preservation must be so much a thing of chance. It was, (Mr. S. said,) to complete this refined process; to complicate it in such a manner as to effectuate this great object alone, that the office of Vice President was instituted. And I demand of gentlemen what apology they will make to the American people for retaining this officer if the present amendment is to prevail? What duties has he to perform other than such as are devolved upon the Speaker of the House? Why will you pay him five thou sand dollars, annually, merely to preside in the deliberations of the Senate, who might as well elect one of their own body for that purpose? And why, sir, will you keep here a high officer, with a liberal salary, for no other earthly purpose than to enable him, from his proximity to the Government, to cabal with greater effect for the succession? If pretensions to economy rest not solely in profession, gentlemen will now abolish this sinecure; they will finish their amendment by expunging the office of Vice President from the Constitution.

Mr. S. said he would close his remarks by seriously asking gentlemen whether the present resolution had not grown out of an overweening anxiety to secure, at all hazards, the re-election of the present Chief Magistrate?

The SPEAKER said it was improper to introduce the Chief Magistrate into the debate.

Mr. SMITH said he was not about to speak disrespectfully of the President, but he would say that no modification whatever of the Constitution, having for its object either to enlarge the power, or to facilitate the attainment of that office, ought to be attempted, so long as the incumbent, whoever he may be, is considered as a candidate for a re-election. Sir, said Mr. S., I will again ask gentlemen, whether they will suffer themselves to be influenced on this great question by their predilection for an individual? Are they prepared to immolate the Constitution of their country upon an altar erected to private friendship and personal esteem? Will they remember that the conservative Senate of France "desirous of furnishing a proof of national gratitude," proposed to the French people, to amend their Constitution by creating Napoleon Bonaparte Consul for life! If the two cases are not altogether parallel, who can say there is much difference in principle? And who, sir, will be answerable for the consequences, if the National Legislature will permit themselves to be governed by considerations of a personal nature, when acting upon a subject infinitely momentous, not only to themselves but to remotest posterity?

Mr. THOMAS said that he was in favor of the amendment as it then stood in the resolution, and

hoped that it would receive the support of a Constitutional majority of that House. At the same time, he confessed that he should have been better satisfied had it gone no further than to designate the President and Vice President, because he thought the more it was trammelled with detailed provisions, the greater the hazard of its final ratification by the respective State Legislatures.

He was not at all alarmed at the variety of opinions which had been expressed on that question, even by those in favor of the general principle. On a subject of so much importance to the welfare of this country, it was natural to expect a difference of sentiment, as to its bearings, and the lengths to which it ought to go. He was happy, however, to find the appearance of a disposition on the part of those honorable gentlemen to concur in passing the amendment, since it embraced the important object of designation, although it was not shaped exactly agreeable to their wishes. He rejoiced to find that, with respect to the great principle contained in the resolution, there appeared but one opinion in that House, unless it was from a quarter from whence we look for opposition on all occasions.

On this question, however, said Mr. T., I do confess that I am greatly disappointed in finding two of my honorable colleagues (Mr. LIVINGSTON and Mr. G. GRISWOLD) hostile to this measure; considering that the Legislature of the State from which those gentlemen are Representatives, in January, 1803, unanimously recommended, in the most impressive terms, the adoption of this amendment to our Constitution, notwithstanding at that time a respectable minority of one branch, and a large majority of the other, coincided with those gentlemen in political sentiment. Knowing this, Mr. Speaker, I did expect, and I think I had a right to expect, different conduct on the part of those honorable gentlemen on this occasion. With the permission of the House, he would read a letter addressed to him as a Representative of the State of New York, on that floor, by the President of the Senate, and Speaker of the House of Assembly of that State, enclosing two resolutions, one of which embraced this object.

[Here Mr. T. read the letter alluded to, and then remarked, that it was not his intention to enter into the merits of the question; he only rose with a view to state this circumstance, and to express his disappointment in finding those gentlemen opposed to this amendment.]

Mr. LIVINGSTON said he should not have risen but for the remark of his colleague, (Mr. THOMAS.) He had, at the time alluded to, the honor to be a member of the Legislature of New York, but he was in a small minority. He had then the same opinion of the majority as at present. He did not, therefore, imagine that anything that came from him would succeed, and did not think it in the least useful to oppose himself to the torrent.

Mr. EUSTIS did not rise to discuss the merits of the amendment, but to answer the call of his colleague, (Mr. HASTINGS.) In 1797, as well as he recollected, the Assembly of Massachusetts instructed their Senators and advised their Repre

H. OF R.

sentatives to vote for an amendment to the Constitution, founded on the same principle with the present amendment. He presumed the gentleman from Massachusetts was ignorant of this fact, or he would not oppose the voice of the people of that State.

Mr. HASTINGS confessed his ignorance of this circumstance. But, had he known it, he should not have considered himself bound to make sacrifice of his own opinion to such instructions. He had no idea that, when a person was chosen to represent the people, he was under any obligation to pursue a line of conduct contrary to the dictates of his own mind, whatever might be the instructions of his constituents. If, after a thorough consideration of a measure, which he should be thus instructed to vote for, he should be convinced that it would operate against the interest of his constituents, he asked if he were not under a solemn obligation to act in opposition to his instructions? Because such measure, if carried into effect, might operate to the disadvantage, perhaps destruction, of the public good. He would not, however, enter into a discussion of this point, but satisfy himself with saying that, if he was instructed by every free citizen of Massachusetts to vote for a measure, which, after mature reflection, he was convinced would prove injurious, he should pursue the dictates of his own judgment and vote against it.

Mr. DANA.-It is extraordinary that the gentleman (Mr. EUSTIS) should rise to make this explanation. Does he mean to say to the Representatives of the people, the State Legislatures may issue their mandates to you, and though they are not your constituents, you shall, nevertheless, obey them? They are not our constituents; they are not authorized to give us instructions; and we are not bound to obey them when given.

Mr. EUSTIS said, he had barely risen to give the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts information; he had not expected to call up his champion from Connecticut, behind him. He had risen merely to state a fact, for the information of his colleague, as, from the observations he had made, it might be inferred that the State of Massachusetts was adverse to the principle of this amendment. It was far from his intention to oppose the sentiments of the Legislature of Massachusetts to the will of that House. He honored the independence his colleague expressed. It was, to be sure, an independence that went to the utmost limit a Representative could have of his constituents. Yet, he did not censure him for asserting it.*

made inquiry respecting the instructions of the Legis* On a subsequent day, Mr. Eustis stated that he had lature of Massachusetts, to which he had on a preceding day referred, without having been able to obtain satisfactory information. He was inclined to think he

had been in error in stating their existence; and, with this impression on his mind, he considered it due to his colleague (Mr. Hastings) to render an apology for the remarks he had applied to him.

Since the period of the above debate, a letter has been addressed to the Secretary of the Commonwealth

John A. Hanna, Josiah Hasbrouck, Daniel Heister, Joseph Heister, James Holland, David Holmes, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Michael Leib, John B. C. Lucas, Matthew Lyon, Andrew McCord, William McCreery, David Meriwether, Samuel L. Mitchill, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thos. Newton, jr., Joseph H. Nicholson, Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, John Patterson, John Randolph, jr., Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Cæsar A. Rodney, Erastus Root, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sandford, Ebenezer Seaver, John Smilie, John Smith of New York, John Smith of Virginia, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, John Stewart, David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Isaac Van Horne, Joseph B. Varnum, Daniel C. Verplanck, Matthew Walton, John Whitehill, Marmaduke Williams, Richard Winn, Joseph Winston, and Thomas Wynns.

NAYS-John Campbell, William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, Thomas Dwight, Calvin Goddard, Thomas Griffin, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, Seth Hastings, William Hoge, David Hough, Benjamin Huger, Samuel Hunt, Joseph Lewis, jr., Thomas Lewis, Henry W. Livingston, Nahum Mitchell, Thomas Plater, Samuel D. Purviance, Joshua Sands, John Cotton Smith, William Stedman, James Stephenson, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Tenney, Sam. Thatcher,

and Lemuel Williams.

LOUISIANA TREATY.

The bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act .to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the thirtieth of April last, and for the temporary government thereof," together with the amendments agreed to yesterday, was read the second time, as follows:

Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to take possession of and occupy the territory ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the thirtieth of April last, between the two nations; and that he may for that purpose, and in order to maintain in the said territories the authority of the United States, employ any part of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the force authorized by an act passed the third day of March last, entitled “Ăn act directing a detachment from the militia of the United States, and for erecting certain arsenals," which he may deem necessary, and so much of the sum appropriated by the said act as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated for the purpose of carrying this act into effect; to be applied under the direction of the President of the United States. SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That, until the expiration of the present session of Congress, or unless provision be sooner made for the temporary government of the said territories, all the military, civil, and judicial powers exercised by the officers of the existing Government of the same, shall be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct, for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of Louisiana in the full enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion.

8th CoN.-18

H. OF R.

On the question, Shall the bill pass? the yeas and nays were required, and stood-yeas 89, nays 23, as follows:

YEAS-Willis Alston, Isaac Anderson, John Archer, David Bard, George M. Bedinger, Samuel Bishop, William Blackledge, John Boyle, Robert Brown, William Butler, George W. Campbell, John Campbell, Levi Casey, Thomas Claiborne, Joseph Clay, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Frederick Conrad, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, John Dawson, William Dickson, John Earle, Peter Early, John W. Eppes, William Eustis, William Findley, John Fowler, Peterson Goodwyn, Andrew Gregg, Wade Hampton, John A. Hanna, Josiah Hasbrouck, Daniel Heister, Joseph Heister, William Hoge, James Holland, David Holmes, Benjamin Huger, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Michael Leib, John B. C. Lucas, Matthew Lyon, Andrew McCord, William McCreery, David Meriwether, Samuel L. Mitchill, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thos. Newton, jr. Joseph H. Nicholson, Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, John Patterson, Samuel D. Purviance, John Randolph, jr., Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Cæsar A. Rodney, Erastus Root, Thomas' Sammons, Thomas Sandford, Ebenezer Seaver, John Smilie, John Smith of New York, John Smith of Virginia, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, John Stewart, David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Isaac Van Horne, Joseph B. Varnum, Daniel C. Verplanck, Matthew Walton, John Whitehill, Marmaduke Williams, Richard Winn, Jos. Winston, and Thomas Wynns.

NAYS-William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, Thomas Dwight, James Elliot, Calvin Goddard, Thomas Griffin, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, Seth Hastings, Joseph Lewis, jr., Thomas Lewis, Henry W. Livingston, Nahum Mitchell, Thomas Plater, Joshua Sands, John Cotton Smith, William Stedman, James

Stephenson, Samuel Tenney, and Samuel Thatcher.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the following bill: A bill for carrying into effect the Convention of the thirtieth of April, one thousand eight hundred and three, between the United States of America, and the French Republic.

Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That, for the purpose of carrying into effect the convention of the thirtieth day of April eighteen hundred and three, between the United States of America and the French Republic, the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, authorized to cause to be constituted, certificates of stock, signed by the Register of the Treasury, in favor of the French Republic, or of its assignees, for the sum of eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, bearing an interest of six per cent. per annum, from the time when possession of New Orleans shall have been obtained, in conformity with the treaty of the thirtieth day of April, eighteen hundred and three, between the United States of America and the French Republic, and in other respects conformable with the tenor of the convention aforesaid; and the President of the United States is authorized to cause the said certificates of stock to be delivered to the Government of France, or to such person or persons as shall be authorized to receive them, in three months at most, after the exchange of ratifica