We were aware of the work of other States, particularly North Carolina and Missouri. I also had studied the General Accounting Office Report discussing the problem. I knew we needed more specific information regarding Minnesota, that there was a good possibility we had at least as bad a problem as existed on a national level. I decided that it was my job as Commissioner of the Department of Public Service to protect the consumer from this kind of situation and it was my job to investigate further. And, I must tell you, that I decided to undertake this investigation even if it meant a resource drain in other areas, because I take very seriously the job of consumer protection and our mission of providing fairness in the marketplace. We devised a plan to go out and pull samples from gas stations and start investigating the extent of the mislabeling problem. We also became involved in looking at the particular statutes and reviewing the authority that I as Commissioner had. We found out that we really did not have as much authority as we would have liked and had to work hand in hand with county attorneys and the State Attorney General's office to have the full authority that we needed to subpoena shipping manifests and invoices and such. We kept our limited authority in mind as we designed and conducted our investigation. This later helped us when we designed and discussed our legislative proposal. We were able to point out specific problems and what specifically would alleviate them. Again keeping in mind our ultimate goal of getting additional resources to do our job better, we realized that informing the public was going to be important. We therefore involved our communication staff at a very early stage. It would be their job to let the public know about this problem. Even though the communication staff members weren't going to be involved in the actual drawing of samples, it was important that they understood the whole story and what we were trying to accomplish. I think this early involvement not only helped them to understand the problem better but helped in their enthusiasm in selling our program. Having them involved in the early stages, even in talking about the design of the investigation, was also helpful. They thought of a couple of things that maybe we wouldn't have--things the media might want to know--and, if we could build that into our investigation we did. We realized early on that the Department of Public Service had difficulty in enforcing octane posting. In addition to limited resources of staff and equipment, there was a problem with our level of authority as I mentioned earlier. We knew that in the long term we needed more resources and authority. I made it clear right from the start that this was one of our primary goals. We were also aware from the experience of other States that, as they vigorously enforced octane labeling, the extent of the problem declined. If we could find a couple of the violators and prosecute them and if we would let the media know about that, everyone would know that we were serious about doing our job. A few well publicized prosecutions would quickly make a number of violators stop their cheating and the problem would start to lessen. It was a difficult balancing act between trying to keep the information that we had maintained confidential and having enough information to provide to the media and ultimately the public. This is the one part of the investigation process that was quite frustrating. I had to walk a tightrope at times. For example, we could not release the individual names of the outlets we had found to be selling mislabeled product because we needed to provide that information to our Attorney General for prosecution. Once we had released the names, we would not be able to prosecute. I wanted to go to the media prior to having a legal outcome, so I really had to weigh prosecution against public information. My decision was to get as much information as possible to the public. We knew we had an issue that every consumer could relate to. Most Minnesotans buy gasoline at one time or another. We knew that in order to achieve our goal we had to get that information released. We ended up releasing the information in aggregate-we did not name the individual stations but provided to the media a list of 119 different communities that we sampled. In total we sampled 208 stations and found a 17 percent failure rate. The news release that our staff wrote also mentioned that our division was hampered severely by its equipment and facilities. We did this to set the stage for our upcoming legislative proposal. It was important to publicly state that this was a very difficult problem to examine and that we were really stretching our resources to even do the amount of investigation that we had already conducted. This really helped later in selling our legislative package. We also worked with the industry. As our investigation unfolded, a number of industry representatives made inquiries about what we were up to. Since we wanted some legal action, we needed to be careful about confidentiality. The industry was aware obviously that we were looking into this problem. Before the news conference, we held a meeting with representatives from the petroleum industries at all levels including refiners distributors and retailers. We provided them with our results and told them exactly what we were going to say at the news conference. We told them we were going to ask the legislature for additional resources and authority. This early groundwork helped us when the media, and later the legislature, asked us "what does the industry think about this?" We could legitimately provide an answer that they agreed that there was a problem and were going to work with us. During the news conference, we focused on future remedies as much as possible. The issue of the names of specific retail stations came up. As I mentioned, we could not release this information. Many media members pressed us on this issue, which made it harder to address the future and the remedy of needing additional resources. Nevertheless, we worked hard to get this point across. By continuing to talk about our role in preserving fairness in the marketplace, we were successful. We also used the news conference to educate the public on how complicated the petroleum industry is. As you know, there are many levels from refiner to retail, and that makes it very difficult to trace where the initial mislabeling has occurred. We needed to explain this to the media and ultimately the public. We used the simplest terms possible. This helped us later when we had to sell our case. It showed that this is indeed a difficult problem and emphasized the need for additional resources to adequately enforce labeling requirements. What were our results? The results were that through the news conference and industry contacts we received a fairly favorable response from the industry. Obviously they were not in total agreement with us but I think, because we drew them in an let them know what we were going to say, we did not get that many disparaging comments. This positive media coverage and a cooperative relationship with the petroleum industry set the stage for our legislative agenda. We timed the public announcement and the release of the results of our investigation with the upcoming legislative session. Our story hit the press about the middle of December and we went to the Legislature with our proposals in January. This timing was very important and was one of the reasons why I finally decided to release the information when I did. As I said earlier, by the time we got to the Legislature most people had heard of this issue. That undoubtedly helped us sell our proposal. It also helped that we could present it as a basic consumer protection issue and a legitimate role of government. This was not a partisan issue. As a result, our package received a very positive reception. We knew how to design a regulatory program to address the problem. We knew what would work, so we drafted our proposal. When we sat down with the industry to present our ideas they welcomed them. Their only concern was that we provide a level playing field. They knew we had the expertise to deliver. Mike Blacik and his staff also did an excellent job researching the proposals. We were specific about the technology we were proposing to improve enforcement. Providing this information in an organized fashion showed the legislature that we had thought about what we needed to solve the problem and were asking for that and nothing more. As a result, there wasn't much haggling about the amount of money that was needed for our program. What we received was $693,000 to purchase equipment and an addition to our staff complement of five positions. Those of you interested in the technical details can talk to Mike Blacik. The new Minnesota equipment can also be used to enforce the upcoming oxygenated fuels requirement of the Federal Clean Air Act Amendments. We will be working in conjunction with our State pollution control agency to enforce that part of the plan. This is a good example of killing two birds with one stone. The Legislature also saw that as an important aspect. It adds another benefit to our proposal. In conclusion, I'd like to say that the basic steps we went though in Minnesota during our octane investigation would be a useful model for most government programs. I think that same approach could be used in foods, grocery scales, or any kind of measurement and weight enforcement. The basic steps that we used were that we studied the problem thoroughly, investigated, and then provided the results to the public with a well-planned public relations effort. If you do your job completely, selling it is easy. Especially if your sales effort is linked directly to public good and service, you can't help but get the Legislative help you need when you ask for it. Thank you again for letting me address you and talk about our successes in Minnesota. I hope you can learn from the comments I have made today and be even more successful in your own States and organizations. Final Report of the Executive Committee Sidney A. Colbrook, Chairman Reference 100 Introduction This is the Final Report of the Executive Committee for the 77th Annual Meeting of the National Conference on Weights and Measures (NCWM). This Report is based on the Interim Report offered in the Conference "Program and Committee Reports" (NCWM Publication 16), the Addendum Sheets issued at the Annual Meeting, and actions taken by the membership at the Voting Session. Items are grouped into two parts: Part I - Executive Committee business; and Part II - National Type Evaluation Program, Board of Governors' business. Table A identifies all of the items contained in the Report by the Reference Key Number, Item Title, and page number. Table B lists the Appendices to the Report. Items 101-3 and 101-12 were grouped as a "consent calendar" and adopted by a vote of 44 yea, 0 nay in the House of State Representative and a vote of 60 yea, 0 nay in the House of Delegates. The membership adopted the report in its entirety by a vote of 41 yea, 0 nay in the House of State Representatives and a vote of 60 yea, 0 nay in the House of Delegates. Organization, Formation of Petroleum Subcommittee to the Laws and Regulations (L&R) 52 101-12 VC Policy, 1.3.1. Procedures for Establishing the Budget and Administering Funds of the 64 Finances, NTEP Operations and Funding Program, OIML Certification Plan Program, NTETC Sectors on Grain Moisture Meters and Protein Analyzers Test Procedures, Belt Conveyor Scales Program, Discontinuation of Provisional CC's for Load Cells Policy, NTEP Limit for Testing Large-Capacity Vehicle Scales NTEP Appeal Procedures |