Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the RussiansStanford University Press, 1992 - 349 pages This book is essentially a series of case histories of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, as seen from the American side. It describes the processes of governmental decisionmaking for arms control in Washington, D.C., and the techniques for joint U.S.-Soviet decisionmaking at the negotiating table. As general counsel of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and member of U.S. delegations to disarmament conferences for eight years, the author was in a unique position to assess the difficulties of fashioning an arms control treaty that could pass muster within the executive branch of the U.S. government, be approved by U.S. allies, be successfully negotiated with the Soviets, and then win the approval of the U.S. Senate. This process will be even more complex now that the United States will face at least four nuclear powers from the former U.S.S.R. The book has three purposes. The first is to add to the recorded history of the following negotiations: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the ABM Treaty of 1972 and its companion SALT Interim Agreements, and the 1987 INF Treaty. The author asks in each case, What did the president and his assistants do (or fail to do) to negotiate a successful agreement? The second purpose is to use the case book approach, common in law schools and business schools, as a teaching device for those who wish to learn how the American government made decisions about arms control negotiations, how U.S.-Soviet negotiators reached decisions, and what the results of the decisions have been. The book's third purpose is to generalize about what works and what does not work in the complex world of arms control negotiations, including information on the impact of negotiating committees and comparisons of the process for negotiating arms control treaties with that for achieving arms limits through action and reaction, without written agreement. The concluding chapter looks to the future: What changes will occur in the arms control process given the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union? |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 58
Managing Negotiations with the Russians. TO WILLIAM C. FOSTER AND ADRIAN S. FISHER who made my participation in the negotiations possible Acknowledgments There are many people whom I would like to.
... possible , for example , to gain a two- thirds vote in the Senate for a treaty opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff ? Not all readers will be interested in all three of my purposes : record- ing history , teaching , and generalizing ...
... possible causes for their failures , but additional obstacles might well have appeared if others had been overcome . To help answer the overarching question of what produced success or failure , I sought answers to subsidiary questions ...
... - ploration.12 Have American administrations explored what is possible with the Soviets and have they done so without appearing to give in to them in the process ? A president and his close subordinates Questions About Negotiations II.
... possible within the executive and legislative branches — and with our allies . Have explorations taken place with the Soviets as well ? If so , who has conducted them ? The case histories will ask these and related questions . Question ...
Contents
1 | |
18 | |
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Another | 49 |
The NPT Finally Brings Widespread International | 83 |
The ABM Treaty and an Opportunity | 106 |
SALT II Misses an Opportunity to Move | 132 |
The Decisionmaking | 168 |
The Negotiating Process | 200 |
Too Many Cooks? The Impact of the Negotiating | 214 |
Arms Control Without Agreements and | 235 |
Will the Process Change with the End | 255 |
Notes | 271 |
Sources | 315 |
Index | 335 |