Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the RussiansStanford University Press, 1992 - 349 pages This book is essentially a series of case histories of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, as seen from the American side. It describes the processes of governmental decisionmaking for arms control in Washington, D.C., and the techniques for joint U.S.-Soviet decisionmaking at the negotiating table. As general counsel of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and member of U.S. delegations to disarmament conferences for eight years, the author was in a unique position to assess the difficulties of fashioning an arms control treaty that could pass muster within the executive branch of the U.S. government, be approved by U.S. allies, be successfully negotiated with the Soviets, and then win the approval of the U.S. Senate. This process will be even more complex now that the United States will face at least four nuclear powers from the former U.S.S.R. The book has three purposes. The first is to add to the recorded history of the following negotiations: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the ABM Treaty of 1972 and its companion SALT Interim Agreements, and the 1987 INF Treaty. The author asks in each case, What did the president and his assistants do (or fail to do) to negotiate a successful agreement? The second purpose is to use the case book approach, common in law schools and business schools, as a teaching device for those who wish to learn how the American government made decisions about arms control negotiations, how U.S.-Soviet negotiators reached decisions, and what the results of the decisions have been. The book's third purpose is to generalize about what works and what does not work in the complex world of arms control negotiations, including information on the impact of negotiating committees and comparisons of the process for negotiating arms control treaties with that for achieving arms limits through action and reaction, without written agreement. The concluding chapter looks to the future: What changes will occur in the arms control process given the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union? |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 85
... agreement , such as to stay in touch with a military adversary , to convey a peaceful image to the world , or to try to legitimize a military deployment by showing that the adversary refuses to negotiate in good faith . Both sides have ...
... agreement with the Soviet Union ? By successful , I mean an agreement that limited or reduced arms developments , de- ployments , or levels and was approved by U.S. allies as well as by the U.S. Senate or the entire Congress . Many ...
... agreement . But major public concessions on the American side have sometimes made it difficult to get a treaty through the Senate , as the comprehensive test ban and SALT II case histories illustrate . A similar problem can exist on the ...
... agreement yet maintained the support of the negotiating committees } This question is closely related to the preceding one . It focuses , how- ever , on the substance of the U.S. position for negotiations rather than on the process of ...
... agreement and at what the Americans thought of the effect of their plans and votes for ABM systems on achieving Soviet agreement . Negotiating from strength came into vogue again with the Reagan administration . It was one of the ...
Contents
1 | |
18 | |
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Another | 49 |
The NPT Finally Brings Widespread International | 83 |
The ABM Treaty and an Opportunity | 106 |
SALT II Misses an Opportunity to Move | 132 |
The Decisionmaking | 168 |
The Negotiating Process | 200 |
Too Many Cooks? The Impact of the Negotiating | 214 |
Arms Control Without Agreements and | 235 |
Will the Process Change with the End | 255 |
Notes | 271 |
Sources | 315 |
Index | 335 |