Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians
This book is essentially a series of case histories of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, as seen from the American side. It describes the processes of governmental decisionmaking for arms control in Washington, D.C., and the techniques for joint U.S.-Soviet decisionmaking at the negotiating table. As general counsel of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and member of U.S. delegations to disarmament conferences for eight years, the author was in a unique position to assess the difficulties of fashioning an arms control treaty that could pass muster within the executive branch of the U.S. government, be approved by U.S. allies, be successfully negotiated with the Soviets, and then win the approval of the U.S. Senate. This process will be even more complex now that the United States will face at least four nuclear powers from the former U.S.S.R. The book has three purposes. The first is to add to the recorded history of the following negotiations: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the ABM Treaty of 1972 and its companion SALT Interim Agreements, and the 1987 INF Treaty. The author asks in each case, What did the president and his assistants do (or fail to do) to negotiate a successful agreement? The second purpose is to use the case book approach, common in law schools and business schools, as a teaching device for those who wish to learn how the American government made decisions about arms control negotiations, how U.S.-Soviet negotiators reached decisions, and what the results of the decisions have been. The book's third purpose is to generalize about what works and what does not work in the complex world of arms control negotiations, including information on the impact of negotiating committees and comparisons of the process for negotiating arms control treaties with that for achieving arms limits through action and reaction, without written agreement. The concluding chapter looks to the future: What changes will occur in the arms control process given the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union?
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The Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Another
The NPT Finally Brings Widespread International
The ABM Treaty and an Opportunity
SALT II Misses an Opportunity to Move
The Negotiating Process
Too Many Cooks? The Impact of the Negotiating
Arms Control Without Agreements and
Will the Process Change with the End
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accept According ACDA achieve administration agree agreement allies American approved arms control Atomic authority bargaining became beginning called Carter Chapter clear Committee comprehensive compromise concessions conference Congress continued cooperation countries cuts decision defense delegation Department deployment Disarmament discussion draft Eisenhower Euratom Europe example exploration Fisher force Foreign formula gain Geneva Germany give given histories IAEA idea important inspections instructions interests Italy Johnson Joint Chiefs Kennedy Khrushchev Kissinger later limits major meetings ment military MIRVs missiles Moscow national security NATO negotiating committees negotiations Nixon non-proliferation nuclear nuclear weapons offer options Peace political position possible presented president produced proposal Reagan reciprocity reduce relations safeguards SALT secretary seemed Senate side Soviet Union speech steps success suggested talks test ban tion treaty U.S.-Soviet unilateral United vote wanted Washington weapons White House