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You will recall, I am sure, that the national emergency sections of the Labor-Management Relations Act provide in part for establishment of boards of inquiry to inquire into and report on the issues involved in a labor dispute.

Senator BRICKER. That is in specific disputes.
Mr. MOSHER. That is in specific disputes; yes.

These Boards of inquiry, however, are specifically prohibited from making recommendations for the settlement of the dispute under consideration. As compared to this statement of congressional purpose and policy, Executive Order No. 10233 directs the wage board, in dispute cases certified to it, to report to the President “with their recommendations to the parties as to fair and equitable terms of settlement." Thus the Executive order avoids the prohibition against "recommendations" contained in the. Labor-Management Relations Act. Perhaps it is only coincidence that both organized labor and the Administration are opposed to that statute. The fact remains, however, that Executive Order No. 10233 deliberately evades the congressional purpose stated in two statutes.

It has been testified that the Wage Stabilization Board is supposed to operate in a different type of dispute than that contemplated in the national emergency provisions of LMRA. The Wage Stabilization Board, however, is supposed to act only in cases affecting defense mobilization, whereas the national emergency provisions of LMRA are supposed to be invoked in strikes affecting the national health or sa fety. In these critical times, defense mobilization and production are synonymous with national safety. It is our position that, unless a defense strike is of such proportions that it affects the national safety, there is no need to invoke any special emergency disputes agency. If it does endanger national health or safety, the national emergency provisions of LMRA should be utilized.

In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons it is our well-considered judgment that no special disputes handling machinery is needed, now or in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, we believe that all provisions of title V of the Defense Production Act, authorizing establishment of any special labor disputes agencies or procedures, should be repealed. In addition, since the President's action in authorizing the Wage Board, created under title IV of the Act, to take jurisdiction over disputes was "extra-legal,” that authority should be withdrawn and the President should be specifically prohibited from again conferring disputes powers upon any such wage stabilization agency or creating any special disputes agency under any “general" or "implied" powers he allegedly possesses.

We fully realize the seriousness of this last recommendation and deeply regret the necessity for making it. At the same time, however, if the President, by virtue of his office, possesses general authority to act in contravention of the clearly expressed intention of the Congress, then any legislation in the field of labor relations is futile.

If that result is to be avoided, then the only alternative left Congress is to prohibit and restrict. In our judgment this issue is much deeper than whether or not a disputes agency shall be created or continued. The broad and deep issue is whether the Congress shall legislate and the President shall “take care that the laws be faithfully

executed" as was specifically provided by the framers of the Constitution. We cannot believe that Congress will abdicate its functions and abandon its responsibilities.

Attached to this brief is the strikes tabulation, which Senator Sparkman asked about a few moments ago, and also is attached this document headed "Settlement of labor disputes in wage stabilization.”

I would like, if I may, to refer to one paragraph.
Senator SPARKMAN. Is this your Appendix B?
Mr. MOSHER. Yes.

I would like to refer to page 25. It is the first full paragraph, No. 3. It reads as follows:

Permitting an alleged Wage Stabilization Board to act as a labor disputes settling agency converts the Board from a wage stabilization agency into an instrument for artificially raising wages and thereby feeding the fires of inflation,

It is inevitable that wage stabilization policy should assume a role secondary to the Board's function of settling disputes.

I would like to repeat that: “It is inevitable that wage stabilization policy should assume a role secondary to the Board's function of settling disputes."

If, in order to settle a dispute, it is necessary to puncture wage ceilings, the Board would undoubtedly do so, and consequently the Board itself would be the first to violate its own wage stabilization policies.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do I understand that you would like to have all of this printed as a part of the record ?

Mr. MOSHER. I think it ought to be part of the record, if it may.
Senator SPARKMAN. As Appendix B to your statement?
Mr. MOSHER. Yes.
Senator SPARKMAN. That will be done.
Mr. MOSHER. Thank you.
(Appendixes A and B follow :)

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III. Summary
Percentage increase in number and magnitude of strikes during War Labor
Board period :

Percent Number of strikes increased...

34. 8 Number of workers involved increased.

75.4 Man-days idle increased.--

13.

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V. Summary Although the number of strikes occurring in 1950 were 34.3 percent higher than the number of 1949 strikes, both the number of workers involved and the number of man-days lost declined, 20.5 and 23.2 percent, respectively.

APPENDIX B

SETTLEMENT OF LABOR DISPUTES AND WAGE STABILIZATION

(A statement by the National Association of Manufacturers, 14 West Forty-ninth

Street, New York 20, N. Y.)

May 2, 1951

SUMMARY

The President's action in establishing a labor disputes board under the camouflage of a Wage Stabilization Board creates the danger of unnecessary industrial disputes, ineffective wage stabilization, and is contrary to congressional intent as clearly expressed in the Defernse Production Act.

The first wage stabilization conferences were held in mid-January and it was apparent at that time that the labor organizations were attempting to expand the Wage Stabilization Board into a disputes settlement agency. The management groups were unanimous in their opposition, pointing out that it was contrary to public policy as incorporated in the Defense Production Act.

The United Labor Policy Committee "walked out” on the Mobilization Program in mid-February in a public revolt against the Wage Stabilization Administrator's 10 percent wage increase formula.

Almost immediately the representatives of business organizations began a series of conferences with the Economic Stabilization Administrator in an effort to find a solution to the impasse. On March 14, the management groups offered a carefully thought out program for reconstruction of the Board.

That program, if it had been adopted, would have provided a sound basis for putting the Board back into action at once. It would have given the Board full authority to act in stabilization matters. It would have been a instrument to handle many of the problems which labor claimed were not being dealt with.

But organized labor refused to return to the Board or to permit it to function in any way unless it was given authority to handle all types of labor disputesthose outside the field of wage stabilization as well as those within it.

Not only was the threat of crippling strikes held over management for 2 months in an effort to force agreement on an all-out disputes board, but acquiescence to labor's demands was stated as the price of their rejoining the mobilization program. It is noteworthy that the only strikes of any national consequence during that period were over stabilization policy and could have been handled by the type of Board proposed by management.

There were basic reasons for management's strenuous, continuous, and united opposition to changing the Stabilization Board into a disputes agency. These were:

1. It would make effective wage stabilization impossible because the proposed board would always be under pressure to trade away wage stabilization principles in dealing with labor disputes.

2. It would undermine genuine collective bargaining between employer and employee and substitute a sort of labor-dictated compulsory arbitration.

3. It would promote industrial unrest and provoke disputes rather than help prevent and settle them.

4. It would, in effect, seriously impede the operation of at least certain provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.

Any one of these reasons would have been enough to make management shy away from the establishment of such a disputes agency with all of the inherent evils which characterized the War Labor Board of World War II. But in combination they loom as far too great a threat to the mobilization program to permit management agreement on such a proposal.

However, the way was cleared for the scuttling of the Wage Stabilization Board and converting it into a disputes agancy when the President appointed his 17-man Mobilization Advisory Board, which proceeded over the united protest of the industry members to recommend the establishment of the kind of disputes board demanded by organized labor.

Even though the reconstituted board is not granted the power to order terms of settlement of nonwage disputes, its power to “recommend” terms of settlement to the President, amount to the same thing, as was demonstrated by the War Labor Board during World War II. In addition, the Executive order does not even require return to work by striking employees pending consideration of a given dispute by the Board.

The creation of a labor disputes board by Executive order contrary to the expressed intent of Congress raises serious question concerning usurpation of power by the Executive branch of Government, and will undoubtedly receive careful congressional consideration,

The attached statement, with supporting data, was prepared in order that Members of Congress might be apprised of the facts leading up to the creation of a disputes settling board; industry's views on this important delevolpment in labor-management relations; and the underlying reasons for industry's position.

By Executive order issued April 21, President Truman created an 18-memher tripartite Wage Stabilization Board with authority to pass, not only on wage stabilization policy and interpretation, but also on the entire range of labor-management disputes which threaten(s) an interruption of work affecting the national defense.

This action by the President of the United States is bound to seriously interfere with the defense mobilization program, will encourage industrial disputes and work stoppages, and rewards the labor leaders who had conducted a 2-month sitdown against the Government with reference to the entire defense mobilization program. In taking this step, the President has disregarded specific provisions of law, as well as the clear intent of Congress.

Because there has been so much confusion growing out of organized labor's campaign to spike the defense mobilization program, industry's position with reference to the entire probram of wage stabilization and settlement of labor disputes is here set forth, together with a summary of the events leading up to the President's Executive order of April 21.

"HE INTENT OF CONGRESS AS EXPRESSED IN THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950

In enacting the Defense Production Act of 1950, Congress authorized price and wage stabilization on its own motion and not at the request of the President. In doing so, Congress laid down certain specific principles applicable to wage and price stabilization.

First: Congress intended the fullest possible reliance upon voluntary action.

It provided that—"The President may encourage and promote voluntary action by business, agriculture, labor, and consumers.” (Section 402 (a)).

Further, Congress stated its intention that the authority conferred by title IV (relating to price and wage stabilization) shall be exercised in particular with full consideration and emphasis, so far as practicable, on the maintenance and furtherance of the American system of competitive enterprise

the

maintenance and furtherance of sound working relations, including collective bargaining, and the maintenance and furtherance of the America way of life.” (Section 401).

Second : Congress intended that wage stabilization should be an integral part of price stabilization.

For example, in section 402 (b) (1), the President is authorized to issue orders for price ceilings and at the same time shall issue regulations and orders stabilizing wages, salaries, and other compensation *". Similarly, sec. tion 402 (b) (3) provides that whenever a ceiling is imposed on a particular material or service, the President shall stabilize wages, salaries, and other com. pensation relating to the production of such material or service. Subsection (4) of the same section also provides for the general imposition of wages, salaries and other compensation in case of general imposition of price ceilings; while subsection (5) provides that the stabilization of wages must be accompanied by regulations prohibiting increases in wages, salaries, and other compensation, which the President deems would require an increase in the price ceiling or impose hardships or inequities on sellers operating under the price ceiling. Congress clearly realized the interdependence of price and wage stabilization and intended effective wage stabilization to accompany and support any price control that might be imposed.

Third : It was the clear intent of Congress that existing laws concerning labormanagement relations be utilized to the fullest extent.

That intent is clearly expressed in section 402 (d) (2) specifying that no action shall be taken with respect to wages, salaries or other compensation which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended or the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, or any other law of the United States, or of any State

Likewise, under title V of the Defense Production Act which deals with the settlement of disputes, there is specifically provided that no action inconsistent with the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, other Federal labor standards statutes, the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, or with other applicable laws shall be taken under this title.

Fourth : It is the clear intent of Congress to separate wage-stabilization machinery on the one hand and the mechanism for the settlement of disputes on the other as two entirely distinct problems.

Wage stabilization is provided for in title IV of the act which also deals with price stabilization. Wage stabilization is regarded as a purely economic control which is an essential part of price stabilization. The settlement of labor disputes, on the other hand, is an entirely separate problem which is provided for under title V. There is nothing in the law or in the legislative history of the act which indicates any intention to combine disputes-settlement provisions with wage stabilization.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS REGULATING ESTABLISHMENT OF DISPUTES AGENCY

It is clear, therefore, that the settlement of labor disputes was to be carried out only in conformity with the national policy of placing primary reliance on negotiation and collective bargaining and within the framework of existing law. Any other disputes-settling mechanisms were to be established only in accordance with any agreement that might be reached between labor and management at voluntary conferences initiated by the President. Only by expressly forbidding the President from acting otherwise than in accordance with title V could Congress have made its statutory design more clear.

Sections 502 and 503 of title V set forth the manner in which such procedures should be devised. Section 502 reiterates the national labor policy as one which places "primary reliance upon the parties to any labor dispute to make every effort through negotiation and collective bargaining and the full use of mediation and conciliation services to effect a settlement in the national interest."

The only action the President is authorized to take is "such action as may be agreed upon in any such conference and appropriate to cary out the provisions of this title" with due regard for established stabilization policies. Congressional intent was clarified in the discussion on the Senate floor between Senator Donnell and the members of the Conference Committee in behalf of the Senate. Senator Donnell asked, "Am I correct in understanding that in order that the President may be authorized to take the action mentioned in the second sentence of section 502 there must have been agreement by each and all of the three segments indicated, namely, management, labor, and such persons as the President may

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