SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION JUNE 24, 2003 Serial No. 108-62 Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house http://www.house.gov/reform 89-848 PDF U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 2003 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut RON LEWIS, Kentucky JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota HENRY A. WAXMAN, California JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts DIANE E. WATSON, California STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California C.A. “DUTCH” RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia JIM COOPER, Tennessee CHRIS BELL, Texas BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Independent) KFOT CONTENTS Brian, Danielle, executive director, Project on Government Oversight; and Ronald E. Timm, president, Reta Security.... Brooks, Linton F., Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administra- Nazzaro, Robin M., Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. General Accounting Office, accompanied by James Noel, Assistant Di- rector, and Jonathan M. Gill, Evaluator, Natural Resources and Envi- ronment; and Glenn S. Podonsky, Director, Office of Oversight and Performance Assurance, U.S. Department of Energy Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Brian, Danielle, executive director, Project on Government Oversight: Report entitled, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security at Risk" Brooks, Linton F., Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administra- Grassley, Hon. Charles, a Senator in Congress from the State of Iowa, Mahaley, Joseph S., Director, Office of Security, Department of Energy, Nazzaro, Robin M., Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. (III) EMERGING THREATS: ASSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX FACILITY SECURITY TUESDAY, JUNE 24, 2003 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m., in room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Shays, Turner, Lewis, Platts, Duncan, Ruppersberger, and Tierney. Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; J. Vincent Chase, chief investiator; Kristine McElroy, professional staff member; Michael Yeager, minority deputy chief counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk. Mr. SHAYS. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations hearing, entitled, "Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons Complex Facility Security," is called to order. From its humble beginnings as the Manhattan Project in the distant New Mexico desert, the Nation's nuclear weapons program has always posed daunting security challenges. Today, the far-flung complex of warhead production plants, research laboratories, test facilities, and former weapons sites stands as an undeniably attractive target for spies and terrorists bent on using their own technologies against us. Even before the attacks of September 11, 2001 forced a reevaluation of physical security standards and procedures, serious questions arose concerning lax management and a stubborn cultural antipathy to protective measures at sites housing plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In response, Congress established the National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA], as a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy [DOE], to focus resources and high-level management attention on security mandates. However, creation of the NNSA failed to stem persistent reports of security lapses and inattentiveness to lingering vulnerabilities throughout the weapons complex. So the subcommittee asked the General Accounting Office [GAO], to evaluate DOE and NNSA management of material safeguards and facility security programs. Of particular interest was how DOE assures contractor adherence to security policies. (1) |