creased the number of protective force members on duty at any given time. They have added additional barriers and hardened fighting positions. Classified cyber operations have also been made

more secure.

Additionally, Secretary Abraham personally directed that the design basis threat be further strengthened after it was submitted for his review. The final design basis threat, which was issued May 20, provides the basis for establishing and assessing protection effectiveness at DOE sites.

Notwithstanding these positive aspects, our inspections have also documented a number of weaknesses. The recent hire of additional protective force personnel has been responsive to the heightened security levels. However, DOE sites continue to rely on the use of overtime until new hires are cleared and trained to perform their duties. As a result, protective force personnel testing and training have been reduced or deferred because existing manpower is stretched to the limit.

DOE sites have primarily responded to the need to enhance security by using manpower-intensive measures. More effective solutions can be gained by enhancing the integration of manpower and technology through increased use of barriers and force multipliers, consolidating security assets, improving manpower deployment to protect vital assets, and making greater use of performance tests. It is clear that every site has increased its level of protection in response to the September 11 attacks. However, few of these enhanced protection schemes have been fully performance-tested or formally evaluated.

Unclassified cyber security continues to be a challenge for many sites. There are recurring deficiencies regarding controls of foreign nationals on DOE computer systems. Additionally, some sites have not fully recognized or addressed the risk associated with the proliferation of wireless computer technology. Weakness in feedback, in improving the process and clarity of security roles and responsibilities are long-standing concerns within both the DOE line and contractor organizations. Progress in these areas has been inconsistent and sporadic.

The NNSA reorganization places increased responsibility onsite offices. However, at this time, not all sites have the staffing and expertise necessary to fully and effectively discharge their security oversight responsibility. The Secretary, Deputy Secretary and NNSA Administrator have placed significant emphasis on reorganizing the management structure to clarify responsibilities and increase accountability. They have demonstrated personal involvement in enhancing security after September 11 and in response to the very recent security lapses. The current efforts are promising, but need significant continued attention and evaluation to ensure that the intended improvements are realized at the field level.

In closing, the Department is making some progress, but much more work is needed to upgrade and vigorously test site programs to meet the new design basis threat, to crystallize security-related roles and responsibilities throughout the Department, and to apply program and performance feedback in continuously improving our overall security posture. The strong and aggressive focus of the Secretary and the NNSA Administrator must be sustained in order

to satisfy the increasingly complex and continually changing security challenges that face the DOE and our Nation.

Thank you.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Podonsky follows:]

UNCLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

GLENN S. PODONSKY
DIRECTOR

OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT AND PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Introductory Remarks

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 24, 2003

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify today. My office - the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance - is responsible for evaluating the Department's environment, safety, and health; emergency management; cyber security; and safeguards and security programs. We report directly to the Secretary of Energy and have no responsibilities for managing DOE sites or for developing policy. As a result, we are able to perform independent assessments of the effectiveness of programs and provide unbiased information to the Secretary and DOE line managers.

In the area of security programs at nuclear weapons complex facilities, we perform regular inspections of all DOE sites that have special nuclear materials and classified information related to the nuclear weapons programs, including all NNSA sites. We inspect the sites against DOE requirements, including the DOE design basis threat policy. However, we also examine the effectiveness of DOE policy in providing protection for our national assets and from time to time identify opportunities to improve DOE security policies.

The focus of my testimony today will be on the current status of security programs at the nuclear weapons production facilities and the national laboratories that design nuclear weapons. However, a brief review of the evolution of the security program is necessary to place the proper context on current security programs. DOE first established an Independent Oversight program twenty years ago. At that time, DOE security systems were in very bad shape. Some nuclear facilities did not even have functional intrusion alarm systems. Protective forces were understaffed, poorly trained, poorly conditioned, and poorly managed. DOE sites were not able to defeat the threat in many cases, as evidenced by numerous performance tests conducted by Independent Oversight and other groups. Recognizing the inadequate levels of security, during the late 1980s, DOE invested close to a billion dollars in improved physical security systems and protective force training. These investments resulted in dramatic improvements in security. However, at several sites, the alarm systems installed 15 years ago are at or near the end of their expected life, and now require extensive maintenance and/or replacement.

During the mid-1990s, budgets for security were reduced significantly at most DOE sites from the high levels required to improve our security posture to a steady-state level, and as part of a widespread effort to more efficiently manage overhead costs. These reductions were a result of

1

the end of the Cold War and an increased focus on environment, safety and health programs. The impact of these changes caused significant reductions in protective forces and decisions not to upgrade or replace security hardware. In most cases, sites compensated for the smaller number of protective force personnel by consolidating nuclear materials into fewer areas and other means, such as more use of electronic access control systems to replace guards. In the 1998 timeframe, Independent Oversight reviews and other external assessments revealed that the security reductions at a number of sites had gone too far-the protection effectiveness was not where it needed to be. However, we are not implying that sites had reached the poor levels of security that were evident in the early 1980s. However, the cost cutting measures went too far and the protection effectiveness was not where it needed to be. At DOE's direction, sites began to rebuild their protection programs including additional personnel, better equipment, and increased training. However, the ramifications of the reductions in the security budgets took several years to overcome, considering the time needed to obtain budget approval for new protective personnel, obtain security clearances, get personnel trained, and test and fine tune response plans.

Another important trend that has impacted security is the proliferation of computers, electronic data files, and the Internet. DOE experienced a number of security lapses in the late 1990s involving classified or sensitive information, such as the well-publicized loss of the hard drive at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Many of these security lapses were partially attributable to the fact that DOE policies and practices in the cyber security arena did not always keep pace with changing technology. Independent Oversight has made cyber security a major focus area for over five years now, and DOE took a number of important steps to enhance policies and practices in the protection of information.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 happened at a time when DOE was still rebuilding its protection programs. DOE, like everyone else, took 9-11 as a wake up call. Since then, DOE has increased security through a number of measures, and has additionally reassessed the design basis threat. However, these represent only the immediate first steps in enhancing DOE security. Historically, roles and responsibilities for security have been unclear in some areas and too fragmented for effective operation in others. Secretary Abraham personally directed that the DOE design basis threat be strengthened. The design basis threat, which was issued May 20th, provides the basis for establishing and assessing protection effectiveness at DOE sites. Secretary Abraham and Ambassador Brooks are addressing the overall management structure for security, but much remains to be done before DOE has a coherent management structure in place to support an effective corporate approach to security.

Independent Oversight Approach and Recent Actions

Our assessment of the current status is based on the inspections that we have performed in the past two years. Since 9-11, Independent Oversight has conducted reviews at all major NNSA production sites and weapons laboratories with the exception of Sandia National Laboratories and the Nevada Test Site. We are currently performing a limited scope review at Sandia National Laboratories and will conduct a comprehensive inspection this fall. We plan to inspect the Nevada Test Site in the near future, after we complete a DOE-wide review of protective forces, which was directed by Secretary Abraham. During that time, we have also conducted

2

inspections of four other non-NNSA sites that have significant quantities of nuclear material and classified information.

Our inspection process has always included assessments of the effectiveness of physical security, including alarm systems, protective forces, training and equipment, and information security including protection of documents and electronic data. We also look at protection program planning, including the site vulnerability assessments, to include the effectiveness of contractor and line management feedback and improvement programs to include the contractor selfassessments and the DOE field element survey programs.

Unlike most inspection programs, Independent Oversight has always made extensive use of performance tests in all areas that we assess. These tests range from relatively straightforward tests of the calibration of security systems, such as intrusion alarms and metal detectors, to large and complex tests of the integrated effectiveness of security systems using engagement simulation systems, more commonly known as MILES gear. We do extensive testing of cyber security systems using the same techniques that hackers use. We have demonstrated our capabilities to Congressional committee members on past occasions and have established a cyber security laboratory that allows us to continually develop and modify our techniques to keep pace with changing technologies and ever-evolving hacker methods.

Although we have been conducting large-scale force-on-force performance tests using the DOE Composite Adversary Team for over 15 years, the 9-11 events prompted us to redouble our efforts in this important area. Since 9-11, we have substantially increased the number of tests we perform. We have also increased the skills and the amount of specialized training of our Composite Adversary Team to include terrorist tactics and advanced training used by the U.S. Special Forces and foreign special operations units. We have also increased our organizational capability to perform effective tests by obtaining specialized expertise from nationally recognized experts in tactical operations and counter terrorism.

OA has also supported the development of the revised design basis threat. Other DOE organizations have responsibility for the revised design basis threat and will discuss its status. Independent Oversight is now considering how it will perform performance testing under the new design basis threat.

Current Status of Security at the Department of Energy

Based on our inspections and performance tests, I will now provide a brief overview of the status of security programs across the DOE nuclear weapons complex.

Starting out with some generally positive aspects:

As a result of the increased security measures put in place following the attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE sites have significantly increased the level of security. They have increased the number of protective force members on duty at any given time and have further limited routine access to key areas of the sites. To accommodate the increased workload, many sites have hired and continue to hire additional personnel for their protective forces. They have also added additional barriers and hardened fighting positions.

3