The GAO findings released today lead to this sobering conclusion: The stern new realities of the post-September 11 world have been far too slow to penetrate the hardened bureaucratic maze of DOE offices, contractors and sites. It took 2 years for DOE to update the fundamental assessment governing nuclear weapons security. The design basis threat [DBT], formally adopted in May, the new, more stringent DBT will not be fully reflected in budget plans until 2005. More of concern, security enhancements demanded by the new DBT will not be completed before 2009, if then. Even the process of completing the GAO study under discussion today was needlessly delayed by DOE refusal to provide access to drafts of the DBT, drafts openly relied upon to justify earlier budget submissions. DOE eventually provided the documents to Congress' audit agency, and we hope that level of cooperation will continue as we pursue our investigation. GAO has found a lack of clear roles and responsibilities among NNSA security offices, inconsistent assessments of contractor performance, potentially critical staff shortfalls and a failure to address the root causes of security lapses. As a result, neither the Department of Energy nor the NNSA can yet provide reasonable assurance weapons grade material is protected against a determined, well-trained adversarial force willing to die in a nuclear detonation or radiological dispersion of their own making. This morning, we will hear testimony on the process of updating and administering security standards at the Nation's nuclear weapons complex. Classified elements of the security and safeguards program will be discussed at a closed session this afternoon. Our witnesses today all bring impressive experience and important expertise to our continuing oversight of nuclear security. They also share a dedication to improve national security and public safety, and we look forward to a constructive dialog on these important issues. Before recognizing Mr. Turner, let me just apologize for being a little late. I got in to Andrews Air Force Base at about 2:30 last night. [The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:] From its humble beginnings as the Manhattan Project in the distant New Mexico desert, the nation's nuclear weapons program has always posed daunting security challenges. Today, the far-flung complex of warhead production plants, research laboratories, test facilities, and former weapons sites stands as an undeniably attractive target for spies and terrorists bent on using our own technologies against us. Even before the attacks of September 11, 2001 forced a reevaluation of physical security standards and procedures, serious questions arose concerning lax management and a stubborn cultural antipathy to protective measures at sites housing plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In response, Congress established the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy (DOE) to focus resources and high-level management attention on security mandates. But creation of the NNSA failed to stem persistent reports of security lapses and inattentiveness to lingering vulnerabilities throughout the weapons complex. So the Subcommittee asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to evaluate DOE and NNSA management of material safeguards and facility security programs. Of particular interest was how DOE assures contractor adherence to security policies. Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays June 24, 2003 Page 2 of 2 The GAO findings released today lead to this sobering conclusion: The stern new realities of the post-9/11 world have been far too slow to penetrate the hardened bureaucratic maze of DOE offices, contractors and sites. It took two years for DOE to update the fundamental assessment governing nuclear weapons security- the Design Basis Threat or DBT. Formally adopted in May, the new, more stringent DBT will not be fully reflected in budget plans until 2005. Security enhancements demanded by the new DBT will not be completed before 2009, if then. Even the process of completing the GAO study under discussion today was needlessly delayed by DOE refusal to provide access to drafts of the DBT; drafts openly relied upon to justify earlier budget submissions. DOE eventually provided the documents to Congress' audit agency, and we hope that level of cooperation will continue. GAO also found a lack of clear roles and responsibilities among NNSA security offices, inconsistent assessments of contractor performance, potentially critical staff shortfalls and a failure to address the root causes of security lapses. As a result, neither the Department of Energy nor the NNSA can yet provide reasonable assurance weapons grade material is protected against a determined, well trained adversary force willing to die in a nuclear detonation or radiological dispersion of their own making. This morning we will hear testimony on the process of updating and administering security standards at the nation's nuclear weapons complex. Classified elements of the security and safeguards program will be discussed at a closed session this afternoon. Our witnesses today all bring impressive experience and important expertise to our continuing oversight of nuclear security. They also share a dedication to improved national security and public safety, and we look forward to a constructive dialogue on these important issues. Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you again for your efforts and leadership in addressing the issue of our national security and the threats that are posed by issues of possible targets of terrorist attacks. Our national labs and nuclear production facilities are appealing targets for terrorists. These sites are challenges to secure, spread over large parcels of land and containing some of the most deadly materials known to man. Terrorists now use once unimaginable tactics to cause death and destruction, and we must now account for the possibility that terrorists will sacrifice their own lives to carry out their missions. And the thought of terrorists attempting to steal plutonium or highly enriched uranium is no longer related to Tom Clancy novels, but is a real-life threat. I am particularly interested in hearing how we can make the NNSA more responsive and flexible to the threats facing our weapons complexes, and it should not take months and years to develop security procedures. The real world does not work this way, terrorists do not work this way, and the ground-level security personnel do not think this way. I look forward to hearing our witnesses' testimony. Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman, and recognize Mr. Duncan. Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this very important hearing. I don't have a formal written statement or opening statement, but I do want to say that I don't represent the facility at Oak Ridge, TN, but slightly over half of the people who work there live in my district, and so this is a subject of great concern to me and my constituents; and I am particularly interested to know if there are any problems or shortcomings at the facility at Oak Ridge. But I will just-I have come here mainly to try to learn about this, what the problem is and what the extent of it is; and I thank you for calling this hearing. Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman for participating and both gentlemen's good work on this committee. Just a few housekeeping before recognizing our panel. I ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered. I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their written statements in the record, and without objection, so ordered. I ask unanimous consent that the subcommittee meet in closed session at 2 p.m. today to hear testimony on classified aspects of the issues under discussion today. Without objection so ordered. We will do that at 2 today. I am going to call on the first panel, recognize them, and then have Mr. Turner take over and conduct this hearing. Our first panel is comprised of Ms. Robin M. Nazzaro, Director, National Resources and Environment, the U.S. General Accounting Office, accompanied from the same division by James Noel, Assistant Director, and also Jonathan M. Gill, Evaluator. The second testimony from this panel will be from Glenn Podonsky, Director of Office of Oversight and Performance Assurance, referred to as "OA," from the Department of Energy. If you would please rise, we will swear you in and we will start the testimony. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record, our witnesses have responded in the affirmative. And we will start with Ms. Nazzaro. Ms. NAZZARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say, we have 5 minutes, but we roll over for another 5 minutes, so you will have, technically, 10 minutes, but we prefer you stop somewhere between the 5 and the 10. It is important that we put your document on the record, so if you need the full 10, feel free to use it. Ms. NAZZARO. OK. Thank you. STATEMENTS OF ROBIN M. NAZZARO, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES NOEL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, AND JONATHAN M. GILL, EVALUATOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT; AND GLENN S. PODONSKY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT AND PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Ms. NAZZARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss physical security of the nuclear weapons complex at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration within DOE. Currently, the nuclear complex includes four production sites, three national laboratories that design nuclear weapons and a number of former nuclear weapons sites that contain nuclear weapons materials. To ensure the physical security of the complex, DOE and NNSA rely on their safeguards and security program. A key component of the DOE's protective strategy is the design basis threat, which identifies the characteristics of the potential threats to DOE. To implement their safeguards and security program, DOE and NNSA rely on contractors to conduct day-to-day security activities subject to DOE and NNSA oversight. Over the past decade, we and others have raised concern about the adequacy of security at nuclear weapons facilities within the Department and NNSA. In addition, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted the importance of effective physical security in response to a challenging and well-organized terrorist threat. In this context, my testimony today focuses on two issues: first, how NNSA manages its safeguards and security program; and second, DOE's response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In summary, Mr. Chairman, we found that NNSA has not been fully effective in managing its safeguards and security program in the following four key areas. First, NNSA had not fully defined clear roles and responsibilities for its headquarters and site operations. Since its creation in March 2000, ÎNSA's management structure has been in a state of |