(4) Budgetary Rules

Besides being subject to the ordinary rules of the Budget System introduced into India for the first time by Mr. Wilson in 1860,1 by which they were required to submit their budget estimates for sanction to the Government of India, and to observe the rules of appropriation in the execution of the grants, Provincial Governments were further given to understand that without the previous consent of the Government of India they

(i) Could not exhaust their balances in the Imperial Treasury.

Prior to 1887 a Provincial Government could propose in its budget estimates to draw upon the whole of its balance. But by the Rules then framed the Provincial Government was required to maintain at all time a certain minimum balance in the Imperial treasury, the amount of which varied with each successive settlement.

(ii) Could not budget for a deficit, that is for provincial expenditure in excess of the provincial revenues of the year.

The stringency of this rule 2 was a little softened, so that a Province could after 1912 budget for a deficit, if it satisfied the Government of India that the cause was exceptional and non-recurring,3 but it was at the same time provided that, if this drawing upon the balances to make up the deficits resulted in reducing the balance below the prescribed minimum, the budget for a deficit would be sanctioned only if the Government of India was able to allow the Provincial Government in question an overdraft to the extent necessary to restore the balance to the required minimum from the general balances to be repaid in such rates of interest and instalments as may be prescribed. 4

1 Rule 11 of 1892, 13 of 1897, and 19 of 1912.

2 Rule 8 of 1892.

Rule 21 and 22 of 1912.

3 Rule 21 of 1912.

(iii) Could not exceed during the currency of the year the expenditure on any head of account as finally sanctioned for it, for that year, by the Government of India.

It could increase the expenditure only if the increase was counterbalanced by re-appropriation, that is, reduction by the amount of the excess of the sanctioned grant under some other head of account under its control. The powers of reappropriation of Provincial Governments were very extensive, for it could sanction re-appropriation between the grants for provincial expenditure included in its budget, whether under a Wholly Provincial or a Divided Major or Minor Head provided that the aggregate grant of provincial expenditure was not exceeded.2

(5) Rules of Audit and Account

Though the Provinces were allowed considerable powers
of re-appropriation within their budgets there was imposed
upon them the obligation of audit and accounts of the money
they spent. The important point to note in this connection
is the fact that this obligation of the keeping of accounts
and submitting them to audit was an obligation which the
Provinces did not owe to their legislatures, but was an
obligation which they owed to the Government of India,
who had conferred upon them the financial power they
exercised. Moreover, the Government of India did not
leave the Provinces to discharge this obligation according
to their own sweet will by employing their own audit and
account staff. On the contrary the responsibility of realiz-
ing this obligation was entrusted to the imperial officers
of audit and account stationed in the different Provinces,
who acted as the critics and guides of Provincial Govern-
ments in the matter of administration and interpretation
of the Rules discussed above. To facilitate their task Pro-
vincial Governments were instructed—

(i) Not to make any alterations in the form of procedure
2 Rule 25 (1) of 1912.

1 Rule 24 of 1912.

of public accounts,1 or direct the division of a charge
between two or more heads of account. In all such
matters they were to abide by the decision of the
Comptroller General-an officer of the Imperial
Government.2

(ii) To transmit the objection of the Imperial audit
officer against its appropriation or sanction with
regard to expenditure with the explanation of the
Provincial Government concerned to the Govern-
ment of India for final disposal.3

Such were the limitations on the Financial Powers of the Provincial Governments. Apart from these specific limitations the Provincial Governments were not altogether the free architects of their own destiny within the sphere allotted to them; for it was provided that the power of supervision and control in any Department still rested in the Governor-General in Council, and that the Provincial Governments should keep him fully informed of their executive and financial proceedings so as to enable the former to discharge its obligations for peace, order and good government. Their general effect on the financial freedom of the Provinces could hardly have been concealed. It must therefore have been a most impervious mind which in face of these paralysing limitations had not lost its faith in the independence of the system of Provincial Finance and had not asked what was after all the nature and advantage of this illusive institution ?

1 Rule 1 (a) of 1897 also embodied in subsequent Resolutions.
2 Rule 4 (2) of 1897.
Rule 30 and 31 of 1912.
Rule 5 of 1877; Rule 15 of 1897; and Rule 6 and 7 of 1912.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE NATURE OF PROVINCIAL FINANCE

THE study of Provincial Finance cannot be said to be complete unless it furnishes a true answer to the question which is bound to be asked in the end, What was the resulting financial relationship under the old scheme between the Central and Provincial Governments in British India? The question is an important one, for the validity of the criticisms and proposals with regard to Provincial Finance, or any subject for that matter, depends entirely upon a correct understanding of its nature. Unfortunately it had not received the attention that its importance demanded, and consequently we find the rather distressing fact that no subject was so confidently discussed, and yet none was so grossly misunderstood, as that of the nature of the old system of Provincial Finance in British India. It therefore becomes necessary to explain what was the exact nature of the system of Provincial Finance established in British India.

In an inter-related system of polities, such as is composed of Central and Provincial Governments in British India, it is always difficult to grasp the exact nature of their financial relationship; for, what may appear on the surface may be very different from what it may really be. None the less, the view was commonly held that the Indian system was based on a separation of sources between the Provincial and the Central Governments, and contributions from the yield by the former to the latter, much the same as was found in the federal system of finance which obtained in the German Empire. Whether such a view was wrong

152

or right there were various incidents of the relationship between the Central and Provincial Governments in India, which, there can be no doubt, went a long way to strengthen that view. Among such incidents must be mentioned the division of functions between the Central and Provincial Governments. An onlooker could not fail to observe that in this distribution of functions the former controlled matters pertaining to Military Affairs, Foreign Affairs, General Taxation, Currency, Debt, Tariffs, Posts and Telegraph, Railways and Audit and Accounts; while the latter administered matters of ordinary internal administration, such as Police, Education, Sanitation, Irrigation, Roads and Buildings, Forests, and the control over Local Bodies. If this incident encouraged the view that there was a separation of services, there was another incident of the relationship which encouraged the view there was also a separation of revenues between the Central and Provincial Governments in British India. That incident was the collection of most of the taxes in India by the agency of Provincial Governments. As observed by the Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure 1

...

"in the United Kingdom the Revenue Administration is centralized under the Chancellor of the Exchequer in London. In India the administration of some branches of revenue is centralized, though not always under the Finance Minister (of the Government of India). That of other branches is decentralized. The Land Revenue is under the control of the Central Department at Calcutta, but that department is subject not to the Finance Minister but to the Minister in charge of the Home and Revenue Departments. The Telegraph Department is under the Minister of Public Works. The Central Government controls the collection of part of the Salt duty and of part of the opium revenue, of Post Office revenue and of other The remainder of the revenue is collected by the Provincial Governments. . . . As regards . . . a large portion of the revenue, the Provincial Governments are units of administration and are efficiently equipped for their duties."

revenues.

1 Para. 25 of the Final Report.