BILLS AND NOTES.
See BONDS, 11, 12.
CARRIER, 2.
EVIDENCE, 1.
1 Where the charter of a bank and its organization and business were illegal, and the plaintiff was particeps criminis, he was disabled to recover on promissory notes which grew out of these illegal transactions made by the president and stockholders of the bank.
BLOCKADE.
See CONTRABAND, 5, 6, 7.
PRIZE, 5, 6, 14, 18, 23, 47, 48, 57, 67, 74.
WAR, 23, 24, 25.
1. The proclamation revoking the blockade of the port of New Orleans did not work the legal termination of blockade of the coast which re
2. Promissory notes growing out of illegal trans-mained under hostile_control. actions are as infirm, in the eye of the law, as the implied promise that existed previous to the giving of the notes.
3. When the consideration of a note given in name of joint owners of a vessel, by one of them, was the balance due by the vessel and its owners to plaintiff, the defendant, one of such owners, is liable for the consideration thereof, although he did not sign the note, and there was no partnership. Newell v. Nixon,
305 4. The holder of a bill of exchange, signed and indorsed in blank, has not unlimited authority to fill it up at pleasure and bind the signer and indorser by his act. 377 5. The delivery of a bill of exchange signed and indorsed in blank only authorizes the receiver, as between himself and the drawer and indorser, to fill it up in conformity with the authority given him. Idem,
6. If there has been no agreement, the authority is general; if there has, it must be pursued. Idem,
377 7. The burden of proof that there was an agreement, and that its terms have been violated, is, in such a ease, upon the defendant; but if he can make such proof it will avail him.
8. No person, unless authorized, either directly or by just inference from the nature of the transaction, can fill up a blank for his own benefit.
377 9. Nor can such a bill be enforced against the drawer and indorser in favor of any one who takes it with knowledge that it has been filled up without authority or in fraud.
377 10. Subject to the limitations just stated, the delivery of a signature in blank is in general an authority to the holder to fill it up as he thinks proper. Idem,
564 12. An ulterior destination to a blockaded port will infect the primary voyage to a neutral port with liability for intended violation of blockade. Idem, 564 13. Violation of blockade by the master affects the ship.
The William Bagaley v. U. S.
583 14. Where the suspicion that the claimants were connected with the breach of blockade is without any foundation, the decree of condemnation will be reversed.
15. Where the only ground of suspicion that a violation of the blockade was intended is the fact that the vessel, when captured, was out of her regular course, and this was sufficiently accounted for, the decree of restitution affirmed. 377 U. S. v. The Sea Witch,
13. An alteration in the date of a promissory note from September to October by one of two makers without the consent of the other, extinguishes the latter's liability.
blockade, the offense is not discharged until the 16. If a ship has contracted guilt by a breach of end of the return voyage. The Wren v. Ū. S. 876 17. The only penalty annexed to the breach of a 14. The plaintiff in such case cannot fall back blockade is the forfeiture of vessel and cargo when upon the note as it was originally. taken in delicto.
15. The alteration annuls the instrument, even in the hands of an innocent holder.
19. Mere possession by the person who professes to transfer a note is not sufficient authority.
See PLANK ROADS, 1-4.
TAXES, 1.
7. The Ohio act of 20th March, 1850, authorized
the city of Cincinnati to contract with a railroad
company for a loan to it of city bonds and a pledge
of its stock as a security.
146
8. The 7th section of the act does not transmute
the pledge of stock into a lien or mortgage upon
the road and fixtures of the company as security.
Idem,
146
9. The courts of a state having, when bonds were
issued, construed its Constitution and laws so as
to give them force and vitality, cannot, by a sub-
sequent and contrary construction, destroy them.
Thompson v. Lee County,
177
10. Where a state legislature possesses the pow-
er to authorize the issue of bonds it can, by a retro-
spective act, remedy all irregularity in their issue.
Idem.
177
11. Bonds with coupons, payable to bearer, are
negotiable securities and pass by delivery, and
have all the qualities and incidents of commercial
21. Where such an act was in force when the
bonds of Galena were issued, it was beyond the
power of the legislature to repeal it, so far as it
concerns such bonds.
22. The city cannot object that it owes a large
amount of other debts, and that if these taxes are
collected, the other creditors will be entitled to
share in the distribution of the proceeds.
Idem,
560
23. The diminished resources of the city, and
the disproportionate magnitude of its debt, are
unimportant considerations.
24 In Wisconsin the legislature may confer on
municipal corporations the power to subscribe for
stock in a railroad or other work of public im-
provement, issue bonds to pay for it, and provide
for their redemption by the levy and collection of a
610
Campbell v. City of Kenosha,
25. A subsequent full legislative recognition of
the legality of such subscription and the issue of
such bonds relieved them from all taint of illegal-
ity, and from all objection on account of irregu-
larities in their issue.
26. Where corporate authorities ratified the
bonds by a series of unmistakable acts, and issued
new ones in place of the old, they cannot repudiate
them
170
4. The act of March 3, 1851, relieves the ship-
owner from liability for loss to goods on board by
fire, to which he has not contributed either by his
own design or neglect.
Walker v. W. Transportation Co.
5. The 6th section of the act saves the remedy to
ter, officers or mariners of such vessel, for negli-
which any party may be entitled against the mas-
gence, fraud, or other malversation.
172
6. The owner is not liable for the misconduct of
the officers and mariners of the vessel in which he
does not participate personally.
172
7. A special contract, set up, founded on usage,
will not take the case out of the act of 1851.
Idem,
172
8. Master of a vessel must be held to have made
his contract of affreightment with a full knowledge
of the course of trade, and must be governed by it.
Strong v. "Convoy's Wheat,"
194
9. Master had no right, when he found there
would be a delay of several days in delivering his
cargo at the port of delivery, to carry it to another
port at the expense of the owner.
10. Common carriers of passengers are obliged to
carry all persons who apply for passage, if the ac-
commodations are sufficient, unless there is a proper
excuse for refusal.
447
11. A refusal to take a passenger should precede
the sailing of the ship.
Idem,
447
12. After the ship has got to sea, it is too late to
take exceptions to the character of a passenger or
to his peculiar position, if he violated no inflexible
rule of the boat in getting on board.
ly, and his fare was tendered, he was entitled to the | been entered, is no deficiency which needs to be
same rights as other passengers.
supplied by certiorari.
447
15. A refusal to carry him was contrary to law,
and although apprehended danger mitigates the
act, it affords no legal justification for it.
16. Where the captain of a vessel excluded a pas-
senger from his boat in the fear that, if returned to
San Francisco, he would be put to death, the legal
injury suffered can be compensated by a small
amount of money.
486
18. Delivery on the wharf is sufficient if due no-
tice be given to the consignees and the different
consignments be properly separated, so as to be
open to inspection and conveniently accessible to
their respective owners.
Idem,
19. When the goods, after being so discharged and
the different consignments properly separated, are
not accepted by the consignee or owner of the cargo,
the carrier should not leave them exposed on the
wharf, but should store them in a place of safety,
notifying the consignee or owner that they are so
stored, subject to the lien of the ship for the freight
and charges, and when he has done so he is no
longer liable on his contract of affreightment.
Idem,
486
20. Parties may agree that the goods shall be de-
posited in the warehouse of the consignee or owner,
and that the transfer and deposit shall not be
regarded as a waiver of the lien.
Idem,
21. When the goods were subject to the lien of
the vessel for the freight, and the libelants, without
just cause or excuse, refused to pay the freight,
they were not entitled to a decree by reason of any
subsequent misconduct of the bailee of the goods.
Idem,
486
22. Ship-owner, as carrier by water, may retain
the goods until the freight is paid.
The "Bird of Paradise" v. Heyneman, 662
23. Such lien is lost by an unconditional delivery
to the consignee.
Idem,
662
24. The lien may be modified, excluded or dis-
placed by some stipulation in the contract of af-
freightment wholly incompatible or irreconcilable
with the existence of such a right.
1. Where the judgment was the final decision of
the highest court of the state in which a decision
of the suit could be had, the omission to set forth
in the record the exceptions and the rulings of a
higher court upon whose order the judgment had
McGuire v. The Commonwealth,
164
2. Certiorari awarded to court below, to supply
omissions in the record.
Stearns v. U. S.
COLLECTORS.
See DUTIES, 2, 3, 6, 11-21.
5. When acting as the officer of the deck and hav-
ing charge of the navigation of the vessel, the mas-
ter of a steamer is not a proper lookout.
Idem,
165
6. Proper lookouts are persons other than the
officers of the deck or the helmsman, and they
should be stationed on the forward part of the ves-
sel.
165
7. A barge fastened to the end of a pier, in a
place she was entitled to occupy, cannot be charged
with any participation or fault in causing a col-
lision.
8. The fact that in these circumstances a steam-
boat did collide with the barge, is conclusive evi-
dence that the former was not properly managed,
and that she should be condemned to pay the dam.
ages caused by the collision.
179
9. When the injured vessel is not a total loss,
and is capable of being repaired and restored to her
original situation, the costs necessary to such re
pair is the correct rule of damages.
10. Where a vessel has the wind free, or is sail-
ing before or with the wind, she must keep out of
the way of a vessel which is closehauled on the
wind or sailing by or against it.
457
11. The vessel closehauled on the wind, or sailing
on the starboard tack, must keep to her course.
Idem,
457
12. But a vessel is not required to keep her course
after the approach of the advancing vessel is so
near that the collision is inevitable.
457
13. An error, in such case, committed by those in
charge of a vessel, if the vessel is otherwise with-
out fault, will not impair her right to recover for
the injuries occasioned by the collision.
457
Idem,
14. In cases of collision where the district and
circuit courts concur in opinion on the facts, and
there is testimony supporting their decision, this
court will not reverse.
The "Hypodame" v. Chapin,
15. Where the danger of collision is the conse-
quence of a sudden and unexpected change of
course of the colliding vessel which produces a sud-
den peril and leaves no time to the other vessel to
display a light before a collision, and the colliding
steamboat might easily have avoided the collision,
the latter is liable for all the damages.
794
16. Objections to the amount of damages as re-
ported by a commissioner, will not be entertained
in this court in a case of collision where it appears
that neither party excepted to the report of the
commissioner.
The Vanderbilt v. McKibbon,
CONDITION.
See DEVISE, 1-5.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 2, 14.
CONTRACTS, 26, 27.
15. Sale of home-made liquors or liquors in sec-
ond hands within a state is subject exclusively to
1. Congress possesses the exclusive power to leg-state control.
islate in respect to the form and effect of process,
mesne and final, in the Federal courts.
768
2. Congress is bound to regard the public treat-
ies, and it had no power to organize a board of re-
vision to nullify titles confirmed many years be-
fore by the authorized agents of the government.
Reichert v. Felps,
849
12. A statute of Mississippi, that judgments of
other states against the citizens of that state shall
not be enforced if the cause of action which was
the foundation of the judgment would have been
barred in her tribunals by her statute of limita-
tions is unconstitutional and void.
Christmas v. Russell,
16. The article of the U. S. Constitution that
cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted,
does not apply to state but to national legislation.
Idem,
675
17. For the offense of keeping and maintaining,
without license, a tenement for the illegal sale of
intoxicating liquors, the fine and punishment of
fifty dollars and imprisonment at hard labor in the
house of correction for three months is not exces.
sive, or cruel, or unusual.
675
18. The mode of prohibiting, under penalties, the
sale and keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors,
without license, is wholly within the discretion of
state legislatures.
675
19. The laws of Massachusetts on this subject are
not in conflict with the Constitution of the United
States.
675
20. A Nevada law, that there shall be levied and
collected a capitation tax upon every person leav
ing the state by any railroad or stage coach, to be
paid by the railroad companies and the stage
coaches, is in conflict with the Constitution of the
United States.
21. This question is not decided by an exclusive
reference to two provisions of the Constitution;
namely, that which forbids any state to lay any
imposts or duties on imports or exports, and that
which confers on Congress the power to regulate
commerce among the several states.
745
22. The right of passing through a state by a cit-
izen of another state is one guaranteed to him by
the Constitution and must be sacred from state
taxation.
Idem,
745
23. Such a tax imposed by a state is inconsistent
states as members of the Union.
with the rights which belong to citizens of other
Idem,
745
24. A law of Louisiana, that the master and war-
dens of the port of New Orleans shall be entitled to
receive in addition to other fees the sum of $5,
whether called upon to perform any service or not,
for every vessel arriving in that port, is repug-
nant to the Constitution of the United States.
Southern St. Co. v. Masters, etc.
CONTRABAND.
See WAR, 25, 36, 37, 38.
1. Articles manufactured and used for military
purposes in time of war destined to a belligerent
country are always contraband.
2. Articles which may be and are used for pur-
poses of war or peace according to circumstances,
are contraband only when actually destined to the
military or naval use of a belligerent.
564
3. Articles exclusively used for peaceful purposes
are not contraband.
11. The party who has advanced money in part
performance of an agreement, and then stops short
and refuses to proceed to its ultimate conclusion,
24. Executory contracts, if they cannot be per-
formed except in the way of commercial inter-
course with the enemy, are dissolved by the declara-
tion of war.
939
79.
3. Charters are to be construed most favorably to
the state; and in grants by the public nothing
passes by implication.
Chenango Br. Co. v. Binghamton Br. Co. 173
4. A municipal corporation cannot modify nor
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