All this evidence was objected to by the | plaintiffs-rejected by the court-and defendants excepted, and now allege such rejection as

error.

We contend that the title in this case was a perfect one.

Defendant Beard had pleaded the five years statute of limitations, and upon this plaintiff's had taken issue by replication.

Even if our title were not valid, for want of record evidence, or for any other reason, yet it still was sufficient to found an adverse possession upon.

It is not necessary that the title for that purpose should be rightful or valid.

La Frombois v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 596, 602; Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 586; Jackson v. Woodruff, 1 Cow. 276; Jackson v. Ellis, 13 Johns. 118; Smith v. Burtis, 9 Johns. 174; Jackson v. Camp, 1 Cow. 605.

Messrs. Casserly and Carlisle for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff in the court below deraigned his title by various mesne conveyances from Joseph S. Alemany, Catholic bishop of Monterey, to whom a patent, embracing the premises in controversy, was issued by the United States. The patent is in the usual form, and 487*] purports on its face to be *issued under the act of March 3, 1851, to ascertain and settle private land claims in the state of California. It recites that the bishop presented his claim to the board of commissioners created under that act, for confirmation; that the board, by its decree rendered on the 18th of December, 1855, confirmed the claim; that an appeal was taken on behalf of the United States to the district court; and that the Attorney General, having given notice that the appeal would not be prosecuted, the district court, by its decree, gave leave to the claimant to proceed upon the decree of the board as upon a final decree. Upon this form of the decree of the district court, thus recited, the defendants below objected to the introduction of the patent, and the objection is pressed in this court. Their position is that, under the 10th section of the act of March 3, 1851, ch. 41 (9 Stat., 631), it was the duty of the district court to proceed and render judgment upon the pleadings and evidence in the case; that, upon the refusal of the Attorney General to prosecute the appeal the court should have dismissed the appeal or affirmed the decree of the board; that, having done neither, the case is still pending undetermined, and consequently there has been no decree on which a patent could issue.

facto as an appeal on behalf of the party against whom the decision is rendered; and, if the decision be against the United States, that it shall be the duty of the Attorney General, within six months after receiving the transcript, to cause a notice to be filed with the clerk that the appeal will be prosecuted; and, on failure to give such notice, “the appeal," *says the [*488 statute, "shall be regarded as dismissed." If it can be regarded as dismissed, it is for all legal purposes in fact dismissed. Here the Attorney General did not allow his intention to be drawn from his silence; he announced it at once. The decree of the court authenticates by its record the refusal of the Attorney General, not leaving this fact open to contestation by oral proof. The form of the decree is the usual one adopted in such cases, and probably a large number of patents issued to parties in California contain a similar clause. By the action of the Attorney General the decree of the board took effect precisely as though no appeal had ever been taken; and it certainly cannot constitute any valid objection to the decree of the court that it declares in terms the effect which the law gave to such action.

After the patent was admitted in evidence the defendants produced the petition of the claimant to the board of land commissioners, and insisted that it showed a want of jurisdiction in the board in this, that it did not set forth any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government. The position of the defendant appears to have been, that the claim of the bishop was invalid because it did not rest upon, or was not sustained by, any direct grant or concession in writing.

The petition sets forth two sources of title, one founded on the laws of Spain and Mexico, and the other on continued possession of the property for a period exceeding half a century. It avers that, at the time of the conquest and cession of California to the United States, the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church was in force as the law of Mexico, as it had been previously of Spain when Mexico was a dependency thereof, in all things relating to the acquisition, transmission use, and disposition of property, real and personal, belonging to the church, or devoted to religious uses; that, by the laws of Spain and Mexico, it was not necessary that a grant of land for ecclesiastical or church purposes should appear by deed or writing, public or private; but that the right of the church to such property was always recognized as regulated by the canon law; that the premises in question,* being church lands at [*489 the mission of San José consisting of the church, churchyard, burial ground, orchard, and vineyard, with the necessary buildings and apThe objection is a very narrow one, and does purtenances, the whole embracing a little over not merit the attention which it has received nineteen acres of land, had for a long period from counsel. Its answer is found in the amend been devoted to religious purposes and uses; atory act of August 31, 1852. That act pro- that, by the canon law and the laws of Spain vides that when a final decision is rendered by and Mexico, the title, control, and administrathe commissioners they shall prepare two cer- tion of all ecclesiastical and church property tified transcripts of their proceedings and de- was vested in the Bishop and Clergy of the cision, and of the papers and evidence upon diocese, who, for such purposes, were regarded which the same were founded, one of which as a body corporate; and that the Catholic shall be filed with the clerk of the proper dis- church, at the date of the conquest and cession trict court, and the other shall be transmitted of California to the United States, had been in to the Attorney General; that the filing of the the actual and undisturbed possession of the transcript with the clerk shall operate ipso | premises in question since the year 1797.

These averments clearly present a case with- | the grant as one in colonization. This was the in the jurisdiction of the board of commission- most favorable view for the defendants, for if ers. They show "a claim by virtue of a right the recitals that it was made upon a sale of misor title derived from the Spanish or Mexican sion lands, and upon authority conferred by the government," which is all that is required by departmental assembly, are to determine its charthe act of 1851. That act does not define the acter, it is without any efficacy in passing the character of the right or title, or prescribe the title. It is simply a void *instrument, [*491 kind of evidence by which it shall be established. and falls directly within the decision of this It is sufficient that the right or title is derived court in The United States v. Workman, 1 from the Spanish or Mexican government and Wall. 475, 17 L. ed. 510. In that case the powit may, in some instances, rest in a general ers of the departmental assembly in the alienalaw of the land, as is the case usually with the tion of lands were very fully and elaborately title of municipal bodies, under the Spanish and considered, and particularly its asserted power Mexican systems, to their common lands. to authorize the governor to sell the mission lands, and it was held that this body could not confer any power upon the governor, and that its own power was restricted to what was conferred by the laws of colonization, which was simply to approve or disapprove of grants regularly made by the governor under those laws.

of the property alone is demanded. But in the same action there may be united a claim for the rents and profits, or for damages for withholdthereon. Distinct parcels of land may also be included in the same complaint where they are covered by the same title, and the action equally affects all parties. The property should be described if practicable, by metes and bounds; but this is not essential. The provision of the statute on the subject is only directory, its object being to insure such particularity of description, as to enable the officer, who may be charged with the execution of a judgment for the possession, to ascertain the locality and extent of the property. A description by name, where the property is well known, will often answer equally with the most minute description by metes and bounds. Castro v. Gill, 5 Cal. 40; Doll v. Feller, 16 Cal. 432; Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 243.

This brief statement of the system of pleading and practice existing in California will furnish the answer to the several objections urged. That system, with some slight modifications, has been adopted by rule of the circuit court of the United States in common-law cases.

when the validity of the claims is finally determined. When informed, by the action of its tribunals and officers, that a claim asserted is valid and entitled to recognition, the governing the property, *or for waste committed [*494 ment acts, and issues its patent to the claimant. This instrument is, therefore, record evidence of the action of the government upon the title of the claimant. By it the government declares that the claim asserted was valid under the laws of Mexico; that it was entitled to recognition and protection by the stipulations of the treaty, and might have been located under the former government, and it is correctly located now, so as to embrace the premises as they are surveyed and described. As against the government this record, so long as it remains unvacated, is conclusive. And it is equally conclusive against parties claiming under the government by title subsequent. It is in this effect of the patent as a record of the government that its security and protection chiefly lie. If parties asserting interests in lands ac quired since the acquisition of the country could deny and controvert this record and compel the patentee, in every suit for his land, to establish the validity of his claim, his right to its confirmation, and the correctness of the action of the tribunals and officers of the United States in the location of the same, the patent would fail to be, as it was intended it should 493*] be, an *instrument of quiet and security to its possessor. The patentee would find his title recognized in one suit and rejected in another, and if his title were maintained, he would find his land located in as many different places as the varying prejudices, interests or notions of justice of witnesses and jurymen might suggest. Every fact upon which the decree and patent rest would be open to contestation. The intruder, resting solely upon his possession, might insist that the original claim was invalid, or was not properly located and, therefore, he could not be disturbed by the patentee. construction which will lead to such results can be given to the 15th section. The term "third persons," as there used, does not embrace all persons other than the United States and the claimants, but only those who hold superior titles, such as will enable them to resist successfully any action of the government in disposing of the property.

No

It only remains to notice the objections taken to the complaint in this case. They are advanced in misapprehension of the system of pleading and practice which prevails in the state of California. The system is there regulated by statute and differs, in many important particulars, from the system which existed at the common law. There the ancient forms of action are abolished. In every case the plaintiff must state, in ordinary and concise language, his cause of action, with a prayer for the relief to which he may deem himself entitled. The fictions of the action of ejectment at common law have no existence. The names of the real contestants must appear in the pleadings. The complaint, which is the first pleading in the action, must allege the possession or seisin of the premises, or of some estate therein, by the plaintiff, on some day to be designated; the sub

an enity of the defendant, and his withpolding the premises from the plaintiff. No other allegations are required, where possession

When, by the consent of the parties on the trial, the claim for the rents and profits was stricken from the complaint, the court did not lose jurisdiction of the case, because the value of the property did not appear by any allegations of the pleadings. It was admitted that the first parcel, the only one recovered in the action, was of the value of $2,500. This was sufficient, for it has long been the settled practice of the courts of the United States in actions where the demand is not money, and the nature of the action does not require the value of the property in controversy to be stated, to allow the value to be proved at the trial. Ex parte Bradstreet, 7 Pet. 647. Judgment affirmed.

THE SCHOONER ELMIRA CORNELIUS,
John Simonson, Claimant, and Leeds & Co.,
Ames & Barnes, et al., Claimants of Cargo,
Appts.,

v.

THE UNITED STATES.

(See S. C. "The Cornelius," 3 Wall. 214-225.) Intent to violate blockade, inferred from facts.

From the facts the court held there was an intent on the part of a vessel to violate the blockade. The court is under the necessity of acting on the presumption which arises from such conduct, and of inferring a criminal intention.

[No. 75.] Argued Jan. 15, 1866.

Decided Jan. 29, 1866. PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

A1

The schooner Elmira Cornelius, laden with a miscellaneous cargo, consisting, among other articles, of drugs, medicines, groceries, provisions, cutlery, farming utensils and cotton

NOTE.-Blockade; what constitutes; right to;

violation of; penalty; termination of inquiry at blockaded port; necessity may justify entry of such port-see note to Prize Cases, 17 L. ed. U. S.

cards, was captured by the United States | decided this case without further consideration; bark Restless, Edward Conroy, Esquire, acting but it is, upon the report of these gentlemen, a lieutenant, commanding, at about half past case of no difficulty. Let a decree condemneight o'clock on the morning of October 1, 1862, ing the vessel and cargo be entered." in Bull's bay, South Carolina, near the inlet that leads to Charleston, at a point variously stated by the examinants, from two to three or from three to six miles within the limits of the squadron blockading the approaches to Charleston.

The vessel and cargo were sent by the captors to Philadelphia for adjudication, and on the 7th of November 1862, the same were libeled as prize of war by the United States attorney for the eastern district of Pennsylvania. Claims were thereupon presented and allowed to be filed, subject to all legal exceptions, by the alleged owners of the vessel and cargo, for their respective interests in the subjects of capture.

A general decree condemning both vessel and cargo as the property of enemies of the United States, or as otherwise confiscable as prize of war, was accordingly entered. The specific ground of the decree was the one found by the nautical assessors-breach of the blockade of Charleston and its approaches, as appears by the proceedings thus set forth.

This decree is now brought by the present appeals before this court for review. Messrs. M. P. Henry and R. H. Gillet, for appellants.

First. The offense, if any was committed by the master of the Elmira Cornelius, consisted in the violation of the provisions of the act of Congress of July 13, 1861, § 5, forbidding commercial intercourse with citizens of an in

The vessel was claimed by John Simonson, her master, an alleged resident of Staten Is-surrectionary state. land, state of New York, on the 15th of Novem- 12 U. S. 257. ber, 1862.

Portions of the cargo on board were, on the 29th of January, 1863, respectively claimed by Ames & Barnes, Leeds & Co., J. T. Grant & Son, all alleged residents and merchants of the city of New York-Edward S. A. Chichester, of Norwalk, Connecticut, and Marinus H. Van Dyke, "of the city of New York," as alleged in his claim.

Alexander Muir, of the city of New York, claimed also a portion of the merchandise on board, on the 9th of May, 1863.

The examinations in prepatorio and the papers and documents found on board at the time of capture having been duly returned by the prize commissioners, the court permitted the claimants to introduce, without limit, further proof of all the points of the case.

After the introduction of such proof, the cause came on to be heard before the learned district judge, assisted by two experienced nautical assessors. Captain John H. Young, one of the prize commissioners of the court, and Captain Enoch Brooks, who had been examined as a witness on behalf of the claimants upon the question of breach of blockade.

Second. The question is one of innocent or guilty intention on the part of the master of the schooner. The question as to what constitutes a violation of a blockade as between a neutral and a belligerent is not involved in the case. The Fortuna, 5 C. Rob. 27.

Third. That the voluntary stranding of the Elmira Cornelius for the purpose of saving vessel and cargo, at a point where the schooner lay within reach of an armed vessel of the United States, so as to enable such vessel either to render assistance to or destroy the schooner in case of an enemy approaching, will not subject the vessel to forfeiture, either under the laws of war or the act of Congress of July 19, 1861. . 12 U. S. § 257.

Fourth. That in no event will the owner of cargo be affected by a wrongful act of the master, done without authority of such owner.

The Mercurius, 1 C. Rob. 82; The Neptune, 3 C. Rob. 173; The Ann Green, 1 Gall. 284; The San José Indiana, 2 Gall. 268; The Nereide, Cranch, 388.

Mr. James Speed, Atty. Gen., and Mr. J. Hubley Ashton, Assistant Atty. Gen., for the United States:

Lord Langdale has said that in an admiralty cause involving a mere question of fact, the privy counsel of England will not differ from the judge of the high court of admiralty and reverse his judgment, unless they can clearly come to a contrary conclusion.

The proofs having been read, and the arguments of the respective counsel having been heard, the learned judge submitted to the assessors, as a merely nautical inquiry, the question whether the facts of the voyage on which the vessel was captured, were consistent with a destination in good faith for New York (from The Christina, 6 Moore, P. C. 381. Port Royal, S. C.), continuing without wilful The same rule has been announced and redeviation until the time of capture; and wheth-peatedly acted upon by this court in that class er if a wilful deviation occurred, it was under of cases. circumstances reasonably consistent with innocence of intention and reference to the blockade.

The assessors thereupon presented very fully to the court, in writing, their views, under the whole evidence on the points submitted, and announced their belief that wilful deviation under both the propositions quoted above was made by the master, with fraudulent intent to run the blockade at Bull's bay."

The learned judge of the district court then said:

"If the views of these nautical experts had been different from my own, I would not have

If sufficient evidence can be found in the record to support the judgment rendered below, the decree must be affirmed. It will not be reversed upon the showing that there is a theory supported by some evidence in the cause, on which a different decree might have been rendered.

The Marcellus, 1 Black, 417, 17 L. ed. 218; The Waterwitch, 1 Black, 500, 17 L. ed. 157. We invoke this principle and ask the court to apply it in the present cases.

That this vessel had deviated from the line of the voyage that she was professedly pursuing, was a patent and conceded fact in the case.