the thing, the infant is the object of the tes- | could be any doubt on the subject, it is removed tator's bounty, and the testator does not mean by the act of 1845, which substitutes for the to deprive him of it in any event. Now, sup-rule of descent here under consideration, the pose that the object of the testator's bounty marries and dies before his age of twenty-one, leaving children, could the testator intend in such an event to disinherit them? Certainly he could not." In Doe v. Perryn, 3 T. R. 495, Buller, Justice, said: "But if this were held not to vest till the death of the parents, this inconvenience would follow, that it would not go to grandchildren; for if a child were born who died in the lifetime of his parents, leaving issue, such grandchild could not take; which could not be supposed to be the intention of the devisor." Mary Jane Barr was, at the death of the testator, within every particular of the category, which, according to the authorities referred to, creates a vested remainder. 1. The person to take was in esse. 479*] *2. She was ascertained and certain. 3. The estate was limited, to take effect in her absolutely, upon the death of her father. 4. That was an event which must unavoidably happen by the efflux of time. 5. Nothing but her death before the death of her father would defeat the remainder lim ited to her. 6. She had a fixed right of property on the death of the devisor. The period of enjoyment only was deferred and uncertain. one which we are asked to apply. Were we to adopt the construction claimed by the plaintiff's counsel, instead of adjudicating we should legislate. That we have no power to do. Our function is to execute the law, not to make it. The instructions given by the court to the jury were in accordance with the views we have expressed. We find no error in the record, and the judg ment is affirmed. Mr. Justice Grier (with whom concurred Clifford, J.), dissenting: I cannot let this case pass without expressing my entire dissent from the conclusions of the majority of my brethren, both on the construction of the will of William Barr and the stat ute of descents of Ohio. In the construction of a will the first great rule-one that should control and govern all others-is, that the court should seek the in tention of the testator from the four corners of his will. All technical rules, from Shelly's Case down, were established by courts only for the purpose of effectuating such intention. But it is easy to pervert the testator's intention by an astute application of cases and precedents, of which the present case is the last example of many which have preceded it, and where the testator's intention is entirely defeated by the application of rules intended to effectuate it. The remainder in fee, to the children of John M. Barr, was not to vest till the decease of Maria Barr. "And upon the decease of said Maria, I devise the remainder of my [*481 estate to the legitimate child or children of John M. Barr and his heirs forever, remainder over, to the testator's sons-in-law in case of failure of such issue of the son." By construing the remainder to vest before "the decease of In the view we have taken of this case, the Maria Barr," the executory devise to the sonsdoctrine of shifting uses can have no applica-in-law is entirely defeated, and the clear intention; we therefore forbear to advert to the rules of law relating to that subject. 7. The time of enjoyment in possession depended upon the death of her mother. The right was in nowise dependent upon that event. 8. Upon the death of her father, she surviving him, her estate, before defeasible, became indefeasible and absolute. We are thus brought to the conclusion, upon technical as well as untechnical grounds, that Mary Jane Barr had, at the time of her death, an indefeasible estate of remainder in fee in the premises in controversy. IV. Mary Jane Barr having died unmarried and intestate, it remains to inquire to whom her estate passed. The descent cast was governed by the statute of December 30, 1815. The 1st section only applies to the subject. The first part of the 4th clause of that section is as follows: "4. If there be neither brother nor sister of the intestate of the blood of the ancestor from whom the estate came, or their legal representatives; and if the ancestor from whom the estate came be deceased, the estate shall pass to the brothers and sisters of the ancestor from whom the estate came, or their legal representatives." This gave the property "to the brothers and sisters" of the testator, "or their legal representatives." The language of this clause is plain and un480*] ambiguous. There is nothing in the context, rightly considered, which qualifies or affects it. There is, we think, no room for construction. Armstrong v. Miller, 6 Ohio, 124. We concur entirely in the views of the eminent counsel, whose professional opinions, long since written, have been submitted to us. We think the point hardly admits of discussion. If there tion of the testator frustrated by factitious rules intended to facilitate its discovery. It often happens that legislative acts require the same liberal rules of construction as wills, where the testator is presumed to be inops con cilii. It only requires the reading of the 5th section of the statute before the 4th in order to effectuate the intention of the legislature, and to clear it from the absurdity of giving an intestate's estate, not to his next of kin, but to his brothers and sisters, instead of his own children. THE STEAMSHIP WREN and Cargo, Edward C. Stiles, Master and Claimant, Appt., v. THE UNITED STATES. (See S. C. "The Wren," 6 Wall. 582-589.) Guilt of ship, when discharged-forfeiture of vessel and cargo-vessel restored, without costs. If a ship has contracted guilt by a breach of NOTE. Blockade, what constitutes; right to: penalty for; termination of; inquiry at blockaded port; necessity may justify entry of such portsee note to Prize Case, 17 L. ed. U. S. 459 blockade, the offense is not discharged until the end | States district attorney before the judge of the of the return voyage. The only penaity annexed to the breach of a blockade is the forfeiture of vessel and cargo when taken in delicto. Where there is strong evidence that the title of a vessel seized as prize was in the claimant, and the proofs relied on to disprove this evidence are wholly inadmissible and incompetent, the vessel restored, but without costs. [No. 101.] Argued Mar. 13, 1868. Decided Mar. 23, 1868, A PPEAL from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida. The case is stated by the court. Mr. Edwards Pierrepont, for appellant: There must be actual war, or there can be no "prize of war" (Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 17 L. ed. 459); and during actual war there can be no condemnation of a neutral vessel as "lawful prize of war," unless the neutral vessel is taken in delicto. If the neutral vessel runs the blockade and returns, she ceases to be in delicto the moment she completes her return voyage. Wheat. Mar. Capt. 306, 307; Hazl. & R. Mar. War. 175; The Mentor, 1 C. Rob. 179; Chit. L. Nat. 145, 146; 1 Duer, Ins. 88; Wolsley, Int. L. 1, 88, 2d ed.; 1 Kent, Com. 152; The Rosalie and Betty, 2 Rob. 343; The Nancy, 3 Rob. 122; Carrington v. Merch. Ins. Co. 8 Pet. 495; The Insette, 6 Rob. 387; The Noffnung, 6 Rob. 112; Williams v. Smith, 2 Cai. 1. There is not a particle of evidence to show that the steamer was ever enemies' property; but the evidence is conclusive that she was at all times the property of a British neutral. Messrs. Henry Stanbery, Atty. Gen. and J. Hubley Ashton, for United States, appellee: Independently of any question of ownership, the vessel is confiscable for this breach of blockade on the next voyage preceding that on which she was captured. The proofs show conclusively that the last voyage before the capture was in May, 1864, from Galveston to Havana, with a cargo of cot ton received in return for the cannon carried on the outward voyage; and this breach of blockade subjected her to lawful capture on the present voyage, and affords a valid Îegal ground of condemnation. The Christiansberg, 6 Rob. 376. The capture was made nondum cessante bello. Messrs. Hughes, Denver, & Peck for cap tors. Mr. Justice Nelson delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of Florida. The steamship Wren, a merchant vessel, left the port of Havana, on the 12th of June, 1865, for Liverpool, via Halifax, Nova Scotia, with a crew of some thirty-five persons, who on the morning of the next day mutinied, confined the officers in their quarters, carried the vessel into the port of Key West, and delivered her as prize to the acting admiral commanding at that station. The seizure was in pursuance of secret arrangements with the United States consul at Havana, before the vessel left that port. libel was filed against the vessel by the United A southern district of Florida, as prize of war. Stiles, the master, put in a claim in behalf of John Laird, a British subject, as owner. After hearing the proofs, the court condemned the vessel on the ground, she was the property of the enemies of the United States. This is the only question in the case. For, although it was insisted on the argument that that the vessel was taken in contemplation of the condemnation might be placed on the ground law in delicto, for violating the blockade of the port of Galveston, Texas, the position is founded in a clear misapprehension of the law. It appears that the vessel had been engaged in running this blockade from the port of Havana to Galveston, and that a short time before she entered on the present voyage, she had successfully entered the latter port, discharged her cargo, and took on one of cotton, and returned in safety. The doctrine on this subject is accurately stated by Chancellor Kent, 1 Kent, Com. 151. "If a ship," he observes, "has contracted guilt by a breach of blockade, the offense is not discharged until the end of the voyage. The penalty never travels on with the vessel further than to the end of the return voyage; and, if she is taken in any part of that voyage, she is taken in delicto. This is deemed reasonable, because no other opportunity is afforded to the belligerent force to vindicate the law." And "the modern doctrine is now [*587 well settled, that the only penalty annexed to the breach of a blockade is the forfeiture of vessel and cargo when taken in delicto. The earlier doctrine was much more severe, and inflicted imprisonment and other personal punishment on the master and crew. As respects the ownership. It appears from the register that she was a British ship, built at Birkenhead in Chester county, England, by Messrs. Laird Bros., in 1864, and that she belonged to John Laird, the younger, of Birkenhead, shipbuilders, as owner; William Raisbeck, master of the ship. The registry bears date the 24th of December, 1864. John Duggan, one of the crew examined in preparatorio, and who resides in Liverpool, testifies that he shipped in her at Liverpool, in December 1864, on the voyage to Havana, and continued one of her crew while she was engaged in running the blockade, and down till her seizure by the crew the 13th of June, 1865. He says she was British built, called the Wren, and never had any other name; and that he knows nothing as respects any bill of sale. the witnesses examined on this subject of a sale agree with this witness. Raisbeck, master of the vessel according to the registry, undoubtedly came out with her to Havana, as appears from shipments addressed to him as master, dated Havana, 15th March, 1865. All The certificate of registry, under the English Acts, must specify the name, occupation and residence of the owner, the name of the ship, the place to which she belongs, her tonnage, the name of the master, the time and place of the building, the name of the surveying officer, together with a particular description of the vessel. This act has been fully complied with in the present case. And the certificate shows that the claimant is the builder of the vessel, and owner; and the proofs show with reasonable certainty that his registered master brought the vessel to Havana, and was there engaged in command of her within three months after she was launched and fully equipped for the voyage, and which was within three months of the time when she was seized, as prize, by her crew. It is quite apparent, therefore, upon the proofs, that the claimant not only built the vessel, but put his master in command in this, her first voyage, and the presumption would seem very strong, if not irresistible (nothing else in the case), that he continued the owner for the short period of six months, which elapsed after she was built, and before the seizure took place. In addition to this, she was in the command of a master claiming to represent Laird as owner. These acts, in connection with the registry, afford strong evidence that the title of the vessel was in the claimant. Cowen's Phillips, 3d vol., p. 39; 3 Kent, Com. 150. Now, most of the proofs relied on to disprove this evidence are wholly inadmissible, and incompetent as testimony in a court of justice. Take, as an instance, the testimony of McGahan in his answer to the 14th interrogatory. "He believes that Frazer, Trenholm, & Co., of Liverpool, are the owners of the vessel, and were so at the time she was seized; has no personal knowledge as to who are the owners; he has heard Major Helms, at Havana, and Mr. Lafitte, also, at Havana, speak of Frazer, Trenholm & Co. as owners." And Duggan, one of the crew, to the fifth interrogatory, says: "He does not know to whom the vessel belonged, but has heard Captain Moore, one of her for mer masters, with whom he sailed in said vessel in former voyages say, that she was owned by the Confederate government." Another item of proof relied on is that Major Helms, a Confederate agent at Havana, appointed Stiles to the command of the vessel for the voyage from that port to Liverpool. McGahan says the master was appointed to command, as he understood, by Major Helms, at Havana; does not know who delivered possession of her; believes that the master took possession by the authority of Major Helms. Duggan says the name of the master of the vessel was Edward Stiles; he was appointed to the command of the vessel by Major Helms, at Ha vana. ap McGahan was again examined, among others, on an order for further proofs, in which examination he says that he does not know who pointed Ed. Stiles to the command of The Wren at the time of leaving Havana; he believes Major Helms appointed him; he arrived at the conclusion from hearing Major Helms speak of the resignation of the former captain. Now, it appears from the testimony of Stiles himself, and of Long, his first officer, that he was appointed to the command by a Mr. Ramsey, who seems to have had some agency of the vessel, as he shipped the crew at Havana for the voyage to Liverpool. The first officer states also that, when he needed anything for the use of the vessel, he was generally sent by Captain Stiles to Ramsey to obtain it. This is substantially all the material evidence in the case on the part of the government, to satisfy the court that the vessel at the time of its seizure was enemy's property, and not the property of the claimant; and we cannot think that it needs any argument to show that it does not rise to the character or dignity of testimony, in any court that respects the law of evidence. We agree that in the facts and circumstances surrounding *and attending the history [*588 and operations of this vessel, and of the individuals connected with her, there are matters for well-grounded suspicion and conjecture as it respects the purpose and intent with which the vessel was originally built and sent to Havana; and, as she entered immediately into furnishing supplies to the enemy and receiving cargoes of cotton in return, it is not unnatural or unreasonable to suspect that the so-called Confederate States, or their agents, had some connection, if not interest in her. But this alone is not evidence upon which to found a judgment in the administration of justice. The facts that the master, Stiles, who was put in command of her for the voyage home, from Havana to Liverpool, was an officer in the enemies" naval service, and had belonged to the United States Navy; and Helms, who was in some way, not explained, connected with her voyages in running the blockade, and who was the agent of the enemy at Havana, might well be entitled to consideration and weight on the question if there had been any legal proof in the case laying a foundation for such a conclusion. So, also, would the evidence that Stiles destroyed at the time of the capture a letter from Helms, agent of the ship as he calls him, to himself, and an order for the payment to him of £40 on the delivery of the ship at Liverpool. But, in the view we have taken of the case, there is no foundation of legal proof of the ownership of the vessel in the Confederate States on which these circumstances can rest, or be attached, as auxiliary considerations to influence the judgment of a court. Our conclusion is, that the decree below must be reversed and the vessel restored, but without costs. CHARLES R. WATERS, Plff. in Err., v. JOHN J. BARRIL and J. Manuel Muir. Citation, when served in time-service on one of the joint defendants-averment as to citizenship, when sufficient. Citation served on the first of December, before the return of the writ, is served in time. Although it was returnable with the writ on the first day of the term, the defendants had thirty days by the statute to appear. The service on one of the joint defendants is good, even if the other is dead. Where the declaration plainly sets out that the plaintiffs are aliens and that defendant is a citizen tion to jurisdiction for defect of averment as to of Maryland, there is no foundation for the objec alienage of plaintiff, and citizenship of the defendant. [No. 90.] Argued Mar. 9, 1868. Decided Mar. 23, 1868. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland. The points on which the case turned appear in the opinion. Mr. R. J. Brent, for plaintiff in error: The writ being properly issued, this court has jurisdiction. The citation is only to bring the proper parties into court, and the time of its service and any irregularity in this respect will only entitle the defendant in error to a continuance at the first term. See Buckingham v. McLean, 13 How. 162; Peale v. Phipps, 8 How. 256; Wood v. Lide, 4 Cranch, 180; 6 How. 90; McDonogh v. Millaudon, 3 How. 707; Brobst v. Brobst, 2 Wall. 96, 17 L. ed. 905. The circuit court had no jurisdiction in this cause, and its judgment must be reversed. The rule is well established, that the pleadings must aver citizenship of the plaintiff and defendant. Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dall. 382; Turner v. Enrille, 4 Dall. 7; Course v. Stead, 4 Dall. 22; Wood v. Wagnon, 2 Cranch, 9; Capron v. VanNoorden, 2 Cranch, 126; Sullivan v. Fulton Steamboat Co. 6 Wheat. 450; 13 Pet. 61; 1 Paine, C. C. 594; 3 Cranch, 267; 1 Wheat. 91; 2 Pet. 136. averment. But if the plaintiff in error had any question to raise upon the writ by abatement, it is clearly his own fault that he did not crave oyer and raise it below. But what impediment was there to a plea in abatement below? Steph. Pl. 478; 1 Chit. Pl. 448. This mode of making the necessary averments has been recognized as proper by this court, in every case in which the question as to the sufficiency of the averment or the proper mode of .making it, has arisen. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 405, 16 L. ed. 451; P. W. & B. R. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 207, 16 L. ed. 74; Sheppard v. Graves, 14 How. 508. Mr. Justice Nelson delivered the opinion of the court: This is a writ of error to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Maryland. This is necessary in order that the defendant A motion has been made to dismiss the case may plead in abatement, and thus try the ques- for want of jurisdiction, on the ground that the tion of citizenship in limine. De Wolf v. Ra-citation was not served in time. But this is a baud, 1 Pet. 498. mistake. It was served on the first of Decem the cases of Villabolos v. The U. S., and The U. S. v. Curry, 6 How. 89, 90, and 106, 112. In the present case the narr. makes no aver-ber, before the return of the writ, and is within ment whatever of citizenship. It is true that the narr. recites the writ as describing the citizenship of the parties, but even if the writ did so describe them, it is no part of the record unless oyer of it is craved, which is not done here. 1 How. 241; 11 Wheat. 280; 2 Wheat. 45; 11 Md. 347; 60 Law Lib. 39. Suppose the writ had correctly described the citizenship of parties, it does not dispense with the necessity of averring it in the narr., so that the defendant may plead in abatement. Here the whole jurisdiction hangs on the character of the parties, and so material a fact cannot be stated by way of recital on the contents of a writ not spread on record. 1 Chit. Pl. 272, marg. note g; 1 Chit. 283; 1 Saund. 318, n, 3. Messrs. S. T. Wallis and John H. Thomas, for Barril: As to the citation. Although it was returnable with the writ on the first of the term, the defendants had thirty days by the statute to appear. The service on Barril was good; he was one of the joint defendants, and it would have been so if Muir was dead, of which there is no legal proof, as the suit would survive against Barril. Then, as to the merits. The only point made is the want of jurisdiction in the court below, for the defect of averment as to the alienage of the plaintiffs, and citizenship of the defendant. There is no foundation for this objection in point of fact, as the declaration plainly sets out that the plaintiffs are aliens, and the defendant a citizen of Maryland. 20 How. 227, 15 L. ed. 896; 21 How. 207, 16 L. ed. 74; 14 How. 508. Judgment affirmed. The writ of error was returnable to the first Monday of December, 1865, being the 4th of THE the month. The citation was not served until the first of December. As a notice of twenty days must be given under the statute before the return day, the record was brought up irregularly and the cause must be dismissed, unless the defect is otherwise cured. Yeaton v. Lenox, 7 Pet. 220. The only ground of error assigned by the plaintiff in error in his brief is that the court below had no jurisdiction, because the alienage and citizenship, on which jurisdiction depended, are not sufficiently averred. It is not pretended that the citizenship and alienage are defectively set forth in the declaration, so far as concerns the language used to describe them, but it is insisted that there is no technical "averment" of the same under the rulings of this court. The description of the parties, it' is said, is given in that part of the narr. which recites the writ, and is not the subject-matter of a specific and subsequent averment. The writ, it is said, is no part of the record unless oyer be prayed; and a recital of the writ can be no better than the writ itself. To such a recital, it is said that no plea in abatement could be pleaded; and hence its insufficiency as an UNION INSURANCE COMPANY, Claimant and Intervener, Appt., v. THE UNITED STATES et al. Condemnation of property under act of Aug. 6, 1861-proceedings must conform to admiralty practice-trial by jury-decree, how far can be reviewed-land leased for making arms may be condemned-liens devestednew trial, how conducted. The act of Congress of August 6, 1861, authorizes proceedings in the circuit court for condemnation of property used in aid of the Rebellion. conformity to the course in admiralty; but issues In such cases the proceeding must be in general of fact on the demand of either party, must be tried by jury. appeal, but only for the purpose of reversing the The decree of the court can be reviewed here on decree of the circuit court as irregular and directing a new trial. Where manufactory of arms was established on grounds leased with the knowledge and consent of the lessor, the land became lawful subject of prize and capture. The rights created by a mortgage, where there is no proof of consent of mortgagee to the unlawful use, except the fact of taking the mortgage before possession was taken under the lease, are not sub-quent in time being of date 8th of October, Ject to forfeiture. 1861-are all indisputable facts. The subsequent seizure for condemnation devested al intermediate liens. The property seized having been real estate, the proceedings on the new trial must be conformed in respect to trial by jury and exceptions to evidence, to the course of proceeding by information on the common law side of the court in cases of seizure upon land. The case is stated by the court. Mr. Thomas J. Durant, for the claimant: 1. The use made of this immovable property by the lessees, the Cooks, being plainly in the aid of the insurrection, would entail liability to confiscate them, not of itself, but only if such use were consented to by the owner. Act of 1861 § 1 (12 Stat. at L. 319). There is no proof that this owner consented to such use. 2. Unlike the act of 17th July, 1862, § 6 (12 Stat. at L. 589), this act of 1861, upon which the proceedings are founded, does not declare sales, transfers, and conveyances of property prior to seizure, but subsequent to guilty use, to be null and void; and the government takes the property on condemnation, cum onere. 3. The consent of the owner to the guilty use of the premises is not a matter of inference; it must be proved. His silence merely shows nothing, because it would have been dangerous for him to attempt to interfere; and as such consent would have been criminal, making the owner guilty of treason, it cannot be presumed against him. 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 34, 35. The mortgage, then, was a mortgage of prop erty "lawful subject of prize." And whatever may be affirmed of the mortgage executed in favor of the Union Insurance Company, appellants must apply a fortiori to their title under its foreclosure and their claim of an attaching lien, by force of a judgment and levy subsequent in time to both, on which a sale in their favor of this forfeited property was frustrated by their interposition of an officer of the United States. If there were no rule governing this case, the statute itself discountenances even bona fide interests subsequently attaching without notice. But the rule is, we believe, settled in this court, that a forfeiture in this country, under a statute which does not otherwise direct, attaches at the time of the offense. Caldwell v. U. S. 8 How. 366; U. S. v. Grundy, 3 Cranch, 350; U. S. v. 1,960 Bags Coffee, 8 Cranch, 399; U. S. v. The Mars, 8 Cranch, 417; The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1; Peisch v. Ware, 4 Cranch, 347; The Ploughboy, 1 Gall. 41. The only question, therefore as it appears to us is whether there is anything in favor of the appellants, to support an exception to the general rule. We think not, because: 1. The rule is fortified by the sense of the statute. 2. No precedent can be shown of a successful intervention by a subsequent purchaser, who had knowledge of the predicament of the forfeited property when his interest attached. In Wells v. Martin, 2 Bay (S. C.) 20, the interest in question was not a subsequent, but a prior interest, and one of no less good faith and sanctity than a widow's dower. The same of Mongin v. Baker, 1 Bay, 73; The Fire De4. On the 5th of April, 1865, when the Unit-partment Kip, 10 Wend. 266, is the case of ed States marshal seized the property, it had a forfeiture created by the statute altogether ceased to belong to the owner who leased, and conditionally. In Clark v. Protection Ins. Co. it had become, by judicial sale, the property of 1 Story, 110, the syllabus, "when property is the claimant. forfeited, it does not vest in the government until after a seizure, which then relates back to the time of the forfeiture," is less qualified than the language of Mr. Justice Story in the decision itself; for what he says under that head, he expressly reconciles with U. S. v. Bags of Coffee, 8 Cranch, 399, and The Mars, 8 Cranch, 417. 5. The act of August 6, 1861, does not forfeit the property, but merely directs legal proceedings to procure its forfeiture. The title to the property was not devested by the guilty use, and could only be devested at the moment of legal sentence of condemnation. Fire Department v. Kip, 10 Wend. 268. 6. Confiscation, when decreed, relates back to the date of the guilty use, but the bona fide purchasers or holders of liens, created in the meantime, are protected. U. S. v. Grundy, 3 Cranch, 338; Clark v. Protection Ins. Co. 1 Story, 110; Mongin v. Baker, 1 Bay (S. C.), 73; Wells v. Martin, 2 Bay (S. C.), 20. Messrs. Henry Stanbery, Atty. Gen., and J. Hubley Ashton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States: That Cook & Brother were engaged in manufacturing arms for the insurgent government in the city of New Orleans during June, 1861, until the capture of that city by the Federal forces; that this fact must have been notorious in that community, and must have been known to Leonce Burthe, the owner of the libeled property, and to the appellants; that the mortgage executed in favor of the appellants was subse In The U. S. v. Grundy, 3 Cranch, 350, Chief Justice Marshall distinctly disallows the common-law doctrine of the property remaining in the owner until devested by consummation of the forfeiture. In support of the proposition that this record affords no color of right in the appellants, we cite, first, the more recent case of Caldwell v. The U. S. 8 How. 366. In support of the same we cite the leading case of U. S. v. 1,960 Bags of Coffee, 8 Cranch, 398. "I adopt the doctrine of Lord Holt, in Bartlett v. Vinor, Carlton, 252, and of Lord Chief Justice Tyndal in De Begnis v. Armistead, 10 Bing. 107, 110, that every contract made for or about a matter or thing which is prohibited and made unlawful by statute, is a void contract, although the statute does not mention that it shall be so, but only inflicts a penalty |