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The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 450; The Pacific, | schooner was in fault in not exhibiting a light 21 How. 372, 16 L. ed. 144.

Mr. Justice Grier delivered the opinion of the court:

In cases of collision the testimony is often conflicting and irreconcilable. Each party can make out a plausible case supported by some evidence. In such cases we have frequently decided that where the districts and circuits concur in opinion on the facts, and there is testimony supporting their decision, we will not reverse it on doubts raised by ingenuity of council. Newell v. Norton [ante, 273]. 224*] *The district courts have better opportunities for examining such cases and forming a correct conclusion than any other. They may examine witnesses ore tenus, and although they may not have Trinity masters to assist them, yet in difficult cases depending on nautical experience the judge may call to his aid experienced masters of vessels (as is done in one district at least), whose report will greatly assist the court in coming to a correct conclusion.

In the case before us we see no reason to doubt that the conclusions of both courts below, on the facts in the case, are correct.

The collision occurred on the Hudson river, a little below Dunderberg point. The schooner was proceeding down the river on a voyage from Albany to Providence, on the westerly side of the channel, at the rate of about one and a half miles an hour.

The propeller was on her way from New York to Albany without a tow, and was going at the rate of seven or eight miles an hour, after passing Verplank's point, about two miles below the place of collision. The propeller ran along the easterly side of the river on a course which, if it had been continued, would have carried her to the eastward of the schooner, but when she reached a point well on the schooner's port bow, her helm was put to starboard, and she made a rank sheer and ran directly towards the schooner. The crew of the schooner immediately shouted to have her keep off; but, although the shout was heard, she continued on and struck the schooner's port side near the cathead, penetrating ten feet or more into her decks, and causing her to sink before she could be towed into shoal water.

on the propeller's change of direction towards her. The collision took place before the pas sage of the act of the 20th of April, 1864. This act (article 5th) requires sailing ships, "under way or being towed, to carry the same lights as steamships under way, with the exception of the white mast-head lights, which they *shall never carry;" an exception justi- [*225 fied by experience, which showed that it caused many collisions, arising from mistaking it for a light on shore; the case of Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 17 How. 152, 15 L. ed. 68, being an example. There the steamer was running on a course a mile wide of the schooner, but mistaking her mast-head light for a light house, she steered with such accuracy of aim as to sink the schooner.

By the customs and rules of navigation every vessel at anchor in a harbor or roadstead is bound to keep a light suspended on board. But previous to the passage of this act sailing ves› sels on the rivers and on the ocean were not bound by any law or custom to carry lights. In the case of The Delaware v. The Osprey, 2 Wall. Jr. 268, it is said: "The rule of pass ing to the right, or porting the helm in the case of vessels meeting on the same line, is founded upon the supposition that each party may see the other. But when one is blind and the other knows it, he should not put himself with in reach of injury by any mistake of the blind The court cannot establish any rule to bind vessels navigating the high seas after night, to carry signal lights; but where one party does this and the other does not, he can and will treat the dark boat as the wrongdoer."

But the case cited applies to vessels meeting in the same line, where one party can plainly see the other and yet keeps dark. But where the danger of collision is the consequence of a sudden and unexpected change of course. which produces a sudden peril and leaves no time to the sailing vessel to display a light be fore a collision-or do more than shout-where the steamboat, if it had had a sufficient lookout, might easily have avoided the collision, it has no right to complain or demand that the damages should be divided as where both are in fault.

The exceptions to the master's report are without just foundation, after the circuit court had reduced the damages to the amount of $513 Decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

We concur with the court below that the propeller had no competent lookout, as required by the frequent decisions of this court. The Ottawa [ante, 165]. The evidence shows that the schooner might have been seen a half mile off it there had been a competent lookout. WILLIAM SLATER, Complainant and Appt.,

When the propeller made the sudden sheer towards the western shore, the man at the wheel told the captain "to stop the boat, there was something ahead; he did not stop her; her wheel was then put to port. I then pulled the bell," etc.

The sheer was abrupt and totally unexpected. Previous to that there was no danger calling for any peculiar precautions. The schooner was in her proper place, and could not possibly anticipate such a sudden change of course. All they could do, under the circumstances, was to shout-they were heard--but no attention was paid to the warning. Producing a light at that time would have been equally unavailing. The defense relied on here was that the

v.

LEWIS MAXWELL.

(See S. C. 6 Wall. 268-277.)

Inadequacy of bid at tax sale, no objection to sale-sale of entire tract void, if bids could have been obtained on part-fraudulent sale set aside-answer-when allegation of, must be positive-void sale will be set aside, or purchaser held to be trustee-relief in equity, Inadequacy of the price given at the sale of land

with the statute necessary-see note to Williams NOTE.-Sale of land for taxes; strict compliance

v. Peyton, 4 L. ed. U. S. 518.

for unpaid taxes thereon, does not constitute a valid objection to the sale.

Of necessity the whole property must be sold, if the sum equivalent to the amount of the taxes is not bid for a portion of the premises.

The sale of the entire tract in one body will vitiate the proceeding, if bids could have been obtained upon an offer of a part of the property.

Where, at the time the land was offered for sale, many persons were present with the view to purchase, but the defendant stated to them that the complainant would redeem his land from the purchasers, and in that way put down all competition and had the entire property struck off to him for the amount of the taxes, the sale will be set aside. If the property was acquired by unfair means within the defendant's own knowledge, the defendant must answer positively, and not merely to his remembrance or belief.

Tax sales, whenever characterized by fraud or unfairness, should be set aside or the purchaser be required to hold the title in trust for the owner: Where the sale is impeached for fraud or unfair practices of officer or purchaser, to the prejudice of the owner, a court of equity is the proper tribunal to afford relief.

[No. 41.]

Argued Jan 6, 1868.

Decided Jan. 20, 1868. PPEAL from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia.

A

This is an appeal by the complainant from the decree of the court below dismissing his bill. The case is stated by the court.

Mr. William S. Frick, for appellant: The first material allegation in the bill is that the lands were sold at a grossly inadequate price so gross as to be fraudulent as to the complainant.

If this were a case between vendor and purchaser no court of equity would hesitate to grant relief (without proof of any special circumstances of imposition, undue influence, or fraud), upon the ground that the unreasonableness and inadequacy of the bargain was so made out (to use the words of Lord Eldon, 9 Ves. 246), as "to shock the conscience, and amount in itself to conclusive and decisive evidence of fraud."

1 Story, Eq. § 246; Osgood v. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. 22.

Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram, in Borell v. Dann, 2 Hare, 451, while refusing to set aside a sale at public auction for mere inadequacy of price, states the exception to be "where the inadequacy is so gross as, of itself, to prove fraud or imposition on the part of the purchaser."

"But where there are other ingredients in the case, of a suspicious nature, gross inadequacy of price must necessarily furnish the most vehement presumption of fraud."

1 Story, Com. § 246.

But on another distinct ground this sale must be decreed to be void, even if it were not tainted by such gross inadequacy of price. The deliberate attempt and plan of the defendant to suppress competition at a public sale, especially a judicial sale, must be held to be contrary to public policy and to deprive him of all right to the benefit of his purchase. Agreements between parties not to bid against each other at public sales, especially where such public auctions are directed or required by law, have been repeatedly held to be void as unconscientious and against public policy, on the ground that they have a tendency to affect injuriously the character and value of such sales, to mislead

private confidence, and to operate virtually as a fraud upon the sale.

1 Story, Com. § 293; Jones v. Caswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 29; Doolin v. Ward, 6 Johns. 194; Gardiner v. Morse, 25 Me. 140; Brisbane v. Adams, 3 N. Y. 130; Phippen v. Stickney, 3 Met. 386.

This rule has been held to apply with espe cial force to tax sales.

Dudley v. Little, 2 Ohio, 504; Blackw. Tax Titles, 466, 470; Fuller v. Abrahams, 3 Brod. & B. 116.

On the assumption that the case is made out as alleged, the jurisdiction of a court of equity to set aside the sale, cancel the tax deed and enjoin the purchaser and those claiming under him from asserting title, cannot be questioned. Blackw. Tax Titles, 571 et seq.; Yancey v. Hopkins, 1 Munf. 419, 437.

Messrs. C. Bogges and Geo. H. Lee, for appellee:

The allegation of the inadequacy of the price in the absence of any proof of the fraudulent combination charged, is without import.

1 Fonbl. Eq. ch. 2, § 11, p. 122, and H. (2); Hansford v. Barbour, 3 A. K. Marsh. 1305; Jenkins v. Hogg, 2 Const. (S. C.) 821; Borell v. Dann, 2 Hare, 440, 450.

The allegation, made by the amendment to the bill, that Maxwell stated to bystanders at the sale that Slater would redeem his land from the purchaser and thus was enabled to put down competition and buy in the land for himself, constitutes the sole remaining ground of equity in the complainant's case.

This allegation is denied by Maxwell in his answer, when he says that he has no recollection of making such a statement; that he does not believe that he did make it, and that he believes the charge that he made it, to be untrue. This denial is sufficient to put the complainant to full proof, both under the Virginia statute and according to the rules of equity pleading. Where matter responded to occurred more than six years before, and especially if it be a conversation or statement made, a denial on recollection or belief is sufficient.

Code, Va. (ed. 1860) ch. 171, § 40, p. 713; Story, Eq. Pl. §§ 854, 855; Coop. Eq. Pl. 309, 310; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 254, 257; Hall v. Wood, 1 Paige, 404; Brooks v. Byam, 1 Story, 296.

If the answer was deemed evasive or insufficient, complainant should have excepted to it, and not replied generally. His general replication is a waiver of exceptions on this account.

There

Story, Eq. Pl. § 867; Cooper, Eq. Pl. 321, 322. The statement imputed to Maxwell at the time of the sale, was of a trifling and immaterial thing. It was vague and inconclusive, and in its essential character but matter of conjecture or opinion, as to which none of the parties could be presumed to confide in any other. was no special confidence, relation or influence as between Maxwell and the owner of the land or the bidders at the sale, which should forbid the expression of his opinion or confident belief that the owner would redeem it, or give any one who would bid a right to place implicit reliance upon it. It was a mere gratis dictum, in respect of which Maxwell was under no legal obligation or pledge to anybody for precise accuracy of statement or certainty of inference or conclu

sion, and it was his own folly or indiscretion, | levied upon property generally bear a very if anyone who heard it chose to give implicit slight proportion to its value, and of necessity credence to it and forbear to bid for no better the whole property must be sold, if a [*274 reason; and this especially as Maxwell, by bid- sum equivalent to the amount of the taxes is ding himself, showed that he knew he might be not bid for a portion of the premises. mistaken about the owner's redeeming, and set the example of taking the chance that he might not redeem.

The sale of the entire tract in one body would have vitiated the proceeding, if bids could have been obtained upon an offer of a part of the 1 Sto. Eq. Jur. §§ 191, 194, 197, 199; Ne- property. In this case the answer avers, and ville v. Wilkinson, 1 Bro. Ch. 546; Turner v. the proof shows, that the sheriff offered to sell Harvey, Jacob, 178; Small v. Attwood, 1 a part of each tract without receiving a bia Younge, 407, 461; Attwood v. Small, 6 Cl. & and it was only then that the entire tract was Fin. 292, 295; Phillips v. Duke of Bucks, 1 put up and struck off to the defendant. Vern. 227; Hough v. Richardson, 3 Story, 659; Trower v. Newcomb, 3 Meriv. 704; Laidlaw v. Organ, 2 Wheat. 178, 195; Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Ves. 173, 192; Davis v. Meeker, 5 Johns. 454; Vernon v. Keys, 12 East, 637; 2 Kent, Com. Lect. 39, pp. 484, 485, 486; 1 Fonbl. Eq. Book, § 8.

Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court:

In April, 1840, the complainant purchased of one Middleton, for the consideration of $3,043, a tract of land containing 19,944 acres, situated in the then county of Ritchie in the state of Virginia. The tract consisted of nine parcels, each of which was distinctly defined and described in the deed from Middleton, which was in May following placed on record in the proper office of registry of the county. In August, 1840, the complainant sold four of the parcels containing 7,955 acres; but notwithstanding the sale, the entire original tract was charged in his name on the books of the commissioner of the revenue of the county, with the taxes for the years 1841, 1842, 1843, and 1844, amount ing in the aggregate to $30.03, and was returned delinquent for their non-payment. Under an act of the state then in force, a list of the land thus returned delinquent, was transmitted by the auditor of public accounts to the sheriff of the county, with directions to sell the land in the mode prescribed by law, and October, 1844, the sheriff sold to the defendant the entire tract of 19,944 acres, to pay the taxes mentioned. In February previous, the county of Doddridge had been created, and embraced within its limits 11,943 acres of the land sold. The clerk of the county of Ritchie therefore conveyed the property to the defendant by two deeds, one of which embraced the portion lying in the county of Ritchie and the other lying in the county of Doddridge. It is to compel the defendants to release whatever right he acquired under these deeds to the property owned by the complainant at the time of the sale, and to surrender the possession to him, that the present suit is brought.

The relief sought by the bill in this case is put upon three grounds:

1. That the sale was made at a grossly inadequate price;

2. That the entire tract was sold in one body;

and

3. That competition at the sale was prevented by the fraudulent declaration of the defendant, made to effect that purpose, that the complainant would redeem the land from the purchasers.

The inadequacy of the price given at the sale of land, for unpaid taxes thereon, does not constitute a valid objection to the sale. The taxes'

The case must, therefore, turn upon the last ground, the alleged fraudulent declaration of the defendant at the sale, to prevent competition.

The allegation of the bill is that at the time the land was offered for sale a great many persons were present with a view to purchase small stated to them that the complainant would retracts for farming purposes, but the defendant deem his land from the purchasers, and in that way put down all competition, and had the entire property struck off to him for the amourt of the taxes; and that this conduet was pursued to enable him to buy without competition, for a trifling amount, all the land of the complainant.

The answer of the defendant to the allegation is evasive and unsatisfactory. It is that he has no recollection of making the statement averred, nor does he believe he did, and that he believes the charge to be untrue. The charge is of conduct which would not readily be forgotten. It is hardly conceivable that a person could acquire so large a domain as 19,944 acres for so trifling a sum as $30 without a distinct recollection of the attendant circumstances. If the

property was acquired by unfair means, the fact was one within the defendant's own knowledge, and in such cases the general rule of equity pleading is, that the defendant must answer positively, and not merely to his remembrance made between recent and remote acts or declaor belief. The distinction which is generally rations of the defendant would hardly seem applicable to a case like the present. It is not necessary, however, to attempt to draw any nice distinctions in this particular, for the answer was not excepted to, and by the general [*275 replication the complainant has waived all objections to its sufficiency. 2 Story, Eq. Pl. The difference, however, between a positive answer and an answer in the form of the present one, upon belief, is important to be considered with reference to the testimony required to overcome its denials. A clear and positive denial of an allegation of the bill can only be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses to the fact alleged, or by one witness and corroborative circumstances. But if a fact alleged be denied upon belief merely, or be denied equivocally or evasively, it may be sustained by the testimony of a single witness. Knickerbacker v. Harris, 1 Paige, 211; 3 Greenl. Ev. § 289.

Turning now to the testimony presented by the record, we find that the allegation of the bill is sufficiently established. One witness states that he was present at the sale of the land, and that the defendant "stepped up and said he knew the owners, and it was not worth while for any person to buy it; that they would pay

the taxes." Another witness states that cer- | tain parties were present at the sale, and that the defendant said "he knew the men, and it was no use for them to bid, that it (the land) would be redeemed." Some attempt was made to impeach the credibility of one of these witnesses, but it failed. On the other hand, there are some circumstances which tend to establish the truth of their statements. There were several persons present, some of whom were desirous of bidding at the sale-at least they so stated at the time. It is difficult to explain the fact that none of them made a bid on the property, but allowed the immense tract to be sold at a price less than two cents an acre, except upon the idea that they believed that a bid by them would be of no avail, because a redemption from the sale would be made by the owner.

face, and extrinsic evidence is required *to show their invalidity. Where, how- [*277 ever, the sale is not open to objections of this nature, but is impeached for fraud or unfair practices of officer or purchaser, to the prejudice of the owner, a court of equity is the proper tribunal to afford relief. Thus in Dudley v. Little, 2 Ham. 504, equity relieved against a tax sale and deed, where there had been a combination among several persons that one of them should buy in the land to prevent competition. Yancey v. Hopkins, 1 Munf. 419; Rowland v. Doty, Harr. Ch. (Mich.) 3; Bacon v. Conn. 1 Sm. & M. (Ch.) 348.

It follows from the views expressed, that the complainant is entitled to a release from the defendant, of all the right and interest acquired by him under the tax deeds in the property owned by the complainant at the time of the sale.

The decree of the court below will therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree in accordance with this opinion.

Again; a portion of the property, amounting to 9,944 acres, was returned delinquent for the taxes of 1846, 1847, 1848, and 1849, in the name of the complainant. Twenty-five of these acres were sold in September, 1850, for these taxes, 276*] *and were bid in by the defendant. August, 1852, the complainant redeemed the property thus sold, and the receipt given by the defendant for the money paid on the redemption MORRIS SELZ and Henry Leopold, Appts.,

In

describes the land as purchased by him in September, 1850, for taxes, and sold as belonging to the complainant. This transaction is inexplicable except upon the hypothesis that the action of the defendant in bidding in the property in 1845 was taken for the benefit of the complainant, or that the sale then made was so far subject to objection for unfairness that he desired its concealment until, from lapse of time, it should become impossible to impeach it successfully.

Such being the case there is no doubt that relief should be granted the complainant. It is essential to the validity of tax sales, not merely that they should be conducted in conformity with the requirements of the law, but that they should be conducted with entire fairness. Perfect freedom from all influences likely to prevent competition in the sale should be, in all cases, strictly exacted. The owner is seldom present, and is generally ignorant of the proceeding until too late to prevent it. The tax usually bears a very slight proportion to the value of the property, and thus a great temptation is presented to parties to exclude competition at the sale, and to prevent the owner from redeeming when the sale is made. The proceeding, therefore, should be closely scrutinized; and whenever it has been characterized by fraud or unfairness should be set aside, or the purchaser be required to hold the title in trust for the owner.

When the objections to a tax deed consist in the want of conformity to the requirements of the statute in the proceedings at the sale or preliminary to it, or in the assessment of the tax, or in any like particulars, they may be urged at law in an action of ejectment, whether the deed be the ground upon which the recovery of the premises is sought by the purchaser, or be relied upon to defeat a recovery by the owner. In some instances equity will interpose in cases of this kind, as where the deed is by statute made evidence of title in the purchaser, or the preliminary proceedings are regular upon their

v.

LEVI J. UNNA et al.

(See S. C. 6 Wall. 327-337.)

Relief not granted in equity where plaintiff has no interest-secret agreement between parties to suit, not enforced when fraudulent-effect of release of one joint tort-feasor discharges the rest-assignees take judgment subject to equities-equal contribution among wrong-doers-agreement when not inequitable.

allegations of the complainant show that he has no *1. Relief will not be granted in equity where the title or interest, legal or equitable, in the subjectmatter of the controversy.

2. Equity will not enforce a secret agreement betion of trespass, that he, the plaintiff, if he prevails, tween certain defendants and the plaintiff, in acwill not levy his execution on their property in case they will give no aid to their associate in making defense.

3. Such an agreement is inequitable as between those jointly liable, and will not be enforced, because its tendency is to secure undue advantage to the plaintiff.

4. Litigants are not only bound to act fairly in respect to each other, but they cannot expect the aid of a court of equity to enforce an agreement made with the intent that it shall operate as a fraud upon the rights and interests of third per

sons.

5. Contracting parties did not intend that the agreement in that case should have the effect to discharge the present complainants from their joint liability, and it did not have that effect.

6. Plaintiffs could not have so intended, as in that event all the other defendants would have had a good defense, as the release of one joint tortfeasor discharges all the rest, because the plaintiff

can have but one satisfaction.

7. Assignees of a judgment take it subject to all defenses that existed against it in the hands of the assignor.

8. But the complainants had no defense against the judgment, except the agreement made in the trespass suit, which equity will not enforce.

9. Equal contribution, even among wrong-doers, is just, although it may be that no action will lie to adjust any inequality in the payments.

*Headnotes by Mr. Justice CLIFFORD.

NOTE. Effect of release of one joint tort feasor on liability of the other-see note, 58 L. R. A. 293.

10. The agreement made with the marshal, to collect one fourth part of the execution of each firm, was not inequitable, and it affords the complainants no ground for relief. [No. 192.]

Submitted Jan. 6, 1868. Decided Jan. 20, 1868.

PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the

5. That contribution would not be enforced, either at law or in equity, and if it would, that it would not be enforced by these defendants, Ross & Co., and Shearer & Co., against Leopold, a mere surety.

6. That if it would be enforced against Selz, it would not be in the proportion of one fourth, but only in proportion to the amount of money

A United States for the Northern District of realized by him and them respectively.

Illinois.

The case is fully stated by the court.

Messrs. Samuel B. Gookins and James H. Roberts, for appellants:

We insist that the agreement is valid not only against the plaintiff Unna, but also against his assignees, Daniel L. Shearer and William Clark; that, in a court of equity, the assignees stand in substantially the same position as their assignor, so far as the rights and equities of the defendants in the judgment or any of them are concerned; and this is so whether they had notice of the agreement between Unna and the complainants or not, whether they paid full value for it or not; and if their assignor, Unna, could not in conscience enforce the payment of the judgment nor any part of it against complainants, they, the assignees, cannot enforce it.

McJilton v. Love, 13 Ill. 486; Himes v. Barnitz, 8 Watts, 39; Chamberlin v. Day, 3 Cow. 353; Jeffries v. Evans, 6 B. Mon. 119; Maghee v. Kellogg, 24 Wend. 32; Olds_v. Cummings, 31 Ill. 188; 2 Lead. Cas. in Eq. part 2, p. 236, and cases there cited; Rawson v. McJunkins, 27 Ga. 432; Wright v. Levy, 12 Cal. 257; Scott v. Shreeve, 12 Wheat. 605; Bush v. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535; 36 Miss. 143; Webster v. Wise, 1 Paige, 319; 1 Ves. 247.

2. The money to purchase the judgment was that of Rosses, and Shearer, Paine, and Strongs, and not that of either Clark or Shearer, the assignees.

3. The authorities bearing upon the question of contribution in cases similar to this are almost uniform, that it will not be enforced at law or in equity.

Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T. R. 186; Farebrother v. Ansley, 1 Camp. 343; Wilson v. Milner, 2 Camp. 452; Thweatt v. Jones, 1 Rand. 328; Acheson v. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1; Nelson v. Cook, 17 Ill. 443; Sedg. Dam. 2d ed. 556; Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455.

We therefore say that the judgment ought not to be enforced against complainants, and they should be relieved against it in a court of equity:

1. Because of their agreement with Unna, which was valid and binding upon him.

2. If Shearer and Clarke were bona fide as

signees of t judgment, it was binding upon them, and they have no better standing in a court of equity against the equity of complainants than their assignor, Unna.

3. That in fact the judgment was paid by Ross & Co., and Shearer & Co., and should be canceled and satisfied of record by the decree

of this court.

4. That being so paid, it is a fraud upon complainants to allow it to stand open and unsatis fied of record, in the names of Shearer and Clark as assignees, and to permit Ross & Co., and Shearer & Co., thus to enforce partial satisfaction on complainants by way of collecting contribution from them.

7. That complainants should not be denied relief for not offering to do equity in their bill, because the bill in that case would have been multifarious; and this cannot apply in any event to the surety, Leopold.

Mr. Jno. J. McKinnon, for appellees: 1. The consideration whereon the complainants predicate their claims to the relief prayed, is inequitable.

What is there in this case that addresses itself to the consideration of a court of equity, one of whose maxims is, "he who seeks equity must be prepared to show that he has done and is ready to do equity?"

Look at the case: honest creditors engaged in a common defense which already evinced success, in the failure of one jury to agree on a verdict. These complainants and their confederate, Cohen, who now does the swearing, say that they, just as the case was called for trial a second time, secretly and without the knowledge of their co-defendants, by agreement with the common prosecutor, Unna, not to collect from them any part of the judgment that he might obtain, desisted and refrained from all further participation in the defense, and with their counsel, retired from the court room, leaving their confederates to be victimized while they went free.

Equality is equity; but we have yet to learn that he who secretly bargains for a benefit that must necessarily result to the injury of others standing in the same relation, falls within the definition.

It is a maxim of equity old as the doctrine itself, that "he that hath committed iniquity shall not have equity."

2. The defendants, Daniel L. Shearer and William Clark, were bona fide purchasers of the judgment for full and valuable consideration.

3. The complainants have no right, title, or interest in or to, and are in no manner or way liable for or on account of, the premises, in respect to which they seek to enjoin the marshal from making a deed.

Of the truth of this proposition there can be no doubt, because it is stated and sworn to by the complainants in their bill.

Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinio.. of the court:

Material facts are that David Sternberg and der the firm name and style of Sternberg & Edward Isidor, doing business at Chicago unIsidor, became largely indebted, and being unable to make payments as promptly as certain of their creditors desired, they confessed judg ments in their favor. Judgments were thus obtained by Morris Selz and Abraham Cohen. doing business under the name and style of Selz & Cohen; by Henry A. Kohn and Joseph Kohn, under the name and style of H. A. Kohn & Brother; by William M. Ross and John H. Ross, under the name and style

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