Courts. Supreme Court has jurisdiction on error to State court judgment refusing to give full faith and credit to judgment of sister State, pp. 310-314.

Cited and principle applied in Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 619, 620, 21 L. 434, 435, holding that a decree in New York overruling claim of an assignee in insolvency appointed in Massachusetts gave the Federal court jurisdiction; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 666, 686, 36 L. 1127, 1134, 13 S. Ct. 227, 235, holding that a judgment of Maryland court, denying faith and credit to a judgment of courts of New York, raised a Federal question; Cunningham v. Butler, 142 Mass. 49, 50, 56 Am. Rep. 659, 660, 6 N. E. 784, 785, holding that an assignee with consideration of a creditor will be enjoined from prosecuting in another State an attachment of a debtor's property there to the prejudice of the trustee in insolvency; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Fleming, 39 Neb. 688, 689, 42 Am. St. Rep. 619, 620, 58 N. W. 228, 229, 23 L. R. A. 213, 214, sustaining statute refusing to allow wages payable in State to be attached under judgment of another State; Van Cleaf v. Burns, 133 N. Y. 543, 30 N. E. 662, 15 L. R. A. 544, and n., holding that the effect of a divorce granted in another State on property rights in State of New York is governed by laws of the latter State. Cited in dissenting opinion in Matter of Bronson, 150 N. Y. 16, 44 N. E. 711, 34 L. R. A. 244, majority holding that stocks and bonds of New York State corporations bequeathed by a decedent domiciled in another State to residents of that State are subject to the transfer tax act of 1892.

Distinguished in Winona, etc., R. Co. v. Plainview, 143 U. S. 391, 36 L. 199, 12 S. Ct. 537, holding that refusal of State courts to accept decision of a Federal court, sustaining the validity of certain municipal bonds, did not constitute a Federal question.

Miscellaneous.-Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 145, 19 L. 111, a second appeal in principal case; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 132, 33 L. 548, 10 S. Ct. 277, in connection with S. C., in 7 Wall., 19 L., from which citation is made; Tillinghast v. Van Buskirk, 154 U. S. 553, 14 S. Ct. 1210, as decided by principal case, nature of case not reported; Rutherford v. Penn Mutual Ins. Co., 1 McCrary, 123, 1 Fed. 459, apparently a miscitation.

5 Wall. 318-325, 18 L. 489, DWYER v. DUNBAR.

Evidence.- Letter to third person by person available as witness, is inadmissible, p. 325.

Cited in Insurance Co. v. Guardiola, 129 U. S. 643, 32 L. 803, 9 8. Ct. 426, holding that letters by plaintiff's agents were incompetent to prove the facts therein recited as against third persons.

Evidence by deposition to prove the contents of a letter is secondary only, and in the absence of the letter itself is inadmissible, p. 325.

VOL. VI-45

Trial.-Court is not bound to give abstract instructions having no practical application to case, p. 325.

See note to 72 Am. Dec. 541, on this point.

5 Wall. 326-337, 18 L. 547, TOWNSEND v. GREELEY.

Public lands.- Act of 1857 for confirmation of California land claims, did not change the nature of estates in land held by individuals or towns, but provided the means of converting equitable claims into legal titles, p. 335.

Cited and approved in Trenouth v. San Francisco, 100 U. S. 255. 25 L. 627, holding that the title of the city of San Francisco rested on the decree of the Circuit Court of the 18th of May, 1865, and the confirmatory act of Congress; San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U. S. 671, 34 L. 1101, 11 S. Ct. 368, holding the act protected property rights both of pueblos and individuals; Knight v. United States Land Association, 142 U. S. 186, 35 L. 983, 12 S. Ct. 265, to same effect, and defining the established boundaries of San Francisco pueblo; City of Brownville v. Basse, 36 Tex. 504, as showing the right of a State to forfeit and regrant pueblo claims of former Mexican city.

Public lands.- Confirmation of a California land claim under act of 1857, establishes the legal title of the confirmee, but not the equitable relation between him and third parties, p. 335.

Cited and principle applied in Carpentier v. Montgomery, 13 Wall. 496, 20 L. 702, holding that an equitable claimant could not maintain action of ejectment against a confirmee; Widdicombe v. Childers, 124 U. S. 405, 31 L. 430, 8 S. Ct. 520, holding that a patent vested the patentee with the legal title, but did not determine the equities; Hedrick v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 167 U. S. 681, 42 L. 323, 17 S. Ct. 925, holding that a patentee of land, located by a wrong description by another under a bounty warrant, could not eject the equitable owner or his assignees: Bouldin v. Phelps, 12 Sawy. 314, 30 Fed. 561, holding that a claimant by derivative title, who has not presented his claim for confirmation, cannot maintain ejectment against a claimant whose claim is confirmed, even if he has acted fraudulently.

Public lands.- If a California land claim stated no trust, and none appeared, the legal title acquired by confirmation was, nevertheless, subject to the trust in hands of claimant, pp. 335, 336.

Cited and approved in Rector v. Gibbon, 111 U. S. 291, 4 S. Ct. 612, holding a court of equity will convert the holder of a patent title into a trustee for the true owner and compel him to convey the legal title; Sanford v. Sanford, 139 U. S. 646, 35 L. 291, 11 S. Ct. 667, holding that grant of a patent does not affect the equities, and equity will control the legal title so as to protect the just rights

of the true owner; Byrne v. Alas, 74 Cal. 640, 16 Pac. 528, holding that an Indian right of occupancy and possession was not disturbed by confirmation of a Mexican claim covering same land. Cited in dissenting opinion in Galliher v. Cadwell, 3 Wash. Ter. 514, 18 Pac.

72.

Public lands. By laws of Mexico, Pueblos were entitled to the use of the site of the pueblo and adjoining lands not exceeding four squares leagues. The pueblo right was limited to right to alienate portions to the inhabitants for building or cultivation and to use of remainder for common, for pasture lands or as a source of revenue, or for other public purposes, p. 336.

Cited and approved in Grisar v. McDowell, 6 Wall. 372, 18 L. 865, as a correct description of the pueblo title in San Francisco; Alexander v. Roulet, 13 Wall, 388, 20 L. 565, to same effect, and that after the conquest of California the prefect had no power to make a valid grant of pueblo land without confirmation by Congress: Palmer v. Low, 98 U. S. 16, 17, 25 L. 64, to same effect, and holding the city's right did not become absolute until July, 1864; Brownsville v. Cavazos, 100 U. S. 139, 25 L. 575, affirming S. C., 2 Woods, 298, F. C. 2,043, to same effect; applied to lands in Texas formerly part of the pueblo of Matamoras in Mexico; San Francisco v. Scott, 111 U. S. 768, 28 L. 593, 4 S. Ct. 688, to same effect, and holding that the question of the power of the alcade to grant pueblo land was not a Federal question; San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U. S. 664, 667, 34 L. 1099, 1100, 11 S. Ct. 366, 367, recounting the history of the San Francisco city lands as in principal case; Montgomery v. Bevans, 1 Sawy. 674, F. C. 9,735, showing that the claim of the city to the four square leagues was founded on the Mexican law and required confirmation; People v. Holladay, 68 Cal. 443, 9 Pac. 656, as to the title of city to Lafayette Square, as part of the pueblo land; Hale v. Akers, 69 Cal. 167, 10 Pac. 389, in deciding conflicting claim of titles under a confirmed Mexican grant and a confirmed pueblo grant; Baker v. Brickell, 87 Cal. 334, 25 Pac. 490. holding that on the confirmation of the title of the city of San Francisco to the outside lands, a widow in bona fide possession was entitled to a conveyance in fee from the city free from any trust for her children; Board of Education v. Martin, 92 Cal. 217, 28 Pac. 802, holding that schoolhouse sites did not pass by the Van Ness ordinance to the person in actual possession in 1855, nor could a title therein be acquired by adverse possession. Cited in general discussion in United States v. San Pedro, etc., Co., 4 N. Mex. 307. 17 Pac. 419.

Municipal corporations. The municipal lands of the city of San Francisco, as successor to the former Mexican pueblo, are held only in trust for its inhabitants, and are not the subject of seizure and sale under judgment and execution against the city, p. 337.

Cited and principle applied in San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 557, holding that city lands were not subject to levy and forced sale on execution, nor subject to alienation, except in accordance with the trust, collecting authorities; Ames v. San Diego, 101 Cal. 392, 35 Pac. 1006, holding that city lands of San Diego could not be sold under an execution sale, but, where not dedicated to any public purpose, title could be acquired by adverse possession.

Miscellaneous.- Grisar v. McDowell, 6 Wall. 379, 18 L. 868, in recounting history of litigation respecting San Francisco pueblo lands; United States v. Santa Fe, 165 U. S. 704, 41 L. 885, 17 S. Ct. 483, to same effect; San Francisco v. United States, 4 Sawy. 584, F. C. 12,316, as to withdrawal of the appeals. See historical note to this case, giving the history of the pueblo from its establishment, in 1834.

5 Wall. 337-338, 18 L. 681, TOWNSEND v. BURBANK.

Municipal corporations.- Municipal lands of city of San Francisco are held only in trust for its inhabitants, and are not the subject of seizure and sale under judgment and execution against the city, p. 337.

Cited and applied in San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 557, to same effect.

5 Wall. 338-341, 18 L. 603, FRANCIS v. UNITED STATES. War.- Act of Congress of August 6, 1861, is an act for confiscation of property used for insurrectionary purposes; collector of customs is not the seizing officer nor entitled to share in the fines and penalties inflicted by the act, p. 341.

Approved in United States v. Athens Armory, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 141, 35 Ga. 355, F. C. 14,473, arguendo, but not deciding whether the acts of August and July, 1862, were criminal or civil statutes.

War.- Under confiscation act of Congress of August 6, 1861, the informer must be a party to the proceeding in its inception, else it would be wholly for the benefit of the United States, p. 341.

Distinguished in United States v. Funkhouser, 4 Biss. 184, F. C. 15,177, as inapplicable to a claim under the act of 1866 (14 Stat. 145), to share in proceeds of forfeited goods as first informer.

5 Wall. 342-370, 18 L. 646, THE GRAY JACKET.

Admiralty.— Order for further proof is always made with extreme caution, and only when ends of justice clearly require it; the court examines the testimony before exercising its discretion, p. 368.

Cited and followed in Sorensen v. Keyser, 51 Fed. 32, 2 U. S. App. 177, refusing an application to bring parol evidence to explain what

parties meant by the use of unambiguous words in a charter-party; The Venezuela, 52 Fed. 875, 1 U. S. App. 314, holding that under rule 7 the court was not bound on the appeal to receive testimony which ought to have been, but was not, produced at the trial; The Adula, 89 Fed. 355, refusing to allow further proof where the evidence clearly showed control by the enemy.

War.- Pardon proclamation of president, in 1863, does not cover case of vessel seized flagrante delicto, running blockade of Southern ports, pp. 367-368.

War.- Property coming from enemy's country is enemy's property, liable to seizure, irrespective of domicile, guilt or innocence of owner, p. 369.

Miscellaneous.- Erroneous citation in Parrott's Chinese case, 6 Sawy. 356, 1 Fed. 488, intended for 15 Wall. 454, 21 L. 204.

5 Wall. 370-371, 18 L. 646, THE GRAY JACKET.

Courts - Supreme Court practice.- Where United States is a party and is represented by attorney-general, his assistant or by special counsel, no counsel can be heard in opposition on behalf of any other department of the government, p. 371.

Cited and followed in Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 458, 19 L. 198, affirming the power of the attorney-general to dismiss or remand for dismissal cases in which the United States was a party, and that an informer was not entitled to resist the motions.

5 Wall. 372-376, 18 L. 646, THE HAMPTON.

War.-Mortgage of a ship is not entitled to any priority on the capture of a vessel as a prize of war; it creates only a lien on the property mortgaged, pp. 374, 375.

Cited and principle applied in The Battle, 6 Wall. 498, 18 L. 933, holding that capture as prize of war, jure belli, overrides all previous liens; The Siren, 7 Wall. 162, 19 L. 133, holding that claims for maritime torts may be dealt with by Prize Courts, but outstanding claims on the vessel existing previous to the capture cannot be considered.

War.- Act of July, 13, 1861, empowering secretary of treasury to remit penalties and forfeitures of property liable to confiscation to United States, has no reference to cases of condemnation as prize of war, p. 376.

War.- Congress has full control over the law of prize as administered in the courts of the United States, but the statutes of 1861 and 1863, relating to confiscation during the Civil War, show no intention to modify that law, p. 376.