of an unpatented mining claim to an alien, and his subsequent conveyance to a corporation qualified to hold, passed a valid title and no forfeiture arose. Cited in dissenting opinion in Tibbitts v. Ah Tong, 4 Mont. 550, 2 Pac. 768, majority holding that if a possessory title to mineral lands passed into the hands of an alien, it reverted to the government and became open to relocation.

5 Wall. 268-290, 18 L. 572, CROXALL v. SHERERD.

Husband and wife.- Post-nuptial settlement construed and contention that donee of first tenant in tail took a legal estate assumed as true, pp. 270-271, 283.

Cited in Green v. Green, 23 Wall. 491, 23 L. 77, construing a similar instrument.

Wills.- Rule in Shelley's case applies alike to equitable and legal estates, and an equitable estate tail may be barred in the same manner as an estate tail at law, and in no other way, p. 281.

Cited in Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 697, holding that in no case whatever of a trust executed have the words "heirs" or "heirs of the body," following a limitation to the ancestor for life, received a construction in equitable estates different from that which the same limitation would receive in legal estates.

Trusts Deeds. Use limited on a use is not executed by statute of uses, which executes only the first use. In a deed of bargain and sale the whole force of the statute is exhausted in transferring the legal title in fee simple to the bargainee. But the second use may be valid as a trust and enforced in equity according to the rights of the parties, p. 282.

Cited and relied upon in Reid v. Gordon, 35 Md. 183, holding that where, under a devise to a wife for life, remainder to children, the wife on remarriage conveyed her estate to trustees, they took the legal estate for her life, and her estate became equitable; Brown v. Renshaw, 57 Md. 76, holding as established law that no use can be limited to arise out of the estate of a bargainee to a third person; Phillpotts v. Blasdel, 8 Nev. 78, holding that under a bargain and sale to A. for the use of B., A. having the legal estate was the proper plaintiff in an action to recover possession of mining property; Martling v. Martling, 55 N. J. Eq. 780, 39 Atl. 204, holding the statute of uses was in substance re-enacted in State by section 7 of the act of March 17, 1714. See note to 78 Am. Dec. 407, on statute of uses, use upon a use.

Trusts.- Equity considers the cestui que trust to be actually seized of the freehold. He may alien it, and his deed will have the same operation in equity on the trust as it would have had at law on the legal estate. The trust, like the legal estate, is descendible, devisable, alienable and barrable by act of parties and by matter

372, 378, holding that where it was clear that only those remaindermen who should be living at the termination of the particular estate should take, the remainder which became vested on the execution of the deed was divested as to such as died during the continuance of the particular estate; Kingsley v. Broward, 19 Fla. 743, holding that a remainderman under a deed by which the termination of a life estate would give him the right of possession, had from the moment of its creation, a vested remainder, which was not affected by his death in the lifetime of the tenant for life; Starnes v. Hill, 112 N. C. 12, 16 S. E. 1014, 22 L. R. A. 602, holding that under a limitation to A. for life, and in the event that B. should outlive A., then to B. for life, with remainder to the heirs of B., B. took a contingent remainder, which did not become a fee until the happening of the contingency.

Remainders. A remainder limited upon an estate tail is held to be vested, though it be uncertain whether it will ever take effect in possession, p. 288.

Adverse possession.- A bona fide purchaser, with possession for the prescribed period from a party in possession, supposed to have a valid title, obtains an absolute title to the land, good as against all the world. When the statute has begun to run it continues to run until its effect is complete, p. 289.

Cited and principle applied in Merryman v. Bourne, 9 Wall. 600, 19 L. 686, holding that the vendee in fee in possession from a vendor, under a writ of restitution and judgment, held adversely to all the world and was not estopped to subsequently deny his vendor's title; Villa v. Rodriguez, 12 Wall. 338, 20 L. 410, holding that one having the right of purchase under an executory contract cannot defend as a bona fide purchaser; Meeks v. Olpherts, 100 U. S. 570, 25 L. 738, holding that under a statute of California a purchaser under an invalid decree for sale, of the Probate Court, who had held peaceable possession for sixteen years, had a valid title as against both administrator and heirs; Bicknell v. Comstock, 113 U. S. 152, 28 L. 963, 5 S. Ct. 400, holding that a patentee of government land and his grantees, holding continued uninterrupted possession thereunder for ten years, had a perfect title, not affected by the commissioner of the land office subsequently recalling and destroying the patent; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 623, 29 L. 485, 6 S. Ct. 211, holding that a possessory title of real or personal property is not affected by a repeal of the statute of limitations under which the title was perfected; Maxwell Land Grant Co. v. Dawson, 151 U. S. 607, 38 L. 286, 14 S. Ct. 465, holding that, under statute of New Mexico, an owner who allowed another to take possession of land, claim it as his own and continue such possession for an unin terrupted period of ten years, was absolutely barred from recovery; Partee v. Thomas, 11 Fed. 778, holding the statute bars both legal

Cited in Bybee v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 11 Sawy. 486, 26 Fed. 591, holding that the company, as purchaser, was not estopped to deny the right of its vendor to construct a ditch on land which belonged to the company.

Remainders. A remainder is never held to be contingent when, consistently with the intention, it can be held to be vested. Present capacity to take effect in possession, if precedent estate should determine, distinguishes a vested from a contingent remainder, pp. 287, 288.

Cited and relied upon in Poor v. Considine, 6 Wall. 478, 18 L. 875, defining a vested remainder as where a present interest passes to a certain and definite person, but to be enjoyed in futuro; McArthur v. Allen, 15 Fed. Cas. 1212, showing the necessity for the interposition of trustees to preserve contingent remainders; Olmstead v. Dunn, 72 Ga. 860, holding, in wills, words of survivorship refer to the death of the testator in order to vest remainders; Wilbur v. McNulty, 75 Ga. 463, construing a trust to convey to the children of life tenant, after his death, share and share alike in fee, with remainders over in default of any such children, as a trust to hold for the use of the tenant for life, with a vested remainder to her children if more than one; Clanton v. Estes, 77 Ga. 359, 1 S. E. 165, holding that words of survivorship in wills are made to refer to the death of the testator in order to vest the remainder; Hoover v. Hoover, 116 Ind. 501, 19 N. E. 469, construing a devise by will to wife for life and at her death to son if living, and if he should be dead, to his widow till death or remarriage, then to his heirs as a vested, not contingent, remainder; Bruce v. Bissell, 119 Ind. 530, 12 Am. St. Rep. 441, 22 N. E. 6, construing a devise in a will, where the first tenant for life outlived the subsequent tenant for life and her lineal issue, holding that the son of the second tenant, who was alive at the testator's death, took a vested estate in remainder; Corey v. Springer, 138 Ind. 509, 37 N. E. 323, holding that a devise to children, after death of the wife, created a conditional fee in expectancy, which would become an absolute fee on death of the widow; Bunting v. Speek, 41 Kan. 446, 21 Pac. 296, 3 L. R. A. 699, and n., in defining distinction between remainders vested and contingent; Seabrook v. Gregg, 2 S. C. 78, holding, under limitations of a will (too long to be stated), the issue of a tenant for life took a vested interest liable to be defeated in the event of their dying under the age of twenty-one.

Remainders. A grant to A. for life and to such of his children as should be living after his death vests an immediate present right to the future possession in such as are living, subject to open and let in after-born children and to be divested as to those who die without issue, p. 288.

Cited and relied upon in Smaw v. Young, 109 Ala. 533, 548, 20 So.

372, 378, holding that where it was clear that only those remaindermen who should be living at the termination of the particular estate should take, the remainder which became vested on the execution of the deed was divested as to such as died during the continuance of the particular estate; Kingsley v. Broward, 19 Fla. 743, holding that a remainderman under a deed by which the termination of a life estate would give him the right of possession, had from the moment of its creation, a vested remainder, which was not affected by his death in the lifetime of the tenant for life; Starnes v. Hill, 112 N. C. 12, 16 S. E. 1014, 22 L. R. A. 602, holding that under a limitation to A. for life, and in the event that B. should outlive A., then to B. for life, with remainder to the heirs of B., B. took a contingent remainder, which did not become a fee until the happening of the contingency.

Remainders.- A remainder limited upon an estate tail is held to be vested, though it be uncertain whether it will ever take effect in possession, p. 288.

Adverse possession.- A bona fide purchaser, with possession for the prescribed period from a party in possession, supposed to have a valid title, obtains an absolute title to the land, good as against all the world. When the statute has begun to run it continues to run until its effect is complete, p. 289.

Cited and principle applied in Merryman v. Bourne, 9 Wall. 600, 19 L. 686, holding that the vendee in fee in possession from a vendor, under a writ of restitution and judgment, held adversely to all the world and was not estopped to subsequently deny his vendor's title; Villa v. Rodriguez, 12 Wall. 338, 20 L. 410, holding that one having the right of purchase under an executory contract cannot defend as a bona fide purchaser; Meeks v. Olpherts, 100 U. S. 570, 25 L. 738, holding that under a statute of California a purchaser under an invalid decree for sale, of the Probate Court, who had held peaceable possession for sixteen years, had a valid title as against both administrator and heirs; Bicknell v. Comstock, 113 U. S. 152, 28 L. 963, 5 S. Ct. 400, holding that a patentee of government land and his grantees, holding continued uninterrupted possession thereunder for ten years, had a perfect title, not affected by the commissioner of the land office subsequently recalling and destroying the patent; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 623, 29 L. 485, 6 S. Ct. 211, holding that a possessory title of real or personal property is not affected by a repeal of the statute of limitations under which the title was perfected; Maxwell Land Grant Co. v. Dawson, 151 U. S. 607, 38 L. 286, 14 S. Ct. 465, holding that, under statute of New Mexico, an owner who allowed another to take possession of land, claim it as his own and continue such possession for an unin terrupted period of ten years, was absolutely barred from recovery; Partee v. Thomas, 11 Fed. 778, holding the statute bars both legal

and equitable remedies, and when the trustee is barred of his legal remedy the cestui que trust is also barred, notwithstanding any disability in him to sue; M'Claskey v. Barr, 42 Fed. 613, holding that adverse possession ripens into title, which vests as soon as the remedy against the adverse holder is barred by the statute; Robinson v. Thornton, 102 Cal. 684, 34 Pac. 122, holding that a purchaser remaining in adverse possession under a deed for the statutory period, and paying all taxes, had a perfect title as against those claiming under prior tax deeds and sheriff's deed; King v. Carmichael, 136 Ind. 27, 43 Am. St. Rep. 308, 35 N. E. 512, holding that a purchaser from a co-tenant, under a deed purporting to convey title to the whole, holds a possession adverse to the other cotenants; Sutton v. Pollard, 96 Ky. 644, 29 S. W. 637, holding that a vendee who enters under a deed, whether defective or not, can hold and claim adversely to all the world, including his own vendors; Jones v. Madison Co., 72 Miss. 808, 18 So. 94, holding that though a tenant cannot dispute his landlord's title to the reversion, yet to defend his term he may employ any defense which does not controvert the reversionary right of the landlord nor violate the terms of his own contract; Spottiswoode v. Morris, 61 N. J. L. 328, 40 Atl. 507, holding that possession under section 2 of the State act of June 5, 1787 (Gen. Stat., p. 1972) would confer a valid title not only against the tenant in tail, but also all persons claiming by descent per formam doni through him; Baker v. Oakwood, 123 N. Y. 29, 25 N. E. 315, 10 L. R. A. 392, holding that continuous adverse possession for the statutory period divested owner of his estate, which passed to the party in possession; Gallagher v. Bennett, 38 Tex. 295, holding that the tenant in possession under a fraudulent lease may, in good faith, buy a superior title and set it up against the landlord in his suit to recover possession. Cited in general discussion in United States v. California, etc., Land Co., 148 U. S. 41, 87 L. 359, 13 S. Ct. 462, as to effect and essentials of plea of bona fide purchase without notice; St. Paul, etc., R. Co. v. Sage, 49 Fed. 320, 4 U. S. App. 160, holding that Federal courts in equity will follow State courts in applying the State statute of limitations. Distinguished in Dalles City v. Missionary Society, 6 Sawy. 145, 6 Fed. 374, holding that the action of Congress in providing for payment of compensation for improvements at the Dalles, Oregon, was not to be taken as any admission of title to the land.

5 Wall. 290-307, 18 L. 475, CHRISTMAS v. RUSSELL.

Limitations of actions.- Statutes of limitations operating prospectively do not impair vested rights or the obligations of contracts. If not unreasonable in their terms their validity cannot be questioned, p. 300.

Cited and ruling applied in Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 633, 24 L. 366, affirming constitutionality of statute of Georgia reducing