Distinguished in Ex parte Cutting, 94 U. S. 21, 24 L. 51, holding that in all the cases in which persons have been treated as parties to a suit without order they have been cited or recognized as parties in the subsequent proceedings; Flash v. Wilkerson, 22 Fed. 691, holding that where a case, begun in State court, was removed into Federal court, that court would follow the State law as to admission of general creditors.

Miscellaneous.- Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 35, 30 L. 1086, 7 S. Ct. 1070, referring more particularly to Seaver v. Bigelows, infra.

5 Wall. 208-211, 18 L. 595, SEAVER V. BIGELOWS.

Appeal and error.- - Supreme Court has no jurisdiction, on appeal by one of several creditors against a fund amounting to $5,000, where appealing creditor's claim is less than $2,000, pp. 210, 211.

Citing cases which make application of this holding in dismissing appeals on the ground of no jurisdiction are: Merrill v. Petty, 16 Wall. 345, 21 L. 501, holding, in a libel for damages by collision, with decree for less than $2,000 and costs, that a recovery in another suit arising out of same collision could not be added to confer jurisdiction; Paving Co. v. Mulford, 100 U. S. 148, 25 L. 591, a suit against several defendants to recover certificates of indebtedness, where the liability of each was separate and under $2,500; Chatfield v. Boyle, 105 U. S. 233, 26 L. 945, bill by creditors to set aside a debtor's fraudulent conveyance, holding the matter in dispute was not the entire fund under the trust deed, but only the distributive shares of each creditor in it; Russell v. Stansell, 105 U. S. 304, 26 L. 990, a bill by several owners to enjoin collection of an assessment on a levee district, where no individual assessment exceeded $2,500; Ex parte Baltimore & O. R. Co., 106 U. S. 6, 27 L. 78, 1 S. Ct. 36, libel in collision, where the owner of the vessel and owner of the cargo joined in the libel and the damages awarded each was under $5,000; Schwed v. Smith, 106 U. S. 189, 190, 27 L. 157, 1 S. Ct. 222, bill by several attaching creditors to set aside a judgment by confession for over $5,000 as fraudulent, where the amount of each creditor's claim was less than $5,000; Farmers' Loan, etc., Co. v. Waterman, 106 U. S. 271, 27 L. 117, 1 S. Ct. 135, appeal in foreclosure proceedings against an order establishing the claims of certain lienors, each less than $5,000, the causes of action of the lienors being distinct; Hawley v. Fairbanks, 108 U. S. 549, 27 L. 822, 2 S. Ct. 851, where several judgment creditors on municipal railway bonds united in a petition to compel the levy of an assessment to pay the judgments, appeal dismissed where individual judgment did not exceed $5,000, retained as to the judgments exceeding that amount; Fourth Nat. Bank v. Stout, 113 U. S. 686, 28 L. 1152, 5 S. Ct. 695, suit by separate judgment creditors, others

joining as intervenors by leave of court, to recover pro rata share of property in hands of a bank, where each individual claim was less than $5,000; Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 64, 29 L. 331, 5 S. Ct. 1164, appeal from separate decrees in bill by creditors to reach property of debtor alleged to have been fraudulently transferred, dismissed as to those whose decrees were for less than $5,000; Henderson v. Wadsworth, 115 U. S. 276, 29 L. 379, 6 S. Ct. 43, in suit against heirs to enforce liability on ancestor's note where separate judgments were rendered against each for his proportion, writs of error by the heirs dismissed as to those whose contra judgments were for less than $5,000; Ex parte Phoenix Ins. Co., 117 U. S. 369, 29 L. 924, 6 S. Ct. 772, in a single suit to recover on separate fire policies issued by several companies, where judgment was for payment of distinct amounts, each less than $5,000; Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 34, 35, 36, 38, 30 L. 1086, 1087, 7 S. Ct. 1070, 1071, 1072, suit by general creditors, only one of whose debts exceeded $5,000, to set aside an assignment as fraudulent, appeal dismissed as to all but that creditor; Clay v. Field, 138 U. S. 479, 34 L. 1049, 11 S. Ct. 425, bill for an accounting on dissolution of partnership in which a separate decree was rendered against the widow of a deceased partner, directing return of money obtained under a judgment for her dower for less than $5,000, held she could not appeal; Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., 147 U. S. 373, 37 L. 208, 13 S. Ct. 350, bill to enjoin collection of taxes in three counties, the amount of the tax in each county being less than $2,000; Hunt v. Bender, 154 U. S. 556, 18 L. 915, 14 S. Ct. 1163, bill by several creditors to subject property to the satisfaction of their judgments where neither judgment exceeded $2,000.

In the following cases the Federal courts refused jurisdiction because the amount in controversy did not amount to the statutory requirement: Rich v. Bray, 37 Fed. 276, 2 L. R. A. 227, and n., bill by heirs-at-law non-resident against two resident heirs, for an accounting and distribution, where the respective interests of the heirs were less than $2,000; Sioux Falls Nat. Bank v. Swenson, 48 Fed. 623, 624, bill by a bank, on behalf of itself and its stockholders, to restrain collection of taxes where none of the taxes assessed exceeded $2,000; Putney v. Whitmire, 66 Fed. 387, bill by several creditors, none of whose claims exceeded $2,000, to set aside mortgages as fraudulent; Busey v. Smith, 67 Fed. 16, bill by creditor of a de ceased to subject shares of the estate in the hands of several heirs to payment of the debt, the liability of the heirs being several and under $2,000 each; Smithson v. Hubbell, 81 Fed. 594, suit in equity against receiver of an insolvent national bank by a creditor whose claim was under $2,000; Wheless v. City of St. Louis, 96 Fed. 867, 868, holding separate property owners cannot unite in suit in Federal court to enjoin making of a street assessment where no individual assessment amounts to $2,000.

In suits in State courts the following cases cite and apply the principle: Guarantee Trust, etc., Co. v. Buddington, 23 Fla. 518, 522, 2 So. 887, 889, holding that neither co-defendants nor co-plaintiffs can unite their separate and distinct interests on appeal so as to make up the jurisdictional amount necessary; Umbarger v. Watts, 25 Gratt. 173, bill by husband and wife to subject a life estate to the lien of a judgment, other creditors coming in before decree, but no claim amounting to $500, holding there was no jurisdiction of an appeal; Hartsook v. Crawford, 85 Va. 416, 7 S. E. 540, in sult against sureties of an administrator, holding the jurisdiction was governed by the claims of the suing creditors; Fleshman v. Fleshman, 34 W. Va. 348, 12 S. E. 715, bill by several beneficiaries under a will, whose individual interests were less than jurisdictional amount, for settlement of account and distribution. Cited, arguendo, in Skirving v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 59 Fed. 745, 19 U. S. App. 442.

Distinguished in The Connemara, 103 U. S. 755, 26 L. 322, sustaining an appeal in a case of claim by a set of salvors for a single salvage service, where a total sum was awarded and distributed, holding the decree to be in effect one decree in favor of all the salvors; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bonner Mercantile Co., 44 Fed. 157, 11 L. R. A. 628, and n., in bill by several insurance companies to enjoin prosecution of an action at law on an award, the court sustained its jurisdiction where it did not appear that the policies had a pro rata clause and the amount of each policy exceeded $2,000; Nat. Bank v. Allen, 90 Fed. 556, 61 U. S. App. 123, overruling demurrer to jurisdiction of Federal court on ground that the limitation in judiciary act does not apply to an intervention by a judgment creditor in a pending suit by a creditor for over $2,000.

Appeal and error.- Several persons whose individual interests are less than the jurisdictional amount cannot, by joining in an appeal, give jurisdiction to the appellate court, p. 211, note.

Cited in Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 35, 30 L. 1086, 7 S. Ct. 1070, as intended to cover two other cases of a similar character.

5 Wall. 211-268, 18 L. 627, UNITED STATES v. REPENTIGNY. War. The inhabitants of a conquered country, who remain and transfer their allegiance to conqueror, are entitled to protection and security in their private property by new government, p. 260.

Cited and applied in Knight v. United States Land Association, 142 U. S. 184, 35 L. 982, 12 S. Ct. 265, to the title of the pueblo in San Francisco; Coburn v. San Mateo Co., 75 Fed. 528, holding that a grant of lands in California, bordering "to the west on the sea," did not include the tide lands below high-water mark; Crane v. Reeder, 21 Mich. 63, 4 Am. Rep. 436, in decreeing a title to land in

Michigan, alleged to have escheated by the death of owner, leaving only alien heirs under the provisions of the "North West Treaty."

Public lands.- Claim to land, granted upon condition of formation of a settlement thereon, is lost by abandonment for over a century after a temporary occupancy for four years, p. 267.

Cited in Muse v. Arlington Hotel Co., 68 Fed. 649, holding that a claim under a Spanish grant will be considered as abandoned, when no attempt is made to establish it for seventy years after dismissal of suit for confirmation.

Treaties. Under treaty of 1783 with Great Britain, United States succeeded to all rights in territory which passed from France to England by treaty of 1763, within the boundaries agreed upon, p. 267.

Affirmed in Crane v. Reeder, 21 Mich. 74, 4 Am. Rep. 443, as to lands in Michigan of which the owner had died leaving only alien heirs.

Public lands.- Before land can be held forfeited for default in observing conditions of grant, a judicial inquiry should be instituted, or office found, or its legal equivalent. A legislative act directing possession and appropriation of the land is equivalent to office found, pp. 267, 268.

The following citing cases make application of this principle: Bennett v. Hunter, 9 Wall. 336, 19 L. 676, holding the income tax act of 1861 (12 Stat. 294) did not work a forfeiture for failure to pay tax; Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 63, 22 L. 555, holding that no one can sue for breach of a condition subsequent annexed to a fee but the grantor, his heirs or successors, and the same rule applies to grants upon condition from the government; Farnsworth v. Minnesota, etc., R. Co., 92 U. S. 67, 23 L. 535, holding that where property is granted for the construction of public works, any public assertion of State ownership by legislative act, after default of the grantee, will be effectual; McMicken v. United States, 97 U. S. 218, 24 L. 952, holding that actual entry or office found is not necessary to enable the government to resume possession of forfeited lands; New Orleans R. Co. v. United States, 124 U. S. 130, 31 L. 386, 8 S. Ct. 420, holding the legislature might, by a subsequent act, impose conditions on the granting of a patent to a railroad company which was in default; Bybee v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 139 U. S. 675, 35 L. 307, 11 S. Ct. 643, holding that the provision in the Central Pacific railroad land grant for avoiding the grant for failure to complete the road was a condition subsequent, enforceable only by the government; New York Indians v. United States, 170 U. S. 25, 42 L. 935, 18 S. Ct. 537, in construing the forfeiture clause in the treaty with the New York Indians, holding that their rights in the lands set apart for them in Kansas were not lost; Southern Pacific R. Co.

v. Orton, 6 Sawy. 183, 32 Fed. 471, holding an individual could not attack the title to the railway lands on the ground of forfeiture to the United States or the State; Schenck v. Peay, 21 Fed. Cas. 683, holding that the United States had power to denounce an absolute forfeiture of lands as a consequence of non-payment of a direct tax thereon; United States v. Willamette Val., etc., Co., 55 Fed. 718, holding that where a condition subsequent was attached to a public grant, forfeiture could only be asserted by judicial proceedings or by a legislative enactment; Sioux City, etc., R. Co. v. Countryman, 83 Iowa, 181, 49 N. W. 75, holding that under an act of Congress granting lands in aid of railroad construction, the State could make no valid grant unless earned according to the conditions; Owens v. Owens, 25 S. C. 161, holding that land became forfeited and vested in the State when it was exposed for sale for unpaid taxes with no bidders; City of Brownsville v. Basse, 36 Tex. 500, 504, holding that the act of 1850, incorporating the city of Brownsville and granting certain lands to the city, was equivalent to a judicial forfeiture or office found; Martin v. Snowden, 18 Gratt. 127, holding that if the intention of an act providing that lands shall be forfeited to the State for non-payment of taxes is clear, no inquisition is required to divest the title of the owners; State v. Sponaugle, 45 W. Va. 428, 32 S. E. 288, 43 L. R. A. 733, holding that if the State Constitution, ipso facto, divested an owner of his title for non-payment of taxes, and vested it in the State, it was within the power of the State, under the tax power, to do so.

Distinguished and qualified in St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. McGee, 115 U. S. 474, 29 L. 448, 6 S. Vt. 125, construing grants to Arkansas and Missouri by act of 1853.

Public lands.-The mode of asserting a forfeited grant is subject to legislative authority of government; it may be after judicial învestigation, or by taking possession directly under authority of government, p. 268.

Cited and rule applied in Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 64, 22 L. 555, holding that State had title to lands granted by act of June 3, 1856, no action having been taken to enforce a forfeiture; Atlantic & Pac. R. Co. v. Mingus, 165 U. S. 433, 41 L. 778, 17 S. Ct. 353, sustaining validity of act forfeiting a portion of the land granted to the railroad company for failure to comply with conditions of the grant; Iron Mountain R. Co. v. City of Memphis, 96 Fed. 127, holding that a city ordinance forfeiting a railway franchise for breach of condition is legislative and within the meaning of section 10, article 1 of the Federal Constitution; De Lancey v. Piepgras, 138 N. Y. 40, 33 N. E. 825, holding that an act directing appropriation, or any other legislative assertion of ownership, was the equivalent of an inquest of office at common law; Gorman Mining Co. v. Alexander, 2 S. Dak. 566, 51 N. W. 348, holding that the conveyance VOL. VI-44