Charities.- A charity is a peculiar subject of jurisdiction of Chancery Court, and in cases of abuse or misuse of the charity by trustees or agents in charge, court will interpose to enforce execution of the trust, p. 169.

Cited and principle applied in Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 481, 43 N. W. 652, 5 L. R. A. 863, affirming power of a court of equity to appoint a new trustee of a charity, the beneficiary being a public corporation; Brown v. Meeting Street Baptist Society, 9 R. I. 186, holding that if an estate held on a trust for charitable purposes is misapplied, the remedy is not forfeiture, but a suit in equity to enforce the trust.

Charities. The chancery power to sanction the alienation of property held on charitable trusts, to promote the interest of the charity, is, in State of Connecticut, exercised by its legislature; the Supreme Court will not revise the facts on which the power has been exercised, pp. 169, 170.

This ruling has been cited and followed in Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 286, 18 L. 579, affirming validity of private act of the New Jersey legislature of 1818, barring an estate tail and dividing it between the children in fee; Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall. 624, 19 L. 207, affirming validity of act of Wisconsin of 1853, creating the city of Beloit and segregating its territory out of former town of Beloit; Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 183, 27 L. 405, 2 S. Ct. 344, holding that a condition prohibiting alienation of the land on which a schoolroom stood, would not prevent the Court of Chancery from permitting its sale in case of necessity; Tindal v. Drake, 60 Ala. 178, sustaining private act of Alabama, directing sale of an infant's lands; Treadway v. Schnauber, 1 Dak. Ter. 271, 46 N. W. 476, affirming the validity of act of Congress of 27th of May, 1872, in relation to the Dakota Southern Railroad Company, although retrospective; Littell v. Wallace, 80 Ky. 254, holding that a sale of a church parsonage could be authorized by legislative act; Richardson v. Knight, 69 Me. 289, holding that when specific property is held in trust without power of sale the legislature may authorize a sale and reinvestment; Old South Society v. Crocker, 119 Mass. 26, 20 Am. Rep. 310, holding that land authorized by law to be held by an incorporated church for the support of public worship, might be sold by authority of the legislature; Academy of the Visitation v. Clemens, 50 Mo. 171, court of equity may authorize conversion of trust property, which had become unfit for the purposes designed by the grantor; Lackland v. Walker, Mo.-, 52 S. W. 426, 428, 431, affirming power of Court of Chancery to decree a sale of property held on a charitable trust created by will under statutory authority; Mercer Home, Fisher's Appeal, 162 Pa. St. 239, 29 Atl. 733, holding that the assent of the State was now given to a sale of propery held under a charitable trust through the Orphans' Court under the Price

act; Brown v. Meeting Street Baptist Society, 9 R. I. 185, 189, holding that the court under its chancery powers could sanction the sale of real estate held upon trust for charitable purposes. Cited, arguendo, in Ould v. Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 312, 24 L. 452, saying that under proper circumstances the legislature or a court of equity could authorize sale of trust property forbidden by the trust. Cited in general discussion in Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 135, 38 Am. St. Rep. 355, 26 Atl. 850, as to the powers of the legislature and courts of the State to administer cy pres relief in matters of charitable trusts. Cited in dissenting opinion in School Board v. Stuart, 80 Va. 76, majority holding that funds dedicated to public uses are subject to the control of the legislature.

5 Wall. 170-178, 18 L. 622, THE DASHING WAVE.

War. A neutral is bound when discharging or receiving cargo to keep his vessel so clearly on neutral side of the boundary line as to repel all imputation of intent to break blockade; failure to do so warrants capture of and payment of costs and charges by offending ship, p. 177.

Followed in The Olinde Rodrigues, 174 U. S. 536, 19 S. Ct. 862, holding that damages and costs will be denied when there was probable cause of seizure.

5 Wall. 180-182, 18 L. 627, THE TERESITA.

War.- Temporary anchorage in waters occupied by blockading vessels does not justify capture in absence of other grounds, and entitles captured vessel to costs and expenses, p. 182.

Not cited.

5 Wall. 183-188, 18 L. 693, THE JENNY.

War-Prize. In case of libel as prize of war, burden of proving neutral ownership of ship and cargo is upon claimants, p. 188. Cited in note to 2 Dall. (Pa.) 21, to this point.

5 Wall. 188-190, 18 L. 676, EX PARTE MILWAUKEE R. R. CO. Appeal and error.- - Appeal bond is not to be rejected because sureties do not reside within the Circuit Court district from which the case comes up, pp. 189, 190.

Cited in Taylor v. Life Association, 3 Fed. 470, holding that non-resident litigants in the Federal courts should not be restricted to finding sureties away from their homes, in the place where the court is held.

Mandamus.-Discretion of judge of lower court in accepting or refusing a bond on appeal will not be controlled by mandamus, p. 190.

Cited in Hudson v. Parker, 156 U. S. 289, 39 L. 428, 15 S. Ct. 455, holding mandamus will not issue to control the discretion of judge as to the persons to be accepted as sureties on a bond.

Appeal and error.- Where case is properly in Supreme Court by appeal, the court may direct issue of a supersedeas to lower court on filing of bond in Supreme Court, p. 190.

Cited and ruling applied in Edmonson v. Bloomshire, 7 Wall, 311, 19 L. 92, holding a bond not essential to a valid appeal, it could be given in the appellate court; Slaughter-House Cases, 10 Wall. 292, 19 L. 920, and French v. Shoemaker, 12 Wall. 100, 20 L. 271, both holding that the Supreme Court can issue a supersedeas to a judgment of a subordinate court only in certain cases, including an Improper rejection of the sureties to a bond because of non-resi dence in the district; In re Claasen, 140 U. S. 208, 35 L. 412, 11 S. Ct. 738, holding the court has power to issue supersedeas under revised statutes, section 716, and that Supreme Court rule 36 had been adopted to remove all doubt on the subject; Hudson v. Parker, 156 U. S. 281, 39 L. 425, 15 S. Ct. 452, holding that under act of March 3, 1891, the Supreme Court may allow a writ of error and supersedeas in a case of an infamous not capital crime; Gunn v. Black, 60 Fed. 160, 19 U. S. App. 489, holding that on a proper application, presenting the facts, the Circuit Court of Appeals could issue a supersedeas.

5 Wall. 190-194, 18 L. 545, BARTON v. FORSYTH.

Appeal and error.- An order on motion to set aside a writ of restitution, issued after a writ of possession, is not a final appealable judgment, p. 193.

Cited and approved in United States v. Abatoir Place, 106 U. S. 162, 27 L. 129, 1 S. Ct. 171, specifying various judgments which were not final and on which writ of error would not lie, collecting authorities; The Elmira, 16 Fed. 139, holding an order denying a motion of a surety in admiralty to set aside the marshal's execution on his property, not a final order nor appealable; Gunn v. Black, 60 Fed. 161, 19 U. S. App. 489, holding that where both parties had appealed from a decree, an order on motion, for the purpose of executing the decree in lower court, but reserving final action until the report should be received, was not subject to review on appeal; Good v. Martin, 2 Colo. 293, holding that an order denying a motion to suppress an execution was not, in State of Colorado, a final judgment, and citing cases pro and con from different States.

Distinguished in Stroheim v. Deimel, 77 Fed. 804, 46 U. S. App. 629, holding that an order of discharge of a prisoner debtor, for

failure to pay his board in advance, was final and appealable, and the only means of relief is by writ of error.

Appeal and error.- A writ of error brings up the whole case, and the court, under section 22 of judiciary act, has jurisdiction to re-examine record and to reverse or affirm; if there is no error the judgment must, of course, be affirmed, p. 194.

Cited in Slaughter-House Cases, 10 Wall. 291, 19 L. 920, saying effect of writ was to remove the record into court granting writ, and to suspend jurisdiction of lower court.

5 Wall 194-205, 18 L. 610, CAMPBELL v. CITY OF KENOSHA.

Municipal corporations.- Legislature, unless restrained by the organic law, may authorize a municipal corporation to issue railroad aid bonds, and to levy a tax to pay bonds and interest, and may cure by a retrospective act irregularities in the exercise of the power conferred, p. 200.

Cited and ruling applied in Otoe Co. v. Baldwin, 111 U. S. 15, 28 L. 336, 4 S. Ct. 273, affirming the power of legislature of Nebraska to validate a previous county bond issue; Grenada Co. v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 272, 28 L. 708, 5 S. Ct. 131, sustaining validity of Mississippi act of 1872, requiring bonds of Grenada county to be issued in payment of a subscription voted in 1871; Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 364, 29 L. 636, 6 S. Ct. 417, sustaining validity of Illinois statute of 1867, ratifying a previous subscription to railroad stock; Shelby County Court v. Cumberland, etc., R. Co., 8 Bush, 218, affirming power of legislature to ratify a municipal railway subscription made without legislative authority; Alexander v. Commissioners, 70 N. C. 234, holding the legislature had power to pass an act giving validity to an issue of bonds by curing irregularities and omissions; Nottage v. City of Portland, Or. 58 Pac. 887, sustaining section 156 of Portland city charter of 1898 as validating prior irregularities in laying a street assessment; Redd v. Supervisors, 31 Gratt. 712, sustaining an act authorizing the supervisors to carry out the wishes of a majority of the county voters as expressed at a former meeting. See notes to 98 Am. Dec. 680, and 51 Am. St. Rep. 860.

Municipal corporations. When a municipality submits a bond issue to the voters by error, under an invalid act, the error will be cured by a subsequent enactment providing for the election of a railroad commissioner as a city officer to represent the city in the aided railroad, pp. 200-203.

Cited, but not followed, in Fisk v. Kenosha, 26 Wis. 29, showing that the judgment in the principal case was founded on a mistake of fact.

Municipal corporations.- If a legislature can expressly legalize an issue of scrip by municipality, invalid on account of irregularities, it may do so equally in any other way, if the intention of the legislature to legalize clearly appears, pp. 203, 204.

Cited in Wooster v. Plymouth, 62 N. H. 216, holding that if the purpose of a law is public, a mandatory statute is valid; if private, the act is vold; Cleveland v. Board, 38 N. J. L. 265, sustaining statute of 1875, which, by implication, validated an express or implied contract for public work, and cured an informality in failing to advertise for proposals; McLean v. State, 8 Heisk. 200, 211 (in opinion of lower court, affirmed on appeal), holding that confirmation by the County Court rendered an assessment valid and the collector and his sureties were liable.

Municipal corporations. When the approval of voters to a bond issue is irregularly obtained, good faith and sound policy require at hands of legislature a full legislative recognition of legality of subscription and issue of scrip, p. 204.

Cited and approved in Commissioners v. Rather, 48 Ala. 445, holding that bonds issued by a county under authority of law and in conformity with law cannot be repudiated; Town of Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt. 205, holding that a proposed issue of bonds to ald in construction of railways need not be submitted to a popular vote in open town meeting.

Miscellaneous.- Memphis v. Brown, 1 Flipp. 217, F. C. 9,415, as to negotiability of corporate securities, collecting numerous authorlties; note to 98 Am. Dec. 681, on conflict of decisions in State and Federal courts in municipal bond cases.

5 Wall. 205-208, 18 L. 604, MYERS v. FENN.

Creditor's suit.- Practice of permitting judgment creditors to make themselves parties to a creditor's bill, without any order obtaining the benefit and assuming their share of expenses of litlgation, is well settled, p. 207.

Cited and followed in Perry v. Godbe, 82 Fed. 143, holding that leave to intervene in a bill for an accounting should be by order, but if the suit be proceeded with without objection, entry of the order will be waived; Gorrell v. Gates, 79 Iowa, 636, 44 N. W. 906, holding that several creditors might join in an action against the trustee of their common debtor for a discovery; Piedmont, etc., Ins. Co. v. Maury, 75 Va. 513, holding, where petitions of intervention were filed, no objection made and cause subsequently proceeded with as if intervenors had been duly admitted parties, the original plaintiff might have lost his right to dismiss. See note to 90 Am. Dec. 291, on parties to creditors' bills. Cited generally in Hunt v. Fisher, 29 Fed. 807, on this point.