and before the publication of notice, the libelant tendered back the notes to the char terers, and they refused to receive them, and the libelant has always been ready to give up the notes. The owner of the ship seeks in this suit to recover the amount of the unpaid balance from the cargo of the homeward voyage, upon the ground that he has a maritime lien on the same for the payment of the charter money. As the consignees of the cargo sought to be insist that the terms of the charter-party in Argued Dec. 29, 1865. Decided Jan. 15, 1866. charged, the claimants resist the claim and APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the united States for the District of Massachusetts. lee in the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. Libelant alleged that, July 4, 1856, he made a contract of affreightment with G. J. and W. P. Lyman, by which they agreed to pay him $35,750, for a round voyage from New York to Melbourne, thence to Calcutta, and thence to Boston; and that, by the contract, the cargo laden on board became pledged to him for the payment of that sum, and that he became entitled to a lien thereon by the admiralty and maritime law. Performance of the voyage is also alleged, and the arrival of the vessel on the 23d of January, 1858, at the return port, with her homeward cargo on board. $8,000 of the charter money, it is admitted, was paid in advance and that a further sum of $8,000 was paid in Melbourne and Calcutta-leaving due, as claimed, the sum of $19,750, which, it is alleged, was payable one half in five days, and the rest in ten days, after the discharge of the homeward cargo. Full discharge of the cargo from the vessel and due demand of the residue of the charter money were also alleged by the libelant. The claimants filed their answer, in which they admit the contract of aftreightment, that the charterer agreed to pay the sum mentioned in the libel for the voyage therein described; but deny that, by the true construction of the contract, the cargo became pledged to libelant for the payment of the charter money, or that he became entitled to a lien thereon as alleged in the libel. They also allege that $10,000 was paid to libelant in Boston, in the month of August, prior to the filing of the libel. this case created no lien in favor of the owner displaced by his own acts, at least to the of the ship, and if it did, that the lien has been amount of the notes specified. Various minor matters were involved which it is unnecessary to mention. The district court rendered a decree for $2,500 in favor of the claimant, and the libelant appealed to the circuit court. That court reversed the decree of the district court and rendered a decree in favor of the libelant upon both of the principal questions. The claimant appealed to this court. Mr. D. Thaxter, for appellants: In a recent decision of this court Mr. Justice instrument as often as otherwise, having inWayne says: "A charter-party is an informal must have a liberal construction, such as accurate clauses, and on this account they mercantile contracts usually receive in furtherance of the real intention of the parties and the usage of trade." Raymond v. Tyson, 17 How. 59, 15 L. ed. 49. In the same case it is also said that the lien considered as having been waived without exof the ship owner for freight or hire, "may be press words to that effect, if there are stipulaexercise of the lien, or where it can be fairly tions in the charter-party inconsistent with the inferred that the owner meant to trust to the personal responsibility of the charterer." See also Dimech v. Corlett, 12 Moore, P. C. 199. ternis are such as, by a true construction therelf, upon the face of the charter-party, the of, to be inconsistent with the idea that the at some time during the continuance of the parties intended a lien, then the mere fact that charter, goods are at a port of delivery in the possession of the master when charter money is due, will not give a lien. Raymond v. Tyson, 17 How. 67, 15 L. ed. 52; Kirchner v. Venus, 12 Moore, P. C. 361; How v. Kirchner, 12 Moore, P. C. 21. This payment consisted of two notes, each for the sum of $5,000, received by the owner of the vessel from the charterers. Those notes were dated 31st August, 1857, and were payable to the order of the owner in six months, and the case shows that he received the notes at his own request, and that he gave a receipt for them to the charterers, stating that the notes were received on account of the charter of the ship, and that the amount was to be insured by the charterers, and charged to the owner of the ship. He procured those notes, as the case shows, to use, and obtained money If the ship owner could not have refused to on one of them at a bank where he was a deliver the goods provided the charterer had redirector and where he had a standing account.mained solvent, he cannot maintain that claim The charterers subsequently failed, and, on January 19, 1857, took the benefit of the insolvent law of the state. After the failure Neither will the subsequent insolvency of the charterer create a lien not given by the charter, or restore a lien once waived or lost; in fact, in all the cases where this question has arisen it will be found, as in this case, that the bankruptcy of the charterer led to the litigation. Pinney v. Wells, 10 Conn. 104. now. Alsager v. St. Katherine Dock Co. 14 Mees. & W. 794. By the terms of the charter-party, the charterers may elect to send the ship from New York to Melbourne, thence to Manilla or Calcutta, thence to Boston or some port in Eng land, paying therefor a round sum named for | each voyage respectively, or they could have had her on a monthly charter, not to exceed eighteen months, at the rate of $2,000 per month. The stipulation in regard to the delivery of the cargo was as follows: "It is also further understood and agreed, that the cargo or cargoes shall be received and delivered within reach of the ship's tackles at the ports of lading and discharging." Black v. Rose, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1009. The only provisions for the payment of the charter money, are that the owner is to take all the outward earnings at Melbourne, after deducting $8,000 advanced here on account of the charter in six months notes. The balance of the charter money is payable, one half in five and one half in ten days after discharge of homeward cargo. It is submitted that the express stipulation that the cargo should be delivered within reach of the ship's tackle, settles the question of the right of retaining the cargo to enforce this lien, which retention involves the unloading and storing of the cargo. But, independent of this express stipulation, it is submitted that the credit given for the payment of the balance of the charter money after discharge at the home port, is inconsistent with the existence of a lien and the discharge of said ship and the delivery of the cargo according to the usual and customary manner. Foster v. Colby, 3 Hurl. & N. 704. It is further submitted that, by the true construction of this charter, the parties intended that the cargo should be discharged and delivered in the usual and customary manner. If, then, the retention of the cargo for the purpose of retaining a lien thereon until the expiration of the credit, will prevent the discharge and delivery of the cargo in the usual and customary way, such retention cannot be authorized. Foster v. Colby, 3 Hurl. & N. 704; Alsager v. St. Katherine Dock Co. 14 Mees. & W. 794. The character of an East India cargo is well known. The witnesses for the appellee say about thirty days would be required for discharging the cargo after the arrival of the vessel. The usual and customary course is to give notice to the consignee or owner of the goods, when his goods are to be discharged, and then to discharge them upon the wharf, when the liability of carrier, as such, ceases, and the goods are at the risk of the owner. Richardson v. Goddard, 23 How. 28, 16 L. ed. 412; The Grafton, Olcott, Adm. 43; Houlder v. General S. N. Co. 3 Fost. & Fin. 170; Black v. Rose, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1009. payable "within ten days after the schooner's return from Boston." The case of Certain Logs of Mahogany is peculiar in itself. If, in this case, as in the case of Bags of Linseed, there had been an express stipulation that the credit given was not to impair the ship owner's lien for freight, undoubtedly the master could have retained the goods for the preservation of the lien. Certain Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sumn. 602; Bags of Linseed, 1 Black, 109, 17 L. ed. 35. The next question to be considered is the effect upon the lien, of the two notes of $5,000 each, received by Kimball, August 31, 1857, on account of the charter of the ship, with an agreement on his part that the insurance should be effected on this amount at his expense. It is agreed that the notes were received for the purpose named in the paper signed by Kimball, of which the following is a copy: "Boston, August 31st, 1857. Received of G. T. & W. P. Lyman, their two notes (of $5,000 each), amounting to $10,000, of this date, payable in 6 months to my order, on account of charter of ship 'Anna Kimball.' It is understood that this amount is to be insured by G. T. & W. P. Lyman, and charged to owners of ship. Edward Kimball." (Signed) It is further agreed that Kimball procured these notes to use, and did obtain money upon one of them at a bank where he was a director, and where he had a standing account. Also, that The Messrs. Lyman effected insurance on these amounts, in pursuance of the agreement, paying therefor $415.20. In England, it is held where money or paper is thus advanced, that it is a payment which is thenceforth at the risk of the shipper or charterer, which risk he may insure against, unless it is made to appear that the advance was merely intended as a loan. In several of the states the contrary doctrine is held; but it is everywhere held, that if the parties intended such advance, whether of money or notes, as a payment which was thereafter to be at the risk of the shipper or charterer, it will be so treated. De Silvale v. Kendall, 4 Maule & S. 37; Saunders v. Drew, 3 B. & Ad. 445; Sansom v. Ball, 4 Dall. 459; Watson v. Duykinck, 3 Johns. 335; Brown v. Harris, 2 Gray, 359; Manfield v. Maitland, 4 B. & Ald. 582. Upon this state of the law, it is submitted that it is well settled, where an advance is made upon freight or charter money, in money or notes, with an agreement that the advance is to be insured for or by the shipper or charterer, that such advance shall be treated as a prepayment of freight, at the risk of the shipper, which, to the extent of it, discharges the lien. If the charterers had neglected to send the ship to a port in England to discharge, and this question had arisen there, it would have been Hicks v. Shield, 7 El. & B. 633; Jackson v. decided adversely to the alleged lien, accord-Isaacs, 3 Hurl. & N. 405; Trayes v. Worms, 12 ing to the well-settled English decisions. L. T. (N. S.) 547; Tamaco v. Simpson, 13 L. T. (N. S.) 160. Foster v. Colby, 3 Hurl. & N. 704; Alsager v. St. Katherine Dock Co. 14 Mees. & W. 794; Kirchner v. Venus, 12 Moore, P. C. 361. In this case, the clause giving a lien would attach to the outward freight, and to demur rage. Foster v. Colby, 3 Hurl. & N. 716. The case of The Volunteer is clearly distinishable from this. There the freight was Whether these notes are to be considered as payment or not, it is well settled that no action could be brought on the original debt until their maturity, and the taking of these notes was tantamount to an agreement on the part of Kimball to give the Lymans a credit of six months from August 31st for that amount of the charter money. Belshow v. Bush, 11 C. B. 191; Price v. Price, Miller v. Austen, 13 How. 218; Homer v. 16 Mees. & W. 239; Wheeler v. Schroeder, 4 R. Brown, 16 How. 354; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. I. 383. 1; Carpenter v. Prov. Ins. Co. 16 Pet. 495; Foxcroft v. Mallett, 4 How. 353; Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134; Williams v. Suffolk Co. 3 Sumn. 277; Gloucester I. Co. v. Younger, 2 Curt. C. C. 332; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 L. ed. 520. The parol evidence sought to be introduced is offered for the purpose of showing that no such agreement was made, and that the agreement for insurance is a nullity, and it is submitted that such evidence is incompetent. Egleston v. Knickerbacker, 6 Barb. 458; Tisloe v. Graeter, 1 Blackf. 353; 2 Pars. Cont. 5th ed. 555; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 305. Mr. B. R. Curtis, for appellee: I. The charter-party is of the kind that retains to the owner a lien on the cargo by its general terms. Volunteer, 1 Sumn. 551; Gracie v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. 699; Faith v. E. I. Co. 4 B. & Ald. 630; Christie v. Lewis, 2 B. & B. 410; Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sumn. 589; Tate v. Meek, 8 Taunt. 280; Raymond v. Tyson, 17 How. 53, 15 L. ed. 47; Clarks v. Edes, 4 Cow. 470. There is always a strong presumption that the owner of a vessel does not intend to relinquish his lien. Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sumn. 589; Raymond v. Tyson, 17 How. 53, 15 L. ed. 47; 3 Kent, Com. 284, 285, 221, 222. II. The provision in this charter-"balance of charter payable one half in ten days after discharge of homeward cargo"-is not inconsistent with the owner's retaining and exercising his lion. The test is, whether the owner can be required to deliver the cargo before the consignee can be required to pay freight. The bills of lading which the claimants took from the Messrs. Lyman, which were their security, contained the clause, "He or they paying freight for the said goods as per charterparty." Both the charterers and the consignees (these claimants) knew that the charter gave a lien for freight, and intended to bring the bills of lading within the rule of the charter. The claimants having full knowledge of the charter, and accepting bills of lading which refer to the charter, and demanding their goods under the bills of lading, are in no better condition than the charterer would be in respect to the obligation to pay freight and the lien on their goods. Gracie v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. 699; Small v. Moates, 9 Bing. 574; Campion v. Colvin, 3 Bing. (N. C.) 17; Gledstanes v. Allen, 12 C. B. 202; Tate v. Meek, 8 Taunt. 280. The notes given in this case were not, in law, payment. By the general commercial law of the United States and Great Britain, they are presumed not to be payment. The onus to prove them payment is on the claimants. Lyman v. Bank of U. 8. 12 How. 225; Downey v. Hicks, 14 How. 249; Clark v. Mundal, 1 Salk. 124; Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. 532; 2 Kent, Com. 106, n. 3; Story, Prom. N. §§ 6, 104. 105, 404, 435. By the local law of Massachusetts, notes are only prima facie payment and the presumption is rebutted if the taking them as payment would be a relinquishment of security. Butts v. Dean, 2 Met. 76; Melledge v. Boston Iron Co. 5 Cush. 158; Page v. Hubbard, 1 Sprague, 335. The case, being one of general commercial law, is not governed by the local law of Massa chusetts. The notes were given for a contingent debt, dependent on the arrival of the vessel. If the vessel did not arrive, the Messrs. Lyman could recover back the notes, or their payment if paid. Brown v. Harris, 2 Gray, 359; Pitman v. Hooper, 3 Sumn. 50; Griggs v. Austin, 3 Pick. 20; Cope v. Dodd, 13 Pa. 33; Phelps v. Williamson, 5 Sandf. 578; Watson v. Duykinck, 3 Johns. 335. It would be inequitable to hold the notes payment, for it would enable the owner in case of loss, to get his charter money without performing the service. It would enable the charterer, if the vessel arrived and he should be insolvent, to escape paying for the service the ship rendered, while his creditors would get the benefit of the ship's service. Even if the notes were, in any sense, payment, the insolvency enables the holder to tender them back and resort to his lien. Arnold v. Delano, 4 Cush. 33; Feise v. Wray, 3 East, 93; Miles v. Gorton, 2 Cr. & M. 504; Stevenson v. Blakelock, 1 Maule & S. 535; Ex parte Lorsing, 1 Rose, 19; Grant v. Mills, 2 Ves. & B. 306; Campbell's opinion in Raymond v. Tyson, 17 How. 70, 15 L. ed. 53. Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court: Two questions are presented for determination in this case: First, whether the lien of the owner of the ship upon the cargo for the freight was waived or displaced by the stipulations of the charter party; and second, whether the notes given for a portion of the charter money constituted payment of the same. It is admitted that the lien of the owner of a ship upon its cargo for freight is favored by the courts; and will not be displaced, so long as the ship owner retains possession of the cargo, except by express contract, or by stipulation in the charter-party inconsistent with its exercise. The position of the appellants is that there are such inconsistent stipulations in the charterparty in this case; and two clauses are mentioned in support of this position-the clause requiring the delivery of the cargo within reach of the ship's tackle, and the clause providing that the balance of the charter money remaining unpaid on the termination of the homeward voyage shall be "payable one half in five and one half in ten days after discharge" of the cargo. There is nothing in these provisions inconsistent with the right of the owner to retain the cargo for the preservation of his lien. The first clause only designates the place where the delivery must be had, which, in this case, is the wharf at which the ship may be lying. The second clause only *prescribes the period [*43 in which payment must be made after the discharge of the cargo. The discharge mentioned does not import a delivery of the cargo; it only imports its unlading from the ship. Such is the obvious meaning of the term, and so it has been judicially held. Certain Logs of Mahog any, 2 Sumn. 589. The clause was intended for the benefit of the charterers. It gives them ample time to examine the goods and ascertain their condition, and decide whether they will take them and pay the freight, or decline to receive them. They can waive it and take the cargo short of the period designated, if it be ready for delivery. The cases cited by the appellants do not support their position. In Foster v. Colby, 3 Hurl. & N. 705, the charter-party provided that the remainder due for freight should be paid "In cash two months from the vessel's report inwards at London or Liverpool, and after right delivery of the cargo." The stipulation for the payment after the delivery of the cargo was inconsistent with the existence of a lien. In Alsager v. St. Katherine Dock Co. 14 Mees. & W. 794, the charter-party contained two clauses, one providing for the delivery of the cargo on payment of the freight at a stipulated price, and the other providing for the payment of the freight "two months after the vessel's inward report at the custom-house." The court reconciled these clauses by annexing to the first the qualification as to the time of payment contained in the second, and read them together as requiring payment two months after delivery. | The payment being thus considered to be irrespective of the delivery, it followed that no lien existed. There is no doubt that a credit for the freight may be given for so great a period as to justify, in the absence of any provision for the delivery, of the cargo, the inference that the ship owner intended to waive his right to a lien, and to look solely to the personal responsibility of the charterers. It is sufficient, however, that there is no such credit given in the present case. Here the period allowed is only a reasonable one for examining the condition of the cargo. 44*] *But if there were any doubt as to the construction of the provision for the credit, it is dispelled by the concluding clause of the charter-party. By that clause the owner binds the vessel, and the charterers bind the cargo for the performance of all their respective covenants, of which the payment of the charter money is one. Though the law, in the absence of any stipulations on the subject, ordinarily implies this mutual security in every contract of affreightment, yet its distinct statement in the charter-party shows that the attention of the parties was called to it, and is an important circumstance to be considered in the construction of other stipulations of the instrument respecting the payment of the freight. cede the payment of the freight, or that the lien of the maritime law for freight was intended to be waived by the parties. The second question for determination is, whether the notes given for a portion of the charter money constituted payment of the same. The notes were given before the termination of the voyage and, consequently, before the balance of the charter money became due. Treating them as an advance of a portion of the freight, they could be recovered back; or their amount, if paid, if the vessel did not arrive. Freight being the compensation [*45 for the carriage of goods, if paid in advance, is in all cases, unless there is a special agreement to the contrary, to be refunded, if from any cause not attributable to the shipper the goods be not carried. Watson v. Duykinck, 3 Johns. 335; Griggs v. Austin, 3 Pick. 20; Phelps v. Williamson, 5 Sandf. 598. And there was no such special agreement in this case. The notes were drawn so as to mature near the time of the anticipated arrival of the ship; and according to the statement of the broker who made the arrangement, they were given for the accomodation of the ship owner, and were to be held over or renewed in case they fell due before the arrival. This statement is consistent with the nature of the transaction, and is sufficient to repel any presumption, under the law of Massachusetts, that the notes were taken in discharge or payment of the claim for the charter money. The presumption which prevails in this state, that a promissory note extinguishes the debt or claim for which it is given, may be repelled by any circumstances showing that such was not the intention of the parties. Clark v. By the general commercial law, as well of England as of the United States, a promissory note does not discharge the debt for which it is given unless such be the express agreement of the parties; it only operates to extend until its maturity, the period for the payment of the debt. The creditor may return the note when dishonored, and proceed upon the original debt. The acceptance of the note is considered as accompanied with the condition of its payment. Thus it was said, as long ago as the time of Lord Holt, that "a bill shall never go in discharge of a precedent debt, except it be part of the contract that it should be so." Mundal, 1 Salk. 124. Such has been the rule in England ever since; and the same rule prevails, with few exceptions, in the United States. The doctrine proceeds upon the obvious ground that nothing can be justly considered as payIn the case of The Schooner Volunteer, 1ment in fact, but that which is in truth such, Sumn. 551, Mr. Justice Story had occasion to consider the effect of a similar clause in a charter-party. In that case the charterers had agreed to pay for the freight "Within ten days after the return of the vessel to Boston," or in case of loss after she was last heard from; and the question was, whether the allowance of the ten days for the payment of the freight amounted to a waiver of the lien. The learned judge held that it did not, and in this connection considered the effect of the clause named. After an extended examination of the authorities, he came to the conclusion that it contained an express contract for a lien; and if it did not, still that it contained enough to repel any notion that the delivery of the goods should pre unless something else is expressly agreed to be received in its place. That a mere promise to *pay cannot of itself be regarded as an ef- [*46 fective payment, is manifest. The rule in Massachusetts is an exception to the general law; but even there, as we have said, the presumption that the note was given in satisfaction of the debt may be repelled and controlled by evidence that such was not the intention of the parties, and this evidence may arise from the general nature of the transaction, as well as from direct testimony to the fact. Thus in Butts v. Dean, 2 Met. 76, where a note was given for a debt secured by the bond of a third person, it was held that it was not to be presumed that the creditor intended to re linquish his security and, therefore, the note was not to be deemed payment for the original debt. And following this and other like authorities of that state, Mr. Justice Sprague, of the United States district court, held that a lien for materials furnished a vessel built in Massachusetts, a lien given in such a case, by a law of that state, was not displaced or impaired by the creditors taking the notes of the debtor. Paige v. Hubbard, 1 Sprague, 338. And on like grounds, we think that any presumption of a discharge of the claim of a ship owner, and of his lien upon the cargo in this case, by his taking the notes of the charterers, is repelled and overthrown. The decree of the Circuit Court must be affirmed, and it is so ordered. THE BRIG ISABELLA THOMPSON, her Tackle, etc., and Nehemiah K. Clements, on behalf of himself and Martin & Co., Claimants of Cargo, Appts., บ. THE UNITED STATES. (See S. C. "The Thompson," 3 Wall. 155-164.) Prize-liability of captor for damages-probable cause for seizure. | said cargo at the time of capture was on board a neutral vessel, on a voyage between neutral ports, viz., Nassau, N. P., and Halifax, N. S. On the 14th of July, 1863, James McDaniel, alleging himself to be a British subject, resident at Halifax, Nova Scotia, filed a claim for the brig and tackle, etc., claiming to be the true and only owner thereof, and that she was, when taken, a neutral vessel on a voyage between the neutral ports as aforesaid. On the 31st of July, 1863, the district court decreed that the vessel and cargo be released from custody and restored to the respective claimants, but without damages or costs as against the United States or captors, which decree, on the 18th of August, 1863, became "final and absolute." The claimants appealed to this court from so much of the decree as withholds damages and costs to the claimants. The only question in this court is, therefore, as to the correctness of that part of the decree. The Isabella Thompson was British built, and was owned by the claimant, McDaniel, who resided at Halifax, N. S. On the 25th of April, 1863, McDaniel chartered her to Wm. Pryor & Sons, of Halifax, for a voyage "at and from Halifax to Nassau, N. P., from thence to New York, or from Halifax to Nassau, and to return to Halifax, with liberty in either case to proceed to a salt island for In time of war, the party who makes a seizure is cargo, if so required by the agents of the charnot always liable to damages and costs, if he fails terers." The names of the "agents of the charto establish the forfeiture of the vessel. Prize courts deny damages in case of restitution, terers," whose control over the vessel is thus when there was probable cause for the seizure, recognized, are not given; but they are evidentand often award to the captors their costs and ex-ly B. Weir & Co., the well-known agents of the The term "probable cause" in matters of prize, means such circumstances as would warrant a reasonable ground of suspicion that the vessel was engaged in an illegal traffic. penses. Where a case of "probable cause" is clearly made out, the court below committed no error in refusing to give the claimants damages and costs, as against the United States or the captors. blockade runners at Halifax. She carried under this charter, from Halifax to Nassau, a general cargo of lumber, fish, etc. Whilst lying in the harbor of Nassau, out in the stream, the brig received on board the cargo of cotton and turpentine with which she was laden when captured. It was not shipped on her from the shore, and never was on the Island of New Providence, but was transferred to her Argued Dec. 28, 1865. Decided Jan. 15, 1866. from the schooner Argyle, which had run the [No. 88.] APPEAL from the District Court of the Unit-blockade of Wilmington, N. C., with this cargo. ed States for the Northern District of New York. On the 5th of June, 1863, Martin & Co., of Nassau, write to B. Weir & Co., Halifax, that The Brig Isabella Thompson, laden with four they have sent by the brig a cargo of four hunhundred and eighty-six barrels of spirits of tur-dred and eighty-six casks of spirits of turpenpentine and eighty-one bales of cotton, was captured on the 19th of June, 1863, by the United States ship of war "United States," Lieutenant Commander Meade, off St. George's Banks, in latitude 40 degrees north, longitude 67 degrees 10 minutes west, or thereabouts. She was brought into the port of New York, and there libeled as a prize of war by the United States attorney for that district on the 24th of June, 1863. On the 10th of July, 1863, Nehemiah K. Clements, alleging himself to be a British subject and resident of Nova Scotia, filed a claim on behalf of himself and of Martin & Co., of Nassau, New Providence, residents of that island and subjects of Great Britain, for the whole of the cargo, claiming that they were the true and only owners of the cargo, and that the NOTE-Seizures-see note to The Apollon, 6 L. ed. U. S. 111. Damages, in cases of cupture, on restitution—see note, 27 L. ed. U. S. 662. tine and eighty-one bales of cotton, which they "You so decide it most to the interests of all con- On the same day, Martin & Co., also write "Dollner, Potter & Co., New York," inclosing invoice and bill of lading of the same cargo, consigned to B. Weir & Co., who was instructed to confer with Messrs. D. P. & Co. as to its dis |