[No. 44.] Argued Dec. 11, 1866. Decided Dec. 26, 1866. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi. The case is stated by the court. Messrs. Carlisle, Badger, McPherson, and B. A. Hill, for plaintiff in error: The fourth plea offered to prove in bar to the action, that the judgment sued on was obtained and procured by the plaintiff by his fraud. Fraud by the plaintiff in procuring the judgment, if well and sufficiently pleaded and proved, would have barred the action. This is the established rule of law, and was so laid down by this court in the case of Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 441; see also Story, Confl. Laws, § 609; Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co. 3 Sumn. 604. It is also the rule in Kentucky where the judgment now sued on was rendered. Talbot v. Todd, 5 Dana, 194-196. The second and sixth pleas were intended to judicial proceeding of the several states (art. 4, § 1), and the inviolability of contracts. Art. 1, § 10. in the brief for the defendant in error, and comThe cases on that subject have been collected prise all that are supposed to have any application to this constitutional question. Without here examining them in detail, it is sufficient to observe that, on the one hand they clearly establish that "the full faith and credit" which is guaranteed to the records and judicial proceedings of the several states, have relation to them only as instruments of evidence (Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481); while, on the other, all the cases concede that the whole subject of remedies by action or suit at law or in equity, is within the undoubted competency of the respective states. In Bronson v. Kinzie, cited in the defendant's brief, Mr. Chief Justice Taney says: "For undoubtedly a state may regulate at pleasure the modes of proceeding in its courts, in relation to past contracts as well as future. It may, for example, shorten the period of time within which claims shall be barred by the statute of limitations. Whatever belongs merely to the remedy, may be altered according to the will of the state, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of the contract. But if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by acting on the remedy, or directly on By that statute it was enacted as follows: the contract itself. In either case, it is pro"No action shall be maintained on any judg-hibited by the Constitution." ment or decree rendered by any court without this state against any person who, at the time of the commencement of the action in which such judgment or decree was or snall be rendered, was or shall be a resident of this state, in any case where the cause of such action would have been barred by any act of limitation of this state, if such suit had been brought therein." Miss. Code 1857, 400. On the brief filed by the defendant in error, it is maintained that such a legislative power cannot be exercised without violating one or both clauses of the Constitution respecting the full faith and credit due to the records and jurisdiction of the court rendering a judgment upon which an action is brought in another state may be inquired into. In the following cases it has been held, that if the judgment had, in the state from whence it was taken, faith and credit as evidence of the highest nature, viz., record evidence unimpeachabie, it should have the same in every other state, and that in such case, where the record disclosed jurisdictional facts, it could not be controverted in the courts of another state. Craft v. Clark, 31 Iowa, 77; Thompson v. Whitman, 21 L. ed. U. S. 897; Zepp v. Hager, 70 Ill. 223; Faber v. Hovey, 117 Mass. 107; 19 Am. Rep. 398; Carleton v. Bickford, 13 Gray, 591; Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 447; Wescott v. Brown, 13 Ind. 83; Hale v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Lincoln v. Tower, 2 McLean, 473; Rankin v. Barnes, 5 Bush, 20; Wilson v. Jackson, 10 Mo. 330; Lapham v. Briggs, 27 Vt. 26. A court will not presume the existence of a debt or legal obligation, by reason of a foreign judgment where the person sought to be charged has not been offered opportunity to make defense unless every fact necessary to authorize the foreign court, to render such judgment is made to appear affirmative ly. Phelps v. Duffy, 11 Nev. 80. | Now, in the present case, the only contract between the parties in form or substance, which is pretended to have had any existence at the date of the Mississippi statute, is one from which it appears that the plaintiff in error, being a citizen and resident of Mississippi, on the 10th day of March, 1840, in that state made and delivered his promissory note to one Churchill, promising to pay to his order a certain sum of money at a certain day thereafter. All that had occurred after the making of this contract was, that a new and higher instrument of evidence, establishing the same contract with greater solemnity, had been imposed upon the 897; Knowles v. Logansport Gas Co. 22 L. ed. U. S. 70. The same point is also decided in the following cases: Wescott v. Brown, 13 Ind. 83; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30; Corp v. Haven, 30 Conn. 190; Frothingham v. Barnes, 9 R. I. 474; Marx v. Fore, 51 Mo. 69; S. C. 11 Am. Rep. 432; Harshey v. Blackmar, 20 Iowa, 161; People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247; Welch v. Sykes, 3 Gilm. 197; 44 Am. Dec. 689; Rape v. Heatin, 9 Wis. 328; Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Tex. 551; Pollard v. Baldwin, 22 Iowa, 328. In Pa. it is held that no averment can be made against the conclusiveness of the record, unless court was of special or limited jurisdiction. Wetherill v. Stillman, 65 Pa. 105. Fraud in obtaining judgment in another state is a good defense to such judgment, such as decoying defendant into state to obtain service upon him. Dunlap v. Cody, 31 Iowa, 260, 7 Am. Rep. 129; Luckenback v. Anderson, 47 Pa. 123; Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. 424; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 421; Buford v. Buford, 4 Munf. 241. A court will not enforce a judgment of the courts of another state obtained by fraud. Davis v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. 115. "The jurisdiction of the court by which judg Where jurisdiction was properly acquired by the ment is rendered in any state may be questioned in court rendering the judgment, fraud is not a good a collateral proceeding in another state notwith-plea to a judgment of another state. Maxwell v. standing the provision of the 4th art. of the Constitution and the law of 1790, and notwithstanding the averments contained in the record of the judgment itself. Thompson v. Whitman, 21 L. ed. U. S. Stewart, 22 L. ed. U. S. 564; Anderson v. Ander- debtor by a proceeding in invitum, in another state of the Union where he happened to be found temporarily sojourning. But the contract between the parties remained the same in its substance, although it had changed its form by operation of law, in which form its substance is distinctly repeated and adjudicated. We suppose the following to be the true propositions arising in this branch of the case: 1. The Kentucky judgment is not a contract in the sense of the Constitution. 2. It is not an express contract at all-the judgment is only conclusive evidence of facts from which the law implies a contract. 3. When, therefore, this judgment was sued upon in Mississippi, it was sued upon as such conclusive evidence of facts upon which an implied contract was then to arise. 4. But if, under the law and policy of that state, no such contract could be implied, then the law of Mississippi has not impaired the obligation of any contract in denying any remedy in the premises. 5. Nor does the statute of Mississippi deny to the Kentucky record the full faith and credit guaranteed to it by the Constitution. In the present case full faith and credit and effect, as evidence, were given to the Kentucky record, as conclusive of every matter and thing which thereby appeared. And it did thereby appear that the judgment had no other foundation than a certain Mississippi contract therein set forth, which fell within the purview of the Mississippi statute in question, the cause of action therein having been long barred by the limitation acts of said state, in force at the date of the contract. Messrs. J. Hubley Ashton, J. W. Russell, and Lindsay, for defendant in error: No other remark need be made as to the pleas of nul tiel record and payment, than that they were clearly, in the issues thereon, for defendant in error-the record being certified as required by the act of Congress, and there being no evidence tending to show that plaintiff in error had paid any part of said judgment. In regard to the plea that the judgment had been obtained by fraud, the circuit court of Mississippi had no authority to inquire as by the 1st section of the 4th article of the Constitution of the United States, the record from Kentucky was conclusive in the first named court. In addition, if it were permissible to plead such plea, it was insufficiently done in this case, in not setting out how the fraud was perpetrated in getting the judgment. But the great reliance, as we suppose, is the Mississippi statute of limitations. The Mississippi act was passed about four years after the suit was begun by Russell, on the note in the Jefferson circuit courts, and went into effect, as will be seen, only eleven days before the judgment was rendered; so that if the statute meant to allow any remedy at all to Russell, it was one that amounted to nothing, if he had to procure a record and sue on it in Mississippi, in eleven days. The legislature might as well have given no time as regards this case. We contend, however, that the act is clearly unconstitutional, as it clearly impairs the rights of the defendant in error-depriving him, in fact, of all right to sue upon the record. The authorities relied upon to sustain our position, are the following: Bronson v. Kinzie, How. 315; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Topley v. Hamer, 9 Sm. & M. 313; W. F. R. Co. v. Stockett, 13 Sm. & M. 307; 24 Miss. 379; 26 Miss. 304; Murray v. Gibson, 15 How. 421; 2 Pars. Cont. 539; Ang. Lim. §§ 22, 23; Story, Confl. L. § 1379. The act is in conflict with the 1st section of the 4th article of the Constitution of the United States, and the act of Congress of May 26th, 1790, made in pursuance thereof. To give the record the same force and effect in Mississippi, in the circuit court of the United States, as it would have had in Kentucky, was at once to preclude all questions of limitation or fraud. But the following authorities will settle the questions: Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481; Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat. 234; McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 320; Bank U. S. v. Merchants' Bank, 7 Gill, 432; 2 Am. L. Cas. 763 to end. Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court: Wilson, on the 11th day of November, 1857, recovered judgment in one of the county courts in the state of Kentucky, against the plaintiff in error, for the sum of $5,634.13, which on the 31st day of March, 1859, was affirmed in the court of appeals. Present record shows that the action in that case was assumpsit, and that it was founded upon a certain promissory note, signed by the defendant in that suit, and dated at Vicksburg, in the state of Mississippi, on the 10th day of March, 1840, and that it was payable at the Merchants' Bank, in New Orleans, and was duly indorsed to the plaintiff by the payee. Process was duly served upon the defendant, and he appeared in the case and pleaded to the declaration. Several defenses were set up, but they were all finally overruled and the verdict and judgment were for the plaintiff. On the 4th day of June, 1854, the prevailing party in that suit instituted the present suit in the court below, which was an action of debt on that judgment, as appears by the transcript. Defendant was duly served with process, and appeared and filed six pleas in answer to the action. Reference, however, need only be particularly made to the second and fourth, as they embody the material questions presented for decision. Substance and effect of the second plea were that the note, at the commencement of the suit in Kentucky, was barred by the statute of limitation of Mississippi, the defendant having been a domiciled citizen of that state when the cause of action accrued, and from that time to the commencement of the suit. Fourth plea alleged that the judgment mentioned in the *declaration was procured [*299 by the fraud of the plaintiff in that suit. Plaintiff demurred to these pleas, as well as to the fifth and sixth, and the court sustained the de murrers. First plea was nul tiel record, but the finding of the court under the issue joined, negatived the pica. Third plea was payment, to which the plaintiff replied, and the jury found in his favor. I. 1. Resting upon his second and fourth pleas, the defendant sued out this writ of error, and now seeks to reverse the judgment, upon the ground that the demurrers to those pleas should have been overruled. Views of the defendant were, and still are, that the second plea is a valid defense to the action on the judgment, under the statute of Mississippi passed in February, 1857, and found in the Code of that state which went into effect on the first day of November of that year. By that statute it was enacted that "no action shall be maintained on any judgment or decree rendered by any court without this state against any person who, at the time of the commencement of the action in which such judgment or decree was or shall be rendered, was or shall be a resident of this state, in any case where the cause of action would have been barred by any act of limitation of this state, if such suit had been brought therein." Miss. Code, 400. Material facts are that the defendant, being a citizen and resident of Mississippi, made the note to the payee, who indorsed the same to the plaintiff, a citizen and resident of Kentucky. Such causes of action are barred by limitation, under the Mississippi statute, in six years after the cause of action accrues. Sometime in 1853 the defendant went into Kentucky on a visit, and while there was sued on the note. He pleaded, among other pleas, the statutes of limitation of Mississippi, and on the first trial, a verdict was found in his favor; but the judgment was reversed on appeal, and at the second trial the verdict and judgment were for the plaintiff. quite obvious that it contains no element which can give it any such character. Plain effect of the proviso is to deny the right of the judg ment creditor to sue at all, under any circumstances, and wholly irrespective of any lapse of time whatever, whether longer or shorter. No day is given to such a creditor, but the prohibition is absolute that no action shall be maintained on any judgment or decree falling within the condition set forth in the provision. Those conditions are addressed, not to the judgment, but to the cause of action *which [*301 was the foundation of the judgment. Substantial import of the provision is that judgments recovered in other states against the citizens of Mississippi shall not be enforced in the tribunals of that state, if the cause of action which was the foundation of the judgment would have been barred in her tribunals by her statute of limitations. Nothing can be plainer than the proposition is, that the judgment mentioned in the declaration was a valid judgment in the state where it was rendered. Jurisdiction of the case was undeniable, and the defendant being found in that jurisdiction, was duly served with process, and appeared and made full defense. Instead of being a statute of limitations in any sense known to the law, the provision, in legal effect, is but an attempt to give operation to the statute of limitations of that state in all the other states of the Union, by denying the efficacy of any judgment recovered in another state against a citizen of Mississippi for any cause of action which was barred in her tribunals under that law. Where the cause of action which led to the judgment was not barred by her statute of limitations the judgment may be enforced; but if it would have been barred in her tribunals, under her statute, then the prohibition is absolute that no action shall be maintained on the judgment. 2. Undoubtedly, the second plea in this case is sufficient in form, and it is a good answer to 300*] the action if the statute *under which it was framed is a valid law. Plaintiff in error suggests that it should be considered as a statute of limitations; and, if it were possible to regard it in that light, there would be little or 4. Article 4, § 1, of the Constitution provides, no difficulty in the case. Statutes of limita- that "full faith and credit shall be given in each tion operating prospectively do not impair vest-state to the public acts, records, and judicial ed rights or the obligations of contracts. Reasons of sound policy have led to the adoption of limitation laws, both by Congress and the states and, if not unreasonable in their terms, their validity cannot be questioned. Consequently, it was held by this court in the case of McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, that the statute of limitations of Georgia might be pleaded to an action in that state founded upon a judgment rendered in the state court of South Carolina. Cases, however, may arise where the provisions of the statute on that subject may be so stringent and unreasonable as to amount to a denial of the right, and in that event a different rule would prevail, as it could no longer be said that the remedy only was affected by the new legislation. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 315; Ang. Lim. 18. 3. But the provision under consideration is not a statute of limitations as known to the law or the decisions of the courts upon that subject. Limitation, as used in such statutes, means a bar to the alleged right of the plaintiff to recover in the action created by or arising out of the lapse of a certain time after the cause of action accrued, as appointed by law. Bouv. Dic. title, Limitation. proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such records shall be proved, and the effect thereof." Congress has exercised that power, and in effect provided that the judicial records in one state shall be proved in the tribunals of another, by the attestation of the clerk, under the seal of the court, with the certificate of the judge that the attestation is in due form. 2. That such records so authenticated "shall have such faith and credit given to them in every other court in the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records were or shall be taken." Act, May 26, 1790, ch. 11 (1 stat. 122); D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 175. *When the question of the construc- [*302 tion of that act of Congress was first presented to this court it was argued that the act provided only for the admission of such records as evidence; that it did declare their effect; but the court refused to adopt the proposition, and held, as the act expressly declares, that the record, when duly authenticated, shall have in every other court of the United States the same faith and credit as it has in the state court from whence it was taken. Mills v. Looking at the terms of this provision it is Duryee, 7 Cranch, 483. Repeated decisions made since that time have | ant, to the fourth plea is, that inasmuch as the affirmed the same rule, which is applicable in judgment is conclusive between the parties in all similar cases where it appears that the court the state where it was rendered, it is equally had jurisdiction of the cause, and that the de- so in every other court in the United States, fendant was duly served with process, or ap- and consequently that the plea of fraud in propeared and made defense. Hampton v. Mc- curing the judgment is not a legal answer to the Connel, 3 Wheat. 234; D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 declaration. Principal question in the case of How. 165; Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 460; Na- Mills v. Duryee was whether nil debet was a tions v. Johnson, 24 How. 203, 16 L. ed. 631. good plea to an action founded on a judgment Where the jurisdiction has attached, the judg- of another state. Much consideration was given ment is conclusive for all purposes, and is not to the case, and the decision was that [*304 open to any inquiry upon the merits. Bissell v. the record of a state court duly authenticated Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Bank of U. S. v. Merch. under the act of Congress, must have in every Bank, 7 Gill, 430. Speaking of the before- other court of the United States such faith and mentioned act of Congress, Judge Story says credit as it had in the state court from whence it has been settled, upon solemn argument, that it was taken, and that nil debet was not a that enactment does declare the effect of the good plea to such an action. records as evidence when duly authenticated. "If a judgment is conclusive in the state where it was pronounced, it is equally conclusive everywhere" in the courts of the United States. 2 Story, Const. 3d ed. § 1313. 5. Applying these rules to the present case, it is clear that the statute which is the foundation of the second plea in this case is unconstitutional and void as affecting the right of the plaintiff to enforce the judgment mentioned in the declaration. Beyond all doubt the judgment was valid in Kentucky and conclusive between the parties in all her tribunals. Such was the decision of the highest court in the state, and it was undoubtedly correct; and if so, it is not competent for any other state to authorize its courts to open the merits and review the cause, much less to enact that such a judgment shall not receive the same faith and 303*] *credit that by law it had in the state courts from which it was taken. Congress, says the court, have declared the effect of the record by declaring what faith and credit shall be given to it. Adopting the language of the court in that case, we say that the defendant had full notice of the suit, and it is beyond all doubt that the judgment of the court was conclusive upon the parties in that state. "It must, therefore, be conclusive here also." Unless the merits are open to exception and trial between the parties, it is difficult to see how the plea of fraud can be admitted as an answer to the action. 3. Domestic judgments, under the rules of the common law, could not be collaterally impeached or called in question if rendered in a court of competent jurisdiction. It could only be done directly by writ of error, petition for new trial, or by bill in chancery. Third persons only, says Saunders, could set up the defense of fraud or collusion, and not the parties to the record, whose only relief was in equity, except in the case of a judgment obtained on a cognovit or a warrant of attorney. 2 Saund. Pl. & Ev. part 1, p. 63; Bank of Australasia v. Nias, 4 Eng. L. & E. 252. II. 1. Second error assigned is that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the fourth plea, which alleged that the judgment was procured by the fraud of the plaintiff. First proposition assumed by the present defendant is, Common-law rules placed foreign judgments that the plea is defective and insufficient, be- upon a different footing, and those rules recause it does not set forth the particular acts main, as a general remark, unchanged to the of the plaintiff which are the subject of com- present time. Under these rules a foreign judgplaint. But the substance of the plea, if allow-ment was prima facie evidence of the debt, and able at all, is well enough under a general demurrer, as in this case. Whether general or special, a demurrer admits all such matters of fact as are sufficiently pleaded, and to that extent it is a direct admission that the facts as alleged are true. Nowlan v. Geddes, 1 East, 634; Gundrey v. Feltham, 1 T. R. 334; Steph. Pl. 142. Where the objection is to matter of substance, a general demurrer is sufficient; but where it is to matter of form only, a special demurrer is necessary. Demurrers, says Chitty, are either general or special; general, when no particular cause is alleged; special, when the particular imperfection is pointed out and insisted upon as the ground of demurrer. The former will suffice when the pleading is defective in substance, and the latter is requisite where the objection is only to the form of the pleading. 1 Chit. Pl. 663; Snyder v. Croy, 2 Johns. 428. Obviously, the objection is to the form of the plea, and is not well taken by a general demurrer. 2. But the second objection is evidently to the substance of the plea, and therefore is properly before the court for decision. Substance of the second objection, of the present defend it was open to examination not only to show that the court in which it was rendered had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, but also to show that the judgment was fraudulently obtained. Recent decisions, however, in the parent country, hold that even a foreign judg ment is so far conclusive upon a defendant that he is prevented from alleging that the promises upon which it is founded were never made, or were obtained by fraud of the plaintiff. *4. Cases may be found in which it is [*305 held that the judgment of a state court, when introduced as evidence in the tribunals of another state, are to be regarded in all respects as domestic judgments. On the other hand, another class of cases might be cited in which it is held that such judgments, in the courts of another state, are foreign judgments; and that as such the judgment is open to every inquiry to which other foreign judgments may be subjected under the rules of the common law. Neither class of these decisions is quite correct. They certainly are not foreign judgments under the Constitution and laws of Congress in any proper sense, because they "shall have such faith and credit given to them in every other court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence" they were taken; nor are they domestic judgments in every sense, because they are not the proper foundation of final process, except in the state where they were rendered. Besides, they are open to inquiry as to the jurisdiction of the court and notice to the defendant; but in all other respects they have the same faith and credit as domestic judgments. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165; Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437. Subject to those qualifications, the judgment of a state court is conclusive in the courts of all the other states wherever the same matter is brought in controversy. Established rule is that, so long as the judgment remains in force it is of itself conclusive of the right of the plaintiff to the thing adjudged in his favor, and gives him a right to process, mesne or final, as the case may be, to execute the judgment. Voorhees v. U. S. Bank, 10 Pet. 449; Huff v. Hutchinson, 14 How. 588. 5. Exactly the same point was decided in the case of Benton v. Burgot, 10 Serg. & R. 240, which in all respects was substantially like the present case. The action was debt on judgment recovered in a court of another state, and the defendant appeared and pleaded nil debet, and that the judgment was obtained by fraud, imposition, and mistake, and without consider306*] ation. *Plaintiff demurred to those pleas, and the court of original jurisdiction gave judgment for the defendant. Whereupon the plaintiff brought error, and the supreme court of the state after full argument, reversed the judgment and directed judgment for the plaintiff. Domestic judgments, say the supreme court of Maine, even if fraudulently obtained, must nevertheless be considered as conclusive until reversed or set aside. Granger v. Clark, 22 Me. 130. Settled rule, also, in the supreme court of Ohio, is that the judgment of another state, rendered in a case in which the court had jurisdiction, has all the force in that state of a domestic judgment, and that the plea of fraud is not available as an answer to an action on the judgment. Express decision of the court is, that such a judgment can only be impeached by a direct proceeding in chancery. Anderson v. Anderson, 8 Ohio, 108. Similar decisions have been made in the supreme court of Massachusetts, and it is there held that a party to a judgment cannot be permitted in equity, any more than at law, collaterally to impeach it on the ground of mistake or fraud, when it is offered in evidence against him in support of the title which was in issue in the cause in which it was recovered. B. & W. R. R. v. Sparhawk, 1 Allen, 448; Homer v. Fish, 1 Pick. 435. Whole current of decisions upon the subject in that state seems to recognize the principle that when a cause of action has been instituted in a proper forum, where all matters of defense were open to the party sued, the judgment is conclusive until reversed by a superior court having jurisdiction of the cause, or until the same is set aside by a direct proceeding in chancery. McRae v. Mattoon, 13 Pick, 57. State judgments, in courts of competent jurisdiction, are also held by the supreme court of Vermont to be conclusive as between the parties until the same are reversed or in some manner set aside and annulled. Strangers, says the court, may show that they were collusive or fraudulent; but they bind parties and privies. Atkinson v. Allen, 12 Vt. 624. *Redfield, Ch. J., said, in the case of [*307 Hammond v. Wilder, 25 Vt. 346, that there was no case in which the judgment of a court of record of general jurisdiction had been held void, unless for a defect of jurisdiction. Less uniformity exists in the reported decisions upon the subject in the courts of New York, but all those of recent date are to the same effect. Take, for example, the case of Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y., 522, and it is clear that the same doctrine is acknowledged and enforced. Indeed, the court, in effect, say that the rule is undeniable that the judgment or decree of a court possessing competent jurisdiction is final, not only as to the subject thereby determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated in the cause, and which they might have had decided. Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 165. Same rule prevails in the courts of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, and in most of the other states. Hollister v. Abbott, 11 Fost. 448; Rathbone v. Terry, 1 R. I. 77; Topp v. The Bank, 2 Swan, 188; Wall v. Wall, 28 Miss. 413. For these reasons our conclusion is that the fourth plea of the defendant is bad upon general demurrer, and that there is no error in the record. The judgment of the Circuit Court is, therefore, affirmed, with costs. THE BARK SPRINGBOK, etc., Thos. May, et al., Claimants, and Isaac Campbell & Co., Claimants of the Cargo, Appts., บ. THE UNITED STATES. (See 8: C. "The Springbok," 5 Wall. 1-28.) Goods destined to belligerent port, conveyance of, by neutral-violation of blockade. Where goods destined for a belligerent port are being conveyed between two neutral ports by a neutral ship, it, though liable to seizure in order to the confiscation of the goods, is not liable to condemnation as prize. Where the cargo was originally shipped with intent to violate the blockade, to be transhipped at a neutral port, the liability to condemnation, if captured during any part of that voyage, attached to the cargo from the time of sailing. The Springbok was captured on the high sea as a prize of war, by the United States ship of war Sonoma, on Feb. 3, 1863, from 150 to 200 miles east of Nassau, N. P., and was brought into the port of New York, where she was libeled in prize by the United States district attorney, on Feb. 12, 1863. NOTE.-Blockade; what constitutes; right to; blockaded port; necessity may justify entry of such violation of; penalty; termination of; inquiry at port-see note to Prize Cases, 17 L. ed. U. S. 459. |