divergent from the via trita of the ancient Eng lish rule. But the grand triumph of reason was reserved for the year 1851, when, in the case of The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, the same august tribunal shook off the yoke of Eng lish authority forever, by deciding that "tidewater" constituted no proper test for admiralty jurisdiction. And that case has been succeeded by a series of luminous judgments, which, taken together, establish the true criterion of juris diction as being "navigable water" per se, in contradiction to water not navigable, and to nothing else. Now, it is plain that the case of The Genesee Chief was the first of its kind. There had been nothing like it, either in England or America. since the days of Lord Coke. It was not only a novelty, but one in clear contradiction of all previous authority. In former times the judges of common law depended for their means of support upon the fees paid by suitors. Hence every case of admiralty was so much subtracted from their salaries; and, of course, every writ of prohibition brought a pound or two more to their own pockets. 2 Pars. Mar. L. 497. First. Our primary argument is derived from the legal nature and generic characteristics of the two things concerned in the case of damage the object injured, and the agent causing the injury. 1. The object, or part of the object injured -the wharf-was unquestionably a maritime thing. A wharf is the necessary terminus, a quo and ad quem, of every voyage, in certain lines of trade; and becomes thus indispensable to commerce and navigation. It is an instrument of navigation, and it has been expressly decided that the lien of a wharfinger appertains to the jurisdiction of the admiralty. Ex parte Lewis, 2 Gall. 483; The Phoebe, 1 Ware, 360; Johnson v. The McDonough, Gilp. 101; Ives v. Buckeye State, 1 Newb. 69; Russell v. The Asa R. Swift, 1 Newb. 553; 2 Pars. Mar. L. 639. 2. It is needless to prove that the agent producing the damage, the vessel which communicated fire to the wharf, was a maritime thing; that fact is conceded. 3. The locality was maritime. The ship, the maritime agent, in the very act of committing the injury, was moored in a maritime place, namely: in "navigable water," and the Supreme Court of the Nation has directly determined that "navigable water" is the test of admiralty jurisdiction in cases of tort. Jackson v. The Magnolia, 20 How. 301, 302, 15 L. ed. 912. 4. I now invoke another legal principle which, in connection with the preceding, covers the en tire case. The civil law has it: "Res accessoria sequitur rem principalem." Broom, Max. p. 368. The maxim has been applied to the admiralty urisdiction in countless cases, and always to his effect: that "when the principal clause is vithin the jurisdiction, there is also jurisdiction over the incidents." 1 Kent, Com. 378; Com. Dig. Admiralty, F., Radley v. Egglesfield, 2 Saund. 259, c; 1 Ventr. 173, 174, 308; 2 Lev. 25; Cro. Eliz. 685; Comb. 462; 6 Vin. Abr. 516. All these are common-law cases, running back, too, to the very cradle of the system; and they all concur to establish the point ruled at a later period in Le Caux v. Eden, 2 Doug. 602, that "when the admiralty has jurisdiction of the original matter, it ought to have of everything incidental." Hence the decisive question emerges-What was the principal matter or thing in this case of damage? What was the original, or, in the language of the scholastics, efficient cause of the injury? To this there can be but one intelligible answer. In the contemplation of law as well as logic, the principal thing, the original cause, was the ship; or rather, the ship in action and performing a wrongful deed, to the great damage of others. The composition or change of causes and ef fects is very simple, being constituted by only six links: 1. The ship, a maritime thing, and within the admiralty jurisdiction. 2. The inception of the fire, through the neg ligence of the master and crew, a maritime wrong, and also clearly within the jurisdiction. 3. The wharf, a maritime thing, and alike within the jurisdiction. 4. The communication of the fire to the wharf. 5. The communication of the fire to the packing house. 6. The destruction of both the wharf and the packing house. Finally, under this head, it has been express ly determined by the Supreme Court of the Union, that it is sufficient for the principal thing to be maritime, to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the admiralty, although the other thing concerned did not appertain to such jurisdiction. Fretz v. Bull, 1 How. 466; Jackson v. The Magnolia, 20 How. 305, 16 L. ed. 914. Second. Our next argument is drawn from a principle very similar to the one just discussed if not, indeed, identical with it. It is this that in "mixed cases," arising partly on land and partly at sea or upon "navigable waters," admiralty has jurisdiction. 2 Pars. Mar. L. 504; Com. Dig. Admiralty, F. 5; U. S. v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72, 76; Plummer v. Webb, 4 Mas. 383. Third. The same inference is powerfully supported by the analogy of prize cases, in which, even in England, "The jurisdiction depends, not on locality, but on the subject-matter." Brown, Adm. 205, 208, 222. Hence, the jurisdiction of the prize court was not, like that of the instance court, restricted to the high seas; but embraced all captures made upon land by the assistance of a naval force. Lindo v. Rodney, 2 Doug. 613, note; 2 Leach, Crown Cases, 1093. The same doctrine has been definitely set. tled in the United States. Case of The Emulous, 1 Gall. 574; Maisonnaire v. Keating, 2 Gall. 325. But the grant of admiralty jurisdiction by our fundamental law clothes the Federal tribunals, at the same time, with all the constitutional prerogatives of both prize and instance courts. 1 Kent, Com. 354; Glass v. The Betsey, 3 Dall. 6; Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 54. Therefore, to confer systematic unity and beauty upon our common admiralty law, it is indispensable to include within the jurisdiction all injuries committed, through the instrumentality of ships, to wharves and houses situated upon the shore. And this very conclusion has already been implicitly drawn by the Supreme Court, in the case of The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443. Fourth. We obtain the same inference from the analogy of those two cases where minors have been enticed away from their homes on the shore, by the masters of vessels, and carried to sea; and in which libels in the admiralty have been sustained against the ship owners. Steele v. Thacher, 1 Ware, 91; Sherwood v. Hall, 3 Sumn. 127; Luscom v. Osgood, 7 Law Rep. 132; The Platina, 21 Law Rep. 397. Fifth. We are claiming no more, in this case, than belonged to the rightful sphere of the ancient admiralty, before the jealousy of the common-law courts had curtailed its jurisdiction; which, in the language of the commissions to the admiralty judges, comprised "all injuries done upon public rivers," and "upon the shores and banks adjoining them.” De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 452; Bened. Adm. 57. In the time of the commonwealth, the jurisdiction included "all cases of prejudice to the banks of navigable 'rivers' or to, 'the docks wharves, quays,'" etc; while the jurisdiction of the Scottish admiralty embraced "all marine, and even commercial causes." Mr. Rufus P. Spalding, for appellee: The claim made by the libelants is for damage done to property, real and personal, situated upon the land, through the negligence of the master and crew of a steam propeller, lying in "navigable water" at Chicago. It is insisted by counsel for defendant, that the admiralty does not take cognizance of trespasses upon "lands and tenements;" and for an injury to persons, and to personal property, the act must be done on the water, in order to give a court of admiralty jurisdiction as for a "maritime tort." 2 Browne, Civ. and Adm. L. 110, 202; Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumn. 9; Steele v. Thacher, 1 Ware, 93; The Propeller Commerce, 1 Black, 579, 17 L. ed. 107. Again, it appears that the act must be consummated upon the water, in order to give the admiralty jurisdiction. U. S. v. Magill, 1 Wash. C. C. 463; 1 Leach, Crown Cases, 432; 2 Hale, Pleas of Crown, 17; 1 Hawk. P. C. ch. 37, sec. 17; U. 8. v. Davis, 2 Sumn. 482; Steele v. Thacher, 1 Ware, 93; Brown, Adm. 30. The general maritime law of continental Europe regards only the character of the transaction, and, therefore, extends to all cases of service, contract, tort or accident, "relating to ships, shipping, and marine commerce." Bened. Adm. 117. If we break the Constitution by departing from the English rule, we have already broken it into atoms. We broke it when we suffered the jurisdiction to penetrate into the body of a country; so we broke it again when the limit of tide water was discarded, with the sovereign arbitrament of the moon. And we broke it again when admiralty jurisdiction was applied to revenue cases. 1 Kent, Com. 372, et seq.; N. J. S. N. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344; The Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297. The act of Congress of 1845, conferring admiralty jurisdiction over the lakes, etc., declares that "the district courts shall possess jurisdiction in matters of contract and tort, arising in, upon, or concerning steamboats and other vessels," etc. Cited in Benedict, 139, § 246. Finally, nothing remains but to consider what can be urged on the other side. And to all our arguments, it will be seen that they can offer only one reply, namely: "That in matters of tort, the jurisdiction of the admiralty is limited to the locality of navigable water.' In support of our position, the case of De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. will be urged with a host of similar decisions. The case of Phil. Wil. & Balt. R. Co. v. Phil. & Havre De Grace Steam Towboat Co. 23 How. 215, 16 L. ed. 435, is to the same point. Mr. Justice Nelson delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois. The libel was filed in this case for cause of damage, civil and maritime, against the owners of the propeller Falcon, which vessel had been fastened to the wharf of the libelants in the city of Chicago, and while there took fire by the negligence of the master and crew; and which fire was communicated to the wharf and buildings thereon and adjacent, the whole of which were destroyed, together with a large amount of personal property contained in them. The wharf was on the east bank of the south branch of the river, a navigable stream for vessels of over twenty tons burden. Much testimony has been taken in the case in the merits, but it will be unnecessary to look into it, as the court below dismissed the libel for want of jurisdiction; and that question is the only one that has been argued in this court. It will be observed, that the entire damage complained of by the libelants, as proceeding from the negligence of the master and crew, and for which the owners of the vessel are sought to be charged, occurred, not on the The jurisdiction of our colonial vice-admiral-water, but on the land. The origin of the wrong ty courts was equally extensive, including "all trespasses and injuries between owners or ships and other persons, done upon the shores of public rivers." Bened. 83; 2 Gall. 471. was on the water, but the substance and consummation of the injury on land. It is admitted by all the authorities, that the jurisdiction of the admiralty over maritime torts depends upon locality-the high seas, or other navigable waters within admiralty cognizance; | maritime tort and, of course, of admiralty cogand being so dependent upon locality, the juris-nizance. diction is limited to the sea or navigable waters not extending beyond high water mark. In the case of Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumn. 9, Mr. Justice Story, in a case where the imprisonment was stated in the libel to be on shore, observed: "In regard to torts, I have always understood that the jurisdiction of the admiralty is exclusively dependent upon the local34*] ity of the act. The admiralty has *not, and never, I believe, deliberately claimed to have, any jurisdiction over torts, except such as are maritime torts; that is, torts upon the high seas, or on waters within ebb and flow of the tide." Since the case of The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, navigable waters may be substituted for tide-waters. This view of the jurisdiction over maritime torts has not been denied. But this, we think, a misapprehension. The owner of a vessel is liable for injuries done to third persons or property by the negligence or malfeasance of the master and crew while in the discharge of their duties and acting within the scope of their authority. It is upon this principle that the defendants are liable, if at all, to the libelants for the damages sustained. The circumstance that the agents were in the employment of the owners on board the vessel, and that the negligence occurred while so employed, and which occasioned the damage, gives to the libelants the right of action. But if they had been employed upon any other structure in the river-on a raft, or floating platform, for work on the river, and the fire had been communicated to the wharf and buildings on account of their negligence while so engaged, the right of action would have been the same. The jurisdiction of the admiralty over maritime torts does not depend upon the wrong having been committed on board the vessel, but upon its having been committed upon the high seas or other navigable waters. A trespass on board of a vessel, or by the vessel itself, above tide-water, when that was the limit of jurisdiction, was not of admiralty cognizance. The reason was, that it was not com But it has been strongly argued that this is a mixed case, the tort having been committed partly on water and partly on land; and that, as the origin of the wrong was on the water, in other words, as the wrong began on the water (where the admiralty possesses jurisdiction), it should draw after it all the consequences resulting from the act. These mixed cases, however, will be found, not cases of tort, but of contract, which do not depend altogether upon locality as the test of jurisdiction, such as contracts of material-men, for supplies, charter-mitted within the locality that gave the jurisparties, and the like. These cases depend upon the nature and subject-matter of the contract, whether a maritime contract, and the service a maritime service to be performed upon the sea, or other navigable waters, though made upon land. The cases of torts to be found in the admiralty, as belonging to this class, hardly partake of the character of mixed cases, or have, at most, but a very remote resemblance. Thom-wrong done. The jurisdiction of the admiralty as v. Lane, 2 Sumn. 2; The Huntress, Davies, 85; U. S. v. Magill, 1 Wash. C. C. 463; Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443; Hollingsworth v. Fry, 4 Dall. 345; 1 Kent, Com. 367, and note; Plummer v. Webb, 4 Mason, 383. They are cases of personal wrongs, which commenced on the land; such as improperly enticing a minor on board a ship and there exercising unlawful authority over him. The substance and consummation of the wrong were on board the vessel-on the high seas, or navigable waters-and the injury complete within admiralty cognizance. It was the tortious acts on board the vessel to which the jurisdiction at tached. This class of cases may well be referred to as illustrating the true meaning of the rule of lo35*] cality in cases of marine *torts, namely: that the wrong and injury complained of must have been committed wholly upon the high seas of navigable waters, or, at least, the substance and consummation of the same must have taken place upon these waters to be within the admiralty jurisdiction. In other words, the cause of damage, in technical language, whatever else attended it, must have been there complete. Much stress has been given to the fact, by the learned counsel who would support the jurisdiction, in his argument, that the vessel which communicated the fire to the wharf and buildings, was a maritime instrument, or agent, and, hence, characterized the nature of the tort. In other words, that this characterized it as a diction. The vessel itself was unimportant. The fact, therefore, *of its having taken [*36 place on board the propeller Falcon, in the present case, is not an element that imparts any pe culiar character to the nature of the tort complained of. This is so in cases of collision, in which the offending vessel may be attached and proceeded against as one of the remedies for does not depend upon the fact that the injury was inflicted by the vessel, but upon the locality-the high seas, or navigable waters where it occurred. Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance. We can give, therefore, no particular weight or influence to the consideration that the injury in the present case originated from the negligence of the servants of the respondents on board of a vessel, except as evidence that it originated on navigable waters-the Chicago river; and, as we have seen, the simple fact that it originated there, but, the whole damage done upon land, the cause of action not being complete on navigable waters, affords no ground for the exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction. The negligence, of itself, furnishes no cause of action; it is damnum absque injuria. The case is not distinguishable from that of a person standing on a vessel, or on any other support in the river, and sending a rocket or torpedo into the city, by means of which buildings were set on fire and destroyed. That would be a direct act of trespass; but quite as efficient a cause of damage, as if the fire had proceeded from negligence. Could the admiralty take jurisdiction? We suppose the strongest advocate for this jurisdiction would hardly contend for it. Yet, the origin of the trespass is upon navigable waters, which are within its cognizance. The answer is, as already given; the whole, or at least the substantial cause of action, arising | IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United out of the wrong, must be complete within the locality upon which the jurisdiction depends-on the high seas or navigable waters. The learned counsel, who argued this case for the appellants with great care and research, admitted that it was one of first impression; 37*]that he could find no case in the books*like it. The reason is apparent, for it is outside the acknowledged limit of admiralty cognizance over marine torts, among which it has been sought to be classed. The remedy for the injury belongs to the courts of common law. Decree of the court below affirmed. States for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs in error, citizens of Massachusetts, brought suit in the courts of Iowa against one O. H. Pratt; and the officer to whom the writ was committed for service, made an attachment therein of certain personal property as the property of said Pratt. For this attachment the defendant in error sued the attaching officer, Hayden, in the courts of Iowa, and recovered judgment for the sum of $6,233.03 damages, and $77.55 cost of suit, and received partial satisfaction of the officer on the judgment. He now brings suit for the same trespass against the plaintiffs in error, who were the attaching creditors. The plaintiffs in er 1*] *WILLIAM R. LOVEJOY, et al., Plffs. in ror gave the officer a bond of indemnity at the Err., v. Argued Jan. 26, 1866. Decided Feb. 5, 1866. NOTE. Estoppel by judgment see note to Aspden v. Nixon, 11 L. ed. U. S. 1059. Joint trespassers; effect of judgment against one; may be sucd separately or jointly. A judgment in an action against one of several tort-feasors is a bar to an action against the others for the same cause, although the judgment remains unsatisfied. Brinsmead v. Harrison, 7 L. R. C. P. 547: 41 L. J. C. P. 19: 27 L. T. N. S. 99; 20 Weekly Reporter, 784; Aff'g, 40 L. J. C. P. 281; 6 L. R. C. P. 584; 24 L. T. N. S. 798; 19 Weekly Reporter, 956; Warden v. Bailey, 4 Taunt. 88. If two, jointly liable for trespass, are sued separately the pendency of one suit may be pleaded in abatement in the other. Boyce v. Bayliffe, 1 Camp. 60; but see Day v. Porter, 2 M. & Rob. 151. A judgment against a co-trespasser was formerly held to be a bar without satisfaction (Wilkes v. Jackson, 2 Hen. & Mun. 358; Smith v. Singleton, 2 McMull. 184; Hunt v. Bates, 7 R. I. 217); but later authorities hold that nothing but satisfaction will bar an action against his fellows. Campbell v. Phelps, 1 Pick. 61; Flood v. Brown, 1 Rawle, 121 Robertson v. Smith, 18 Johns. 459; White v. Philbrick, 5 Greenl. 147; Livingston v. Bishop, 1 Johns. 290; Elliott v. Hayden, 104 Mass. 180; Turner v. Brock, 6 Heisk. 50; Elliott v. Porter, 5 Dana, 299: United Soc. of Shakers v. Underwood, 11 Bush. 265; 21 Am. Rep. 214; Davis v. Caswell, 50 Me. 294; Mitchell v. Libby, 33 Me. 74. Judgment against one of the wrongdoers will not bar a recovery against the others in either trover, trespass or detinue. Du Bose v. Marx, 52 Ala. 506; Thomas v. Rumsey, 6 Johns. 26; Sheldon v. Kibbe, 3 Conn. 214; Knott v. Cunningham, 2 Sneed, 204; Woods v. Pangburn, 75 N. Y. 495, 498. time of the attachment, and took part in the defense of the suit. Judgment was for plaintiff. Error brought to this court. It was held in the court below was 1. That this action could be maintained against the plaintiff's in error, although partial satisfaction had been obtained of the officer, on the judgment against him. 2. That, inasmuch as it appeared that the plaintiffs in error defended the suit against the officer, they were concluded by the judgment recovered in that suit. Mr. Hutchins, for plaintiffs in error: There seems to be a great conflict of opinion in the books, whether a judgment alone against one tort-feasor operates as a bar to a suit against another, some holding it to be an absolute bar, others that judgment with execution is necessary, and others that satisfaction is necessary. In the following cases in this country, it has been held that judgment alone operates as a bar. Murrell v. Johnson's Adm'r, 1 Hen. & Munf. 449; Wilkes v. Jackson, 2 Hen. & Munf. 355; Rogers v. Moore, 1 Rice (S. C.), 60, 62; Norris v. Beckley, 2 Const. Rep. (S. C., N. S.) 228; Johnson v. Packer, Nott & McCord, 1; Wilburn Satisfaction of such a judgment is a bar. Bird v. Randall, 3 Burr. 1345; Morton's Case, Cro. Eliz. 30; Page v. Freeman, 19 Mo. 421; McGehee v. Schafer, 15 Tex. 198; Swope v. Courtney, 1 Cranch C. C. 33. A wrong committed by a number of persons is several in character and only joint, because each is liable for the acts of all. Ayer v. Ashmead, 31 Conn. 447. Where several persons have been jointly concerned in the commission of a trespass, they may, in general, all be charged jointly, or the plaintiff may sue any of the parties upon whom individually a separate trespass attaches. Mitchell v. Tarbutt, 5 Term. K. 651; Sutton v. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 29. A party receiving an injury from the wrongful acts of others is entitied to but one satisfaction and an accord and satisfaction by, or a release or other discharge of, one of two or more trot feasors, is a discharge of all. Knickerbocker v. Hawes, 8 Cow. 111; Bronson v. Fitzhugh, 1 Hill, 185; Barrett v. Third Ave. R. Co. 45 N. Y. 628: Woods v. Pangburn, 75 N. Y. 495, 498; Co. Litt. 232; Hob. 66; Noy, 62; 5 Co. 97; Brownl. 189; Cro. Jac. 444; Wilson v. Reed, 3 Johns. 175; Kiffin v. Willis, 4 Mod. 379. Plea of former recovery against a co-trespasser and a voluntary payment of damages and costs to the clerk in open court, without averring that plaintiff accepted the payment in satisfaction of his recovery is bad on that demurrer. Blann v. Crocheron, 20 Ala. 320. For exhaustive note on effect of judgment against one joint-tort feasor upon liability of the other-see 58 L. R. A. 410. Lowell v. Parker, 10 Met. 314; Foxcroft v. Nevens, 4 Me. 72; Hayes v. Seaver, 7 Me. 237; Thompson v. Roberts, 24 How. 233, 16 L. ed. 648. The defendants were neither parties nor priv v. Bogan, 1 Speers, 179; Floyd v. Browne, 1 Rawle, 121; Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawle, 288; Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 Watts & S. 103; Merrick's Estate, 5 Watts & S. 9; Trafton v. U. S. 3 Story, 646 (adopting English doctrine); Marlborough v. Sisson, 31 Conn. 332; Ayer v. Ash-ies to the plaintiffs' judgment against Hayden. mead, 31 Conn. 447, 453; Knickerbacker v. Colver, 8 Cow. 111; Same v. Hawes, 8 Cow. 111; Sheldon v. Kibbe, 3 Conn. 214 (Chapman, J., dissenting); Hunt v. Bates, 7 R. I. 217. In the following cases, that judgment and execution operate as a bar: Livingston v. Bishop, 1 Johns. 290; White v. Philbrick, 5 Me. 147; Campbell v. Phelps, 1 Pick. 62, 65. In the following and some others, it was held that satisfaction was necessary: Sanderson v. Caldwell, 2 Aiken, 195. Clark v. Carrington, 7 Cranch, 308; Sprague v. Oakes, 19 Pick. 455, 458, 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 525; Alexander v. Taylor, 4 Den. 302; Church v. Leavenworth, 4 Day, 278; Eastman v. Cooper, 15 Pick. 276; Gilbert v. Thompson, 9 Cush, 348. An attaching creditor is not answerable in trespass for an attachment made by an officer, unless the attachment is made in pursuance of directions by him. The relation between an attaching creditor and officer is not that of master and servant, nor principal and agent. Add. Torts, 489; Sowell v. Champion, 6 Ad. & El. 417; Fitler v. Fossard, 7 Pa. 540. The case does not show that the attachment of the goods of Pratt was made by the direction of the plaintiffs. One may indemnify an officer for an act committed by him without being liable for that act himself, and may defend his suit against an officer without being himself a trespasser. It is impossible to reconcile these cases; but the English courts keep clear of the whole difficulty by treating the judgment alone as a bar; and this, it is submitted, is the better doctrine. Add. Torts. 302-303, 858-860, 861 (2d ed.); Buckland v. Johnson, 15 C. B. 145, 161-163 (80 Eng. Law, 145, 159); Cooper v. Shepherd, 3 C. B. 271; King v. Hoare, 13 Mees. & W. 494; Lechmere v. Fletcher, 1 Crompt. & M. 623; Add. Torts, 830, 831, 2d ed.; Wilson v. TurnBird v. Randall, 3 Burr. 1345; Brown v. Woot-man, 6 Scott, N. R. 894; Wilson v. Barker, 4 ton, Cro. Jac. 73 (Yelv. 67). Barn. & Ad. 614; 2 Selwyn, N. P. 1326, 7 Am. ed.; 2 Greenl. Ev. §§ 1, 8. But if the court shall be of the opinion that a party may sue and recover separate judgments against co-trespassers, and then elect which judgment he will enforce, then we say that the recovery of judgment against officer Hayden, and the receipt of partial satisfaction on that judgment from the officer before the commencement of this suit, will operate as a bar to this suit. Livingston v. Bishop, 1 Johns. 290; Thomas v. Rumsey, 6 Johns. 26; Hunt v. Bates, 7 R. I. 217; Harrington v. Fuller, 18 Me. 277. In the case of Sanderson v. Caldwell, 2 Aiken, 195, which is much relied upon by the defendants in error, the judgment first recovered was in no part satisfied. How can the court proceed now to try the original trespass, when it has been partially settled for? How would a declaration be framed? How would the court proceed at the trial? What becomes of the $800 paid? Must it not be credited in some way, or deducted? And if so, how? The plaintiff is seeking to recover full damage for a wrong partially redressed. Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 Watts & S. 103. The fact that payment was made by Hayden upon the execution against him for the proceeds of the goods sold, can make no difference with its effect. It was received as a payment, paid as and for a payment, and must operate as a payment. The money used had no earmark, and the payment cannot be recovered, and the money was not paid with the knowledge or ussent of the plaintiffs in error. It was the money of the officer. Shepley, J., Harrington v. Fuller, 18 Me. 277. The plaintiffs in error are not estopped to defend this suit because they gave Hayden a bond of indemnity, or because they took part in the defense of the suit against the officer. If admissible, the judgment is not conclusive. It only shows that Hayden took the goods wrongfully. Mr. Josiah D. Ball, for defendant in error. "All persons who direct or request another to commit a trespass are liable as co-trespassers;" and giving a bond of indemnity in such case makes the party a trespasser. Herring v. Hoppock, 15 N. Y. 409, 413; Davis v. Newkirk, 5 Den. 92, 94; Root v. Chandler, 10 Wend. 110-112; Wall v. Osborn, 12 Wend. 39. It is a well-settled elementary principle of law, that all torts are several as well as joint, and that the injured party can maintain an action against all the tort-feasors jointly, or against each one separately. Baker v. Lovett, 6 Mass. 80; Smith v. Rines, 2 Sumn. 347; Mitchell v. Tarbutt, 5 T. R. 651; Cocke v. Jennor, Hob. 66. A judgment against one tort-feasor is no bar to a suit against his co-trespasser. Nothing short of full and actual satisfaction will be a bar. Sanderson v. Caldwell, 2 Aiken (Vt.) 195, 201; Morgan v. Chester, 4 Conn. 387; Sheldon v. Kibbe, 3 Conn. 214; Hyde v. Noble, 13 N. H. 494; Hepburn v. Sewell, 5 Har. & J. 211; Sharp v. Gray, 5 B. Mon. 4; Barb v. Fish, 8 Blackf. 481; Livingston v. Bishop, 1 Johns. 290; Curtis v. Groat, 6 Johns. 168; Osterhout v. Roberts, 8 Cow. 43; Calkins v. Allerton, 3 Barb. 173; Jones v. McNeil, 2 Bai. 474; Knott v. Cunningham, 2 Sneed, 204; Elliot v. Porter, 5 Dana, 299; Blann v. Crocheron, 20 Ala. 320; Williams v. Otey, 8 Humph. 563, 568, 569; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 533; 2 Kent, Com. 10th ed. 388, 389; Cocke v. Jennor, Hob. 66; Corbet v. Barnes, Wm. Jones, 377; Cooper v. Shepherd, 3 Man. G. & S. 266; Adams v. Broughton, 2 Str. 1078, and Jenkins, 4 Cent. Cas. 88, p. 189. A judgment recorded in any form of action is still but a security for the original cause of action until it be made productive and satisfactory to the party; and therefore, till then it cannot operate to change any other collateral concurrent remedy which the party may have. |