that the evidence was properly admitted. Morris & Co. v. Industrial Board, 119 N. E. 944 (Ill.).

Workmen's compensation laws frequently exempt industrial boards from the common-law rules of evidence. See 1914, CONSOL. LAWS N. Y., c. 64, Art. 4, 68; PAGE AND ADAMS, ANN. OHIO GEN. CODE, §§ 1465-44; BULLETIN NO. 203, U. S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 284. In Illinois, however, there is no such statutory provision, and so the common-law rules apply. Victor Chemical Works v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 11, 113 N. E. 173; Goelitz Co. v. Industrial Board, 278 Ill. 164, 115 N. E. 855. See 1917, HURD'S REV. STAT. ILL., C. 48, § 141. By the weight of authority in the United States a coroner's verdict is not admissible either in civil or criminal actions to prove the cause of death. Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Milward, 118 Ky. 716, 82 S. W. 364; Wasey v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 126 Mich. 119, 85 N. W. 459. Illinois, on the contrary, follows the early English rule, admitting the coroner's verdict as a judicial record and hence as an exception to the hearsay rule. United States, etc. Ins. Co. v. Vocke, 129 Ill. 557, 22 N. E. 467; Armour & Co. v. Industrial Board, 273 Ill. 590, 113 N. E. 138. See 15 HARV. L. REV. 664. The Illinois courts are apparently influenced by a statute which provides that coroner's verdicts shall be recorded. See 1917, HURD's Rev. Stat. Ill., c. 31, § 19. According to the Illinois doctrine, the decision in the principal case is therefore correct. On principle, however, the prevailing American rule seems preferable. In view of the hurried and careless manner in which inquests are frequently conducted, the coroner's verdict, though relevant in determining the cause of death, is of slight probative value and should not be excepted from the operation of the hearsay rule. Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Ross Lewin, 24 Colo. 43, 51 Pac. 488; Kane v. Lodge, 113 Mo. App. 104, 87 S. W. 547.

INJUNCTION-INVASION OF FRANCHISE RIGHT BY PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION HAVING NO LICENSE TO DO BUSINESS. A public service commission had authority to license a duplication of service by a competing public utility if required by public necessity. An established and licensed telephone company sought to enjoin the defendant telephone company, which was beginning construction in the same municipality without a license from the commission. Held, that a permanent injunction was properly granted. Farmers' & Merchants' Co-op. Telephone Co. v. Boswell Telephone Co., 119 N. E. 513 (Ind.).

The mere usurpation of a public privilege cannot, without more, constitute a private wrong to another public utility. Jersey City Gaslight Co. v. Consumers' Gas Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 427, 2 Atl. 922; Coffeyville M. & G. Co. v. Citizens' Natural M. & G. Co., 55 Kan. 173, 40 Pac. 326. But where the plaintiff's special interests or property rights are threatened, equity will grant relief. Williams et al. v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 130 Ind. 71, 29 N. E. 408; City Ry. Co. v. Citizens' St. Ry. Co., 166 U. S. 557, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653; Hudspeth v. Hall, 111 Ga. 510, 36 S. E. 770; Douglass's Appeal, 118 Pa. St. 65, 12 Atl. 834. And a franchise is a contractual or proprietary right. Bartlesville E. L. & P. Co. v. Bartlesville I. Ry. Co., 26 Okl. 453, 109 Pac. 228; Millville Gas Co. v. Vineland L. & P. Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 305, 65 Atl. 504; Louisville v. Cumberland T. Co., 224 U. S. 649, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 572. Moreover, an exclusive monopoly is universally considered a property right, and an illegal interference will be enjoined. Croton Turnpike v. Ryder, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 611; N. O. Gas Co. v. N. O. Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Atlantic City W. W. Co. v. Atlantic City, 39 N. J. Eq. 367. A franchise not exclusive in its terms is exclusive against those having no license to compete, and should be dealt with similarly. Delaware & R., etc. Co. v. Camden & A., etc. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 546; Millville Gas Co. v. Vineland L. & P. Co., supra. See Patterson v. Wollmann, 5 N. D. 608, 611, 67 N. W. 1040, 1042, and cases cited. See also

3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 1992. Moreover, the defendant's unauthorized construction of its poles and lines on a street or highway is a public nuisance. Van Horne v. Newark P. Ry. Co., 48 N. J. Eq. 332, 21 Atl. 1034. And one suffering a pecuniary loss proximately resulting from a public nuisance may abate it in equity. Griswold v. Brega, 160 Ill. 490, 43 N. E. 864. Some courts have refused to grant an injunction because the plaintiff seeks to prevent competition. Coffeyville M. & G. Co. v. Citizens' N. G. & M. Co., supra; Baxter T. Co. v. Cherokee C. M. T. A., 94 Kan. 159, 146 Pac. 324. Public welfare especially requires that public utilities shall compete whenever conditions warrant it. East St. L. Ry. Co. v. East St. L. U. Ry. Co., 108 Ill. 265. But free competition in the principal case would be subversive of the public interest, because adequate service there requires no duplication.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CIVIL SUIT-ABSENCE OF ARREST OR SEIZURE. - In an action for malicious prosecution in a civil suit, where there had been neither arrest of the person of the plaintiff nor seizure of his property, held, that the plaintiff could recover. Pearson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 78 S. W. 204 (Ala.).

Alabama, meeting this question for the first time, takes its place among the states allowing such recovery. The English rule, owing to the Statute of Marlbridge (52 HEN. III, c. 6), which allowed heavy costs pro falso clamore to the defendant in a civil action, denies such relief in a separate action for malicious prosecution. Savile v. Roberts, 1 Ld. Ray. 374. Formerly the weight of American authority was in accord with the English rule. Wetmore v. Mellinger, 64 Ia. 741, 18 N. W. 870; Potts v. Imlay, 4 N. J. L. 382. See cases cited in AMES'S and SMITH'S CASES ON TORTS, Pound's ed., 1917, 650. But now the weight of authority seems to have swung to the other side. Kolka v. Jones, 6 N. D. 461, 71 N. W. 558. On principle, American costs being meagre, the view of the principal case seems sound. The fear of multiplying litigation is without merit. To deny relief might often lead to persecution without remedy. See 9 HARV. L. REV. 538.

MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-CHARITABLE INSTITUTION. - An employee sued a purely charitable institution under the Act for injury by a buzz planer. The Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act in terms includes all employees, one clause specifically excepting farm laborers and domestic servants. MASS. STAT. 1911, c. 751, §§ 1, 2. Held, that charitable institutions are impliedly excepted. Zoulalian v. New England Sanatorium & Benevolent Association, 119 N. E. 686 (Mass.).

Charitable organizations are generally not liable for the negligence of servants or agents. McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432. In England the law is in some confusion as regards their liability at common law; hence a decision holding such an institution liable under the Act may not apply to the principal case. MacGillivray v. Institute for The Blind, 1911, S. C. 897, 48 Scot. L. R. 811. Public commissions managing essentially private or quasi-public enterprises have been held to come under the Act. In re Ryan, N. S. Wales St. Rep. 33; Gilroy v. Makie, 1909, S. C. 466, 46 Scot. L. R. But see Brown v. Decatur, 188 Ill. App. 147. The California Act specifically includes "the state. and all . . . having persons in service for hire." 1917 STAT. C. 2143, § 7. The Massachusetts court properly holds that the specific exemption of farm laborers and domestic servants does not necessarily imply that all other workmen are included. More doubtfully the court finds an implied exception in the general intent expressed in the law. The economic principle on which Workmen's Compensation Acts are often justified obviously would not apply to charitable institutions. Yet, as apparently in California, it may be thought that on humanitarian principles every enterprise should

bear its casualties. See BOHLEN, "Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts," 25 HARV. L. REV. 328, 329. In the setting of the Massachusetts Act, however, the decision seems sound.

MASTER AND SERVANT WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS - COMMON RISKS. — An employee working in a trunk factory was directed to go to the factory maintained by the same company on the opposite side of the street to letter a trunk. While returning, after he had completed his task, he slipped on the ice in the street and sustained fatal injuries. Held, that the accident arose out of his employment. Redner v. H. C. Faber & Son Co., 119 N. E. 842 (N. Y.).

The greatest difficulty in determining whether an accident arises out of an employment is experienced in cases where the workman's injuries result from risks run by every one, yet in contact with which he is brought in the course of his employment. Most courts have applied the test that there must exist a frequency or peculiarity of subjection to the common risk to make the accident one arising out of the employment. Andrew v. Failsworth Industrial Society, [1904] 2 K. B. 32; Pierce v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co., Ltd., [1911] 1 K. B. 997; Fensler v. Associated Supply Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 447. But what frequency or peculiarity is required has never been definitely established, and it is precisely this uncertainty that has caused such a hopeless conflict among the decisions involving the question. Late English and American decisions, however, have discarded this test and have adopted one more determinate in character. It suffices that the risk resulting in the accident was one which the workman incurred through his employment, and the fact that the risk was a common one also, avails nothing. Dennis v. White & Co., [1917] A. C. 479; Bett v. Hughes, [1914] 52 Scot. L. Rep. 93; Milwaukee v. Althoff, 156 Wis. 68, 145 N. W. 238. This reasoning has been applied in the principal case. Since this criterion dispenses with the indefinite elements of "frequency" and "peculiarity," it is more certain and will cause much less confusion in the cases. See also 25 HARV. L. REV. 530–37.

MASTER AND SERVANT WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS STATUTE PROVIDING EITHER COMPENSATION OR DAMAGES: WHEN RECOVERY AGAINST EMPLOYER IS NOT A BAR TO RECOVERY AGAINST NEGLIGENT THIRD PARTY. Under Workmen's Compensation Act of Rhode Island an employee negligently injured by a third party may take action against him or the employer, but shall not recover both damages and compensation. LAWS, 1912, c. 831, art. 3, 21. A written agreement for compensation was, in accordance with the act, filed and approved in the Superior Court. The employee now sues the tortfeasor in accordance with an agreement with his employer providing that the employee should, out of the money thus recovered, repay the employer the sums advanced for compensation. Did receipt of compensation under these circumstances bar recovery against the tortfeasor? Held, it did not. Mingo v. Rhode Island Co., 103 Atl. 965 (R. I.).

The case has apparently no American precedents. Under the English Act of 1897, repealed by that of 1906, an employee might at his option proceed against either employer or tortfeasor, but not both. 60 & 61 VICT. c. 37. Under this act an agreement to take compensation "without prejudice" did not bar action against the tortfeasor. Oliver v. Nautilus Steam Shipping Co., [1903] 2 K. B. 639, 19 T. L. R. 607. Under the English Act of 1906 an employee may "take proceeding" against both parties, but is entitled to but one recovery. 6 EDW. VII. c. 58. Under this act an agreement to refund compensation on subsequent recovery from the tortfeasor was not such "recovery" as to bar action. Wright v. Lindsay and Others, [1912] S. C. 189, 49 Scot. L. R. 210. The Rhode Island statute has similar provision to the later English act, and ex

plicitly provides that the employer who pays compensation shall be indemnified and "subrogated to the rights of the employee to recover damages therefor.” This shows an action by an employee cannot be barred by filing a compensation agreement, for, if so, an employer who is subrogated to the right of the employee could never sue after such agreement. In view of English precedents and the evident intent of the act the decision is sound.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS REDELEGATION OF DELEGATED POWERS DISCRETION STATUTE. By statute the city council of Springfield was given authority to license and regulate the transportation of passengers for hire by motor vehicle. (1916, MASS. STAT. c. 293.) Another statute provided that the city council might delegate the granting of licenses to other officials and might regulate the granting. (1913, MASS. STAT. c. 429.) The city council passed an ordinance regulating the fee and requirements and delegated to the police commission authority to grant licenses where the applicants were found to be "suitable to conduct such business" and the vehicles, after inspection, "safe and proper." The defendant was convicted for operating without a license. Held, conviction sustained. Commonwealth v. Slocum, 119 N. E. 687 (Mass.).

It is settled that the legislature may delegate powers concerning municipal affairs to municipal corporations. Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745; State v. Carpenter, 60 Conn. 97, 22 Atl. 497. When the method of exercising the power is not prescribed by the legislature, the local body may use reasonable discretion. City of Lake View v. Tate, 130 Ill. 247, 22 N. E. 791; Halsey v. Rapid Transit Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 380, 20 Atl. 859. See I DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 5 ed., § 242 et seq. This discretion as to method of exercising the power cannot be delegated to any other body. Johnson v. The Mayor and Council of City of Macon, 62 Ga. 645; Conn. v. Glavin, 67 Conn. 29; Commonwealth v. Maletsky, 203 Mass. 241, 89 N. E. 245; State v. Garibaldi, 44 La. Ann. 809, 11 So. 36; Day v. Green and Another, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 433. However, ministerial or administrative functions may be delegated. Los Angeles, etc. Corp. v. Los Angeles, 163 Cal. 621, 126 Pac. 594; Harcourt v. Asbury Park, 62 N. J. L. 158, 40 Atl. 690. The police commission has been allowed to decide whether moving pictures were immoral. Block v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 251, 87 N. E. 1011. An official has been allowed to decide the number and position of saloons. People v. Gregier, 138 Ill. 401, 28 N. E. 812. And it has been held that discretion in an administrative function may be used whether the ordinance gives it or not. Harrison v. People, 222 Ill. 150, 78 N. E. 52. The ordinance in the principal case does not set a fixed standard. This is immaterial, for it is impossible to set one, and public policy demands protection of the public. See Block v. City of Chicago, supra, 262, 3. And so the statute in the principal case which allows the above rule of common law is merely affirming the common law and should be construed in accordance with it. Hewey v. Nourse, 54 Me. 256; Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87.

PROXIMATE CAUSE - WHAT CONSTITUTES IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS. The plaintiff's vessel lying at anchor 1000 feet off shore was damaged by a concussion of the air caused by an explosion due to fire on shore. Plaintiff's ship was insured in defendant company. The policy covered loss by fire without expressly excepting explosions. Held, insurance company is not liable. Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 120 N. E. 86 (N. Y.).

A policy of fire insurance covers all damage which, within the meaning of the policy, is the proximate consequence of the fire. Lynn Gas, etc. Co. v. Meriden Fire Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 570, 33 N. E. 690. Logically, damage by concussion from a distant explosion of powder caused by fire is a proximate consequence of the fire, since no independent cause intervenes, but the few cases

deciding the point have denied recovery. Everett v. London, etc. Ins. Co., 19 C. B. (N. S.) 126; Laballero v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., 15 La. Ann. 217. See Taunton v. Royal Ins. Co., 2 H. & M. 135, 138, 10 L. T. (N. S.) 156, 157. In New York, if a fire on the insured's premises causes an explosion, the insured can recover, though loss from explosion was excepted from the policy; but if the fire and explosion are on another's premises, recovery is denied. Hustace v. Phenix Ins. Co., 175 N. Y. 292, 67 N. E. 592. Proximate causation does not explain these cases, as property lines and mere distance are not intervening causes. However, insurance policies are construed in accordance with the laws of insurance which cannot follow the chain of causation beyond business usage and the intention of the parties. The premium is fixed by certain fairly calculable elements of fire insurance. See ZARTMAN & PRICE, YALE READINGS IN INSURANCE - PROPERTY INSURANCE, ch. 8. Such a highly speculative risk as distant air concussion cannot enter into business calculations.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANIES RATE REGULATION RIGHT OF COMPANY TO INCREASE RATES FIXED BY CONTRACT. - Plaintiff brought suit in equity for specific performance of a ten-year, low-rate contract made by it with the predecessor of the defendant natural gas company in October, 1913, and for an injunction restraining defendant from cutting off its service in violation thereof, as it had done and threatened to continue to do, unless the plaintiff, a manufacturing corporation wholly dependent on this service for the operation of its plant, paid the greatly increased rates filed by defendant with the state public service commission. Defendant denied the binding force of said contract, alleging that it was discriminatory, and therefore illegal under the Public Service Company Law which took effect Jan. 1, 1914. Previous to filing the increased rates complained of, defendant had twice filed schedules at said contract rate for that class of service. Held, suit dismissed, and legal right of the utility company to discontinue said contract and increase rates for that service without first applying to the public service commission for permission sustained. V. & S. Bottle Co. v. Mountain Gas Co., Pa. Sup. Ct. (June 3, 1918), 13 Rate Research, 335.

For discussion of the principles involved, see NOTES, p. 74.

TAXATION PARTICULAR FORMS OF TAXATION - INHERITANCE TAXES TAX ON THE TRANSFER OF POSSESSION OR ENJOYMENT. - A statute provided that an inheritance tax be imposed on all transfers of property made by a deed intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the grantor. Lineal descendants were exempt. In 1911 C executed a deed to T in trust to pay the income to C during his life, then to distribute among lineal descendants of C. In 1914 an amendment to the statute abolished the exemption of lineal descendants; and in 1917 C died. Held, the gifts to the lineal descendants are subject to the tax. Carter v. Bugbee, 103 Atl. 818 (N. J.). A voluntary trust completely established cannot be revoked by the settlor. Lovett v. Farnham, 169 Mass. 1, 47 N. E. 246; Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575, 81 N. E. 300. The principal case follows what appears to be the settled authority that a statute taxing the receipt or transmission of possession or enjoyment is imposing a transfer tax as distinguished from a property tax imposed on ownership. In re Green's Estate, 153 N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292; Crocker v. Shaw, 174 Mass. 266, 54 N. E. 549. See 28 HARV. L. REV. 437. Cf. 20 HARV. L. REV. 655. However, if, as the courts admit, the execution of the deed by C gives the descendants a vested equitable interest, it is arguable that a statute passed afterward, which taxes the already vested right to a later possession or enjoyment, goes as far towards imposing a property tax as it would if taxing the receipt of possession by any remainderman or if taxing the reversion of possession to a bailor. The principal case is materially