for the specified cotton. The exchange house surrendered the bill of lading to the drawee bank and obtained its acceptance. The bill of lading was forged. The acceptor paid the ultimate holder of the draft, and debited the buyer of the cotton. Held, the buyer can not recover the amount of the draft from the exchange house. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co., [1918] 2 K. B. 623 (C. A.). See NOTES, page 560.

CARRIERS BILLS OF LADING LADING AS A FEDERAL CRIME.

- FORGERY OF AN INTERSTATE BILL OF Defendant was indicted for forging an interstate bill of lading, an act made criminal by section 41 of the Pomerene Act of 1916. Held, that as such a bill is void, it does not affect interstate commerce, and hence section 41 is unconstitutional. United States v. Ferger, So. Dist. Ohio, October, 1918.

For a discussion of this case, see NOTES, page 557.

CONFLICT OF LAWS ADMIRALTY MARITIME LIEN - FOREIGN LAW. Two foreign vessels collided in an Algerian port. Thereupon the master of one of the vessels brought an action in personam in the Algerian court against the master of the other. No maritime lien was given by the local law, but an attachment of the vessel, there known as a "protective seizure," followed. Upon giving a letter of indemnity the vessel was released and then came to the United States where she was libeled by the plaintiff in the foreign action which had not proceeded to trial or judgment, but was still pending. Held, that the libellant had a maritime lien under the general maritime law of the United States, enforceable by a proceeding in rem. The Kongsli, 252 Fed. 267 (Dist. Ct., Dist. Me.).

As a result of the collision the lex loci gave a cause of action, but did not create a maritime lien. In such a case admiralty may take jurisdiction between foreigners to enforce a maritime lien, given by the general maritime law, even though none was given where the cause of action arose. The Kaiser Wilhelm II, 230 Fed. 717. See The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 435, 450, 452. If jurisdiction depends on a maritime lien, it is difficult to see how the court, in the principal case, had jurisdiction, as the lex loci of the collision did not give such a lien. However, there being a cause of action, and the vessel being within the jurisdiction of the court, it seems that the court could give a maritime lien, recognized by its law, as a means of enforcing the cause of action, one of the remedies of its judicial proceeding. See MARSDEN, COLLISIONS AT SEA, 6 ed., 198. And as the jurisdiction was in rem, the pendency of the action in personam in the foreign country would not be a bar to the present action. The Kalorma, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 204; The Bold Buccleugh, 7 Moore (Privy Council), 267.

CONFLICT OF LAWS DIVORCE REMARRIAGE WITHIN PROHIBITED TIME PROPERTY RIGHTS. - A statute in Washington prohibits remarriage by either party within six months of a decree of divorce. (1915, REM. CODE, 419, § 992.) The plaintiff and her husband were divorced in Washington. Two months later, the plaintiff, in company with the defendant, a resident of Washington, went to Canada where the two were married. They immediately returned to their domicile in Washington believing in good faith that the marriage was valid. The plaintiff brings suit for annulment and for a division of the property acquired subsequent to the marriage. Held, the marriage was void, the property to be divided as that of a partnership. Knoll v. Knoll, 176 Pac. 22 (Wash.).

It is well settled that the validity of a marriage contract depends upon the law of the place of celebration. Henderson v. Ressor, 265 Mo. 718, 178 S. W. 175; Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Cons. 54. See I NELSON, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, § 33. But although the contract by the lex loci contractus is

valid, the lex domicilii may refuse to impose thereon the resulting status of marriage. Hall v. Industrial Commission, 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312; Brook v. Brook, 9 H. of L. Cas. 193. See 26 HARV. L. REV. 538. Construing the statute in the principal case as a limitation upon the decree of divorce, the original marriage was not completely dissolved until the specified time had elapsed. Accordingly, although the marriage contract was valid by the lex loci, the lex domicilii could not impose thereon the marriage status. Warter v. Warter, 15 P. D. 152. Cf. Hooper v. Hooper, 67 Ore. 191, 135 Pac. 525. The Washington decisions, however, construe the statute as applying only to persons who remain domiciled in the state, so that either party could remarry during the prohibited period by acquiring a new domicile. State v. Fenn, 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417; Pierce v. Pierce, 58 Wash. 622, 109 Pac. 45. As to property acquired after marriage by the husband or wife, or both, Washington, following the civil-law doctrine, considers such to be community property. See 1915, REM. CODE, 2155, $5917. Even where the marriage is annulled, yet if the parties in good faith believed they were married, as in the principal case, the community doctrine permits the acquests to be divided equally between the man and woman. Lawson v. Lawson, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 69 S. W. 246; In re Brenchley's Estate, 96 Wash. 223, 164 Pac. 913. It is unfortunate, however, to call this property "partnership" property, for that term implies not a marital relation but a business relation entered into for profit. See LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIP, 6 ed., 3, 10; BALLINGER, COMMUNITY PROPERTY, §§ 15, 16.

FEDERAL COURTS DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP DOMICILE AS THE EQUIVALENT OF STATE CITIZENSHIP. - The plaintiff, a citizen of the United States, had acquired a domicile in California. He left that state never intending to return, and toured the United States. In the course of his travels he came temporarily to Virginia. He there sued the defendant in a federal court, claiming citizenship in California. Held, that the bill be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Pannill v. Roanoke Times Co., 252 Fed. 910 (Dist. Ct.).

To sue in a federal court the plaintiff must be a citizen of some state. New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. (U. S.) 91. A citizen of the United States is a citizen of the state wherein he resides. U. S. CONST., Art. XIV, § 1. But the residence must be animo manendi. Marks v. Marks, 75 Fed. 321; Hammerstein v. Lyne, 200 Fed. 165. As in the principal case a person may thus be a citizen of the United States and not a citizen of any particular state. Hough v. Société Elec. Westinghouse de Russie, 231 Fed. 341. See Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 74. This fact is also illustrated by the status of citizens of territories and of the District of Columbia. Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch (U. S.) 452; New Orleans v. Winter, supra. The courts requiring a residence animo manendi for citizenship also say domicile in a state is the substantial equivalent of citizenship in that state. See Harding v. Standard Oil Co., 182 Fed. 421, 423; Hammerstein v. Lyne, 200 Fed. 165, 170. Now one's last domicile remains until a new one is acquired. Desmare v. United States, 93 U. S. 605. It might seem to follow that one remains a citizen of the state of his domicile even when he leaves it sans animum revertendi, so long as he has not acquired a new domicile. But the court in the present case correctly sees that such a result would be utterly inconsistent with the settled view that state citizenship requires permanent residence.

GARNISHMENT EFFECT OF GARNISHMENT VALIDITY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST GARNISHEE WHEN PRINCIPAL DEFENDANT IS GIVEN NO NOTICE. In an action in Tennessee to recover wages, the defendant proved as a defense a judgment obtained against it as garnishee in a proceeding in Virginia. In the garnishment proceeding no service, actual or constructive, was made on

the principai defendant, the present plaintiff, and no notice was given him by the garnishee. Held, that the garnishment judgment was valid and a defense to the present action. Southern Ry. Co. v. Williams, 206 S. W. 186 (Tenn.).

It is established law that jurisdiction over a debt in garnishment proceedings may be obtained by acquiring personal jurisdiction anywhere over the garnishee. Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Deer, 200 U. S. 176. The soundness of this doctrine may well be questioned. See 27 HARV. L. REV. 107; 31 HARV. L. REV. 917. Exercising the jurisdiction so obtained with no notice to the principal defendant except an "extrajudicial" one from the garnishee has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be "due process of law." Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Hostetter, 240 U. S. 620. The principal case is in accord with the latter decision on this point, because the presence or absence of such an extrajudicial notice can have no effect on the constitutionality of the proceedings. But it has been held, contrary to the decision in principal case, that such notice is necessary to protect the garnishee from repayment of the debt to the principal defendant. Pierce v. Chicago Ry., 36 Wis. 283; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Crews, 151 Pac. 879 (Okla.). See also Morgan v. Neville, 74 Pa. St. 52, 57; Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 227. On ordinary principles, the failure by the garnishee to give notice can make him liable to pay the debt a second time only because his negligence has injured the principal defendant to that extent. It should therefore, it is submitted, be necessary for the principal defendant, in his suit against the garnishee, to show (1) (injury) that the claim of the plaintiff in the garnishment proceedings was unjust, and (2) (causation) that the claim could have been successfully resisted if the garnishee had given the omitted notice. Since neither of these elements of liability was established in the principal case, the decision, notwithstanding its obvious injustice to the present plaintiff, seems the correct one if we are logically to follow Harris v. Balk and Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Hostetter, supra.

HUSBAND AND WIFE CRIMINAL CONVERSATION RIGHT OF WIFE TO SUE. The plaintiff, a married woman, sued another woman for criminal conversation with the plaintiff's husband. Held, the plaintiff may recover. Turner v. Heavrin, 206 S. W. 23 (Ky.).

Under the old common law a wife either had no right of action for the alienation of her husband's affections or for criminal conversation with him, or else she had a right she could not enforce because of the necessity of joining her husband, one of the wrongdoers as a party plaintiff. See Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. 577, 594, 595; Humphrey v. Pope, 122 Cal. 253, 257, 53 Pac. 847, 848 (affirmed in 1 Cal. App. 374, 82 Pac. 223); Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 584, 29 N. E. 389, 390. A few jurisdictions still follow the old rule, sometimes on account of a needlessly narrow interpretation of Married Women's Property Acts. Morgan v. Martin, 92 Me. 190, 42 Atl. 354; Lellis v. Lambert, 24 Ont. App. 653. Most jurisdictions now, however, allow a wife recovery in an action for alienation of affections, especially where the action involves both alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Messervy v. Messervy, 82 S. C. 559, 64 S. E. 753; Nolin v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N. E. 890. While generally the cases fail to distinguish the two actions, one court has held that a wife may maintain an action for alienation of affections, but not for criminal conversation. Kroessin v. Keller, 60 Minn. 372, 62 N. W. 438. Another court held in a dictum the wife could maintain either. Dodge v. Rush, 28 App. D. C. 149, 153, The present case, allowing recovery for criminal conversation alone, seems sound.

JURISDICTION

- CIVIL AND MILITARY TRIBUNALS - CALL TO SERVICE UNDER THE DRAFT ACT WHILE AWAITING SENTENCE IN A CIVIL TRIBUNAL. The

petitioner was duly registered and subject to draft under the Selective Service Law. (ACT OF CONGRESS, May 18, 1917.) Following his registration he committed grand larceny, was indicted and pleaded guilty, and was awaiting sentence when called to report for military duty. Claiming his call to service changed his status to that of a soldier subject to military law, and that the jurisdiction of the military authorities was absolute, the petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus. Held, that the application be denied. Ex parte Henry, 253 Fed. 208 (Dist. Ct.).

When one in military service commits an offense which is both a civil and military crime, the jurisdiction of the civil and military tribunals is in times of peace concurrent. But should the jurisdiction of the civil authorities first attach, the military authorities must yield thereto. A. W. 74; should the jurisdiction of the military authorities first attach, they may, but need not, give way to the civil tribunals. A. W. 74; United States v. Lewis, 200 U. S. 1. In times of war, however, the military authorities are supreme and need not yield to the civil authorities though the jurisdiction of the latter first attached. Ex parte King, 246 Fed. 868. They may allow the civil authorities to punish the offender as a matter of comity or expediency. That has been declared to be the proper policy where the charge is serious. J. A. G. O., October 30, 1917; Ibid., June 11, 1917. See Ex parte Bright, 1 Utah, 145. In the principal case the petitioner, though subject to draft, was not at the time the offense was committed subject to military law, and his call to service while he was awaiting sentence from the civil tribunal could not deprive that tribunal of his custody unless it was the intent of Congress so to do. That Congress had no such intent is shown by the Selective Service Regulations which places infamous criminals in Class V, and all other criminals awaiting trial or serving sentence in Class IV. S. S. REG., 2 ed., § 79. Moreover, the result of the principal case is sound, for it is not the military authorities but the wrongdoer himself who seeks his release. See Ex parte Calloway, 246 Fed. 263.

LIBEL AND SLANDER - PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS STATEMENTS OF ALDERMEN. - Defendant as alderman made charges of want of integrity and unfitness against the plaintiff, a policeman, before the board of aldermen, which had power to remove policemen. The plaintiff was exonerated and sued the defendant for libel. Held, that actual malice could not be inferred from the mere falsity of the defendant's statements, and that in the absence of malice the plaintiff could not recover. Sweeney v. Higgins, 104 Atl. 791 (Me.). Usually, action lies for false statements about a person in his trade or profession tending to bring him into general contempt, hatred, or ridicule. Farmer's Life Insurance Co. v. Wehrle, 165 Pac. 763 (Colo.); Carver v. Greason, 101 Kan. 639, 168 Pac. 868. Sometimes, however, public interest in freedom of comment out weighs individual interests in untarnished reputations. A person with a duty or interest, although only social or moral, in communicating his belief about another to a third person with a corresponding interest in hearing it is protected if the informant does not abuse the exigencies of the occasion. Everest v. McKenny, 195 Mich. 649, 162 N. W. 277; State v. Fish, 90 N. J. L. 17, 102 Atl. 378. Public interest in the freedom of speech by members of legislatures, judges, persons in judicial proceedings, and high executive officers is so great that their statements made in the course of duty are absolutely privileged. Dillon v. Balfour, 20 Ir. L. R. 600; Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Exch. 220; Rogers v. Thompson, 89 N. J. L. 639, 99 Atl. 389; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D. C. 413. This is hardly true of inferior boards such as city councils and investigation committees, but there is some authority for holding their privilege absolute, not qualified. Bolton v. Walker, 197 Mich. 699, 164 N. W. 420. Contra, Ivie v. Minton, 75 Or. 483, 147 Pac. 395. The court in the principal case adopts the sounder view.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACTION AGAINST TOWN-AUTHORITY OF COMMITTEE TO EMPLOY ATTORNEY. By vote at a town meeting a committee was authorized to build a bridge. Litigation arose concerning the bridge and the committee employed counsel in connection therewith. In a suit by counsel against the town to recover for his professional services, held that the town is not liable, the committee having acted beyond its authority in employing counsel. Stewart v. Inhabitants of York, 104 Atl. 701 (Me.).

In the absence of express or implied restrictions a town has the authority to employ an attorney to attend to its corporate interests. Cheesebrew v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 71 W. Va. 199, 79 S. E. 350; City of Holdenville v. Lawson, 40 Okla. 38, 135 Pac. 405. See TIEDEMAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 316, § 176. But there is no authority to employ an attorney in regard to matters not affecting the interests of the town. Peck v. Spencer, 26 Fla. 23, 7 So. 642; Tharp v. Blake, 171 S. W. 549 (Tex. Civ. App.). See 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 5 ed., 1246, § 824. In the principal case, as the court points out, the authority given the committee to build a bridge carried with it the incidental. authority to select an engineer, obtain plans and specifications, advertise for bids, and award and execute the contract. See Blaisdell v. York, 110 Me. 500, 518, 87 Atl. 361, 370. It would seem that the committee also had power to employ counsel in regard to the litigation in question, for that litigation affected the interests of the town in that it was purely an expense of building the bridge. Waterbury v. Laredo, 60 Tex. 519, reversed on other grounds in 68 Tex. 565, 5 S. W. 81. In deciding otherwise, the court was apparently influenced by two Massachusetts decisions. See Butler v. Charlestown, 7 Gray (Mass.) 12; Fletcher v. Lowell, 15 Gray (Mass.) 103. But the latter case decided that authority in the mayor to employ counsel in defending an action for damages against the city did not include the employment of counsel for the extraordinary purpose of putting through the legislature an act diminishing the claim for damages. In the former case there was no official action at all, the legal services being rendered merely at the request of individual aldermen. Accordingly neither case is in point.

PLEDGES

- MORTGAGE COLLATERAL-DUTY OF PLEDGEE TO FORECLOSE ON REQUEST OF PLEDGOR. - Defendant assigned overdue real estate mortgages and bonds to the plaintiff as collateral security for his note. Without tendering money to cover the expenses, the defendant requested the plaintiff to foreclose at a time when the property would have satisfied the debt. The plaintiff assented, but failed to do so. Subsequently the obligor on the bond went bankrupt and the property depreciated. In an action on the note the defendant counterclaimed for negligence in failing to foreclose. Held, that the plaintiff was not negligent. City Bank of York v. Ricker, 104 Atl. 804 (Pa.).

Inasmuch as both the pledgor and the pledgee of collateral security are interested in its application there is a duty of due care imposed on the latter in handling the security. See COLEBROOKE, COLLATERAL SECURITIES, 2 ed., §§ 87, 117. He may not sell the collateral to satisfy his debt, but must hold and collect it as it becomes due. Joliet Iron & Steel Co. v. Scioto Fire Brick Co., 82 Ill. 548. Ordinary diligence is required of the pledgee in collecting on the collateral at maturity. Farm Investment Co. v. Wyoming College, 10 Wyo. 240, 68 Pac. 561; Larkin Co. v. Dawson, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 345, 83 S. W. 882. See Coleman v. Lewis, 183 Mass. 485, 487, 67 N. E. 603. The same is true where overdue collateral is pledged. Wakeman v. Gowdy, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 208. In the principal case the pledgee was requested to foreclose, which would involve litigation and risk. It may be argued that if the security is ample the foreclosure should not be left to the caprice of the pledgee. See 19 HARV. L. REV. 471. The pledgor, however, can protect his interest by taking up the security or having a third person do so. It is generally held, therefore, as in the principal