ingly, after notice of termination by G's executor, the only relief would be on the above equitable grounds.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANIES - SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE CONDITIONS TO GRANTING RELIEF. The plaintiff contracted to furnish the defendant city with water and light, together with a certain number of hydrants and arc lamps for the use of which the city was to pay a specified rental. Owing to the direction in which the city had grown, certain of the hydrants and lights were useless, and others were not advantageously located. The city refused to go on with the contract. Held, specific performance will be granted subject to the equitable modifications of the contract that certain hydrants and lights be relocated. La Follette v. La Follette Water, Light, & Tel. Co., 252 Fed. 762 (C. C. A., 6th Circuit, Tenn.).

If unforeseen contingencies produce hardship in the performance of a contract, specific performance may be granted with such modifications as justice requires. King v. Raab, 123 Ia. 632, 99 N. W. 306; Wright v. Vocalion Organ Co., 148 Fed. 209. But mere hardship resulting from foreseeable circumstances will not prevent complete relief to the plaintiff. Franklin Tel. Co. v. Harrison, 145 U. S. 459; Clark v. Hutzler, 96 Va. 73, 30 S. E. 469. On this ground the principal case is wrong. The result, however, is correct on the principle that a public utility must furnish reasonable service. A utility may not contract that it be relieved of its public duty. Inter-Ocean Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56 N. E. 822; Smith v. Gold & Stock Tel. Co., 42 Hun (N. Y.) 454. Then, as in the instant case, if the performance of a contract conflicts with the legal duty of the utility to render reasonable service, the contract is unlawful. See 32 HARV. L. REV. 74, 79. This principle is also illustrated by the regulation of fares according to the necessities of adequate service, despite prior stipulations fixing the rate. Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U. S. 624; Arlington Board of Survey v. Bay State St. Ry., 224 Mass. 463, 113 N. E. 273. Some courts, however, have put the regulation of rates under the police power. See 32 HARV. L. REV. 74, and cases cited. It would seem to follow that a special contract would have no effect whatever. But it is not futile. The consumer under the contract should be bound to accept the service of the utility, whereas if there were no contract, he could refuse. The only limitation on this service is that it be reasonable at all times.

RES JUDICATA - WHAT JUDGMENTS ARE CONCLUSIVE AWARD OF JUsTICES OF THE PEACE. · A statute provided that every person who shall carelessly damage any lamp-post belonging to the Electric Light Company shall pay by way of satisfaction to the company an amount not exceeding £5, as any two justices or the sheriff shall think reasonable. The plaintiff, in his suit before the justices, was awarded £5, and now seeks to recover for the additional damage; the extent of the damage being £29. Held, that the award by the justices made the matter res judicata. Birmingham Corporation v. Samuel Allsopp and Sons, Ltd., 145 L. T. 454.

The statute involved in the principal case did not preclude the plaintiff from bringing suit before a tribunal competent to award full compensation. Crystal Palace Gas Co. v. Idris & Co., 82 L. T. R. 200. The case then comes within the rule that a judgment by a justice of the peace is a bar to another proceeding on the same cause of action. Worral v. Des Moines Retail Grocers' Ass., 157 Iowa, 385, 138 N. W. 481; Liscum v. Henderson Sturgis Piano Co., 44 Okla. 549, 145 Pac. 773. See Brundsen v. Humphrey, 14 Q. B. D. 141, 145. Even if the plaintiff objects that the award is inadequate, the rule is still applicable. Wright v. London General Omnibus Co., 2 Q. B. D. 271. Cf. Bilyeu v. Pilcher, 16 Okla. 228, 83 Pac. 546; Pilcher v. Ligon, 91

Ky. 228, 15 S. W. 513; Brown v. Mathewson, 71 Misc. 110, 129 N. Y. Supp. 907. However, a justice of the peace may have no jurisdiction at all over a suit involving more than he may award; and though the plaintiff claim a less amount, the judgment has been held void. Story v. Nicpee, 105 S. C. 265, 89 S. E. 666. Only when the plaintiff abandons his claim to the surplus is the judgment held to be a bar. Catawba Mills v. Hood, 42 S. C. 203, 20 S. E. 91; Buxton v. Nelson, 103 Ga. 327, 30 S. E. 38. In the principal case there was no such abandonment. Yet there is jurisdiction over the cause, for the statute gives jurisdiction over every person committing the wrong; the limitation is on the damage that may be awarded and is not made a measure of the justice's jurisdiction.

WAGES - INTERRUPTED VOYAGE.

SEAMEN Seamen were engaged "for the run" or the complete voyage. The vessel was frozen in, and the voyage was interrupted. The master requested the seamen to complete the voyage, and promised they would be paid what was proper. At the end of the voyage, when a dispute arose as to the amount due, the seamen refused to unload. They now sue for wages. Held, the seamen are entitled to recover on a quantum meruit. The Helen Fair-Lamb, 251 Fed. 412 (Dist. Ct. E. D., Pa.).

The old rule was that no wages were due if no freight had been earned. Icard v. Goold, 11 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 279; Henop v. Tucker, 2 Paine, 161. But this has been changed by statute. U. S. REV. STAT. (1878) § 4525. When the voyage is abandoned by the fault of the owner or master, seamen are entitled to wages for the full voyage. Walker v. The City of New Orleans, 33 Fed. 683; The Ocean Spray, 4 Sawy. 105. If the voyage is abandoned because of perils of the sea, seamen may recover wages up to the time of the abandonment. Boulton v. Moore, 14 Fed. 922. See Hindman v. Shaw, 2 Pet. Adm. 264. When, however, the pay is one lump sum "for the run," nothing is earned by the seamen unless the vessel receives some benefit through freight. Stark v. Mueller, 22 Fed. 447. In such a case, if the voyage is broken up by perils of the sea, the seamen are entitled to no wages. Stark v. Mueller, supra. They are, however, entitled to their discharge without completing the "run." Thorson v. Peterson, 14 Fed. 742. They may also remain with the vessel and be maintained till the voyage is completed, even though their services are of no value to the ship. See Miller v. Kelly, 17 Fed. Cas. 326, 328. But if, as in the principal case, they remain with the vessel at the request of the master, and render services, they become entitled to compensation on a quantum meruit.

TAXATION - ENTERTAINMENTS DUTY. The proprietors of a restaurant furnished music with service of meals during certain intervals throughout the day. Diners only were admitted, and the charges for meals were the same whether the music was being played or not. An act provided that a duty should be levied upon all paid admissions to entertainments an entertainment being defined as including any exhibition, performance, amusement or sport. Summonses were taken out against the proprietor for admitting persons to a place of entertainment without paying the duty. Held, that the provision for music did not constitute an entertainment. Lyons & Co. Ltd. v. Fox, 145 L. T. 439 (1918).

In a recent case, under very similar facts, the English court reached the opposite result. See Attorney-General v. McLeod, [1918] 1 K. B. 13. In the latter case, however, the music was not purely incidental to the service of meals, but was given in the form of a concert which took place in a separate portion of the building. Again, it was easily determined in that case what part of the full admission price was paid for the privilege of hearing the music. In the principal case, however, patrons incurred the same charges whether music was being played or not, and it seems, therefore, that no distinct portion of the sum paid

by listeners for meals went as admission price for the music. The two cases seem correct and reconcilable.

TRUSTS RESULTING TRUSTS - WANT OF CONSIDERATION AS A GROUND FOR RESULTING TRUST IN FAVOR OF GRANTOR. - A church congregation agreed to deed the church property to the trustees of presbytery in consideration of the assumption of a mortgage, with the privilege of redemption, and the use of the church by the grantor congregation. The deed did not specify the assumption, and was on its face absolute. Held, the grantee held in resulting trust. Deutsche Presbyterische Kirche v. Trustees of Elizabeth Presbytery, 104 Atl. 642 (N. J.).

In the absence of unusual circumstances the prevailing American rule is that where land is conveyed by an absolute deed, with an oral agreement to hold in trust for the grantor, such agreement is unenforceable, either because contrary to the Statute of Frauds or the parol-evidence rule. Turner v. McKown, 242 Pa. St. 565, 89 Atl. 797; Revel v. Albert, 162 N. W. 595 (Ia.); Crawford v. Workman, 64 W. Va. 19, 61 S. E. 322. The English courts, however, impose a constructive trust on the grantee to prevent unjust enrichment of the grantee at the expense of the grantor. Rochefoucauld v. Boustead (1897), 1 Ch. 196. For the same reason in both England and the United States the courts treat a deed absolute on its face as a mortgage, if the parties intended it to be such. Donlon v. Maley, 60 Ind. App. 25, 110 N. E. 92; Voris v. Robbins, 52 Okla. 671, 153 Pac. 120. Logically there is no difference between an oral agreement to hold by way of mortgage or trust, and the principal case, in recognizing such and in following the English rule as to oral agreements to hold in trust, is sound.

TRUSTS-SPENDTHRIFT TRUST CREATED BY THE CESTUI : WHETHER GOOD AGAINST CREDITORS. A conveyed his property to a trustee in trust for himself for life with remainder in trust for his wife and children subject to his changing the remainder by will. He further provided that the trust property and income should not be liable for his future debts. Suit by the present plaintiff, a creditor, went to judgment and execution was levied against the trustee as garnishee. Held, the property is liable to the plaintiff's claim. Benedict v. Benedict, 104 Atl. 581 (Pa.).

The authorities are in great conflict as to the validity of spendthrift trusts. Broadway Nat. Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170; Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716; Bramhall v. Ferris, 14 N. Y. 41. Contra, Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. Jr. 429; Tillinghast v. Bradford, 5 R. I. 205; Honaker v. Duff, 101 Va. 675, 44 S. E. 900. But even where spendthrift trusts are allowed, where the beneficiary is also the grantor of the spendthrift trust, it has been held fraudulent as to subsequent creditors. But such cases are limited to instances where the donor also reserves to himself the right to change at any time the beneficiaries of the remainder. The view being taken is, that the donor has reserved to himself all the rights of ownership, but so transferred the property as to free it from the liabilities of ownership. Scott v. Keane, 87 Md. 709, 40 Atl. 1070; Ghormley v. Smith, 139 Pa. St. 584, 21 Atl. 135. But where the donor has definitely and conclusively given away the remainder while creating the trust, the courts allow the subsequent creditors to proceed merely against the life interest, the property of the donor-beneficiary. Jackson v. Sezdlitz, 136 Mass. 342; Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N. Y. 36, 50 N. E. 967. This view is quite logical, for since a man having no debts can give away all his property directly, he should be able to do so by the trust arrangement, even though the part of the trust referring to his life estate misfires.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. By Edward Jenks. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1918. pp. viii, 369.

The title of this book arouses hopes which are not realized. There is very little about the British Empire or even the British Isles, outside England. For example. English local government receives forty-seven pages, Scotch two, Irish one-half, colonial seven. English education fills ten pages, with no mention of the outlying regions. A purely provincial topic like church history before the Reformation gets nine pages. On the other hand, one can learn nothing here about such vital colonial matters as the right of a British subject, e. g., a Hindoo, to possess full citizenship everywhere in the Empire; the legal status of the blacks in South Africa; the inclusion of natives upon Indian councils; the unfortified frontier of Canada; colonial demands to share in Imperial foreign policy; the Australian Monroe doctrine; the veto power of colonial governors and their liability to civil action for official misconduct; the relations of the various federal governments to their states or provinces. Under this last head we should like to read of the problem of McCulloch v. Maryland in Australia; the inability of the Privy Council to review Australian decisions on constitutional law unless allowed to do so by the Australian High Court; or the extent to which the Canadian government exercises its veto power over provincial legislation. Much is said of English political parties, nothing of the French Canadian Nationalists, the Labor party in Australia, or Sinn Fein. Out of thirty-eight pages on courts, only half a page is devoted to industrial tribunals in the Dominions.

Yet the book is valuable as a storehouse of information about English government, gathered with much effort to secure accuracy and to include the most recent developments, of which it would be very inconvenient to learn elsewhere. For example, the terms of the 1917 franchise act are given with considerable fulness. This is the book to answer those troublesome questions which continually recur to the casual reader of English political novels and articles. What does the Lord Privy Seal do? How is a budget introduced? What is the function of the various English courts, ancient and modern?

There are occasional interesting discussions of constitutional and political principles. For example, it is questioned whether the old two-party system unfits the House of Commons for a proper handling of the problems of Empire. "Secret diplomacy" is felt to be necessary in a modified form. "Crises which, if handled confidentially, can be discreetly averted, are apt to become distinctly more unmanageable when they are discussed in public with the aid of an excited Press, bent on arousing the passions of its readers." The sanest proposition, in Mr. Jenks' opinion, is a joint legislative committee on foreign relations, to which all international negotiations should be continually reported. (This frequent use of fear of the press as a check on popular control of government will perhaps one day suggest the treatment of newspapers as educational institutions instead of money-making enterprises.)

There are some features of the English Constitution, when spread out in its details, which transport us into the realms of Gilbert and Sullivan. Chapter I is devoted to "The King-Emperor," who "stands at the head of the British Empire," and to his extensive powers over army, police, courts, legislation, foreign policy. But the last paragraph warns us against the natural impression "that, the British Empire is an autocracy." All that has gone before is only make-believe, and the King-Emperor does not really rule the lives of his subjects by his personal likes and dislikes. Chapter II, "The Constitutional Monarchy," will make him safe for democracy. The curious outsider who wonders why this official exists at all is told of the immense "influence of the

Royal Family in matters of religion, morality, benevolence, fashion, and even in art and literature." Passages in "Joan and Peter" spring to mind, and Max Beerbohm's cartoon of "Mr. Tennyson reading 'In Memoriam' to his Queen.' And besides, says Mr. Jenks, "it is possible that the majority of the people, even of the United Kingdom, .. believe that the government of the Empire

is carried on by the King personally." In other words, if he did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him.

It is suggested that the King-Emperor has three true political rights. The first is, to be informed by a daily letter from the Prime Minister of the public proceedings of Parliament and the secret discussions in the Cabinet. It is clear that this right has no effect in making the sovereign indispensable; if he were abolished, nobody would need the information and the Prime Minister's time would be freer. The second right is, to warn his minister privately out of the lessons of his political experience, which is continuous unlike theirs. The value of this right depends upon the certainty that the King-Emperor will be a man of political sagacity; is inheritance the best method to secure that result? The third right is, to refuse to act on the advice of his ministers in certain rare cases. Thus he can refuse to appoint an unworthy man to office or to swamp the House of Lords with newly created peers. Mr. Jenks also thinks that he can refuse to dissolve Parliament under certain circumstances, but the citation of precedents is needed on this point. A possible fourth right is not mentioned, that of deciding between two candidates from the majority party for the office of Prime Minister. On the whole, the case for continuing the monarchy in England, as presented in this book, does not appear strong.

The book is as full of survivals and exceptions as a Latin grammar. Crown colonies are under the Colonial office, but Ascension Island is under the Admiralty. The inferior clergy are still summoned to Parliament, but they never come. Indeed, an Anglican or Roman Catholic clergyman cannot sit in the House of Commons, but he can sit in the House of Lords if he happens to be a peer, while the more fortunate Methodist minister can sit anywhere. English peers belong to the House of Lords as a matter of course. Scotch and Irish peers elect some of their number to represent them there. The unlucky Scotch lord who loses the election can not even run for the House of Commons, but an Irish peer can. Every exercise of the royal authority until recently was required by statute to have three seals before the Great Seal, each imposed by a separate official, who should be entitled to charge a fee for his share in the process. "A cynical observer might say that the last provision afforded the most powerful guarantee that the statute would be obeyed." A member of Parliament can not resign, but gets appointed Bailiff of the Three Hundreds of Chiltern, and automatically ceases to be a member; then he resigns as Bailiff. County courts have nothing to do with counties. The Archbishop of Canterbury is a member of the Board of Trade. He is Primate of All England, while his brother of York is only Primate of England. When a bishop dies, the cathedral chapter receives a letter from the Crown giving them leave to elect his successor. Unfortunately for the chapter a second letter follows close, containing the name of A, the Crown candidate. It is true that B's name is also added in this letter, to keep up the appearance of a free choice. But if the chapter elected B, they would be punished with all the terrors of a præmunire. All these provisions of the British Constitution seem like papers stuck into pigeonholes at random, with the hope of systematic filing, on a day that never comes. But let us be humble, and think of the electoral college. What should we do if Democratic electors voted for the Republican candidate?

We may mention some discussions of minor details which interest an American reader:

(1) The Canadian government pays the Leader of the Opposition a salary