the employer; a maximum rate would be in effect a restraint upon an employee. The act gives power to prescribe a minimum rate, and the object of that power would be defeated if a man who thinks that his services are worth more than the minimum rate were not free to hold out for a higher rate. Some employers pay more than the minimum for the avowed purpose of attracting the best men. Incidentally it may be remarked that the position as now settled here is very far from justifying the fears of those who look on provisions for minimum rates as tending to the establishment of a "servile state." Mr. Belloc's dogma that "the principle of a minimum wage involves as its converse the principle of compulsory labour," is not confirmed by such experience as I have had. 6 The statement has often been made that the minimum rate tends to become the maximum rate. I have not found it so. It is quite true that far more employees get the minimum rate prescribed than got it before the rate was fixed, for, before that time they usually got varying rates, mostly below the minimum. I have not found unions objecting to members taking extra pay for extra usefulness; for instance, in building operations an expert scaffolder often claims, and gets without objection, a higher rate than the flat minimum prescribed; and leading hands in a labouring process often get higher rates than their mates; 7 but unions object to extra rates for extra servility, for disloyalty to one's comrades. OFFENSIVE JOBS, ETC. Connected with this doctrine are the propositions that the Court does not attempt to discriminate in minimum rates on the ground of comparative laboriousness, and that the Court will not prescribe an extra minimum to compensate for unnecessary risks to the life or health of the employee, or for unnecessary dirt. For instance, members of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers failed to get an increase of rate under the name of "dirt money" when handling dirty work. That is to say, the Court refused to increase the minimum rate prescribed. So, too, in artificial manure works, "The Servile State," 172. 7 Broken Hill, 10 Com. Arb. 200, 201 (1916). 8 Propositions 12 and 19 of the previous article. • Broken Hill, 10 Com. Arb. 155 (1916). the employees asked for an increase in the minimum rate because of dust and fumes. It was said that dust affected the air passages and produced catarrh, etc.; but there was no evidence to show how far, if at all, the dusty conditions operated to reduce the effective wages. The Court was unable to express the injury in terms of money. Of course, if the subject of defective arrangements under which dust is produced come before the Court directly as a grievance for regulation, the Court would have to decide the matter as best it could; but employers must not be allowed to purchase by money a right to injure health. The same principles are applied to cases of excessive strain on employees, as by excessive weights or excessive use of certain muscles or injury to clothes: "This Court tends rather to refuse to make differences in minimum rates except for clearly marked distinctions and qualifications, such as craftsmen's skill, or exceptional responsibility, or special physical condition, necessary for the function. . . . Differentiation in minimum rates prescribed must be made on broad lines." 10 On the same grounds the Court expressed disapproval of the system of extra minimum rates for special cargoes handled by waterside workers. When one special cargo was conceded by another tribunal there were incessant efforts to make more cargoes special, until at last the complaint was that all cargoes should be special except case goods. No subject has caused more incessant friction. There can be, however, no objection to a man refusing to accept employment for a cargo which injures his health or is beyond his powers, or if he think that he ought to get a payment beyond the minimum. Beyond the minimum there is an ample area for free bargaining. REGULATION OF EMPLOYERS' METHODS But although the Court does not prescribe a differential minimum rate on the ground that a job is offensive or distressing, it has sometimes to award directly on the subject when it is made the ground of a substantive dispute. For instance, the waterside workers complained that the weights put upon them to carry or to wheel were too heavy; and the Court prescribed a maximum of 10 Artificial manures, 9 Com. Arb. 187-89 (1915). I cwt. for bagged ore to be lifted, a maximum of 5 cwt. for one man using a two-wheeled truck (the truck itself weighs 2 cwt.), a maximum of 200 lbs. for bagged cargo to be carried, a maximum of 15 cwt. for two men using a trolley." There were certain exceptions made; it was recognised also that the weight might vary with the condition of the wharf; and, above all, there was no appropriate scientific evidence of the kind that is collected in the excellent work of Miss Goldmark, "Fatigue and Efficiency." But interference on such subjects is rare. It is well known that the Court is very chary about dictating to those that have to direct the work as to the mode of carrying it out;12 and that it will not dictate conditions unless it be clearly shown that the mode adopted involves undue pressure on human life. The Court usually refuses to prevent the employer from having the work done as he thinks desirable for his undertaking,13 or to dictate the number of men to be employed,1 or to alter the functions of the respective officers,15 or to prevent an employer from calling on an employee to work extra hours if paid substantial extra rates,16 or to prevent coastal vessels from being at sea on Sundays," or to prescribe the number of retorts to be drawn and charged by a stoker in his shift,18 or to interfere with the choice of men for appointment or promotion. The Court does not favour the arbitrary limitation of the proportion of boys to adults if the employer finds that boys will answer the purpose of his undertaking as well as men, and especially if he bind himself to teach the boys a definite trade. But the position is different if the boys would not be employed for certain heavy or risky work except for their wages being lower- if the employer would not employ boys but for the cheaper rate.19 In one case the Court refused to exempt any boys from the minimum adult wage unless they were properly apprenticed.20 Similar principles are 11 Waterside workers, 9 Com. Arb. 305–09 (1915). 12 See proposition 30. 13 Pastoralists, 11 Com. Arb. (1917). 14 Marine engineers, 10 Com. Arb. 528 (1916). 15 Postal electricians, 10 Com. Arb. 578 (1916). 16 Merchant Service Guild, 10 Com. Arb. 673 (1916). 18 Gas employees, 11 Com. Arb. (1917). 19 Linemen, 10 Com. Arb. 602, 613 (1916). 20 Butchers, 10 Com. Arb. 465, 495 (1916). applied in the case of women. If women are put to work more suited for men, as that of a blacksmith, or even to work for which men are equally suited, the women must get a man's minimum.21 DIRECTORS OF INDUSTRY The Court does not ignore, however, the increasing demand of employees for some voice as to the conditions of working, the uneasy feeling that the employers, or rather their foremen, have an autocratic power which is too absolute. Wages and hours are not everything. A man wants to feel that he is not a tool, but a human agent finding self-expression in his work. The Court tries, therefore, to encourage by all the means in its power the meeting of representatives of the unions with representatives of the employers. Such meetings produce a good effect, even when the employers adhere to their methods, giving their reasons. Fortunately there is no difficulty as to recognition of the unions. The unions have come and have come to stay. Our act could not be worked without unions. One of the chief objects of the act is, under section 2, "To facilitate and encourage the organisation of representative bodies of employers and employees, and the submission of industrial disputes to the Court by organisations." Now the act 22 enables the Court to appoint "Boards of Reference," and such boards involve opportunities for meeting for discussion of methods and alleged grievances. The difficulties which the Court has to face as to such boards appear in a passage in a judgment of last year, a passage which I take the liberty of setting out: "The most serious difficulty that I see in the agreements and in this award is the absence of the provision for a Board of Reference - a Board in which the employer and the employed could take counsel together for the purpose of dealing with any grievances which employees allege and which the directors and managers, owing to their remoteness from the stress of actual operations, cannot realise. It is one of the signs of the times, of which employers would do well to take heed, that the workers are gravely dissatisfied, because they have no voice whatever in the regulation of the conditions under which they spend so much of their lives, that their opinions as to the possibility of preventing unnecessary hardship are not to be treated as being of more account than 21 Fruit-growers, 6 Com. Arb. 61, 71 (1912). 22 § 40 a. as if they were engines or horses. Many a grievance, or supposed grievance, would be removed before it developed into a serious trouble by a proper board of reference. I have hoped and worked for an agreement for such boards in this case, one at least for each undertaking; but the parties cannot agree as to the conditions. The companies want to insert a provision that before a grievance can come before the board of reference it must be brought by the individual employee aggrieved before his foreman or immediate superior. The union desires that the grievance shall be brought before the management by the works committee of the union, and then, if necessary, before the board of reference; but it is willing, as a compromise, to agree that either the individual or the board may approach the management. The companies unite in insisting that the individual employee must first make the complaint. Such a provision was not in the agreements of 1913, and there is no evidence that the lack of it has had any ill-effect. But the companies are firm on the subject. It is suggested that I should exercise my power under Sec. 40-A to appoint a board of reference. That section enables me to assign to a board the function of dealing with "any specified matters or things which under the award or order may require from time to time to be dealt with by the board." Unfortunately these words mean, according to a majority of the High Court, that I must specify now, in my award, the specific grievances which the Board may deal with (Federated Engine-drivers v. Broken Hill Company, 16 C. L. R. 245). Apparently it is not enough for me to commit to the Board all or any matters which may arise even arise under the award or order. I have said in previous cases, it is impossible for me to specify beforehand the grievances which will arise or be alleged. Whether the view of the High Court is correct or not, I shall obey it. I had hoped that Parliament would have come to the assistance of the Court by an amendment of the section, but it has not done so. I cannot make use of the section, at all events, so as to meet the circumstances of this case." 23 As The fundamental difficulty of the position seems to be that the employer and the union look at the methods used from different points of view. The employer- generally a company acting through directors - looks at money results, at profits, at expenses. The union looks at the results to the human instrument. Both sides of the subject ought to be considered. It is significant that the unions are always willing to have such boards, and the Court often manages to get an agreement on the subject. The board of 23 Gas employees, 11 Com. Arb. (1917). |