a mistake made by the magistrate in issuing a warrant against plaintiff for larceny. This disposes of counts 1 and 2 of the complaint. Hahn v. Schmidt, 64 Cal. 284, 30 Pac. 818; Newman v. Davis, 58 Iowa, 447, 10 N. W. 852; Lark v. Bande, 4 Mo. App. 186; Frankfurter v. Bryan, 12 Ill. App. 549. 2. There can be no recovery on the remaining fourth count charging slander. There is no proof to sustain the allegation that defendant made such a charge, except that while being examined as a witness on the trial before the magistrate, he may have used some such expression as that plaintiff stole his fodder. The witness, Ward, testified that defendant testified before the magistrate that plaintiff had gone on his premises and stolen his fodder in the following manner, that plaintiff claimed to have bought the fodder from witness' tenant, who had left his place without paying his rent, and that the fodder belonged to witness, and after plaintiff had taken away a part of the fodder, he was warned by witness not to take away any more, but, nevertheless, plaintiff went on witness' place and took the balance of his fodder without his consent. The plaintiff was examined and testified that defendant when examined before the magistrate, testified that he, plaintiff, had gone on his, defendant's premises and taken a lot of his fodder without his consent, and there were a lot of people present at the time. He did not testify that defendant had testified that plaintiff had stolen the property. Such testimony is privileged, and will not support an action of slander. In his work on Slander and Libel (page 339, § 223), Mr. Townshend very correctly, as we conceive, lays down the doctrine to be, that "the due administration of justice requires that a witness should speak, according to his belief, the truth, the whole truth and nothing else but the truth, without regard to the consequences; and he should be encouraged to do this by the consciousness that, except for any willfully false statement, which is perjury, no matter that his testimony may in fact be untrue, or that loss to another ensues by reason of his testimony, no action of slander can be maintained against him. It is not simply a matter between individuals, it concerns the administration of justice. The witness speaks in the hearing and under the control of the court, is compelled to speak, with no right to decide what is material or what is immaterial; and he should not be subject to the possibility of an action for his words. This is the view in the courts of England and some of the states, and in our opinion is the correct view." To the same effect is Odgers, Lib. & Sland. p. *191; Newell, Defam. p. 449, § 43. See, also, 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 408 ("Witnesses"), where the decisions of many of the states are collated. This count contained no averment that the charge against plaintiff, attributed to defend ant, was willfully false,-nothing upon which perjury could be predicated. There was no error in the general charge given for defendant. Affirmed. (126 Ala. 194) AMERICAN PIG-IRON STORAGE-WAR- EVIDENCE-RECEIVER'S PENSES. 1. Where pledged property is wrongfully moved from the possession of the pledgee by the pledgor, a bill in equity will lie against a storage company to whom the bailor afterwards pledged the goods to determine the interest of the first pledgee, and to enforce the pledge by judicial sale. 2. The pendency of other creditors' bills against an obligor does not preclude the pledgee from maintaining an original bill to determine and enforce his interests against a future pledgee of the same property after it had been wrongfully taken from the first pledgee's possession, instead of intervening under the other bills, although the second pledgee was a party to such other bills. 3. The statutes relative to chattel mortgages do not require a pledge of property to be in writing and to be recorded, in order to be valid as against third parties who have acquired the property without notice of the pledgee's claim. 4. A furnace company, to secure its notes, pledged iron to the plaintiff. The iron was placed on a particular piece of ground belonging to the company, but not forming a part of its iron yards, which ground was tendered to the pledgee for his use. The initials of the plaintiff were marked on the iron with paint. Held to show a sufficient possession in the pledgee, as against one to whom the pledgor pledged such property after wrongfully removing it from such yard. 5. A pledge of property takes effect on the delivery of the property to the pledgee, although the contract for the creation thereof was made prior thereto. 6. Evidence of statements by an officer of a corporation which has pledged certain property that the pledgee authorized the corporation to remove the property is hearsay, and is inadmissible to show the corporation's right to remove the property. 7. A finding by the register of the quantity of iron removed from the possession of a pledgee will not be disturbed because the testimony does not harmonize as to the quantity removed or as to the time of removal, when such evidence may harmonize on the supposition that removals in different quantities occurred at different times, and that all of such acts were not known to each witness. 8. It is not necessary that all parties in interest as defendants be named in a petition of intervention, where they are properly served with process. 9. A petition in intervention is not required to contain a formal prayer for process. 10. A pledge is not defeated by the wrongful act of the pledgor in taking possession and disposing of the pledged property. 11. Where a pledgor wrongfully took possession of the property, and removed it and placed it in the possession of a storage company, who issued warrants thereon, the storage company and its warrant holders acquire the property subject to the pledge, without regard to their having notice thereof. 12. Code, § 4222, providing that a warehouseman who has issued warehouse certificates not indorsed "not negotiable" shall be deemed the owner of the property thereon specified, in order to give validity to a pledge made by such person, does not validate the title of a holder of a warrant issued by a storage company on property which its pledgor has wrongfully removed from a former pledgee. 13. A decree will not be reversed for the reason that the register admitted incompetent testimony, when there was sufficient competent testimony to support his finding. 14. Where a receiver of an insolvent iron company is authorized by the court to manufacture its accumulated raw material and sell the same for the payment of incumbrances, and the receiver is authorized to borrow money therefor and to issue certificates on the iron as security for the borrowed money, the lien so Created may be transferred to other iron which by order of court and the acquiescence of the parties has been substituted for the iron on which the certificates were issued. 15. Expenses incurred by the receiver of an insolvent corporation in the issuance of certificates at the instance of a storage company, and in guarding property of the insolvent corporation, part of which was in the yard of the storage company, may be properly prorated between the two companies. Appeal from chancery court, Shelby county; J. R. Dowdell, Chancellor. Suit by Marie L. E. German, executrix, against the American Pig-Iron Storage-Warrant Company to establish plaintiff's right as bailee to property in the possession of the defendant. From a decree in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. The present appeal is the sequel of the litigation growing out of the insolvency of the Alabama Iron & Steel Company, commenced by a bill filed by one of its directors, under a resolution of its board, praying the chancery court to administer the assets of the insolvent corporation, etc. Subsequently other bills and petitions were filed by interested parties, claiming priorities and liens upon the property of the corporation, and seeking to assert rights to some iron manufactured by the receiver in the cause. First and last, there were five bills and two petitions filed. All of these were heard together, and one decree was rendered on the several claims and rights of the parties, as regards the matters involved in this appeal. The five bills and the two petitions were filed as follows: First. What is known as the "E. T. Peter Bill," No. 471, filed May 21, 1894, by the complainant in the capacity of a director of the iron and steel company, under a resolution of its board of directors. This bill alleged the insolvency of the company, and asked the court to take charge of and administer the assets of the corporation. The only parties defendant were the iron and steel company and French Nabors, a simplecontract creditor. On the day the bill was filed the defendant answered, admitting the allegations, and by consent T. J. Peter was appointed receiver. The order of the register appointing him is set out in the record. Second. On June 1, 1894, Thomas M. Fancher and Henry Burke, who were unsecured creditors, filed their bill, No. 472, as serting the invalidity of certain mortgages on the property of the corporation, not material to the issues of this cause, and alleging the invalidity of the pledges of iron made to the appellant. It made parties defendant the warrant company, the iron and steel company, the Central Trust Company, the trustees of the mortgage, and receiver. On the same day the register made an order which recites that "it appearing that all the property and assets of said corporation are now in the hands of T. J. Peter as receiver," and concludes "that the said receiver keep and hold possession of the property heretofore taken possession of by him under the previous orders of the honorable court, and hold the same subject to the claims of complainants in this cause, as they may be ultimately determined." Third. On July 4, 1894, F. C. McKeever, who was also a simple-contract creditor, filed his bill, No. 474, in which he alleged that the bills filed by E. T. Peter and Fancher and Burke were collusive, and alleged the invalidity of both the mortgages to the Central Trust Company and the pledges of the iron deposited in the yards of the storage company. It made parties defendant of all parties to the two former bills. On July 9, 1894, the register made an order which recites the possession by T. J. Peter as receiver under the former order of the court, and orders that the said receiver "keep and hold the possession of the property taken possession of by him under the previous orders of the court, and hold the same subject to the claims of the complainants in this cause as they may be ultimately determined." Fourth. On the 7th day of July, 1894, Peter, as receiver, filed a petition in causes Nos. 471 and 472, which were the E. T. Peter and Fancher and Burke bills, in which he recited his appointment in case 471 and the extension of the receivership to 472, and averred that among the other assets of the corporation was a "large amount of material, consisting of charcoal, lime rock, iron ore, and other material, procured, before the appointment of a receiver, for the purpose of manufacturing pig iron." The petition further shows that in the opinion of the receiver it would be to the interest of all parties interested in the assets of the corporation for him to be allowed, for the purpose of raising the necessary funds, to use up the material, and to pay certain debts which were liens on some of the assets, and to repair the furnace, to issue receiver's certificates for an amount not exceeding $17,000, and to make up the material into iron, and then sell the iron and pay off the certificates. Fifth, On July 7th the chancellor made an order in causes 471 and 472 (the Peter and Fancher bills), which recites that "notice of said petition, and of the nature and character thereof, and of the time and place set for the hearing of the same, has been given to the several attorneys representing the various parties complainant and defendant in the above causes, and that the parties consent to the granting of said order as prayed therein," authorizing the receiver to create an indebtedness not exceeding $17,000, for the purpose of paying off the liabilities mentioned, and for operating the furnace of the iron and steel company, and to issue therefor certificates payable by the 1st of January, 1895, which "certificates shall be a first lien upon all of the iron that may be manufactured by the receiver, and the proceeds thereof." A form of certificate was prescribed by the order, which provides that the certificates shall "be a first lien upon all the iron manufactured by me as receiver, on the furnace of the Alahama Iron & Steel Company, and upon the proceeds thereof; the produce of said furnace and the proceeds thereof being pledged for the payment of this and all other certificates issued under the said order." The certificates involved in the Lamar petition were issued under this order. Sixth. The American Pig-Iron Storage-Warrant Company was not a party to the E. T. Peter bill, and was not represented in the Fancher bill until August 2, 1894, when it filed its answer in the latter cause, which was nearly a month after the order allowing the issue of receiver's certificates, and long after the certificates were in fact issued. Seventh. The receiver never took possession of the yards of the storage company until they were surrendered under an order of the chancellor dated July 16, 1894, and filed in the office of the register on July 18, 1894. Eighth. On October 2, 1894, Joseph Verchot filed his bill, which recites the filing of the bills above mentioned, claims a first lien on 700 tons of iron, which it alleges are in the hands of the receiver, and prays that the iron be subjected to the alleged liens; and on January 24, 1895, the chancellor made an order extending the receivership of Peter to the bill, and ordered "that the receiver hold all of the property, funds, and proceeds of the Alabama Iron & Steel Company in his hands, or which may come into his hands, as such receiver, subject to discharge the liens of the parties in all of said suits described in this bill in their regular order or priority." Ninth. On March 14, 1895, P. E. Williams et al. filed their bill, alleging that they were unsecured creditors of the iron and steel company, reciting the former bills, and denying the validity of the bonds issued by that company, or the validity of the pledges of the iron stored in the yards of the warrant company, and made parties defendant all parties to the former bill, and other parties not necessary to a decision of any question raised on this appeal. This bill prayed that the assets of the iron and steel company be marshaled, the bonds declared void, and the iron subjected to the claims of the unsecured creditors, and that the receivership granted in the other bills be extended on this. On March 17, 1895, the chancellor made an order that the receivership granted In the other causes "is hereby extended over this cause." Tenth. On September 18, 1897, R. H. Pfaff filed his petition in the consolidated cause made by the bills set out above, and asserted that certain iron which had been pledged to C. S. Plumb had been transferred to him, and that the iron thus pledged was in the possession of the receiver, and asking that he be decreed to have the first lien on the iron, and have it sold for his benefit. This petition is in relation to what is known as the "Plumb Iron," and the order made on the petition is one of the matters involved in this appeal. Eleventh. On September 16, 1897, L. & E. Lamar et al. filed their petition, in which they alleged that they were the holders of certain receiver's certificates issued under the order of July 7, 1894, and further that the receiver had certain property in his possession which was subject to the lien of these certificates. and prayed that certain iron claimed by the warrant company be subjected to their lien. The order made is one of the matters involved in this appeal. The E. T. Peter, the McKeever, and the Williams bills were dismissed without prejudice to the petition of Lamar, and the Burke and Fancher bill was dismissed for want of prosecution. No further attention need, therefore, be given them, except as to what occurred in them, affecting appellant, prior to the dismissal of these bills. Verchot Case. The original bill in this cause was filed by Joseph Verchot on October 2, 1894, against the Alabama Iron & Steel Company, the American Pig-Iron Storage-Warrant Company, and others, and sought to subject 700 tons of iron then in the yards of the warrant company to the payment of debts due him by the Alabama Iron & Steel Company. The bill alleged that at various times between the 11th day of September, 1893, and the 9th day of October, 1893, the Alabama Iron & Steel Company had borrowed of one E. B. Nelson, his transferror, and of said Verchot, the sum of $7,000, and had pledged to said Verchot 700 tons of iron to secure the same; that the iron thus pledged had been delivered to him and marked with his initials, J. V., and that all of said iron remained in his possession and under his control until, without his knowledge or consent, and in his absence, the same was moved by T. J. Peter, the president of the Alabama Iron & Steel Company, and placed in the yard of the American PigIron Storage-Warrant Company; and that E. T. Peter, acting for or attempting to act for the warrant company, had certified that the iron had been stored in said yards, and the warrant company had issued its warrants for said iron, and on said warrants the warrant company or some one else, claimed to have loaned money to said iron company. The bill averred that the rights of such persons were subordinate to those of complainant. The bill further alleged that on May 21, 1894, E. T. Peter, as a director of the iron company, had filed his bill, No. 471, against said com pany, alleging the insolvency of the company, and praying the court to take charge of the assets of the company and administer the same, and for the appointment of a receiver; that on the day the bill was filed T. J. Peter, the president of the iron company, was appointed receiver; that the only parties to this bill were the iron company and French Nabors, a simple-contract creditor; and that the receiver, T. J. Peter, acting under the orders of the court, took possession of the 700 tons of iron pledged to complainant. The bill further alleged that on June 1, 1894, Thomas M. Fancher and Henry Burke, who were unsecured creditors of the iron company, filed their bill, No. 472, in behalf of themselves and all other unsecured creditors; and this last bill set up the invalidity of certain mortgage bonds (not material to be further noticed), and averred that in the progress of its operation the iron company manufactured a large amount of pig iron, amounting to twelve or thirteen thousand tons, of the value of $168,000, which pig iron is now stored at Briarfield, in Bibb county, on the property of the iron company; and that the warrant company now claims that the said iron was pledged by the iron company to secure certain notes to various parties, amounting in the aggregate to $110,000, -and alleged that the pledges claimed were never made by the iron company, and that upon petition the receivership was extended to all these bills. The bill further alleged that on July 4, 1894, one F. C. McKeever, as a simple-contract creditor, filed his bill, No. 474, in which he alleged that the bills filed by E. T. Peter and Fancher and Burke were collusive; that the mortgages were invalid, and the pledge of the pig iron invalid and void; that by order of the court the three cases made by these bills were heard together, and the receivership was extended to cover all these bills. Verchot further alleged that the iron company was hopelessly insolvent, and Verchot, claiming a prior right to the 700 tons of iron, prayed that he be allowed to assert his rights by a sale thereof to pay his debts. Copies of the notes given at the time the money was borrowed are attached to the bill, and, with the exception of dates and amounts, were as follows: "$1,000. Briarfield, Ala., 1894. One year after date promise to pay to ourselves or order the sum of one thousand dollars, without defalcation, for value received, having deposited herewith, and pledged as collateral security to the holder hereof, the following property, viz. [here follows a description of the iron], with authority to the holder hereof to sell the whole of said property, or any part thereof or any additions thereto, at public or private sale. * * * To this bill there was a demurrer filed by the warrant company on November 18, 1894, on the following grounds: (1) Because it appeared from the bill of complaint that the complainant had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, in that the property he claims to have a lien upon is still in existence, still under the control of T. J. Peter, who, as the general managing agent of the iron and steel company, pledged the pig iron, and now has the custody of the same as receiver. (2) It appears from the bill of complaint that at least three creditors' bills have been filed in the same court touching the same property, and the marshaling of the assets of the iron and steel company, under which complainant claims, and that complainant states no facts to show why he cannot have full relief by proper petition filed in either of said pending suits, and particularly in the suit No. 472, brought by Thomas M. Fancher and Henry Burke against the Alabama Iron & Steel Company et al. (3) From the statements of said bill of complaint it appears that the said iron claimed by complainant was stored in the ware yards of the warrant company without notice to the registrar of the warrant company, and warehouse receipts were issued by the warrant company therefor, representing the pig iron, and that such warrants have been pledged by the iron and steel company to purchasers for value and without notice, of the equity of complainant therein. (4) Because it appears that the iron named in the bill and claimed by complainant was so mingled with other iron stored in the storage yards of the warrant company at Briarfield as to be incapable of identification, and that complainant's only remedy is at law. This demurrer was overruled. The warrant company answered the bill on the 20th of March, 1895. In its answer it admitted that the Alabama Iron & Steel Company, some time before the 18th of May, 1894, deposited with it in its yards at Briarfield 500 tons of iron (not 700 tons), for which this respondent says it executed to the Alabama Iron & Steel Company its warrant, in the nature of warehouse receipts, acknowledging the receipt of said 500 tons in 100-ton lots. It denied that the warrant company or E. T. Peter, its agent, or any other agent in its employment, knew when said warrants were issued for the 500 tons, or for any other lot of iron, or that it had any notice, knowledge, or information, that Verchot had any claim to or interest in the said iron, or any other iron so stored with it. It denied that Verchot, or any one for him. ever had the custody, possession, or control of the iron claimed by him, and averred that the iron so stored by it had been in the possession, custody, and control of the Alabama Iron & Steel Company, its agents and employés. It further averred that Verchot left all of said iron, if he ever had any claim thereto, in the custody and control of the Alabama Iron & Steel Company, and that it was not designated or pointed out in any way so as to identify the same, or to distinguish it from other iron belonging to the Alabama Iron & Steel Company; and it charges and states that, by so leaving the said iron in the custody and control of the Alabama Iron & Steel Company. it had put it in the power of the said Alabama Iron & Steel Company to obtain, by means of the warrants or receipts so issued to the said Alabama Iron & Steel Company, money, by hypothecating such warrants with lenders, and that the said Alabama Iron & Steel Company so hypothecated the iron stored with the warrant company, who knew nothing about any claim said Verchot had to and in such iron. The answer further alleges that since said warrants were executed as aforesaid, and since the suit was commenced, the warrant company had been informed, and therefore charges, that when the iron now claimed by Verchot was put in the storage yard the said Verchot and the said fron and steel company agreed that the said iron should be weighed into the storage yard of the warrant company, and that warrants or receipts should be executed therefor, and that the iron and steel company should take such warrants and hypothecate or pledge the same for money to be paid to the said Verchot in settlement of the debt of the iron and steel company to the said Verchot, the evidences of which debt are attached to the bill as exhibits. The answer then states that of the said agreement the warrant company had no notice, knowledge, or information when it issued the said warrants for the iron claimed by Verchot; that it had no notice, knowledge, or information when the iron and steel company received the money upon the hypothecation of the said warrants that the money so received by it was to be paid to said Verchot; that the agreement between the fron and steel company and Verchot constituted the said company or the said T. J. Peter the agent or trustee for Verchot to raise money on said iron for the benefit of Verchot, and to pay the demands claimed in the bill of complaint. And the answer then charges that by virtue of this agreement all the right, title, and interest of Verchot in the iron, if he had any, became vested in the holders of the warrants which were issued when the iron was weighed into the yards. The answer denies that 700 tons of iron in which Verchot was interested, or which had been pledged to him, had been weighed into the warrant yard of the warrant company, and avers that whatever iron was weighed into its yards was not kept separate and apart from the other iron of the iron and steel company, and that said iron has no marks of identification; but that the same was mingled with all other iron therein stored, and was not distinguishable therefrom, and was received by the warrant company without notice or knowledge of the claim of Verchot; and it denies that Verchot has a lien on the iron superior to the lien of any other person, by virtue of his contracts, which are made exhibits to his bill. The answer charges that, whatever lien Verchot may have had by reason of these contracts, he waived and forfeited the same when he consented that the iron should be stored with the warrant company, and that the warrants issued therefor should be sold to raise money to pay his demands. The answer further denies that there ever was as much as 11,600 tons of iron stored with it. On March 17, 1896, the warrant company amended its answer by leave of the court, in which, after denying that the iron and steel company had deposited iron in its storage yards at Briarfield, as alleged in the bill, it avers that, in all, the iron and steel company deposited with it in its three storage yards at Briarfield, Ala., iron to the amount of about 11,600 tons, for which, as warehouseman, this respondent issued its warrants in the nature of warehouse receipts, acknowledging the delivery to it of iron in 100-ton lots. The answer then denies that either it or its agent E. T. Peter, or any other agent in its employment, knew when said warrants were issued for any of said iron as aforesaid, or for any other lot of iron at Briarfield or elsewhere, that the iron so deposited did not belong to the iron and steel company, and denied any notice, knowledge, or information that the said Verchot had in his lifetime any claim or interest in said iron, or any other iron stored with it. The amended answer further denies that Verchot, or any one for him, ever had the custody, possession, and control of the iron mentioned in the bill, but avers that the iron remained in the possession of the iron and steel company, its agents and employés, and it was left there by the said Verchot. It further alleges that the said iron was not designated or pointed out in any way so as to identify it or to distinguish it from other iron belonging to said iron and steel company, and charges that, by so leaving the said iron in the custody and control of the said iron and steel company, Verchot put it in the power of the iron and steel company, by hypothecation or pledge of ware-yard receipts therefor with lenders, to obtain money thereupon. The answer further alleges that the warrant company, about the time the bill was filed, had been informed by the managing agent of the iron and steel company, in substance, as follows: That the iron and steel company had pledged to Verchot iron to the amount of 700 tons, but never in fact had that much iron on hand to pledge to said Verchot; that, when said iron to the amount of about 700 tons was pledged to Verchot, it was in a separate place, under the control of the iron and steel company, and that afterwards Verchot and the iron and steel company (Verchot then pressing the iron and steel company for the money which it owed him) agreed that the iron and steel company should have weighed into the storage yards of the warrant company the iron which the iron and steel company had pledged to Verchot, and that warrants of the warrant company should be issued to the iron and steel company, which that company would pledge, and obtain money by such pledging to pay |