notice to the taxpayer, as relates to this tax, obviously it was the intention of the constitutional convention to give to the police jury considerable latitude. We do not consider, in a strict sense, that the question of method adopted to notify the per capita tax debtor is before us for adjudication at this time. We therefore only hold that, in view of the power conferred on the police jury, we do not think it essential for the indictment or information to contain a recital of the steps followed in giving notice to the taxpayer of the per capita road tax. Defendant specially urges that the imposition of a penalty for the nonpayment of a tax without notice of delinquency be given is not due process of law. That is quite true in a civil action for the collection of taxes, but here the constitution has taken the steps for the recovery of this tax out of the category of civil proceedings, and made it in its nature criminal. From that point of view the citation, summons, and ordinary service of notice are not essential in order that the proceedings may be considered due process of law. We understand that a rule applying to all alike is followed in order to collect the tax, and there is nothing of record showing that the due course of law, in matters in their nature criminal, has not been followed. Another complaint is that the police jury has not divided the parish into road districts under the constitution of 1898, and that there is no evidence showing proper promulgation of the ordinance. We judge from the brief of the defendant's counsel that this position is abandoned, for from it we insert: "Admitted that the ordinance in the transcript was duly passed by the police jury of Bossier parish in regular session convened on July 5, 1898, and was duly published, on July 14, 1898, in the Bossier Banner, the official journal of the police jury, he appeals and relies for relief upon the ground that the bill of indictment was filed, and the judgment thereon was illegal and unconstitutional, as set 1orth in his motion to quash and in arrest of judgment." Moreover, the objection on the score before stated would fall even if it had not been waived, for the question, being one of law and facts, is not presented to our consideration by recitals of points of law and facts, as required by a bill of exceptions. The next ground in the order of defense is that the police jury has no power to create a misdemeanor, and subject one to criminal prosecution. The word "misdemeanor" is written in the ordinance. We do not think that its use in a police jury ordinance of this nature has the effect of vitiating the ordinance. It must be borne in mind that the power conferred on this body by the constitution is entirely exceptional, and applies to public roads placed under its special supervision and control. Unquestionably, in exerting that power, it may pass ordinances to compel payment of this tax, or incur a penalty in the manner, as we understand, has been followed here. The ordinance is complete in itself, without reference to the word "misdemeanor." If it should be entirely eliminated, it yet remains an ordinance having full force and effect. The public roads always excite attention. They are the property of the sovereign authority,-the general public. There are those who point to the degree of perfection to which they have been carried, and are pleased to recall that it generally corresponds to the degree of civilization of the country where they are situated. Although this be true, in addition it requires prudent direction on the part of those in charge. The rule necessarily must fall justly, and not harshly, on all alike, the poor and the rich. Borrowing the words of an ancient bard on the subject: "Æquo pulsat pede pauperum tabernas; regumque turres." Each should feel that the community is interested in having good roads, and that in this general improvement all should be concerned, and that to it every one is called upon to contribute. For the reasons given above, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be, and the same is hereby, affirmed. BLANCHARD, J., concurs in the decree. (52 La. Ann. 2042) GOWLAND v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS. (No. 13,573.) (Supreme Court of Louisiana. June 21, 1900.) TAX SALE-ADJUDICATION TO STATE-SALE TO THIRD PARTY-CITY TAXES-NOTICE MORTGAGES-PRESCRIPTION. The state caused certain property to be adjudicated to itself at a sale, under assessments made in the name of Francois Snaer and Victoria Snaer. It then, as owner, sold the property, under Act No. 82 of 1884, to one Jacobs, who received a deed and recorded it. While so holding the property, the city proceeded to the enforcement of the city taxes under the same assessments, proceeding, in the matter of the sale, contradictorily with Jacobs, by giving him notice of sale. The original owners or their vendee sought to attack the city's title without, as ancillary thereto, attacking the state's title. Held: (1) The state's title not being contested, the later title under the city cannot be attacked. West v. Negrotto, 19 South. 819, 48 La. Ann. 922. (2) The notice of sale was properly given to Jacobs. Adolph v. Richardson, 27 South. 665, 52 La. Ann. 1156. (3) The original owners are not in position to question Jacobs' title from the state by reason of his not having, before receiving a deed, paid all the city taxes then due. Such prior payment of city taxes is not a condition precedent to Jacobs' acquiring title under the adjudication to him. West v. Negrotto, 27 South. 75, 52 La. Ann. 381. (4) Mortgages securing taxes prior to 1880 do not prescribe by the prescription of three years. (5) The date of commencement for the computation of the prescription of taxes is from the 31st of December of the year for which they were assessed. On Rehearing. The laws looked to the future, and not to past, liens, privileges, and mortgages, which remained unchanged as to the latter (the mort gages) until the statute of 1880, which provid- | ed 'H.' The said admission by the plaintiff ed for the limitation to three years of the mortgages attaching to taxes, was enacted. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from civil district court, parish of Orleans; George H. Théard, Judge. Action by George Gowland against the city of New Orleans. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed. James J., McLoughlin, Asst. City Atty., and Samuel L. Gilmore, City Atty., for appellant. Kernan & Gowland, for appellee. NICHOLLS, C. J. The plaintiff alleged himself to be the owner of certain described property in the city of New Orleans; that the city had recorded or charged up against said property certain taxes, tax liens, privileges, mortgages, and adjudications for the years 1877 to 1879, inclusive, all of which were illegal, null, and void for the following reasons, to wit: First, that no notice was ever served on petitioner, or his authors, of the intended sale of this property for taxes; second, that the taxes, adjudications, and assessments whereon they were based were made in the names of persons not the owners; third, that all the taxes, tax liens, privileges, and mortgages for said years were prescribed by two, three, five, and ten years. He prayed that he have judgment annulling and canceling the said taxes, liens, privileges, mortgages, and adjudications, and for costs and general relief. The city answered, pleading the general issue. The case was submitted to the district court on the following note of evidence and statement of facts: "It is admitted that the city of New Orleans adjudicated the property described in the petition as lots Nos. 15, 16, and 17, of square No. 902, to herself, by three separate sales made on August 14, 1893, and one on June 19, 1893, respectively, and that all of these adjudications were duly registered in the conveyance office of the parish of Orleans; that the said sales were made for the taxes of 1880 to 1887, in the names of Francois Snaer and Victoria Snaer, respectively; that the city bases her titles to said property on notices served on one Louis C. Jacobs, to whom the property, lots Nos. 15 and 16, was assessed at the time the notice was served, and at the time the said sales were made; that the said Louis C. Jacobs acquired a deed from the tax collector under Act No. 82 of 1884. It is admitted that the plaintiff acquired the property in controversy by purchase from W. H. Howcott, as per act under private signature, filled herein, and marked 'D,' and Howcott acquired from heirs of Francois Snaer (whose succession has never been opened) after the sales to city and Jacobs. It is admitted that the tax research certificates filed herein, and marked 'E' and 'F' and 'G,' correctly show the assessments of the properties in controversy, and their condition on the tax rolls. Plaintiff offers conveyance certificates mark of the sales and adjudications to the city of New Orleans is made without in any manner admitting their validity or legality, but, on the contrary, denying their validity and legality. It is admitted that, at the time the city served her notices of sale on Louis C. Jacobs, his deed was extant upon the records of the conveyance office of the parish of Orleans. It is admitted that the late Francois Snaer acquired this property in 1837. It is admitted that Francois Snaer died in 1880; that the service of the notice of the city on which the sale of lot No. 15, of square No. 902, is based, was made in the manner set forth on the copy from the stub of the notice book of the city of New Orleans, herein filed, and marked 'A.'” The district court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, annulling and canceling the adjudications to said city, being sales Nos. 1,610, 1,611, and 1,553, made, respectively, on August 14, 1893, and June 19, 1893, of lots Nos. 15, 16, and 17, in square No. 902, bounded by Prieur, Johnson, Lapeyrouse, and Onzaga streets, in the Third district, and further ordering the cancellation of the inscriptions of said adjudications, and of all tax liens, privileges, and mortgages for city taxes for the years 1879 to 1897, both inclusive, bearing upon said lots and upon lot No. 16, in square No. 113, bounded by St. Claude, Rampart, St. Philip, and Dumaine streets, in the Second district of this city; costs of said suit to be paid by defendant. The city appealed. Opinion. The proceedings in the matter of the adjudication of the lots Nos. 15, 16, and 17, of square No. 902, to the state of Louisiana, in enforcement of its taxes, are not before the court, nor are they attacked by the plaintiff. The adjudications which are attacked are (1) those of the state, made, as owner, to one Louis C. Jacobs, under Act No. 82 of 1884; and (2) those made to the city by itself in enforcement of taxes, while the title stood on the records as the property of Louis C. Jacobs, under his purchase from the state under the act of 1884. It may be that the title of the state, under the adjudications made to itself for state taxes, was defective, but it is not contested by the pleadings, and we cannot, in this proceeding, ignore them or declare them null. We have to take the case as we find it. If we assume that the title of the state under the adjudications to itself was valid, the state was authorized to sell the property as any other owner had, if the tax collector had authority to sell it in its behalf. The tax collector did have the authority to sell it under Act No. 82 of 1884, and under the provisions of that act adjudicated it to Jacobs, giving him a deed which was duly recorded. It is not claimed that Jacobs did not comply with his bid by paying all the state taxes then upon the property, but it is asserted that he did not pay the city taxes then due upon the property; that his doing so was a condition precedent, under the act | acquired no valid title, as against the original of 1884, to his acquiring any title to the property, or being entitled to a deed from the tax collector; and that therefore the city was not justified in assuming, at any time, that he was the owner, or warranted in taking any proceeding in enforcement of its taxes contradictorily with him. If Jacobs, having become the adjudicatee of the property under a sale made by the state under the terms and conditions of Act No. 82 of 1884, had failed to pay all the state taxes then due upon it, the state would have been entitled to ignore the adjudication, and proceed to sell the property de novo, notwithstanding the fact that the tax collector might have given him a deed. This would have been permissible under the decisions of this court in Martinez v. State Tax Collectors, 42 La. Ann. 677, 7 South. 796, and Rernick v. Lang, 47 La. Ann. 914, 17 South. 461. We did not declare in those cases that payment of the city taxes with which the property was affected at the time of its adjudication at a sale for state taxes, under Act No. 82 of 1884, was a condition precedent to the vesting of a title in the adjudicatee at such a sale, and that the failure so to pay would strike with nullity any deed given to him by the tax collector. The state authorities were not charged with the duty of collecting the city taxes. These remained upon the property, subject to payment by the adjudicatee under the personal obligation assumed by him so to do. West v. Negrotto, 52 La. Ann. 390, 27 South. 75. If the property. passed from the owners of the property owing the tax to the state in enforcement of state taxes, the owners so devested of title were in no position to set up, as against the acquisition by a third person of a legal title to the same from the state, that this latter purchaser had not paid the city taxes then due on the property. If the property had passed from them to the state, it was no concern of theirs whether, for the purpose of acquiring title, the adjudicatee paid the city taxes immediately or not. That was a matter between the city and the adjudicatee. The original owners could not have brought a petitory action against the tax adjudicatee under such circumstances, the deed to the adjudicatee remaining unattacked. West v. Negrotto, 48 La. Ann. 926, 19 South. 819. The city, finding that the property had passed from the former owner to the state, and from the state to a purchaser, who had, as part of the purchase price, assumed to pay all the city taxes upon it, had the right to proceed against the property, and, contradictorily with this purchaser, to enforce its taxes. It was not compelled to test the validity of the purchaser's title, as derived from the state, before doing owners, under its own tax proceedings, and, same is hereby, annulled, avoided, and reversed, and plaintiff's demand be, and the same is hereby, dismissed as of nonsuit; costs of appeal to be borne by the appellee. On Application for Rehearing. (June 25, 1900.) BREAUX, J. Plaintiff urges that his predecessors in title were entitled to a notice of the intended sale for taxes; in the alternative, that the court should order the cancellation of the liens, privileges, and mortgages for the taxes of 1877 and 1878. In words different from those used in the original opinion, we reiterate that ordinarily the assessor need not look beyond the recorded title, and we cite, in support of the opinion, Adolph v. Richardson, 52 La. Ann. 1156, 27 South. 665, Reinach v. Improvement Co., 50 La. Ann. 497, 23 South. 455, and Augusti v. Bank, 46 La. Ann. 529, 15 South. 74. This view is not controverted by plaintiff, who, however, contends on another ground, viz. that Jacobs, the adjudicatee and adverse claimant, cannot hold, because he did not pay, as an adjudicatee, all the taxes due on the property; that his sale was void, to the knowledge of the city; and that the city could not acquire title on an assessment so absolutely void. The fact is that Jacobs did pay all the taxes due to the state. In our opinion we held that this was sufficient, as relates to that one issue only, to give him title as against the state, and that, as the city's interest was not affected by this sale, the sale was not void, even if he had failed to pay the taxes due to the city, and that, while it may be void on other grounds, the court, with the record made as it is, declined to pass upon other issues, as relates to the assessment and sale. This brings us to the second ground grow. ing out of the application to amend the decree (and that without granting a rehearing) by ordering the cancellation of the liens and mortgages of 1877 and 1878. By the effect of section 20 of the city charter of 1870, prescription did not run against taxes, and the liens and mortgages by which they were secured. This statute was in full force and effect until the statute of 1877 (No. 96) was enacted. By this last statute the prescription of three years was made to apply to privilege and pledge, but not to mortgages. In State v. Recorder of Mortgages, 34 La. Ann. 178, the court said (by Act No. 68 of 1870; City Charter) that taxes were secured by mortgages as well as by privilege and pledge; that, while the statute of 1877 (No. 96) subjected privilege and pledge to the prescription of three years, it was silent as to mortgages, and that mortgages still remained imprescriptible. It was only in 1880 that the legislature provided that all tax mortgages and tax privileges were subject to the prescription of three years. As legislation regarding taxes applies only to the future, it follows that the taxes for 1877 and 1878, as relate to the mortgages by which they are secured, still remain imprescriptible. We are constrained to adhere to Reed v. Creditors, 39 La. Ann. 115, 1 South. 784, and State v. Recorder of Mortgages, 34 La. Ann. 178, although they are not in accord with a decision of a more recent date, to which counsel invites our attention. These abovecited decisions are nearly contemporaneous with the dates of the statutes in question, and, besides, accord with our view of the question. We therefore decline to amend our decree, and order the incumbrance in question to be canceled. Rehearing refused. (52 La. Ann. 1888) S. D. MOODY & CO., Limited, v. CHAD. WICK. (No. 13,399.) (Supreme Court of Louisiana. June 18, 1900.) SIDEWALKS-PAVING-LIABILITY OF ABUTTERS. 1. No personal liability attaches in New Orleans to the owner of property for the paving of the sidewalks in front of the same by the city authorities. 2. The property itself is liable only for its proportion of total cost of the work, and not for the cost, according to its frontage, of the paving along the front of the square on which it is situated. Paving Co. v. Watt, 26 South. 70, 51 La. Ann. 1346. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from civil district court, parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge. Action by S. D. Moody & Co., Limited, against E. H. Chadwick. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Modified. Buck, Walshe & Buck, for appellant. Edwin N. Whittemore and George L. Bright, for appellee. Statement of the Case. NICHOLLS, C. J. The prayer of the plaintiff is for a judgment against defendant for $706.31, with interest, with recognition of the lien, privilege, and right of pledge upon the property referred to in the certificates annexed to the petition, or its proceeds, and decreeing that said properties be sold, and the proceeds applied to the payment of its claim against the properties. The demand is based upon allegations: That in accordance with the charter of the city of New Orleans and the acts amendatory thereof, and under and by virtue of the provisions of Ordinance No. 11,986, C. S., adopted by the city council of the city of New Orleans on March 3, 1896, and previous proceedings, as required by law, petitioner did, by act before Joseph D. Taylor, notary public and city notary, on March 14, 1896, enter into a contract with the city of New Orleans to construct a brick sidewalk on both sides of Rendon street from Canal street to Toulouse street, and all labor and work incidental and necessary thereto, in accordance with the stipulations as contained in said act, a duly-certified copy of which, and also of said petition, was filed with its petition. That it had complied with its part of said contract, and completed the construc. tion of the sidewalk and other work thereon and in accordance with the specifications thereof. That the same had been accepted by the city of New Orleans, and accordingly the city engineer and commissioner. of public works had issued to petitioner certifi cates showing the proportion of the cost of said work due by each front proprietor upon said street. That the said E. H. Chadwick was then, and was still at the time of the signing of said contract and the doing of said work, the owner and front proprietor of two certain properties on said Rendon street, -one on the lake side, between Carondelet Walk and Toulouse street, and the other on the river side, between Customhouse and Bienville streets; and as evidence to represent the proportion of the cost of said work due by the said E. H. Chadwick to petitioner, and secured by lien and privilege upon his said properties, respectively, the city authorities aforesaid issued to petitioner their two certain certificates, both dated May 31, 1897, showing the amount due by the said E. H. Chadwick on account of the aforesaid property to be the said sums, which certificates, under the law and the said contract, bore interest at 6 per cent. per annum from the date of the same, until paid; and that, in order to secure to petitioner its lien, privilege, and right of pledge which it had upon the aforesaid property for the payment of said respective amounts, it had caused both of said certificates to be recorded in the mortgage office of the parish of Orleans. Petitioner alleged amicable demand in vain. The certificates annexed to plaintiff's petition were as follows: "No. 4. "City Engineer's Office, City Hall. "New Orleans, December 9th, 1896. "This is to certify that S. D. Moody & Co., Limited, contractors for a brick sidewalk on both sides of Rendon St., from Canal to Toulouse St., as per Ordinance No. 11.986 of the city council, adopted March 3/96, have constructed certain work under their contract, and that there is now due them by E. H. Chadwick, for his portion of work done, as itemized below, the sum of three hundred and nineteen and 74/100 dollars, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date until paid. Lumber, 1,811.2 ft., B. M., at $32.50 per M. $ 58 86 Brick sidewalk, 109.6 sq. yds. at 1.09 per yd. Filling, 113.8 cu. yds. at 1.19 per yd. Drain pipe, 24 lin. ft. at .25c per ft. Total 119 46 135 42 6. 00 $319 74" "City Engineer's Office, City Hall. "New Orleans, Dec. 9th, 1896. "No. 12. "This is to certify that S. D. Moody & Co. Ltd., contractors for a brick sidewalk on both sides of Rendon street, from Canal to Toulouse street, as per Ordinance No. 11,986 of the city council, adopted March 3/96, have constructed certain work under their contract, and that there is now due them by E. H. Chadwick, for his portion of work done on Rendon (lake side) street, between Carondelet Walk and Toulouse street, as itemized below, the sum of three hundred and eighty-six and 31/100 dollars, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date until paid. Lumber, 1,841.8 ft., B. M., at $32.50 per M. Brick sidewalk, 111.33 sq. yds. at 1.09 per yd... Filling, 167.32 cu. yds. at 1.19 per yd. Drain pipe, 24 lin. ft. at 25 cents per ft. Total $ 59 85 121 35 199 11 6 00 $386 31" Defendant excepted that plaintiff had no cause of action specially: (1) Because the law required the work to be sold to the lowest bidder, and the specifications did not afford a proper foundation for determining who was the lowest bidder, and much of the work was left to the discretion of the city surveyor; (2) because the specifications and the contract imposed obligations and expenses on the contractor and on the property owner unauthorized by law; (3) because the specifications and the contract provided that the property owner should pay for the work done directly in front of his property, and not that the whole cost of the pavement should be borne by the owners in equal proportion, according to the running foot; (4) because the contract and the specifications provided that payments should be made by the owner on the completion and acceptance of every two blocks, whereas the law provided that payments should only be made on the completion of the whole work; (5) because the contract and specifications imposed expenses on the owner which were unauthorized by law, and left the doing of the work optional with the contractor; (6) because no one who had not a city license was permitted to bid for the work; (7) because the contract and the specifications provided that none but bona fide resident citizens of New Orleans should be employed as laborers to do the work, and was a violation of the constitution of the United States, art. 4, § 2, and other articles of the constitution, and upon this question defendant specially prayed for the judgment of the court; (8) the whole contract was one prepared for the contractor's individual benefit to despoil the property owners. The defendant prayed that this peremptory exception be maintained; that judgment be rendered in his favor and against the plaintiff; that all liens, privileges, and mortgages inscribed against this defendant and his property be canceled and annulled. The court referred the exceptions to the merits. Defendant then answered, pleading the general issue, and prayed for judgment as prayed for in the exception. The court rendered judgment in favor of the |