On the day before Christmas, Secretary Kissinger was interviewed by Jeremiah O'Leary, diplomatic correspondent for the Washington Star. The interview was printed, in question and answer form, in the Washington Star of December 28. The text follows.

Kissinger:

Criticism and Myths
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger

has been at the center of a colossal array of diplomatic events-war, revolution, triumph-since taking over the National Security Council and related assignments in 1969. To some, he is seen as the lightning rod of these stormy times a gathering point of intensities, energies and controversy. To many, he is the storm-maker-a generator of swirling emotions, ideas and debate. To others, he is the storm itself. Kissinger discusses here with Washington Star Staff Writer Jeremiah O'Leary some of the attitudes which he brings to this complex picture.

MR. O'LEARY: You are seen in different ways by different people. How do you see your own role as director of American foreign policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, obviously in this job all the perceptions are heightened, because there are always more problems to deal with than you can possibly address. And therefore I suppose both the exhiliration and the frustration are greater than it can be in any comparable job, except the Presidency. But in general, throughout my life, I have always looked for opportunities to do the things I believed in. And I have never taken jobs just for income. As a result, I think those people who have worked with me have generally found that I work rather intensely. I like not to do things that are not worth doing intensely.

Q. If you were not Henry Kissinger, would you say that you were a nice guy?

A. I would say I am certainly a complicated man.

Q. All members of the human race are complicated. In what way are you uniquely complicated?

A. To go back to your previous question, I don't know whether "nice" is a very precise attribute. I think I am a reliable friend to my friends. And as for the rest, in working, I think my associates know that whatever happens is done for an objective and not for harassment. And those who have stayed with me have almost invariably become close friends.

Q. You are said to be a reasonably demanding taskmaster.

A. Extremely demanding. But, first of all, I don't demand anything of my associates that I don't do to myself. Secondly, I have high standards. I believe that it is the task of the people in charge of an organization to discover qualities in their subordinates they didn't know they had, and therefore I have found very often that people do things that work for me that they have never done in other jobs. Do I lose my temper? Yes. Usually I lose my temper more on trivial things than on big things.

Q. They say you throw wastebaskets and kick ashtrays . . .

A. That is not true. I don't throw objects. I become very impatient. when what I consider trivial obstacles get in the way of things that I need, believe me, to be done.

Q. How about the less trivial, disagreeing people, for example?

A. One of the myths is that I like conformists. But look at the people I have around me-Joe Sisco, Hal Sonnenfeldt, Tom Enders, Chuck Robinson, Win Lord.

Q. They all talk back?

A. They all talk back. And they are all extremely independent. Once a decision is made, I believe that then everybody has an obligation to carry it

out.

Q. When somebody that works for you doesn't come up to your standards, do you fire them yourself, or do you have it done by someone else? Not fire-but perhaps find a better place for them.

A. Well, among my close associates, I have never had any occa

sion to fire anybody. In other positions, it is usually done by Eagleburger, who is in charge of management.

Q. You never fire anybody

A. Well, I don't fire people who have worked closely with me. And I would never fire anybody who has made a mistake. But one sometimes makes a mistake in appointing somebody that one hasn't known too well, and in a large organization like this, that happens occasionally.

Q. How do you react to criticism that might come to you through the press or from a public speech at the Hill, or from another diplomat? Are you thin-skinned?

A. It depends whom it is from. There are some groups of people from whom I expect criticism and that have taken fixed positions, either for political reasons or ideological reasons. There are others where I would suppose it bothers me, yes.

Q. Do you have an outlet for that? A. Well, when I first came here I used to argue with critics. I think now I realize-at least I realize intellectually that it is part of the game here and unavoidable.

Q. Have you ever said or done anything, whether in the NSC or as Secretary of State, that you deeply regret?

A. Well, I have made mistakes. It is inevitable that you make mistakes. I think you really cannot afford to torment yourself with things that have happened in the past. You make these decisions under great pressure, almost athletically-because the time is pressing on you, and you have to react quickly. I don't think you can torment yourself with decisions you have made.

Q. Do you have any problem admitting a mistake?

A. When I feel I am wrong, I would make an apology. On decisions, what I invariably do, when we conclude an episode here, whether I believe it has succeeded or failed, I get the key people together and have a brainstorming session on what we did well, what we did badly, what we

could have done better. And in fact I

critiques. That is what got me into trouble with one of the committees. Oh, no-that was an unasked-forno, that was an asked-for critique.

Q. Were his goals the same as yours? Are they essentially a balance of power?

A. Well, any serious person thinking about security has to think of balance of power. I know no great statesman in history who has not had to address the question of balance of power. There can be no security without balance of power. The question is whether you can go beyond the balance of power to concepts that relate nations to each other on the basis of justice as well as of power. And this is the difference between the periods of construction and the periods that simply manipulate. But I really don't know any leading figure in history, international figure, who has not had to address the question of balance of power in some way.

Q. Who do you see as the greatest persons in your lifetime?

A. DeGaulle was a great figure. Franklin Roosevelt. Mao. I am not attaching moral judgments. Churchill,

of course. To some extent Adenauer. My definition of great is somebody who made a qualitative difference in the life of his people and without whom it would be difficult to imagine that the history of his people would have been the same.

Q. The Legislative branch is a reality that has to be dealt with-the check and balance between the legislative and executive branches, that sometimes almost approaches impasse. Is this frustrating to you?

Deputy Under Secretary for Management Lawrence S. Eagleburger has approved the report of a special working group which identified low priority positions and recommended their reallocation to meet more urgent needs.

The position survey was prompted by the budgetary stringencies called for by the President throughout the executive branch. As a result the Department found it necessary to look largely to present resources to fulfill future needs.

The Reprogramming Working Group, headed by Willard DePree of the Policy Planning Staff, conducted a careful analysis of the staffing in all bureaus, at home and abroad.

The Group, which included representatives from S/IG, A, M/MO, A/BF and DG/PER, found during its study 226 positions which were of relatively low priority from the standpoint of the Department's overall needs.

The bureaus have been informed

A. Yes, it is frustrating to me. But it isn't the checks and balances that is frustrating. What is frustrating is that it is my conviction that you cannot conduct foreign policy except on the basis of some coherent set of ideas. You cannot segment foreign policy into a series of isolated decisions. On the other hand, the legislative branch, even with the best intentions, can only address individual problems. And they therefore can make decisions that have consequences far beyond those which they intend. But then we have to pick up the pieces and they go on to something else. I am afraid that we are going to paralyze our foreign policy if the Congress takes over the conduct of foreign policy, which is increasingly

the case. And we have to find out-I

completely agree with the editorial in your paper today-there has to be found a distinction between supervision of foreign policy, which, however painful it may be, is important, and the conduct of foreign policy, which the Congress cannot do.

Q. Do you have a religious, spiritual or philosophical ethic that you follow?

A. Well, I believe that unless-the only way one can make the difficult decisions that have to be made in

that these positions are to be abolished-over a period of the next 18 months, to avoid personal hardship for incumbents and disruption of the work of the posts and offices involved.

The abolishment and reallocation of the 226 positions, it was recognized, has come about through the evolution of the Department's needs over the years, and is unrelated to the work of present incumbents. New functions or areas can grow rapidly in importance; changing requirements cause changes in relative priority.

The positions which have become available for use elsewhere as a result of this effort will be allocated to higher priority activities. The first such allocation was made in late December by Mr. Eagleburger, to provide additional staffing to meet urgent needs in 14 posts abroad and six offices in the Department.

Subsequent allocations will be made over the next year and a half to meet high priority needs identified by the Priorities Policy Group (PPG).

these positions is from a basis of some rather deeply held values. And strangely enough, I believe that tactical flexibility requires strong moral conviction, and that those who have no conviction can also not be very flexible, because everything then becomes a new problem for them.

Q. When you are no longer Secretary of State, what would you most like to do?

A. I have absolutely no plans. I have never discussed this with anybody outside I have never discussed it. I think after I leave I will have to take a month or two to decompress. And I hope that in that period I will have an opportunity to discuss it.

Q. Do you have a book in you, as we say?

A. Well, everybody says that I am going to spend my time writing my memoirs. I have again not discussed this with any publisher. I suppose I ought to write my account of the period, because there are many events in which I was uniquely involved and for which the documentation could therefore be uneven. I cannot imagine myself spending my life as a writer. And therefore, I have to find something else to do, except to write. But what that something else is, I don't know.

In Congressional testimony:

Following is a statement by Deputy Under Secretary for Management Lawrence S. Eagleburger before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law of the House Judiciary Committee on December 10:

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss State Department consular operations with you.

Although it is usually the political and economic aspects of our foreign policy that capture attention, it is the consular function, and those in the Department and the Foreign Service who perform consular work, that most in

fluence the attitudes of Americans toward the State Department.

In the early days of our Republic consular affairs were the primary duty of American diplomats overseas. Since then our world responsibilities have drastically changed our order of priorities. Today, for example, only 22 percent of our personnel resources are devoted to consular operations. Nonetheless, consular work is of great importance, and the Department of State recognizes this fact.

Although statistics are never the most gripping of topics, I know this Committee is interested in facts, so let me briefly review the most salient ones with you.

Consular operations encompass three functions: (1) visa issuance; (2) passport and citizenship; and (3) special consular services. Although passport requests have declined since FY-1972, workload demands in all three categories have increased in volume or complexity in recent years. The Department has sought to meet these increasing demands both through management reforms and increased allocation of resources to consular work. During the five-year period from FY1972 through FY-1976, the Department has requested, and Congress has provided, some 305 additional positions with a first-year cost of $3,394,100 to meet our increased consular workloads at Foreign Service posts.

Visa issuance

While many consular officers at smaller Foreign Service posts must

perform several or all consular functions, the majority of our consular personnel are primarily engaged in visa work. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, Foreign Service personnel holding consular commissions are responsible for granting or refusing both immigrant and nonimmigrant visas to aliens seeking entry into the United States. This responsibility is of great importance,

both in terms of our national interests

and our allocation of resources to it. In FY-1975, for example, approximately 313,000 immigrant and 3,400,000 nonimmigrant visas were issued, at a cost of some 300 man-years of consular officer time.

In recent years visa work has become more difficult as a result of two

developments: first, because of the rapidly expanding and highly seasonal number of nonimmigrant visa applications; and second, because of the increasing prevalence of fraudulent practices and documents.

Citizenship and passport

Approximately 85 man-years of American consular officer time were employed in providing citizenship and passport services overseas in FY1975. Our officers have had to deal with citizenship claims, and have been called upon to provide various types of passport services to American citizens abroad—such as issuing passports and registering births. This citizenship and passport function overseas has, over the years, been relatively stable in terms of resource requirements.

Special consular services

Finally, approximately 140 manyears of consular officer time were devoted to special consular services overseas in FY-1975. This includes such diverse types of assistance as helping American citizens in need, trying to find missing citizens, and administering various types of Federal benefits programs for beneficiaries residing abroad.

The demands upon our special consular services have grown steadily, commensurate with the increased overseas travel and residence of American citizens. In the past decade, in particular, there has been a substan

tial increase in travel by younger Americans. At the same time, foreign governments have tightened their enforcement of drug laws; as a consequence there has been a dramatic increase in the number of American citizens requiring protection services. Ast of November 1975, for example, some 1,700 American citizens were being held in foreign jails on drug-related charges.

Staffing of consular positions

Let me now turn to the question of the staffing of our overseas consular positions. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, the Department has long faced a difficult problem in deciding how to divide its personnel resources between our diplomatic requirements and our consular responsibilities. By the late 1960's we had come to recognize that the combined effects of inadequate recruitment in previous years, increasing personnel attrition, and a growing workload threatened to make it impossible for us to fulfill our consular responsibilities. As a result, the Department began recruiting young FSO candidates specifically for careers in consular work. Since 1969, using normal Foreign

Service examining techniques, we have been able to close the gap between personnel needs and availabilities.

In June 1968 the Department had a shortfall of some 70 consular officers. In September of this year, that gap had been reduced to 10, despite the fact that our total requirements for consular officers had grown by almost 100 positions over the same period of time. Thus, emphasis on the cone system for recruiting consular officers was, in the main, a successful method for reducing the substantial shortage we experienced in the late 1960's. But, the cone system carried with it other disadvantages-disadvantages that have led the Department, within the last year, to move to modify the system. I will be glad to discuss these modifications, and the reasons for them, with you if you wish.

The current modest shortage of consular personnel is aggravated by the fact that one-third of our people are, in any given year, moving from one post to another, with an inevitable loss of productive time. Moreover, an in

creasing number of consular personnel are assigned to non-consular work, or to various types of training such as area and language study, or to university and senior training. There are now, for example, some 62 consular officers in Washington assigned to training or to non-consular assignments outside SCA. The resultant staffing shortfall is met by utilizing officers from other functional specialities who are available for normal tours of assignment, or temporary duty, in a consular section.

Despite these burdens, the Department strongly believes that it is important not only to continue, but to increase the number of out-of-function assignments for consular officers. We take this view because our objective is a Foreign Service capable of performing well in a variety of jobs. We believe this is to be in the national interest, and, in the long run, the best interests of the individual Foreign Service officer. We want no second-class citizens in the Foreign Service. Everyone should have an opportunity to develop a sufficiently broad background so that-if he has the capability and desire he can some day rise to the highest ranks and responsibilities of the service.

Promotion opportunities are obviously related to position requirements. Here we have a problem insofar as consular officers are concerned, and there is no sense in trying to ignore that fact. This Subcommittee was advised in 1973 that the Foreign Service had a major reclassification study under way that would result in the equitable adjustment of position levels in the Service. While the classification study did produce a 15 percent increase in the FSO-5 level of consular positionsthereby raising by one class the normal working level for consular positions in the field-it also resulted in significant decreases in the number of FSO-4, 3 and 2 positions in all four Foreign Service disciplines-consular, administrative, economic and political.

Consular positions, on the average, continue to be classified the lowest of all cone disciplines in the Foreign Service. There is no easy answer to this problem, and all I can assure you of at this moment is that we will continue to give it our attention. I am hopeful that out-of-cone assignments for consular officers will improve their promotion potential and career opportunities, and mitigate the effects of a grade classification structure that is inherently disadvantageous to consular officers.

Mr. Chairman, the Department, through the use of the consular pack

age budget technique, has been able to develop a data base that has enabled us to justify to the Congress our need for increased consular positions. Because of the support of this Subcommittee, and our improved ability to defend our case, the Congress provided 62 consular positions in FY-1974, 87 in FY1975, and 74 in FY-1976.

In preparing the State Department's FY-1977 budget request for presentation to the OMB and the President, the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs recommended to me that we request 68 new consular positions for FY-1977. That request, based on workload analysis and projections of increased demand abroad, was a legitimate one. I have no doubt that the Department will need some 60 to 70 new consular positions during the 1977 fiscal year. Nevertheless, I disapproved SCA's recommendation; I went farther-I disapproved every recommendation sent to me from any bureau if it called for a request to the Congress for an increase in S and E positions. This decision on my part was discussed at length with Secretary Kissinger, who wholeheartedly supported what I had done.

Mr. Chairman, I decided that the Department was not going to request any positions from the Congress for FY-1977 for one simple reason: it is time we took a very hard look at what we now use our resources for, and how

we can make more effective use of the resources we already possess. I do not believe, to put it bluntly, that the Department needs to request additional positions from the Congress for consular work, or for any of the other requirements that were identified as we prepared our FY-1977 budget. I am convinced that, if we are ruthless in our examination of what the Department now does, and the resources it uses to do that job, we can draw the 68 positions SCA has requested from existing resources. Thus, for FY-1977 I intend to fill the need for additional consular positions-as well as other new position needs-by reprograming within the Department and the Foreign Service. It will be a difficult and painful task.

But in a time of expanding budgets, economic recession, and a Presidential undertaking to hold down Federal expenditures we owe it to the American people, the Congress, and ourselves to examine whether we are doing the very best we can with the resources at hand. And in the process of this examination, I suspect that we will find that there are some things we now do that we need not do at all, and other activities that are, at best, of marginal utility. And when we are done, I hope that the Department of State will be a more effective instrument for the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs than it was before we began.

The Panel on Federal Compensation, headed by Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller, has called for twenty changes in the major Federal compensation systems.

The Panel's report was released by President Ford on December 16.

The group recommended that "the many separate Federal civilian pay systems should be reviewed, and combined with other pay systems or eliminated if no longer needed."

It also urged that the principle of comparability with the private sector should be reaffirmed as the basis for Federal pay-setting, but comparability should be extended to include benefits as well as pay.

The panel recommended that the present General Schedule, which covers white-collar employees, should be replaced by a new Clerical/Technical Service and a new Professional Administrative/Managerial/Executive

Service.

Merit, rather than length of service, "should be the principal basis for within-grade pay advancement for employees in the Professional/ Administrative/Managerial/Executive Service," the Panel urged, and "pay rates for the Executive Schedule should be increased so that the rate for level V [the lowest level of the Executive Schedule] is above the current 'comparability' rate for GS-18."

Other major recommendations: -Consideration should be given to conducting major Federal pay surveys less frequently than once a year, with interim adjustments based on an appropriate statistical indicator.

-Development and testing of the principle of comparability should take place over the next two years to determine the best approach to implementation.

-The Clerical/Technical Service should be paid local or other geographical rates.

-The executive branch should be authorized to establish special occupational schedules and personnel systems when the regular schedules. hamper management's ability to recruit and manage a well-qualified workforce.

-Federal pay laws should be amended to permit the inclusion of State and local governments in Federal pay surveys when needed.

-The President's Agent should

permit the inclusion of State and local governments in wage surveys when needed.

-The Civil Service Commission should develop appropriate legislative and regulatory proposals to provide more equitable premium compensation to all Federal employees working under similar circumstances.

-The President's Agent, the Federal Employees Pay Council, and the Advisory Committee on Federal Pay should meet jointly on a regular basis throughout the year to discuss and resolve the issues in the pay-setting process, with a view to formulating a common recommendation to the President.

-The present roles in the paysetting processes of the Federal Wage System should be continued.

-The Advisory Committee on Federal Pay should be assigned the responsibility for an ongoing review of the interaction between the Federal compensation system and the private sector marketplace.

President Ford appointed the Panel on Federal Compensation last June 12 to review the major Federal compensation systems and submit policy recommendations on changes needed to the President by November 1.

The President later extended the Panel's assignment to December.

In addition to Vice President Rockefeller, who served as Chairman of the Panel, the group included Robert E. Hampton, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Vice Chairman; John Dunlop, Secretary of Labor; James T. Lynn, Director of the Office of Management and Budget; Michael

H. Moskow, Director of the Council on Wage and Price Stability; and William Brehm, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Dr. T. Norman Hurd was Special Assistant to the Chairman and Robert R. Fredlund of the Department of the Treasury was Executive Director of the Panel.

President Ford also designated as advisers to the Panel James M. Cannon, Executive Director of the Domestic Council; Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors; L. William Seidman, Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs; and Jerome M. Rosow, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Federal Pay.

Civil Service annuities to increase in March

A cost-of-living increase of at least 5 percent will go into effect on March 1 for Civil Service annuitants—on the basis of November's 0.7 percent increase in the Consumer Price Index. Final figures will not be available until late January.

A Civil Service annuity increase was triggered when the Consumer Price Index for October reached 164.6 percent. This was 3.3 percent above 159.3 percent, the current Civil Service base level.

The CPI for November reached 165.6 percent-4 percent above the base level. If the present CPI level remains at or above 165.6 percent through December, Civil Service annuitants will get at least 5 percent.

The amount of the annuity increase is based on the highest percentage increase over the base CPI during the consecutive three-month period, plus an additional 1 percent authorized by law in October 1969.

The cost-of-living increase will affect employees under the Civil Service Retirement System who retire on an immediate (not deferred) annuity.

Employees who retire under the Foreign Service Retirement System will not receive a cost-of-living increase until the CPI reaches 167.2 percent-three percent above the current Foreign Service base level (162.3 percent) and remains at or above that level for three consecutive months.