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upon the trial of this cause. Our reference labor of his hands, prepare and accommust necessarily be brief and confined in plish the things which I have commandscope. ed. And go ye out from the wickOn page 159 of that book, in what is there ed." In another revelation," January 5, stated to be a "Revelation given through 1831, page 163, addressed to one James CoJoseph, the Seer, at Fayette, New York, ville: "Hearken and listen to the voice of January 2, 1831,' we read: "Thus saith Him who is from all eternity to all eternity, the Lord, your God, even Jesus Christ, the the Great I Am, even Jesus Christ. Great I Am, Alpha and Omega: *Verily, verily, I say unto thee [Coville] thou Gird up your loins, and be prepared. Be-art not called to go into the eastern counhold, the kingdom is yours, and the enemy tries, but thou art called to go to the Ohio. shall not overcome. 營 * * Behold, the And, inasmuch as my people shall assemble enemy is combined; and now I show unto themselves to the Ohio, I have kept in store you a mystery, a thing which is had in se- a blessing such is not known among the cret chambers, to bring to pass even your children of men, and it shall be poured forth destruction in process of time, and ye knew upon their heads, and from thence men it not. Fear not, for the kingdom shall go forth, into all nations. Behold, is yours. * * * The rich I have made; verily, verily, I say unto you that the peoand all flesh is mine; and I am no respecter ple in Ohio call upon me in much faith, of persons. And I have made the earth thinking I will stay my hand in judgment rich; and behold, it is my footstool. Where- upon the nations; but I cannot deny my fore, again will I stand upon it, and I hold word; wherefore, lay to with your might, forth and deign to give unto you greater and call faithful laborers into my vineyard, riches, even a land of promise, a land flow- that it may be pruned for the last time." ing with milk and honey, upon which there Again, in a "revelation," December 25, 1832, shall be no curse, when the Lord cometh. page 304, at a time in the history of the Ye shall have it for the land of your United States when "nullification" trouinheritance, and for the inheritance of your bles in South Carolina bad culminated in children forever, while the earth shall stand; calling a convention, which was thought and ye shall possess it again in eternity, at the time to portend civil war, and such and no more to pass away. But verily I trouble seemed imminent, we have: "Versay unto you that in time ye shall have no ily, thus saith the Lord, concerning the king nor ruler; for I will be your king, wars that shall shortly come to pass, beand watch over you. Wherefore, hear my ginning at the Rebellion of South Carolina, voice, and follow me, and you shall be a which will eventually terminate in the death free people, and ye shall have no laws but and misery of many souls. The day will my laws, for I am your law-giver; and come that war will be poured out on all what can stay my hand? And nations, beginning at that place; for beagain I say unto you that the enemy in the hold, the southern states shall be divided secret chambers seeketh your lives. Ye against the northern states, and the southhear of wars in far countries, and you say ern states will call upon other nations, even there will soon be great wars in far coun- Great Britain, as it is called, and they shall tries; but ye know not the hearts of the also call upon other nations in order to demen in your own land. I tell you these fend themselves against other nations; and things because of your prayers; wherefore, thus shall war be poured out upon all natreasure up wisdom in your bosoms, lest tions. And it shall come to pass after the wickedness of men reveal these things many days slaves shall rise up against their unto you by their wickedness, in a manner masters, who shall be marshaled and diswhich shall speak in your ears with a voice ciplined for war, and it shall come to pass louder than that which shall shake the also that the remnants who are left of the earth. But if ye are prepared, ye shall not land shall marshal themselves, and shali fear. And that you might escape the power become exceeding angry, and shall vex the of the enemy, and be gathered unto me, a gentiles with a sore vexation; and thus, righteous people, without spot and blame- with the sword and by bloodshed, the inless; wherefore, for this cause, I gave unto habitants of the earth shall mourn, you the commandment that ye should go until the consummation decreed hath made to the Ohio; and there I will give unto you a full end of all nations; that the cry of the my law; and there you shall be endowed saints, and of the blood of the saints, shall with power from on high; and from thence, cease to come up into the ears of the Lord whomsoever I will, shall go forth among Sabaoth, from the earth, to be avenged of all nations, and it shall be told them what their enemies." they shall do; for I have a great work laid up in store; for Israel shall be saved, and I will lead them whithersoever I will; and no power shall stay my hand. And now I give unto the church in these parts a commandment that certain men among them shall be appointed, and they shall be appointed by the voice of the church,

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What motives and purposes do these socalled "revelations" disclose? Do they not point directly at results which this organization has since done much to attain? Are they not calculated to cause distrust and hatred of all who are not of this socalled church? They are of the essence of *this so-called church, though those we have and this shall be their work: To govern copied constitute but a small part of such the affairs of the property of this church. teachings, and do not touch their plan of And they that have farms that cannot be organization, polity, and system of governsold, let them be left, or rented, as seemeth ment. Yet these may be sufficient to show them good. And that every man, the temporal_features and nature of this both elder, priest, teacher, and also mem-"Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day ber, go to work with his might, with the Saints," with some of its aims and pur

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poses; and help, with other like teachings, | spects, but refusing to take the oath of to explain the phenomenon of its history. non-membership. The right to vote was Those parts we have copied are mixed with much matter apparently merely fustian and meaningless, and not apparently explanatory of the general purpose, as indicated by the extracts. These do not touch the extraordinary teachings of polygamy, or plural or celestial marriage; yet those are also included in the blessings of liberty and the pursuit of happiness. We are not at liberty to say these extracts have no meaning, nor that their true meaning and signification are not indicated by the language used. They speak of other people as 'enemies," and evidently imply that their presence, their laws and institutions are to be looked upon as a curse upon the land," which the church aspires to dominate; that in such land there is to be no government or laws, except those alone of the church,-evidently the germ of that state of chronic warfare which that "church" has ever, and still does, maintain against all government save that of the church; that even the members of the "church" are not their own masters. Their individuality as freemen and citizens is denied them. Their rights of choice and of action as freemen are merged in the church. Internecine wars are welcomed as a means by which the gentiles are to be exterminated." The intent to despoil the unsuspecting people of Ohio, who vainly "called with much trust," among them that people then seeking a home, and who were giving to those people" much faith," is plainly intimated. The revelations on polygamy and plural or celestial marriage had not then been introduced. They came in 1843, and have since been propagated, with what success the public statutes and records of the courts in some degree show. None of these objectionable features have been expunged or modified, and now license to pursue and realize all these aims is demanded. It is time to speak plainly on this subject. The true interests of this people themselves and all others demand it. The tendency of such principles and purposes is clear. They do not lead to the "security of the blessings of liberty;" but they do lead to its utter subversion. The guaranty of the freedom of speech and of the press is not generally held to be a shield to protect license and crime; nor is there anything in the bare name of religion, when it seeks thus to deal with temporal matters, with the facts and interests of social and political life, that should exempt it from that wholesome rule conceded to license and crime.

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denied, and he brought an action for dam-
ages against the judges of election. Judg-
ment was given for the defendants. The
issue was as to the validity of section 504.
The reasons for such invalidity were there
alleged to be: (1) That the statute is in
violation of the first amendment of the con-
stitution; (2) that it is in conflict with the
act of congress of March 22, 1882. On the
first point it was urged, as in this case,
that to make membership in this organiza-
tion a test of the right to vote was an in-
fringement of religious liberty, and hence
was forbidden. And under the second, that
congress, in 1882, in the Edmunds act. in
declaring that polygamists and bigamists
shall not vote in the territory, had cov-
ered the whole ground; and that the legis-
lature was precluded from prescribing any
further test in any way, however remotely
connected with those crimes. On both of
these points the supreme court overruled
the appellants. We think the ruling should
be followed. While the section of the stat-
ute is not the same in the case at bar as in
that, yet the two sections are parts of the
same act, and the principle involved in the
two is practically the same. But while
that case has our approval, it may be well
in this to say further that several acts have
been passed both by congress and by the
territorial legislature, prescribing the qual-
ifications of voters. The act of congress of
March 3, 1863, organizing the territory of
Idaho, is one of those acts. By section 5 of
the organic act, it was provided that "ev-
ery free white male inhabitant above the
age of 21 years, who shall have been an act-
ual resident of said territory at the time of
the passage of this act, shall be entitled to
vote at the first election,
but the
qualifications of voters, and of holding office
at all subsequent elections, shall be such as
shall be prescribed by the legislative assem-
bly." The legislative power, (Id. § 6,) was
declared to "extend to all rightful subjects
of legislation consistent with the constitu-
tion of the United States, and the provis-
ions of this act," except as to laws inter-
fering with the primary disposal of the soil,
taxing property of the United States, or
taxing property of non-residents higher
than property of residents. Those except-
ed subjects only were forbidden. The leg-
islature exercised this right in 1864, and
again, by Rev. Laws 1874, page 684, the law
was entirely changed. The law of 1864 was
repealed, and one enacted that "all male
inhabitants over the age of 21 years shall
be entitled to vote at any election," pro-
vided they be citizens, etc., and have resid-

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We think, if we are at liberty to look at the preamble of the federal constitution, as the appellant asks us to do, as expressed in the territory four months, and in the ing the objects of that instrument, and as an aid in construing its provisions, such expression, applied to the aims and objects of this organization, does not favor the view of the appellant.

county where they offer to vote thirty days; but no person under guardianship, non compos mentis, or insane, nor any person convicted of treason, felony, or bribery, etc., unless restored to their civil rights, But to look further. The question of the shall be permitted to vote at any election. validity of the election law has already In the Revised Statutes of the United been before the supreme court of this terri-States, passed at the first session of the tory. Innis v. Bolton, 17 Pac. Rep. 264, forty-third session of congress, 1873-74, as was a case where a party claiming the further revised and reported September, right to vote, being challenged, declined to take the oath prescribed in section 504; complying with the law in all other re

1878, provisions on this subject, "common to all the territories," are collated. These provisions differ from that under which the

territory was organized, and under which its legislature had acted, up to that time. It is there provided (section 1860) that at all elections after the first "the qualifications of voters, and of holding office, shall be such as may be prescribed by the legislative assembly of each territory," except (1) the right of suffrage and holding office shall belong to citizens, or those who have declared their intention to become citizens, of the United States, over 21 years of age, and have taken an oath to support the constitution, etc.; (2) there shall be no distinctions on this subject between citizens on account of color, or previous condition of servitude; (3) no officer, soldier, or mariner, shall, etc., unless he has resided in the territory six months; (4) no person belonging to the army or navy shall hold any civil office. Now, although this act is very full in saying who may and who may not be allowed to vote, nothing is said about persons under guardianship, persons non compos mentis, or insane; nor of persons convicted of treason or other crimes; yet no one pretends that this general legislation by congress affected the status of such persons as voters. Congress had only its special purpose in view, and did not cover other ground. But, following that general act, on March 22, 1882, congress enacted the "Edmunds Law." Its object is expressed to be "to amend section 5352, Rev. St. U. S., in reference to bigamy, and for other purposes." No part of the act touches the power of the legislature, unless, as counsel claim, the eighth section does. That provides that "no polygamist, bigamist, or any person cohabiting with more than one woman, and no woman cohabiting with any of the persons described as aforesaid in this section, in any territory or other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, shall be entitled to vote at any election held in any such territory or other place." In the absence of any expressed intent to repeal the grant of power to the territories, it is not easy to see how this could at all affect such power. It

ers delegated by the states. If the former have those powers, the latter, except in exceptional cases, does not possess them. No such relations of antagonism exist between congress and the territories. The will of congress and that of the territorial legislatures are not two distinct wills, within the holding of some of those cases, but are for certain purposes (of which the act in question is one) one and the same will. While in their operation they are distinct, there is the relation of superior and inferior in all territorial affairs; and the superior may prohibit or nullify the acts of the inferior. Until it does so the acts of the inferior are as valid, within its province, as the acts of the superior. If it were true (though it is not true) that section 8 of the Edmunds act covered the whole ground of section 501, and that each was intended as a punishment for the same offense, under the authority cited by the appellant, (Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 23,) it would seem that the combined acts would be only concurrent, and that both would be valid. See, also, Innis v. Bolton, 17 Pac. Rep. 264. But it is not necessary to go to the extent indicated in that case, as the two acts do not cover the same ground. After a careful consideration of this case, we do not find the act of the territorial legislature in conflict with any provisions of the federal constitution, or with any act of congress. The ruling and the judgment of the court below must be affirmed.

(6 Utah, 143)

UNITED STATES V. BREDEMEYER. (Supreme Court of Utah. Feb. 19, 1889.)1 ADULTERY.

On a trial for adultery, where the only evidence against defendant is that of the girl with whom it is charged that the crime was committed it is error not to allow defendant to show the bad character of the witness.

Appeal from district court, Salt Lake county.

Asst. U. S. Atty.
C. S. Varian, for appellant. Ogden Hiles,

must be borne in mind that the territorial legislature is but a creature of congress; SANDFORD, C. J. The defendant was conand while it, for certain purposes, exercises victed of the crime of adultery, and from the same power, it acts as a separate po- the order denying his motion for a new litical organization. An act of congress is trial, and from the judgment entered benot an act of a territorial legislature, and low, has appealed to this court. His convice versa. Each may act upon the same tention is that the evidence was not suffisubject, from its own stand-point, and the cient to justify the verdict, and he alleges acts of each may be valid. In such case errors of law, and a misdirection in the their powers are clearly concurrent. But charge of the learned judge who tried the in the act of 1882 the act of congress does cause. It appears that the only witness of not cover, nor profess to cover, the same the alleged crime was the girl with whom ground as the act of the territory. It does the act was alleged to have been commitnot deal with membership in any organi- ted. Her mother testified that she, at the zation as a qualification to vote. The one suggestion of the appellant, nad sent her subject is not even germane to the other; daughter to his place of business to proor, if it has a remote relation, as is contend-cure some fruit. The latter, on her direct ed, congress did not choose to enter on the examination, stated that she had lived in ground covered by the territorial legisla- the family of the defendant as a nurse girl, ture. The counsel cites, in addition to the and had taken care of his child; that durEdmunds act, Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. ing the month of March, after she had 22-24; Prigg v. Com., 16 Pet. 618; Passen- ceased to be employed by him, she visited gar Cases, 7 How. 400, and elementary au- the defendant's place of business five times, thorities. All the cases cited involve the re--the first time to procure some money. As lation between the several state govern- to the other visits her testimony was that ments and the United States. In them it is

'Publication delayed through failure to receive

a question of which sovereignty has the power in dispute. Congress exercises pow-copy.

the defendant took "liberties with her," and "had intercourse with her." What the liberties were that he took with her does not appear, nor what manner of intercourse it was that she had with the defendant. She stated that the defendant gave her a little money, and that she ceased to visit him because he did not ask her to come again. No other testimony as to the commission of the crime charged was presented by the prosecution. The defendant testified in his own behalf, and admitted that he called on her mother, and had suggested that the daughter call for the fruit; but denied that he had given the daughter any money in March, and denied generally the charge made against him. A request by the prisoner's counsel to the court to instruct the jury to acquit on the ground that the testimony of the accomplice was not corroborated was refused, and an exception taken. The refusal was based on the ground that the territorial statute relating to the testimony of an accomplice was inapplicable in this case, in which the United States was the plaintiff.

It was error to refuse to allow the defendant to show the bad character of the girl who testified against him. This evidence would, if received, have necessarily affected her credibility. The evidence of defendant's guilt was vague, unsatisfactory, and insufficient to sustain the verdict. On account of the error above referred to, without considering the other points raised on the appeal, we are of the opinion that there should be a new trial. The judgment below is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

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2. Where a right of appeal in such a case is not given as mentioned a writ of review will lie to examine the proceedings had on the conviction, in order to ascertain whether or not the tribunal before whom they were had exercised its functions erroneously, or exceeded its jurisdiction, to the injury of the plaintiff in the writ.

nance, must be construed to mean a definite locality within the city, of the same kind or nature as a street or house.

5. In accordance with these views, held, that the charter of the city of La Grande, in the county of Union, Or., does not confer a right of appeal upon a party convicted of a violation of an ordinance of the city, and consequently that a writ of review will lie in such a case; also, that where the complaint charged that the acts constituting the disorderly conduct prohibited by the ordinance were dignity, but did not specify any definite locality committed within the city, against its peace and therein where they were committed, that the complaint was not sufficient to support a conviction for a violation of such ordinance. (Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from circuit court, Union county. C. H. Finn and T. H. Crawford, for appellant. J. D. Slater, for respondent.

THAYER, C. J. The appellant herein was tried and convicted in the recorder's court of the city of La Grande for disorderly and riotous conduct. He was charged in the complaint filed against him as follows: "The said Thomas Barton did, on the 19th day of June, 1888, in the city of La Grande, Union county, Or., demean and conduct himself in a disorderly manner by then and there wrongfully and unlawfully striking and beating the said G. C. Schleur with the fist of him, the said Thomas Barton, contrary to section 1 of ordinance No. 20, series of 1885, entitled 'An ordinance concerning offenses and disorderly conduct,' and approved August 20, 1885, and against the peace and dignity of the city of La Grande, Union county, Or." To this complaint the appellant filed a demurrer on the grounds that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of prosecution; also that the court had no jurisdiction, either of the appellant or of the subject-matter. The demurrer having been overruled, the appellant interposed a plea of "not guilty,' and of a former acquittal, and upon which plea he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to pay a fine. He then sued out a writ of review from the said circuit court, which, having been duly returned, was by said court, upon motion of the respondent's counsel, dismissed, and from that decision this appeal is taken.

The first question to be considered is whether a writ of review will lie from a conviction in the recorder's court of the city of La Grande for the violation of a city ordinance. That question depends, of course, upon whether or not an appeal is allowed in such case by the charter of the city. The respondent's counsel concedes that unless the charter expressly gives the

3. A writ of review in such a case, like a common-law certiorari, only brings up the record, which includes the complaint and proceedings had thereon, and no question of fact determined by the tribunal, or any ruling made by it in the admission of evidence upon an issue of fact, can be consid-right of appeal from such a decision, none

ered.

4. A complaint under a city ordinance, which provides that any person or persons who shall be guilty of any violent, riotous, or disorderly conduct, or who shall use profane, abusive, or obscene language in any street, house, or place within the city, whereby the peace or quiet of the city is or may be disturbed, shall, upon conviction thereof before the recorder, pay a fine, will not be sufficient to constitute an offense under such ordinance, unless it shows that the act was committed in a street, house, or similar place within the city. The general word "place, as used in the ordi'Publication delayed through failure to receive

copy.

exists; and that the appellant's remedy would then be by writ of review. That undoubtedly is the law. The respondent's counsel, however, claims that certain sections of said charter do expressly give such right, and refers us to sections 43 and 44 thereof. Section 43 reads as follows: "The recorder is the judicial officer of the corporation, and shall hold a court therein, at such places as the council shall provide, which shall be known as the 'recorder's court,'" etc. Section 44 reads: "He shall have jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses defined and made punishable by any ordi

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nance of the city," etc. "He has the authority and jurisdiction of a justice of the peace for the county of Union, within the limits of the city of La Grande, in both civil and criminal matters; and all proceedings in his court shall be governed and regulated by the general laws of the state applicable to justices of the peace and justices' courts in like or similar cases." "His court," savs the counsel, "referred to in section 44, is the recorder's court provided for in section 43." Conceding that to be true, it does follow that the right of appeal is given, because all proceedings in "his court" are to be governed and regulated by the general laws of the state applicable to justices of the peace and justices' courts, in like or similar cases. We are not authorized to assume that a right of appeal exists in favor of the parties to the proceedings. Such right must be conferred by a positive provision of statute. The proceedings, which are to be governed and regulated by the general laws of the state applicable to justices of the peace, etc., as provided in said section 44, are proceedings in the exercise of the recorder's jurisdiction of crimes and offenses, defined and made punishable by ordinances of the city; and the right of appeal in favor of parties affected by the exercise of such jurisdiction has no connection therewith whatever. The effect of the clause in the charter referred to is to confer certain jurisdiction upon the recorder's court, and to regulate the manner of its exercise; and no inference can be drawn therefrom, as I can discover, that the right of appeal was intended to be given in favor of parties affected by its exercise. When the recorder exercises the authority and jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, under the charter of the city, he is pro hac vice a justice of the peace, and the provisions of the Justices' Code, giving a right of appeal from judgments of justices' courts, apply to him the same as to any justice of the peace; but those provisions have no application to his judgments rendered in cases of violation of city ordinances.

The decision in Town of La Fayette v. Clark, 9 Or. 226, is decisive of the question of the right of appeal in this case. The doctrine declared in that case is sound, and this court did not intend to depart from it in City of Corvallis v. Stock, 12 Or. 391, 7 Pac. Rep. 524. In the latter case an appeal had been taken from a judgment of the recorder of the city of Corvallis to the circuit court for the county of Benton, and been sustained by the latter court upon the authority of Sellers v. Corvallis, 5 Or. 273, which was directly in point. This court held, in the case last referred to, that the charter of the city of Corvallis gave a right of appeal from judgments rendered by the recorder's court in both class of cases; and therefore we accepted that construction in City of Corvallis v. Stock, although we would not have given it such a construction if the question were res nova. We did not, however, attempt to change the rule announced in Town of La Fayette v. Clark, nor do we see any reason for changing it at this time. According to this view, the decision of the circuit court herein, dismissing the writ of review upon the grounds that an appeal was the proper remedy, was erroneous.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the proceedings had in the recorder's court upon the conviction of the appellant, in order to ascertain whether or not that court exercised its functions erroneously, or exceeded its jurisdiction to the injury of appellant. The writ of review, like a common-law certiorari, merely brings up the record. We cannot consider any question of fact determined by the recorder, or any ruling made by him in regard to the admissibility of evidence. We have a right to consider the sufficiency of the complaint upon which the prosecution was based, and the regularity of the conviction. The only question necessary for us to consider in this case is whether the complaint was sufficient to constitute a violation of the ordinance referred to therein, as we are of the opinion that it was defective, and consequently the recorder had no jurisdiction to render a judgment of conviction against the appellant. The substance of said ordinance is as follows: "That any person or persons who shall be guilty of any violent, riotous, or disorderly conduct, or who shall use any profane, abusive, or obscene language, in any street, house, or place within the city of La Grande, whereby the peace or quiet of the city is or may be disturbed," etc., "shall, upon conviction thereof before the recorder, pay a fine," etc. The complaint against the appellant, filed with the recorder, as will be seen from an inspection of it, does not charge in what particular place within the city of La Grande the disorderly conduct occurred. The common council of the city evidently did not intend by the ordinance to subject persons to punishment for disorderly conduct, unless the peace or quiet of the city was thereby disturbed; and the act, in order to be punishable, must occur in a street, house, or similar place in the city. The language of the ordinance, that any person or persons who shall be guilty, etc., in any street, house, or place within the city, whereby the peace or quiet of the city is or may be disturbed, is disqualifying in its terms. It implies that the person must be guilty under the circumstances mentioned. The charge, therefore, in order to be sufficient, must show that the act was not only committed, but committed under the circumstances rendering it penal. The counsel for the respondent claims that the terms "street," "house," or place" imply that the act would be punishable as an offense if committed anywhere in the city, and consequently it need not be alleged in the complaint in what particular place in the city it was committed. But it is a rule of construction that general words, following an enumeration of particulars, are to have their generality limited by reference to the preceding particular enumeration, and to be construed as including only all other articles of the like nature and quality. Rap. & L. Law Diet. tit. "Ejusdem Generis." The word "place," therefore, as used in the ordinance, implies a particular place of similar character of a street or house. There are two obvious reasons why the complaint, in such a case, should set out the particular locality within the city where the act was committed,— one of which is that the accused may be definitely informed as to the charge; and the

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