I said that his Excellency already knew what were the views of His Majesty's Government regarding an occupation of Persia. If Russia occupied North Persia, I thought it would be a matter of extreme difficulty for you to defend such a step before British public opinion. I was therefore certain that His Majesty's Government would do everything in their power to remove the causes which, in the opinion of the Russian Government, called for Russian intervention. I reminded M. Nératof that Russia had recently vetoed the various proposals put forward with the object of enabling the Persian Government to restore order in the country-proposals which, for our part, we had welcomed as affording some hope of an improvement in the state of things in the south. Russia had objected to these proposals, but she had suggested nothing to take their place. I begged his Excellency to tell me frankly what it was that the Russian Government wished done. M. Nératof replied that the first thing necessary was that Mr. Shuster should understand that he must act in concert with, and in accordance with the interests of, Russia, and of course, his Excellency added, of Great Britain also. The Persian reforms must be proceeded with gradually and in such a manner as to take Russian interests into account. It must be remembered that the question was not merely one of the good of Persia, but also of the special position of Russia. If Mr. Shuster obtained a free hand from the Medjliss in regard to railway concessions and loans, it would be necessary that he should give an undertaking, in such a way as to inspire confidence that he would keep it, to the effect that he would act entirely according to the wishes of the two Powers. Mr. Shuster, however, was hardly the man to give an undertaking of that kind. His Excellency regretted that Russia should play an obstructive rôle" in Persia, but it had been forced upon her against her will.

I left his Excellency, saying that I would report his remarks to you. This morning, fearing that the Russian Government might possibly take some immediate action, I addressed a private letter to M. Nératof, saying that I thought I had understood from him that the Russian Government had not yet taken a definite decision with regard to the proposed measures in Persia, but begging him, in the contrary case, to give me the earliest possible notice. His Excellency replied that the Russian Government were at present only considering the necessity of a military expedition, and that they counted on the assistance of His Majesty's Government in endeavouring to avoid active intervention on a large scale.

Hugh O'Beirne.

4) Sir G. Barclay an Sir Edward Grey.

(Telegraphisch.)

Teheran, October 22, 1911.

Please refer to Mr. O'Beirne's telegram dated 19th October.

The principal feature of the situation in Tehran is the manner in which the extremists and the treasurer-general are co-operating. There is very

Jahrbuch des Völkerrechts. I.

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great tension between Shuster and the Cabinet. A threatened ministerial crisis was avoided by a proposal to induce the Medjliss to curtail treasurergeneral's powers, but this idea appears for the time being to have been tacitly abandoned, in consequence of the opposition of the Medjliss, who feared it would cause Shuster to resign office.

Samsam-es-Sultaneh, whom I saw yesterday, expressed himself very bitterly in regard to treasurer-general. His Excellency gave me to understand that the Cabinet greatly resent the firm control Shuster is exercising over Government funds, and that they are alive to the danger which his defiant attitude towards the two Powers involves.

I see no reason to suppose that Persian Government are responsible for treasurer-general's recent utterances in the British press, which I hear will be followed by a more detailed indictment of the policy of Great Britain and Russia in Persia.

5) Sir Edward Grey an O'Beirne.

(Telegraphisch.)

Foreign Office, October 23, 1911.

Your telegram of the 19th October.

I saw Count Benckendorff, and urged upon him that I could see nothing which necessitated an occupation of North Persia.

Count Benckendorff replied that M. Nératof had been rendered most anxious by the prospect that the control of affairs in Persia was falling into Shuster's hands. It was impossible for his Government to allow the predominance in Persia of a power which took no account whatever of them. He had, however, not heard that a military expedition was contemplated.

To this I replied that, although I quite understood that Russia must protect her own interests if they were being undermined, I thought the danger was overestimated.

Please speak to M. Nératof in sense of the above.

6) O'Beirne an Sir Edward Grey. (Telegraphisch.) Petersburg, October 24, 1911. Conveys substance of the following despatch, dated the 25th October: Sir, I called yesterday on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and communicated to him your views, as expressed in your telegram of the 23rd instant, on the subject of the threatened Russian action in North Persia.

M. Nératof said that Russia desired the independence of Persia as much as you did, but the dispatch of a military expedition would not destroy it. The dispatch of a Russian force to Kazvin dit not have any such effect, and the presence of Russian troops at Tabreez had, on the contrary, undoubtedly saved that town from falling into the hands of the ex-Shah's supporters. I reminded his Excellency that he had spoken to me of an occupation", and he said that occupation" was perhaps too strong a word. M. Nératof's tone on this occasion was in marked contrast to that which he

used at my conversation with him of the 19th instant. He appeared quite to appreciate the force of your observation that Mr. Shuster had been able to effect nothing to which the Russian Government objected, and he said that so long as that was the case Russia would take no action of the kind contemplated.

I endeavoured, but without much success, to induce his Excellency to indicate more precisely what were the arrangements with regard to existing difficulties in Persia which he would consider satisfactory, and which would remove all cause for strong measures on the part of Russia. He reiterated that Mr. Shuster should be made to understand that he must act in consultation with the two Powers. I have, &c.

Hugh O'Beirne.

7) Sir G. Barclay an Sir Edward Grey. (Telegraphisch.)

Teheran, November 2, 1911.

I have to report that the Russian consul-general has intervened by force with the seizure of certain properties of the ex-Shah's brothers, which had been confiscated in consequence of the part their owners had taken in the insurrection.

The circumstances were briefly reported to the Times" in telegrams from Tehran, dated the 9th October and the 10th October, as follows:

Tehran, October 9.

(1.) The treasurer-general, in accordance with an order of the Cabinet, to-day sent an official of his department with five Treasury gendarmes to make an inventory of Shoa-es-Sultaneh's Tehran property, which the Government has confiscated to the Crown. Two members of the Russian consulate in uniform, with ten Russian Cossacks, ordered them to retire, threatening to fire. The party retired.

The incident so far is unexplained, as Shoa-es-Sultaneh claims Turkish not Russian, protection. The matter has now been referred to the Russian Minister."

Tehran, October 10.

(2.) Two further incidents took place yesterday in connection with the confiscation of the various properties of Shoa-es-Sultaneh. Russian Cossacks with consular officials were present at each property. They arrested five Treasury gendarmes who were sent with a Treasury official to make the inventory, and took them on mules to the Russian consulate.

To-day a strong body of Treasury gendarmerie marched to Shoa-esSultaneh's principal property, where they found a small guard of Persian Cossacks only. They evicted the guard and took possession. The Russian Cossacks are now said to have withdrawn from all the properties.

All these proceedings appear to have been due to the initiative of M. Pokhitonoff, the Russian consul - general. The Russian Minister has

rectified the matter, and the incident now seems to be closed, except that the Persian Government is addressing a protest against the action of the consul-general."

As you will see from these telegrams, the action of the Russian consulgeneral was directed against the seizure of certain properties of Shoa-esSultaneh, who is not a Russian subject.

Russian Minister is to-day demanding, in accordance with orders from St. Petersburgh, the withdrawal from the Shoa-es-Sultaneh's properties of Shuster's gendarmes, who are now in possession. These properties being mortgaged to the Russian bank, and one of them being leased to a Russian subject, the Russian Minister had made all proper reserves with the Persian Government as to Russian rights, but the Russian Government bases its demand on the fact that Shuster's gendarmes were sent to take possession without previous notice having been given to the Russian consulate-general. M. Poklewsky is further to demand a formal apology for an incident alleged to have occurred on the 10th October at the principal property in question, when the gendarmes in possession are said to have pointed their rifles at two passing officials of the consulate-general and at the consulategeneral itself, which is close to the property. This story is disputed by the officer commanding the gendarmes, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had offered the Russian Minister reparation for this incident in the event of confirmation of the story of the Russian consular officials after a joint enquiry. The Russian Government reject this proposal, and demand an apology forthwith.

8) Sir G. Barclay an Sir Edward Grey. (Telegraphisch.)

Teheran, November 2. 1911. Mr. Lecoffre, a British subject and a man with strong sympathies for the Persian Nationalist party, has been appointed by Shuster as a treasury agent at Tabreez.

For the last two years Lecoffre has been employed by the Persian Government, but before that he was in the Imperial Bank's service.

9) Sir Edward Grey an Sir G. Barclay. (Telegraphisch.) Foreign Office, November 6, 1911. Appointment of Mr. Lecoffre: see your telegram of 2nd November. Russian Government are sure to be annoyed at this appointment, and it is not unlikely that they will defend their interests by energetic measures, which might even go as far as an occupation of Northern Persia. You should advise Shuster most strongly to do all in his power to conciliate the Russian Legation, and point out the probable result of continued provocation on his part. He should be made to understand clearly that Russian Government have it in their power to employ means which would seriously impede the discharge of his duties, and which it would be impossible for him to with

stand. He must be made to see that the Russians are sure to take measures for the protection of their own interests if administrative posts in their sphere of interest are filled by British subjects, and that His Majesty's Government cannot deprecate such measures, as it would be contrary to the spirit of the convention of 1907.

His Majesty's Government are pledged to avoid any displacement of Russian influence by British in the north, and the Russians are gaining the impression that under cover of Shuster's administration this is being done.

10) O'Beirne an Sir Edward Grey. (Telegraphisch.)

Petersburg, November 6, 1911.

Conveys substance of the following despatch, dated the 7th November: The Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me yesterday that he was constantly receiving reports from Persia of a most unsatisfactory character, that the situation was becoming impossible, and that if matters did not improve it would really be necessary for Russia to do something.

His Excellency referred particularly to two subjects of conflict which had arisen between the Russian and Persian Governments certain recent appointments made by Mr. Shuster, and an incident between Persian Cossacks and Mr. Shuster's gendarmes in which the Russian consul-general was concerned.

The second of these matters has been referred to in recent press telegrams from Tehran. According to the very brief account of it which M Nératof gave me, the Persian authorities (for whose action his Excellency thought that Mr. Shuster was responsible) desired to take possession of certain property belonging to adherents of the ex-Shah in which the Russian bank had an interest. The Russian Government did not object to the sequestration of the property, but they were bound to safeguard the interests of their bank. The Russian consul-general had placed Cossacks as guards over the property, and there had been a conflict of some sort between the Cossacks and Mr. Shuster's gendarmes. Thereupon, the Persian Government had gone so far as to demand the recall of the consul-general, and also, I think, of some subordinate officials of the consulate who had been involved in the dispute. The Russian Minister had of course returned the Persian note, and there had been a lively explanation between M. Poklewski and the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Everything now depended on the further action of the Persian Government. If they persisted in the attitude which they had taken up the matter would become excessively serious, and he did not know what action the Russian Government would have to take. The relations between the two Governments were, as I could see, extremely strained.

As regards the question of appointments, M. Nératof stated that Mr. Shuster had nominated three Treasury agents at Shiraz, Ispahan, and