10. An erasure and interlineation in an assessment roll in the District of
Columbia, made nearly twelve months after it was completed and
deposited in the register's office, and after lots not assessed had passed
into the ownership of a bona fide purchaser, is neither a reassessment
nor an amendment of the original assessment. Although the illegality
of a tax sale is patent on the face of the proceedings, if the property
was acquired by a bona fide purchaser before the sale and without
notice of the tax, a court of equity has jurisdiction to remove the cloud
upon the title. Ib.
11. In Utah a complaint which alleges that the plaintiff is owner and in
possession of land, that the defendant claims an adverse interest or
estate therein, that such claim is without legal or equitable foundation
and is void, and that it is a cloud on the plaintiff's title and embarrasses
him in the use and disposition of his property and depreciates his
property, and which prays for equitable relief in these respects, is suffi-
cient to require the adverse claim on the part of the defendant to be
set up, inquired into and judicially determined, and the question of
title finally settled. Parley's Park Silver Mining Co. v. Kerr, 256.
12. The provisions of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin which require
service of process generally on cities to be "by delivering a copy thereof
to the mayor and city clerk," and the provisions of the charter of the
city of Watertown which requires such service to be made by leaving
a copy with the mayor, have been held by the highest court of the
State to be peremptory and to exclude all other officers, and it has also
held that the fact that there is a vacancy in the office of mayor does
not authorize service to be made upon some other substituted officer:
and this court concurs with that court in this construction. Amy v.
Watertown, (No. 1,) 301.
13. To entitle a property owner to recover for injury to his property in
Ohio by reason of the location of a railroad on a public street, road or
alley, it is not necessary under the provisions of Rev. Stats. Ohio,
§ 3283, that the property should be situated upon the street so occupied ;
but it is sufficient if it is near enough to be injured by the location
and occupation. Shepherd v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 426.
14. Damages for a temporary injury sustained by a property owner by
reason of the occupation of a street during the construction of a rail-
road are not recoverable under § 3283, Rev. Stats. Ohio. Ib.
15. The pleadings in this case cover both the claim for damages under the
statute, and the claim for special damages by reason of obstruction
during construction. Ib.
See BILL OF LADING (Texas);
CRIMINAL LAW (Utah);
JURISDICTION, A, 9 (Montana);
JURISDICTION, C (Dakota);
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF, 5 (Wisconsin);
MECHANICS' LIEN (Texas).
The time of the service of a cadet in the Military Academy at West Point
is to be regarded as a part of the time he served in the army within
the meaning of the act of July 5, 1838, 5 Stat. 256, and should be
counted in computing his longevity pay; and in an action to recover
that pay he is entitled to judgment for so much of the amount thereon
thus computed as is not barred by the statute of limitations. United
States v. Watson, 80.
MARITIME LAW.
See ADMIRALTY.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
See CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
A statute of Texas, passed in 1879, gave a lien for wages to mechanics and
laborers, on a railroad, prior to all other liens, and authorized its en-
forcement, in a suit, by a judgment for the sale of the railroad, and
provided that it should not be necessary to make other lien-holders
defendants, but that they might intervene and become parties. It did
not provide for any notice by publication. In 1882, a railroad in Texas
was mortgaged to secure bonds. In 1884, a creditor of the railroad
company holding such labor claims, in a suit against it alone, in a
court of the State, obtained a judgment for his claim and lien, and
for the sale of the railroad. In a suit afterwards brought by a bond-
holder, in the Circuit Court of the United States, to have the rights of
the creditors of the company ascertained, and a receiver appointed, it
was referred to a master to report on the priority of claims. The
creditor by judgment presented his claim; it was objected to by the
bondholder as fraudulent and embracing amounts not covered by the
statutory lien. The master reported that the claim included amounts
which were not a lien, as well as amounts which were, but did not sep-
arate them; that the claim was a valid one against the company, but
that it was not a lien entitled to priority. The court, on exceptions,
awarded priority of lien to the claim, for the full amount of the judg-
ment; Held, (1) The bondholders were not bound by the judgment
rendered in a suit to which they were not made parties; (2) as the
claims of the creditor originated after the mortgage was made, he was
bound to prove affirmatively, before the master, the existence and pri-
ority of his lien; (3) the evidence before the master did not sustain
the lien for the whole amount; (4) the proceeding in the state court
could not be sustained as one in rem, because the adverse claimants
did not have even constructive notice of it; (5) the claim was founded
wholly on the statute of Texas; (6) it was proper that the claim
should be reexamined before a master. Hassall v. Wilcox, 493.
1. The question, under Rev. Stat. § 2319, as to what customs and rules of
miners in a mining district not inconsistent with the laws of the
United States are in force in the district where an application is made
for a patent of mineral land, is one of fact determinable by the Com-
missioner of the Land Office. Parley's Park Silver Mining Co. v.
Kerr, 256.
2. Rule 4 of the rules of the Blue Ledge mining district in Utah, adopted
May 17, 1870, limiting the width of a mining location to 100 feet, was
so modified May 4, 1872, that thereafter the surface width was to be
governed by the laws of the United States. lb.
3. The provision in Rev. Stat. § 2324, that records of mining claims shall
contain such "reference to some natural object or permanent monu-
ment as will identify the claim," means only that this is to be done
when such reference can be made; and when it cannot be made, stakes
driven into the ground are sufficient for identification, or a reference
to a neighboring mine, with distance and date of location, which will
be presumed to be a well-known natural object in the absence of con-
tradictory proof. Hammer v. Garfield Mining and Milling Co., 291.
4. The oath of one of the locators of a mining claim, accompanying the
recorded notice of the location is, in the absence of contradiction,
prima facie evidence of the fact of the citizenship of all the loca-
tors. Ib.
5. It being established, in an action to quiet a mining title in Montana,
that the plaintiff was in quiet and undisputed possession of the prem-
ises, the validity of his location not being questioned in the pleadings,
and that the boundary of his claim was so marked on the surface as to
be readily traced, this constitutes a prima facie case which can only be
overcome by proof of abandonment, or forfeiture, or other divestiture,
and the acquisition of a better right or title by the defendant. lb.
6. A forfeiture of a mining claim cannot be established except upon clear
and convincing proof of the failure of the former owner to have work
performed or improvements made to the amount required by law. Ib.
See PUBLIC LAND, 5, 6.
1. No right exists at common law, or in the system of equity as adminis-
tered in the courts of England prior to the organization of the govern-
ment of the United States, to redeem from a sale under a decree of
foreclosure. Parker v. Dacres, 43.
2. Clark v. Reyburn, 8 Wall. 318, does not recognize a right of redemp-
tion after a sale under a decree of foreclosure, independently of a
right given by statute. Ib.
3. The courts of the United States, sitting in equity, recognize a statutory
right of redemption from a sale under a decree of foreclosure, and
that the statute conferring it is a rule of property in the State. Ib.
See LOCAL LAW, 3.
ΜΟΝΤΑΝΑ.
See EVIDENCE, 1;
JURISDICTION, A, 9.
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
See JURISDICTION, A, 1.
MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM.
See ADMIRALTY, 1, 2.
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT.
See JURISDICTION, B.
The constitution of Colorado of 1876 provided that no county should con-
tract any debt by loan in any form except for certain purposes therein
named; that such indebtedness contracted in any one year should not
exceed the rate therein named; and that "the aggregate amount of
indebtedness of any county for all purposes . . . shall not at any
time exceed twice the amount above herein limited," etc.; Held, that
this limitation was an absolute limitation upon the power of the county
to contract any and all indebtedness, not only for the purposes named
in the constitution, but for every other purpose whatever, including
county warrants issued for ordinary county expenses, such as wit-
nesses' and jurors' fees, election costs, charges for board of prisoners,
county treasurer's commissions, etc. Lake County v. Rollins, 662.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, B;
ESTOPPEL.
MUNICIPAL TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS.
See LOCAL LAW, 8, 9, 10.
MURDER.
See CRIMINAL LAW.
See CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
Negotiable certificates, issued by the Board of Public Works of the District
of Columbia, redeemed according to law, and cancelled by the proper
officers by stamping in ink across the face words stating such cancella-
tion, are thereby extinguished; and if a clerk, who has no duty or
authority connected with their redemption or care, afterwards steals
them, fraudulently effaces the marks of cancellation, and puts them in
circulation, the District of Columbia is not liable to a purchaser in good
faith, for value and before maturity. District of Columbia' v. Cornell,
655.
1. A retired ariny officer, accepting pay under an appointment in the diplo-
matic or consular service, is thereby precluded from receiving salary as
an officer in the army. Badeau v. United States, 439.
2. Whether a retired army officer, whose name is dropped from the rolls
under the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 1223, in consequence of his accept-
ing an appointment in the diplomatic or consular service of the govern-
ment, can be restored to the army under the provisions of the act of
March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 512, is not decided in this case. Ib.
3. An officer whose name is placed on the retired list of the army by the
Secretary of War, in apparent compliance with provisions of law, is an
officer de facto, if not de jure, and money paid to him as salary cannot
be recovered back by the United States. Ib.
OFFICER IN THE DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR SERVICE.
See OFFICER IN THE ARMY, 1.
On the facts it is held that Stewart was not an indispensable party to this
suit, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to a portion of the relief prayed
for. Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 505.
On the facts of this case, it was held that the defendant was not a co-part-
ner with another person, in his general business, and liable for his
debts. Wilson v. Edmonds, 472.
1. The first claim in reissued letters patent No. 5294, granted February
25, 1873, to the Collins Company, as assignee of Lucius Jordan and
Leander E. Smith, for an improvement in wrenches, was only the
application to the bar of the Coes wrench, (which was an existing
patented invention at the date of the alleged invention of Jordan and
Smith,) for the purpose of securing and supporting the step, and
resisting the strain of a nut already in use on the Hewitt or Dixie
wrench; and as such it lacks the novelty of invention requisite to sup-
port a patent within the recent decisious of this court; and this con-
clusion is not affected by the fact that in complainant's wrench the
screw-rod of the Coes wrench is availed of instead of the screw-sleeve
of the Dixie wrench. Collins Company v. Coes, 56.
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