6. The amount necessary to give this court jurisdiction to reexamine a
judgment or decree against a defendant in the court below (whether
rendered in the trial court or in the appellate court) is to be deter-
mined by the amount of the judgment in the trial court without add-
ing interest, unless interest is part of the claim litigated, or forms part
of the judgment in the trial court and runs from a period antecedent
to that judgment. District of Columbia v. Gannon, 227.
7. At the trial of an action against the District of Columbia to recover for
personal injuries received by reason of a defect in the streets of Wash-
ington, the refusal to charge that the District cannot be held respon-
sible for the negligence of a government which is imposed upon it by
Congress; or that no such action can be maintained against it because
it derives no profit from the duty of maintaining the streets, does not
draw in question the validity of the statutes of the United States creat-
ing the government of the District, so as to give this court appellate
jurisdiction of the cause, independently of the amount of the judgment
in the trial court. Ib.
8. A certificate of division in opinion upon a matter over which the court
below has no jurisdiction brings nothing before this court for review.
United States v. Pile, 280.
9. The modes of procedure in Montana being substantially the same at
law and in equity, if the trial court there calls a jury in a case where
the remedy sought is equitable, and the trial is conducted in the same
manner as a trial of an issue at law, and there is a general finding by
the jury, and the case is brought here by writ of error, the finding
will be treated here as if made by the court, and as covering all the
issues; and the only questions which can be considered here are those
arising from the rulings in the admission or rejection of evidence, and
those respecting the inferences deducible from the proofs made. Ham-
mer v. Garfield Mining and Milling Co., 291.
10. When it does not appear, affirmatively, from the record that the Circuit
Court had jurisdiction, the judgment below will be reversed and the
cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with law. Brock
v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 341.
11. Where the objection of want of jurisdiction in equity because of ade-
quate remedy at law is not made until the hearing on appeal, and the
subject matter belongs to the class over which a court of equity has
jurisdiction, this court is not necessarily obliged to entertain such
objection; even if taken in limine, it might have been worthy of atten-
tion. Reynes v. Dumont, 354.
12. This court has no authority to review on bill of exceptions rulings of
a judge of the Circuit Court at the trial of an action at law, had before.
him at chambers, by consent of the parties, under an order providing
that it should be so tried, and that if at such trial there should appear
to the judge to be in issue questions of fact of such a character that
he would submit them to a jury if one were present, they should be
submitted to a jury at the next term. Andes v. Slauson, 435.
13. This court will not, by a technical construction of an obscure record,
preclude itself from correcting an error committed in the trial below,
if a construction can be given to it which will give jurisdiction. Dun-
lap v. Northwestern Railroad, 649.
14. An action on the official bond of a collector of customs is not one of
which this court has appellate jurisdiction, under § 699 of the Revised
Statutes, without regard to the sum or value in dispute. United States
v. Haynes, 653.
See ADMIRALTY, 1;
APPEAL, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9;
JUDGMENT, 1, 2, 3;
PRACTICE, 3, 4;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES;
STATUTE, A, 1, 2;
JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
A motion to set aside a judgment if made, and service thereof made at the
term at which the judgment is rendered, may be heard and decided at
the next term of the court if properly continued by order of court.
Amy v. Watertown, (No. 1,) 301.
C. JURISDICTION OF TERRITORIAL COURTS.
1. The validity of an election to determine the county seat of a county in
Dakota under the laws of the Territory, when presented to the courts
in the form prescribed by those laws, becomes a subject of action within
the jurisdiction of the territorial court, whose judgment thereon is sub-
ject to appeal to the Supreme Court of the Territory. Smith v. Adams,
2. The act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 385, c. 341, § 9, was enacted to trans-
fer to territorial courts, established by the United States, the juris-
diction to try the crimes described in it, (including the crime of
murder,) under territorial laws, when sitting as and exercising the func-
tions of a territorial court; and not when sitting as or exercising the
functions of a Circuit or District Court of the United States under
Rev. Stat. § 1910. Gon-shay-ee, Petitioner, 343.
3. The facts that the petitioner in this case was sentenced to imprisonment
in Ohio, and that the offence was committed within a judicial district
instead of an Indian reservation, do not take this case out of the de-
cision in Gon-shay-ee's Case, 130 U. S. 343. Captain Jack, Petitioner,
353.
D. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
Congress enacted that A B and C D "be permitted to sue in the Court of
Claims, which court shall pass upon the law and facts as to the lia-
bility of the United States for the acts of its officer " E F, . . . "col-
lector of internal revenue," etc., "and this suit may be maintained,
any statute of limitation to the contrary notwithstanding." Held, that
this was a waiver of the defence based upon the statute of limitations,
but not a waiver of the defence based on the general principle of law
that the United States are not liable for unauthorized wrongs inflicted
on the citizen by their officers while engaged in the discharge of
official duties. United States v. Cumming, 452.
KENTUCKY.
See LOCAL LAW, 4, 5, 6, 7.
In a suit in equity, brought by the United States to redeem a parcel of
land in Kansas, from a mortgage, the defence of laches cannot be set
up, although the bill was filed more than twelve years after the defend-
ant obtained title to the land by purchasing it on a foreclosure sale
under the mortgage, and more than thirteen years after the United
States purchased the land on a sale on execution on a judgment ob-
tained by it, after the mortgage was given, against the mortgagor, who
still owned the land, the United States not having been a party to the
foreclosure suit. United States v. Insley, 263.
1. The general rule respecting statutes of limitation is that the language
of the act must prevail, and that no reason based on apparent incon-
venience or hardship will justify a departure from it. Amy v. Water-
town, (No. 2,) 320.
2. Cases considered in which courts of equity and some courts of law have
held that the running of the statute was suspended on the ground of
fraud.
3. Cases considered in which courts of law have held the operation of the
statute suspended for want of parties, or because the law prohibits
the bringing of an action. Ib.
4. Inability to serve process upon a defendant, caused by his designed
elusion of it, is no excuse for not commencing an action within the
prescribed period. Ib.
5. In Wisconsin an action is not commenced for the purpose of stopping
the running of the statute of limitations until service of process had
been effected, or until service had been attempted and followed up by
actual service within sixty days or publication within that time.
Knowlton v. Watertown, 327.
6. Even before the act of June 1, 1872, c. 255, a provision, in a state stat-
ute of limitations of personal actions, that a service of the summons,
or its delivery to an officer with intent that it should be served, should
be deemed a commencement of the action or equivalent thereto, was
applicable, like the rest of the statute, to an action in the Circuit
Court of the United States. Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred, 693.
7. A provision in a statute of limitations, that the delivery of the sum-
mons to an officer, with intent that it should be actually served, shall
be deemed equivalent to the commencement of the action, is satisfied
if the summons made out by the clerk, pursuant to the attorney's
direction, is placed by the clerk in a box in his office, designated by
the officer, with the clerk's assent, as a place where processes to be
served by him may be deposited and from which he usually takes
them daily. Ib.
LIMITED LIABILITY.
See ADMIRALTY, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11.
County of Warren v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96, affirmed to the point that all per-
sons dealing with property are bound to take notice of a suit pending
with regard to the title thereto, and will, on their peril, purchase the
same from any of the parties to the suit. Union Trust Co. v. Southern
Inland Navigation Co., 565.
1. The constitution and general laws of Oregon do not authorize a railroad
corporation, organized under the laws of the State, to take a lease of a
railroad and franchises. Oregon Railway and Navigation Co. v. Ore-
gonian Railway Co., 1.
2. The general laws of Oregon confer upon a foreign corporation no right
to make a lease of a railroad within the State, but only the right to
construct or acquire and operate one there. Ib.
3. The Civil Practice Act of Washington Territory of 1873 provides that
all sales of real estate under execution, except sales of an estate of less
than a leasehold of two years unexpired term, shall be subject to a right
of redemption by the judgment debtor, or his successor in interest,
within six months after confirmation of sale upon tender to the sheriff
of the amount due with interest, and that the sheriff “may be required
by order of the court or a judge thereof to allow such redemption, if
he unlawfully refuses to allow it." The freehold estate of the plaintiff
below having been sold under a decree of foreclosure, he tendered
to the sheriff the amount necessary to redeem it within six months from
the date of the confirmation of the sale. The sheriff refused to receive
the money. No application was made to the court or a judge thereof,
under the statute, for an order upon the sheriff requiring him to allow
the redemption; but about nine years after the sale, the plaintiff below
brought this suit to redeem; Held, that, without deciding whether the
statute of the Territory is applicable to a sale under a decree of fore-
closure, a court of equity should refuse aid to a party asserting under
it a right of redemption, who has neglected, at least without sufficient
cause, before the expiration of six months from the confirmation of
the sale, to invoke the authority of the proper court or judge to com-
pel the recognition of such right by the officer whose duty it was,
under the statute, to accept a tender made in conformity with law.
Parker v. Dacres, 43.
4. In Kentucky when the record of a County Court, composed of the county
judge and a majority of the justices of the peace of the county, shows
affirmatively an adjudication of the necessity of a construction con-
tract; an appropriation for preliminary work upon it; the appointment
of an agent to make the contract; and the levy of taxes to pay for
work done under it, it is not necessary, in order to fix liability on
the county, that the record should further show that the contract was
reported to the court with the name of the person making it; that it
was filed in the court, or that it was accepted by the county judge.
Bullitt County v. Washer, 142.
5. When a body like the county courts of Kentucky has judicial powers,
and also large administrative and executive powers, and is by law
authorized to employ agents in the execution of the latter branch of
powers, the acts of the agents are not in every case required to appear
of record.
6. When a County Court in Kentucky, constituted as the law requires,
enters into a construction contract on behalf of the county in the
manner prescribed by law, and charges the county with the amount
specified therein, its jurisdiction in that special mode of organization
ceases; and it is then the legitimate province of the County Court,
held by the county judge alone, to superintend and control the erection
of the structure. Ib.
7. As a general rule in Kentucky, when any power is conferred or duty
imposed by statute upon a County Court, the term is understood to
mean a court held by the presiding judge alone, and not in conjunction
with the justices, and should be held so to mean, even when used in
connection with fiscal matters, if it relates to mere ministerial duties.
lb.
8. Under the laws in force in the District of Columbia, when the cause of
action in this case arose, the failure of the commissioner of improve-
ments to deposit with the register a statement exhibiting the cost of
setting the curbstone and paving the footway in front of each lot or
part of lot, separately, and the amount of tax to be paid by each pro-
prietor, the failure of the register to place without delay in the hands
of the collector a list of the persons taxed and the failure of the col-
lector to give the required notice to such persons, rendered invalid a
tax sale under those laws and certificates thereof, as against an inno-
cent purchaser. Lyon v. Alley, 177.
9. The provisions in those laws respecting the deposit of such statement
with the register, the placing the list in the hands of the collector, and
the notice to the owners were intended as a condition precedent, a strict
compliance with which was necessary in order to make the tax a lien
upon the lots. Ib.
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