the bill. See 121 U. S. 14. Thereupon Ballard moved in this case, on
the records in the two cases, and on affidavits, to reverse the decree of
the court below, and to remand this cause to the Circuit Court, with
direction to dismiss the bill; Held, that if such a course could prop-
erly be taken in any case, it would be improper to take it in this case;
but that, as the appellant might be subjected to great injustice if the
cause should go to hearing on the appeal in the present condition of
the record, the cause should be remanded with instructions to the Cir-
cuit Court to allow the defendant below to file such supplemental bill
as he might be advised, in the nature of a bill of review, or for the
purpose of suspending or avoiding the decree, upon the new matter
arising from the reversal of the former decree in Worden v. Searls.
Ballard v. Searls, 50.

2. In January, 1875, a patent issued from the state land office in Michigan
for 160 acres of mineral land to McDonald and McKay, who furnished
the money for it. The application was made by Moore in their behalf,
and under an agreement which the court finds to be established by the
proof as made (but not as made in writing) that he was to have one
third interest in it in consideration of his services in prospecting. On
the 18th of October, 1875, Moore, being then unmarried, executed and
delivered a deed of one sixth interest in the tract to Monroe for a val-
uable consideration, informing him that he (Moore) was to have a deed
of one third part from McDonald and McKay, which was probably at
that time made out. McDonald and McKay executed their deed to
Moore some time in 1875, and deposited it with a third party to be
delivered when a debt due from Moore to McDonald should be settled,
which was done in 1877. Moore did not know of the existence of this
deed, and it was subsequently lost. On the 16th of December, 1880,
at Moore's request, and for the avowed purpose of defeating his deed
to Monroe, McDonald and McKay conveyed the promised one third
interest to the wife of Moore, he having been in the meantime married,
and the wife having knowledge of the deed to Monroe, and of the object
of the conveyance to her. Moore then entered into possession, and
managed the property as if it were his own. Monroe died intestate in
Colorado in 1878, and his widow moved into Canada. In the summer
of 1871 she first learned that Moore disputed Monroe's title. She wrote
him a letter informing him of the claim of the widow and heirs of
Monroe to one sixth part of it, which he received in the fall of 1881,
or in the spring of 1882. February 8, 1882, the widow and heirs com-
menced this suit to compel a conveyance of the one sixth interest to
them; Held: (1) That the transaction must be regarded in equity as
if McDonald and McKay had conveyed to Moore, and Moore had con-
veyed to his wife, she holding one half of the interest conveyed to her,
being one-sixth of the whole, in trust for Monroe and his heirs; (2)
that Moore was guilty of a fraud in preventing the conveyance to
himself which would have inured to the benefit of Monroe, and that
his wife, by accepting with knowledge, became a party to it; (3) that

the fact that McDonald and McKay could not have been compelled to
convey to Moore because of the want of written evidence of their agree-
ment to do so does not entitle Mrs. Moore to invoke the Statute of
Frauds as a defence, they having kept their faith with Moore by con-
veying under his directions; (4) that treating Moore's deed as a cove-
nant to convey to Monroe, he would have been precluded from denying
the title if the deed of McDonald and McKay had been made directly
to him; and that this was not changed by the interposition of a third
person, who took without consideration and in order to enable the
fraud to be carried into effect; (5) that the fraud was of such char-
acter as to enable a court of equity to decree the relief as against the
covenantor, not only under his own name, but under the name of his
wife; (6) that as the contract was binding at the time of Monroe's
death, his heirs had the right to compel specific performance; (7)
that there was no sufficient proof that the deed of Moore to Monroe
was set aside by consent, and the purchase abandoned by Monroe;
(8) that the defence of laches, if available at all, was not made out;
(9) that the allegations of the bill as amended were sufficient to sup-
port the decree. Moore v. Crawford, 122.

3. Where it is competent for a court of equity to grant the relief asked
for, and it has jurisdiction of the subject matter, the objection that
the complainant has an adequate remedy at law should be taken at
the earliest opportunity, and before the defendants enter upon a full
defence. Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354, followed. Kilbourn v.
Sunderland, 505.

4. Equity jurisdiction may be invoked, although there is also a remedy at
law, unless the remedy at law, both in respect of the final relief and
the mode of obtaining it is as efficient as the remedy which equity
could confer under the same circumstances. Ib.

5. When a charge of fraud involves the consideration of principles appli-
cable to fiduciary and trust relations, equity has jurisdiction over it,
as "fraud” has a more extensive signification in equity than it has at
law. Ib.

6. When a party injured by fraud is in ignorance of its existence, the duty
to commence proceedings arises only upon its discovery; and mere
submission to any injury after the act inflicting it is completed cannot
generally, and in the absence of other circumstances, take away a right
of action, unless such acquiescence continues for the period limited by
the statute for the enforcement of the right. Ib.

7. In a suit in equity to set aside a conveyance of a silver mine in Idaho,
as induced by false and fraudulent concealment and misrepresentations,
the court, after stating the pleadings and the facts, holds, that neither
the law nor the equities are with the plaintiffs. Synnott v. Shaugh-
nessy, 572.

EQUITY OF REDEMPTION.

See MORTGAGE, 1, 2, 3.

EQUITY PLEADING.

See LOCAL LAW, 11.

ESTOPPEL.

The constitution of Colorado imposed a limit upon the power of municipal
corporations to contract debts. The legislature authorized county com-
missioners (a vote of the tax-payers first being had) to issue bonds of
the county, not to exceed the amount of the floating debt, that amount
to be ascertained by the commissioners, no reference being made in the
statute to the constitutional limitation. The commissioners of Lake
County settled the amount of the floating debt of the county at $500,000,
which was in excess of the constitutional limitation, and issued bonds
to that amount, in which reference was made to the statute, and in which
it was "certified that all the provisions and requirements of said act
have been fully complied with by the proper officers in the issuing of
this bond." Held, that the county was not estopped to deny that the
bond was issued in violation of the provisions of the constitution.
Lake County v. Graham, 674.

EVIDENCE.

1. In the absence of a provision of statute in Montana respecting the
manner of authenticating a copy of the certificate of incorporation of
a corporation of a State, filed in the records of a county of Montana,
the certificate of the original custodian in the State of origin, under
his seal of office, is a sufficient authentication. Hammer v. Garfield
Mining and Milling Co., 291.

2. In an action to recover for goods sold and delivered, a copy of an item-
ized account of them may be handed to a witness to refresh his mem-
ory in regard to the matters contained in it. New York and Colorado
Mining Syndicate v. Fraser, 611.

3. Evidence that a witness is familiar enough with gold mills to know
what they can perform and what they can earn, but that he has only
seen one silver mill, being the one in controversy, lays no foundation
for his testimony as to the fair rental value of that silver mill. Ib.
4. In the absence of other and better evidence, the rental value of a silver
mill may be shown by proof of the amount of ore delivered and
milled. Ib.

5. The declarations of the defendant's agent as to matters within the
scope of his authority were properly admitted in evidence. Ib.

See DAMAGES, 3;

MINERAL LAND, 4.

EXCEPTION.

When the exception to the refusal of a request to instruct the jury shows
no evidence tending to prove the facts which the request assumes to
exist, there is nothing before the court for consideration. New York
and Colorado Mining Syndicate v. Fraser, 611.

EXECUTION.

See LOCAL LAW, 3.

FLORIDA INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT FUND.

The conveyance by the trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of
Florida, on the 10th February, 1871, to the Southern Inland Naviga-
tion and Improvement Company was subject to such decree as the
court might render in a suit commenced in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Northern District of Florida against said trus-
tees and others on the 3d of November, 1870; and as the Navigation
and Improvement Company was a party to that suit, and as the decree
of December 4, 1873, in that suit, rescinded the agreements which the
company had with the trustees in respect of lands constituting a part
of the trust fund and restored to that fund the lands conveyed or
attempted to be conveyed to the company by the trustees, the said
deed of February 10, 1871, and the mortgage by that company to the
Union Trust Company of March 20, 1871, based upon it, are invalid
as against the present trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund.
Union Trust Co. v. Southern Inland Navigation Co., 565.

FRAUD.

See EQUITY, 4, 5, 6, 7.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.

See EQUITY, 2 (1), (5) 7.

INTEREST.

See DAMAGES, 1, 4.

INDIAN.

See JURISDICTION, C, 3.

JUDGMENT.

1. A judgment of a lower appellate court, which reverses the judgment of
the court of original jurisdiction and remands the case to it for further
proceedings, is not a final judgment. Smith v. Adams, 167.

2. A judgment of reversal is only final when it also enters or directs the
entry of a judgment which disposes of the case. Ib.

3. The suspension of the execution of a judgment in a criminal case until
the next term of court, unaccompanied by any pending motion for a

rehearing or modification of the judgment or other proceeding taken
at the term of court when the judgment was rendered, leaves the judg-
ment in full force, and the court without further jurisdiction of the
case. United States v. Pile, 280.

4. A party to a decree in a state court in a matter subject to its jurisdiction
cannot attack it collaterally in a suit commenced in a Circuit Court of
the United States after the jurisdiction of the state court had attached.
Central Trust Co. v. Seasongood, 482.

See FLORIDA INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT FUND;
RAILROAD, 5.

JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC.

See APPEAL, 8.

JURISDICTION.

A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME Court.

1. An order overruling a motion for a new trial after the plaintiff, by leave
of court, has remitted a part of the verdict, is not subject to review
by this court upon a writ of error sued out by the party against whom
the verdict is rendered. Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle Co. v. Mann,
69.

2. Amendments are discretionary with the court below, and are not re-
viewable here. Bullitt County v. Washer, 142.

3. By "the matter in dispute," as that phrase is used in the statutes cou-
ferring jurisdiction on this court, is meant the subject of litigation,
the matter upon which the action is brought and issue is joined, and
in relation to which, if the issue be one of fact, testimony is taken;
and its pecuniary value may be determined not only by the money
judgment prayed, but, in some cases, by the increased or diminished
value of the property directly affected by the relief prayed, or by the
pecuniary result to one of the parties immediately from the judgment.
Smith v. Adams, 167.

4. A promise by a third person to grant to a litigant certain lands, or make
particular donations exceeding $5000 in value in case of a successful
prosecution of a suit, will not confer jurisdiction on this court, if with-
out such promise or conditional donation the court would not have the
requisite jurisdiction. Ib.

5. In an action against the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company to
recover for injuries suffered by an unlawful use of the streets of Wash-
ington by the company, the judgment being for less than the jurisdie-
tional amount necessary to sustain a writ of error, this court will not
acquire jurisdiction by reason of a charge to the jury which instructs
them that certain uses of those streets were warranted by statutes of
the United States, and that certain other uses were not authorized by
them. Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Co. v. Hopkins, 210.