tion that the owner himself was in fault does not affect the jurisdic-
tion of the court to entertain the cause of limited liability. Ib.
5. The steamboat inspection act of February 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 440, c.
100, Rev. Stat. Title LII. does not supersede or displace the proceed-
ing for limited liability in cases arising under its provisions.
6. Whether the act of June 26, 1884, 23 Stat. 53, c. 121, § 18, is intended
to be explanatory of the intent of Congress in its legislation concern-
ing limited liability of shipowners, quære. Ib.
7. In the absence of an allegation to the contrary, it will be presumed in
a limited liability case in admiralty that the captain and the first mate
of a sea-going coast-wise steamer were licensed pilots. Ib.
8. The law of limited liability was enacted by Congress as part of the
maritime law of the United States, and is coëxtensive in its operation
with the whole territorial domain of that law. Ib.
9. While the general maritime law with slight modifications, is accepted
as law in this country, it is subject under the Constitution to such
modifications as Congress may see fit to adopt. Ib.
10. The Constitution has not placed the power of legislation to change or
modify the general maritime law in the legislatures of the States.
Ib.
11. The limited liability act (Rev. Stat. 4282-4285) applies to the case of
a disaster happening within the technical limits of a county in a State,
and to a case in which the liability itself arises from a law of the
State. Ib.
12. Whether a law of a State can have force to create a liability in a
maritime case, within the dominion of the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, where neither the general maritime law nor an act of
Congress has created such liability, is not decided. Ib.
13. The City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468, affirmed as to insurance money.
Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6.
AMENDMENT.
See DOWER, 1;
JURISDICTION, A, 2.
1. It is a well-settled rule that this court will not entertain an appeal
where the transcript of the record is not filed in this court at the term
next succeeding the taking of the appeal, unless a recognized satisfac
tory excuse for the laches is made. Richardson v. Green, 104.
2. It is not a sufficient excuse that the clerk of the court below was mis-
taken in his understanding as to the time when the transcript must
be filed, and that it was prepared as soon as possible by him, having
due regard to the other duties of his office, and the size of the record.
Ib.
3. Where the transcript of the record was placed in the hands of the clerk
of this court at the next term after the appeal was allowed and per-
fected by the filing of a bond, but no appearance was entered for the
appellant, nor any deposit for costs made, at that term, but these
things were done at the next following term, and the case was then
docketed, and a motion to dismiss the appeal was made at the third
term thereafter; Held, that the motion must be denied. Ib.
4. Where an appeal is allowed in open court at the same term the decree
is made yet if the bond to perfect the appeal is not accepted at or
during that term, a citation is necessary. Ib.
5. The issuing of a citation may be waived by the appellee, and a general
appearance by him is a waiver of a citation. lb.
6. Where this court has jurisdiction of an appeal, and a citation is neces-
sary, it will issue one. 1b.
7. Reasons stated why the appeal in this case is not open to the objection
that it does not involve more than $5000, or to the objection that the
appellee is not named in the order allowing the appeal. Ib.
8. Where the appellee died after the argument of the motion to dismiss
the appeal, the order on the motion was entered nunc pro tunc as of
the day of the argument. Ib.
9. An appeal prayed and granted in a Circuit Court "of this cause to the
Supreme Court" brings the whole case here including orders previously
made in it. Central Trust Co. v. Seasongood, 482.
ARMY OFFICERS.
See OFFICERS IN THE ARMY.
ASSESSMENT.
See LOCAL LAW, 8, 9, 10.
1. A state bank gave a receipt or certificate, stating that J., agent for W.,
had placed with it, on special deposit, $5200 of railroad mortgage
bonds, and a note for $5000. The receipt was sent by the bank by
mail directly to W., on the request of J. At the same time the bank
entered the note and the bonds in its special deposit book as deposited
by J., agent for W. Afterwards, with the concurrence of J., but with-
out authority from W., the bank discounted the note and applied its
avails to pay a debt due to it from a firm whose business J. managed,
and delivered up the bonds to J., knowing that he intended to pledge
them as security to another bank for a loan of money to the same firm.
The bank also knew that J. held the note and bonds as investments
for W., and that it was not a safe investment to lend their avails to
the firm; Held, that the bank was liable to W. for the amount of the
note and the value of the bonds. Manhattan Bank v. Walker, 267.
2. A suit in equity by W. against the bank for the return of the property
or the payment of its value, would lie, as it was a suit to charge the
bank, as a trustee, for a breach of trust, in regard to a special deposit.
Ib.
1. The controversy in this case involves the allowance in favor of the trus-
tee in bankruptcy of S. of liens upon certain bonds, owned in fact by
C. and D., though ostensibly belonging to C. only, as pledged to secure,,
by express agreement, the general balance of account of a New Orleans
bank, of which C. was president; and also, by implication from the
usage of the banking business in which S. was engaged, C.'s general
balance. Reynes v. Dumont, 354.
2. The court is of opinion upon the evidence that the bonds were pledged
to secure the remittance by the bank to S. of "exchange bought and
paid for;" that is, bills drawn against shipments and purchased by
advances to the shippers, and that they cannot be held to make good
a debit balance of the bank created by the non-payment of certain
drafts drawn by it directly on Europe and unaccompanied by docu-
ments. lb.
3. A banker's lien rests upon the presumption of credit extended in faith
of securities in possession or expectancy, and does not arise in refer-
ence to securities in possession of a bank under circumstances, or
where there is a particular mode of dealing, inconsistent with such
lien. Ib.
4. The pledge of these bonds to guarantee the remittance by the bank as
before stated and the circumstances under which they were left in the
possession of S., and had been made use of by C., preclude the allow-
ance of the banker's lien claimed on behalf of S. as against the ulti-
mate indebtedness of C. Ib.
5. The receipt by D. and the assignee of C. of the remaining bonds and
money realized from bonds and coupons, after the satisfaction of the
amounts decreed as liens by the Circuit Court, did not deprive D. and
C.'s assignee of the right of appeal. Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3, 8,
approved. Ib.
A bill of lading, fraudulently issued by the station agent of a railroad com-
pany without receiving the goods named in it for transportation, but
in other respects according to the customary course of business, im-
poses no liability upon the company to an innocent holder who receives
it without knowledge or notice of the fraud and for a valuable con-
sideration and this general rule is not affected in Texas by the stat-
utes of that State. Friedlander v. Texas and Pacific Railway Co., 416.
BANKRUPT.
If an attachment of property in an action in a state court is dissolved
by the defendant's entering into a recognizance with sureties to pay
within ninety days after any final judgment against him, the amount
of that judgment; and the defendant, after verdict against him, obtains
his discharge in bankruptcy upon proceedings commenced more than
four months after the attachment; the Bankrupt Act does not prevent
the state court from rendering judgment against him on the verdict,
with a perpetual stay of execution, so as to leave the plaintiff at liberty
to proceed against the sureties. Hill v. Harding, 698.
CADET AT WEST POINT.
See LONGEVIty Pay.
CALIFORNIA.
See PUBLIC LAND, 4.
1. Amy v. Watertown, No. 2, 130 U. S. 320, affirmed and applied to this
case. Knowlton v. Watertown, 327.
2. City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468, affirmed as to insurance money. Butler
v. Boston and Savannah Steamship Co., 527.
3. County of Warren v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96, affirmed. Union Trust Co.
v. Southern Inland Navigation Co., 565.
4. Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3, approved. Reynes v. Dumont, 354.
5. Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, followed. Chinese Exclusion Case,
581.
6. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662, affirmed and applied to the bonds
in controversy in this action. Lake County v. Graham, 674.
7. Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354, followed. Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 505.
8. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, followed. Chinese Exclusion Case,
581.
CASES EXPLAINED OR QUALIFIED.
1. Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266, and Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S.
289, differ essentially from this case. Amy v. Watertown, No. 1, 301.
2. Clark v. Reyburn, 8 Wall. 318, explained. Parker v. Dacres, 43.
3. Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71, explained. Oregon Railway and
Navigation Co. v. Oregonian Railway Co., 1.
CERTIORARI.
See PRACTICE, 4.
The history of Chinese immigration into the United States stated, together
with a review of the treaties and legislation affecting it. Chinese Ex-
clusion Case, 581.
See CONSTITUTIONal Law, A, 7, 8.
CITATION.
See APPEAL, 4, 5.
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT IN UTAH.
COLORADO.
See ESTOPPEL;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
COMMON CARRIER.
See ADMIRALTY;
BILL OF LADING.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
A. OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. If the trial court makes the decision of a motion for a new trial depend
upon a remission of the larger part of the verdict, this is not a reëx-
amination by the court of facts tried by the jury in a mode not known
at the common law; and is no violation of the Seventh Article of
Amendment to the Constitution. Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle
Co. v. Mann, 69.
2. In their relations with foreign governments and their subjects or citi-
zens, the United States are a nation, invested with the powers which
belong to independent nations. Chinese Exclusion Case, 581.
3. So far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign power
can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this
country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforce-
ment, modification or repeal. The Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580,
and Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, followed. Ib.
4. The abrogation of a treaty, like the repeal of a law, operates only on
future transactions, leaving unaffected those executed under it previous
to the abrogation. Ib.
5. The rights and interests created by a treaty, which have become so
vested that its expiration or abrogation will not destroy or impair
them, are such as are connected with and lie in property, capable of
sale and transfer or other disposition, and not such as are personal
and untransferable in their character. Ib.
6. The power of the legislative department of the government to exclude
aliens from the United States is an incident of sovereignty, which
cannot be surrendered by the treaty making power. Ib.
7. The act of October 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 504, c. 1064, excluding Chinese
laborers from the United States, was a constitutional exercise of legis-
lative power, and, so far as it conflicted with existing treaties between
the United States and China, it operated to that extent to abrogate
them as part of the municipal law of the United States. lb.
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