Opinion of the Court. that he made the attempted service by delivering a copy of the summons to Wm. H. Rohr, the last mayor of the city, a copy to Henry Bieber, city clerk, a copy to Chas. H. Gardner, city attorney, and a copy to Thomas Baxter, the last presiding officer of the board of street commissioners of the city of Watertown, the office of mayor being vacant and there being no president of the common council nor presiding officer thereof in office. Was this such a service upon the city as the law requires? It clearly was not, unless, by the law of Wisconsin, the circumstances of the case were such as to dispense with a literal compliance with the charter. The charter requires service on the mayor of the city. No such service was made. There was no mayor in office at the time. The last mayor had resigned, and his resignation had taken effect. Service on him was of no more avail than service on an entire stranger. The case is different from those in which we have held that a resignation of an officer did not take effect until it was accepted or until another was appointed. In those cases either the common law prevailed or the local law provided for the case and prevented a vacancy. Such were the cases of Badger v. Bolles, 93 U. S. 599; Edwards v. United States, 103 U. S. 471; Salamanca v. Wilson, 109 U. S. 627. In Badger v. Bolles the law of Illinois was in question, and it appeared that by the constitution of that State the officers elected were to hold their offices until their successors were elected and qualified. In Edwards v. United States the case arose in Michigan, and it was held that the common-law rule prevailed there, by which the resig nation of a public officer is not complete until the proper authority accepts it or does something tantamount thereto, such as appointing a successor. In Salamanca v. Wilson, a case arising in Kansas, the treasurer of a township moved across the township line into another township. By the constitution of Kansas, township officers were to hold their offices one year from their election and until their successors were qualified, and nothing was said either in the constitution or laws about residence or non-residence. We held that the removal did not necessarily vacate the office and that service of summons on the treasurer was good. Opinion of the Court. In the present case, it is true, the consolidated charter of the city of Watertown provides (chap. 1, sec. 6) that "all elective officers except aldermen shall, unless otherwise provided, hold their respective offices for one year, and until their successors are elected and qualified." But that provision has respect to ordinary cases. It cannot apply in a case of death; and does not apply in case of resignation; for by chapter 61 of the Private and Local laws of 1867, relating to Watertown (sec. 1), it is declared that "any city officer who shall resign his office shall file with the city clerk his resignation in writ ing, directed to the mayor, and such resignation shall take effect from the time of filing the same." And by chapter 204 of the Private and Local laws of 1871, relating to Watertown, it is declared (sec. 2) that "the resignation of the mayor shall be in writing, directed to the common council or city clerk, and filed with the city clerk, and shall take effect at the time of filing the same." These provisions of the statute law are decisive, and preclude the operation of any such rule as was recognized in Badger v. Bolles and Edwards v. United States. The service upon Rohr, the last mayor, therefore, was of no force, and had no effect whatever. The same thing may be said of the service on Baxter, the last presiding officer of the board of street commissioners. The question then is reduced to this, whether, in case the mayor has resigned, and there is no presiding officer of the board of street commissioners, (a body which seems to take the place of the common council of the city for many pur poses,) service of process on the city clerk, and on a conspicuous member of the board, is sufficient. If the common law (which is common reason in matters of justice) were permitted to prevail there would be no difficulty. In the absence of any head officer, the court could direct service to be made on such official persons as it might deem sufficient. But when a statute intervenes and displaces the common law, we are brought to a question of words, and are bound to take the words of the statute as law. The cases are numerous which decide that where a particular method of serving process is pointed out by statute, that method must be followed, and the rule is espe Opinion of the Court. cially exacting in reference to corporations. Kibbe v. Benson, 17 Wall. 624; Alexandria v. Fairfax, 95 U. S. 774; Settlemier v. Sullivan, 97 U. S. 444; Evans v. Dublin &c. Railway, 14 M. & W. 142; Walton v. Universal Salvage Co., 16 M. & W. 438; Brydolf v. Wolf, Carpenter & Co., 32 Iowa, 509; Hoen v. Atlantic and Pacific Railway Co., 64 Missouri, 561; Lehigh Valley Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 81 Penn. St. 398. The courts of Wisconsin strictly adhere to this rule. Congar v. Railroad Co., 17 Wisconsin, 477, 485; City of Watertown v. Robinson, 59 Wisconsin, 513; City of Watertown v. Robinson, 69 Wisconsin, 230. The two cases last cited related to the charter now under consideration. In the first case, service was made upon the city clerk and upon the chairman of the board of street commissioners whilst the board was in session, in the absence of the mayor, who could not be found after diligent search. The court, after referring to the provisions of the charter and the Revised Statutes on the subject, say: "The question whether the Revised Statutes control as to the manner of service is not a material inquiry here, because both the charter and general provision require the service to be made upon the mayor, but no service was made upon that officer as appears by the return of the sheriff. The principle is too elementary to need discussion, that a court can only acquire jurisdiction of a party, where there is no appearance, by the service of process in the manner prescribed by law." In the last case (decided in 1887) service was made in the same manner as in the previous one, and the court say: "When the statute prescribes a particular mode of service, that mode must be followed. Ita lex scripta est. There is no chance to speculate whether some other mode will not answer as well. This has been too often held by this court to require further citations. When the statute designates a particular officer to whom the process may be delivered, and with whom it may be left, as service upon the corporation, no other officer or person can be substituted in his place. The designation of one particular officer upon whom service may be made excludes all others. The temporary inconvenience arising from a vacancy in the office of mayor affords no good reason for a substitution of some other officer Opinion of the Court. in his place, upon whom service could be made, by unwarrantable construction not contemplated by the statute." It is unnecessary to look farther to see what the law of Wisconsin is on this subject. It is perfectly clear that by that law the service of process in the present case was ineffective and void. The counsel for the plaintiff in error endeavor to avoid this conclusion by referring to the act of 1879, which declares that "the board of street commissioners of said city, and the chairman of said board, shall have concurrent power with the mayor and common council of said city, in the appointment of inspectors and clerks of election, and shall have all other powers conferred, by law, upon said mayor and common council, subject to the control of said common council, except the power of levying taxes." It is contended that this act gives to the chairman of the board of street commissioners the same power as the mayor has to receive service of process against the city. But the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, as we have seen, has expressly decided otherwise. And the language of the act of 1879 is not that the chairman of the board shall have the power of the mayor, but that the board and the chairman shall have concurrent power with the mayor and common council, — evidently referring to the power of the body, not to the separate power of the officers. Besides, if it were conceded that the chairman of the board had the same power as the mayor, Baxter, who was served with process as chairman of the board, was not permanent chairman, but was only temporary chairman of the particular meeting, and ceased to have any official position as such after the meeting adjourned. He was in no sense chairman of the board at the time when he was served with process. This fact, however, does not seem material in the view of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin; for in the cases before it, the chairman of the board was served with process during its actual session and whilst he was presiding. In the construction of a state statute, in a matter purely domestic, (as this is,) we always feel strongly disposed to give great weight to the decisions of the highest tribunal of the State. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20. Opinion of the Court. There is a question entirely outside of the one which we have been discussing; it is, whether the state law, as thus ascertained, is objectionable on the score of being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. Does it impose embarrassments in the way of the creditor in pursuit of his claim, which did not exist when his debt was created? The point is not distinctly made by the counsel of the plaintiffs in error, although it is hinted at in their brief. But no statute has been pointed out to us, showing any change in the law of the State in this regard. As the record stands, we have no sufficient ground for discussing the question in the present case. With motives we have nothing to do. Certainly, improper motives cannot be attributed to a state legislature in the passage of any laws for the government of the State. Individuals may be actuated by improper motives, and may take advantage of defects and imperfections of the law for the purpose of defeating justice. The mayor of Watertown may have been actuated by such a motive in resigning his office immediately after being inducted into it. But he had a legal right to resign; and if the plaintiffs are prejudiced by his action, it is damnum absque injuria. The plaintiffs are in no worse case than were the creditors of the city of Memphis after the repeal of its charter and the establishment of a taxing district in its stead. The State has plenary power over its municipal corporations, to change their organization, to modify their method of internal government, or to abolish them altogether. Contracts entered into with them by private parties cannot deprive the State of this paramount authority. See Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472. The cases of Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266, and Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289, cannot aid the plaintiffs in this case. Those were cases in which a new name was given to an old corporation, or a new corporation was made out of an old one, that was the substance of it- and the question was whether the new corporation, or the old corporation by its new name, was liable for the old debts; and we held that it That was a question of liability, not a question of procedure. There the way was open for looking into the actual was. |