Opinion of the Court.

brought for the possession of certain mineral lands in California, where the defendant contended that he was in possession by virtue of an authority inferred from the general policy of the United States in relation to mines of gold and silver, Chief Justice Chase, speaking for the court, in dismissing the writ of error, said:

"The decision was, that no such license existed; and this was a finding by the court of a question of fact upon the submission of the whole case by the parties, rather than a judgment upon a question of law. It is the same case, in principle, as would be made by an allegation in defence to an action of ejectment, of a patent from the United States with an averment of its loss or destruction, and a finding by the jury that no such patent existed, and a consequent judgment for the defendant (plaintiff). Such a judgment would deny, not the validity, but the existence of the patent. And this court would have no jurisdiction to review it."

In Gill v. Oliver's Executors, 11 How. 529, under a treaty between the United States and Mexico a sum of money was awarded to be paid to the members of the Baltimore Mexican Company, and the proceeds of one of the shares of this company were claimed by two parties, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland as to which of the claimants was entitled to the money was held not reviewable by this court. Williams v. Oliver, 12 How. 111.

The case at bar does not involve the exercise of an authority under the United States, in the sense of an authority to act for the government, but it is claimed that the railroad company acted under certain statutes of the United States authorizing such action, and that the validity of these statutes, or of authority under them, was denied.

But the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia did not deny the right of the defendant company to use its tracks in Washington on Maryland Avenue between Ninth and Tenth streets, in a lawful manner, for the purpose of transacting its lawful business; but, on the contrary, the jury was instructed that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for any annoyances, discomforts, or inconveniences, which resulted from such

VOL. CXXX-15

Opinion of the Court.

uses of Maryland Avenue by the railroad company "as were reasonably incident to the careful conduct of its through business, and to the maintenance and careful use of its freight depot or station abutting on the south side of said avenue between said Ninth and Tenth streets southwest," and the lawful uses to which the street might be put by the railroad company were clearly explained.

The jury were told that all stoppage of trains and shifting of cars necessary for carrying cars out of its freight depot over the different tracks for the purpose of making up freight trains were lawful. The right of the railroad company to establish freight stations or to lay as many tracks "as its president and board of directors might deem necessary was not questioned. But the court also held that the company was not justified in occupying the public streets for the purposes of a freight yard as such, because the various statutes bearing upon the matter did not authorize such occupation, with which conclusion we are inclined to agree, though we forbear a determination of the point until presented in a case properly pending before us. The validity of the statutes and the validity of authority exercised under them, are, in this instance, one and the same thing; and "the validity of a statute," as these words are used in this act of Congress, refers to the power of Congress to pass the particular statute at all, and not to mere judicial construction as contradistinguished from a denial of the legislative power. In our opinion the validity of no act of Congress, or authority under the United States, was so drawn in question here as to give us jurisdiction, and therefore, as the amount of the judg ment did not exceed five thousand dollars,

The writ of error must be dismissed.

Opinion of the Court.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. GANNON.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 182. Argued March 5, 6, 1889. Decided April 1, 1889.

The amount necessary to give this court jurisdiction to re-examine a judgment or decree against a defendant in the court below (whether rendered in the trial court or in the appellate court) is to be determined by the amount of the judgment in the trial court without adding interest, unless interest is part of the claim litigated, or forms part of the judgment in the trial court and runs from a period antecedent to that judgment. At the trial of an action against the District of Columbia to recover for personal injuries received by reason of a defect in the streets of Washington, the refusal to charge that the District cannot be held responsible for the negligence of a government which is imposed upon it by Congress; or that no such action can be maintained against it because it derives no profit from the duty of maintaining the streets, does not draw in question the validity of the statutes of the United States creating the government of the District, so as to give this court appellate jurisdiction of the cause, independently of the amount of the judgment in the trial

court.

MOTION TO DISMISS for want of jurisdiction. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. S. S. Henkle (with whom was Mr. John F. Ennis on the brief) for the motion.

Mr. A. G. Riddle and Mr. H. E. Davis opposing.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant in error recovered judgment in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, against the District, for five thousand dollars, in an action on the case for personal injuries, on the 17th day of January, 1885, which judgment was affirmed in general term on the 28th of May succeeding, and the cause brought here on writ of error.

Under the act of Congress of March 3, 1885, (23 Stat. 443,) no appeal or writ of error can be allowed from any judgment or decree in any suit at law or in equity in the Supreme Court

:

Opinion of the Court.

of the District of Columbia, unless the matter in dispute exclusive of costs shall exceed the sum of five thousand dollars, or unless the validity of a patent or copyright is involved in the suit, or the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, is drawn in question therein.

The judgment in the case at bar, as rendered at special term, was for five thousand dollars and costs, and this was affirmed with costs, but not with interest; the general term thereby simply declaring that it was satisfied to let the former judgment stand. In all particulars material to the inquiry as to the value of the matter in dispute, the record is the same as in Railroad Company v. Trook, 100 U. S. 112, where this court, speaking by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, said: "In cases brought here on writ of error for the re-examination of judgments of affirmance in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the value of the matter in dispute is determined by the judgment affirmed, without adding interest or costs."

The general rule has been repeatedly so laid down. Western Union Telegraph Company v. Rogers, 93 U. S. 565; Walker v. United States, 4 Wall. 163, 165; Knapp v. Banks, 2 How. 73; New York Elevated Railroad v. Fifth National Bank, 118 U. S. 608.

Where interest, instead of accompanying the judgment or decree as damages for the detention of a specific amount adjudged or decreed, is part of the claim litigated, and the judgment or decree is so framed as to provide for it to run from a period antecedent to the rendition of such judgment or decree, or, in actions ex contractu, according to the terms of the contract upon which the action is based, jurisdiction may attach. Zeckendorf v. Johnson, 123 U. S. 617; The Patapsco, 12 Wall. 451; The Rio Grande, 19 Wall. 178.

This result would have followed here, if, by the judgment of affirmance, interest had been directed to be added to the judgment at special term. As it is, however, the judgment falls below the amount necessary to give us jurisdiction.

Upon the trial, the following, among other instructions, were asked for the defendant and refused:

Opinion of the Court.

"The present government of the District of Columbia having been imposed by the people of the District without any power or opportunity on the part of said people to accept or reject the same, the District cannot be held responsible for the negligence of said government."

"The District of Columbia, under the form of government existing at the time of the accident which is the subject matter of this suit, is not liable for damages resulting from said accident."

"If the care of the streets of the city of Washington, as a public duty, is imposed by the statutes upon the District of Columbia, the performance of which is for the general benefit, and the District derives no profit from it, then no action can be maintained against the District for damages resulting from a neglect to perform such public duty."

"The present form of government of the District of Columbia, consisting, as it does, of officers who are all appointed and paid by the United States, without any power to levy taxes or expend money except as directed by Congress, is not of such a character as to make the District responsible in damages for any negligence of those officers."

It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff in error that the validity of the authority conferred upon the District Commissioners by Congress is drawn in question in this suit.

We do not agree with counsel in this view. The instructions above quoted involved the acts of Congress creating the District government only as bearing upon the question of the liability of the District for negligence in failing to keep the streets in repair, and by way of construction, and the validity of the acts themselves, or of the authority exercised under them, was not denied. The case of Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company v. Hopkins, ante, 210, is decisive that jurisdiction cannot be maintained on this ground under such circumstances. The writ of error will therefore be

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. EMERSON, No. 183. District of Columbia. Argued March 6, 1889.

Dismissed.

In error to the Decided April 1.