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$158.9 Categories of information that require review before declassification: Department of the Navy systems.

The following categories of Navy information shall be reviewed systematically for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this part.

(a) Naval nuclear propulsion information.

(b) Conventional surface ship information:

(1) Vulnerabilities of protective systems, specifically:

(i) Passive protection information concerning ballistic torpedo and underbottom protective systems.

(ii) Weapon protection requirement levels for conventional, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

(iii) General arrangements, drawings, and booklets of general plans (applicable to carriers only).

(2) Ship-silencing information relative to:

(i) Signatures (acoustic, seismic, infrared, magnetic (including alternating magnetic (AM)), pressure, and underwater electric potential (UEP)).

(ii) Procedures and techniques for noise reduction pertaining to an individual ship's component.

(iii) Vibration data relating to hull and machinery.

(3) Operational characteristics lated to performance as follows:

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(i) Endurance or total fuel capacity. (ii) Tactical information, such as times for ship turning, zero to maximum speed, and maximum to zero speed.

(c) All information that is uniquely applicable to nuclear-powered surface ships or submarines.

(d) Information concerning diesel submarines as follows:

(1) Ship-silencing data or acoustic warfare systems relative to:

(1) Overside, platform, and sonar noise signature.

(ii) Radiated noise and echo response. (iii) All vibration data.

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(f) Information concerning mine warfare, mine sweeping, and mine countermeasures.

(g) ECM or ECCM features and capabilities of any electronic equipment.

(h) Torpedo information as follows: (1) Torpedo countermeasures devices: T-MK6 (FANFARE) and NAE beacons.

(2) Tactical performance, tactical doctrine, and vulnerability to countermeasures.

(i) Design performance and functional characteristics of guided missiles, guided projectiles, sonars, radars, acoustic equipments, and fire control systems.

§ 158.10 Categories of information that require review before declassification: Department of the Air Force systems.

The Department of the Air Force has determined that the categories identified in § 158.7 of this part shall apply to Air Force information.

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(a) Technological developments; widespread public knowledge of the subject matter; changes in military plans, operations, systems, or equipment; changes in the foreign relations or defense commitments of the United States; and similar events may bear upon the determination of whether information should be declassified. If the responsible DoD reviewer decides that, in view of such circumstances, the public disclosure of the information being reviewed no longer would result in damage to the national security, the information shall be declassified.

(b) The following are examples of considerations that may be appropriate in deciding whether information in the categories listed in §§ 158.7 through 158.10 may be declassified when it is reviewed:

(1) The information no longer provides the United States a scientific, engineering, technical, operational, intelligence, strategic, or tactical advantage over other nations.

(2) The operational military capability of the United States revealed by the information no longer constitutes a limitation on the effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

(3) The information is pertinent to a system that no longer is used or relied on for the defense of the United States or its allies and does not disclose the capabilities or vulnerabilities of existing operational systems.

(4) The program, project, or system information no longer reveals a current weakness or vulnerability.

(5) The information pertains to an intelligence objective or diplomatic initiative that has been abandoned or achieved and will no longer damage the foreign relations of the United States.

(6) The information reveals the fact or identity of a U.S. intelligence source, method, or capability that no longer is employed and that relates to no current source, method, or capability that upon disclosure could cause damage to national security or place a person in immediate jeopardy.

(7) The information concerns foreign relations matters whose disclosure can no longer be expected to cause or increase international tension to the detriment of the national security of the United States.

(c) Declassification of information that reveals the identities of clandestine human agents shall be accomplished only in accordance with procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence for that purpose.

(d) The NSA/CSS is the sole authority for the review and declassification of classified cryptologic information. The procedures established by the NSA/ CSS to facilitate the review and declassification of classified cryptologic information are:

(1) COMSEC documents and materials. (i) If records or materials in this category are found in agency files that are not under COMSEC control, refer them to the senior COMSEC authority of the agency concerned or by appropriate channels to the following address: Director, National Security Agency, Attn: Director of Policy (Q4), Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755.

(ii) If the COMSEC information has been incorporated into other documents by the receiving agency, referral

to the NSA/CSS is necessary before declassification.

(2) SIGINT information. (i) If the SIGINT information is contained in a document or record originated by a DoD cryptologic organization, such as the NSA/CSS, and is in the files of a noncryptologic agency, such material will not be declassified if retained in accordance with an approved records disposition schedule. If the material must be retained, it shall be referred to the NSA/CSS for systematic review for declassification.

(ii) If the SIGINT information has been incorporated by the receiving agency into documents it produces, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary before any declassification.

§ 158.12 Department of State areas of interest.

(a) Statements of U.S. intent to defend, or not to defend, identifiable areas, or along identifiable lines, in any foreign country or region.

(b) Statements of U.S. intent militarily to attack in stated contingencies identifiable areas in any foreign country or region.

(c) Statements of U.S. policies or initiatives within collective security organizations (for example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Organization of American States (OAS)).

(d) Agreements with foreign countries for the use of, or access to, military facilities.

(e) Contingency plans insofar as they involve other countries, the use of foreign bases, territory or airspace, or the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

(f) Defense surveys of foreign territories for purposes of basing or use in contingencies.

(g) Reports documenting conversations with foreign officials, that is, foreign government information.

§ 158.13 Central Intelligence Agency areas of interest.

(a) Cryptologic, cryptographic, or SIGINT. (Information in this category shall continue to be forwarded to the NSA/CSS in accordance with § 158.11(d). The NSA/CSS shall arrange for necessary coordination.)

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(b) Counterintelligence.

(c) Special access programs

(d) Information that identifies clandestine organizations, agents, sources, or methods.

(e) Information on personnel under official or nonofficial cover or revelation of a cover arrangement.

(f) Covertly obtained intelligence reports and the derivative information that would divulge intelligence sources or methods.

(g) Methods or procedures used to acquire, produce, or support intelligence activities.

(h) CIA structure, size, installations, security, objectives, and budget. (i) Information that would divulge intelligence interests, value, or extent of knowledge on a subject.

(j) Training provided to or by the CIA that would indicate its capability or identify personnel.

(k) Personnel recruiting, hiring, training, assignment, and evaluation policies.

(1) Information that could lead to foreign political, economic, or military action against the United States or its allies.

(m) Events leading to international tension that would affect U.S. foreign policy.

(n) Diplomatic or economic activities affecting national security or international security negotiations.

(0) Information affecting U.S. plans to meet diplomatic contingencies affecting national security.

(p) Nonattributable activities conducted abroad in support of U.S. foreign policy.

(q) U.S. surreptitious collection in a foreign nation that would affect relations with the country.

(r) Covert relationships with international organizations or foreign governments.

(s) Information related to political or economic instabilities in a foreign country threatening American lives and installations therein.

(t) Information divulging U.S. intelligence collection and assessment capabilities.

(u) U.S. and allies' defense plans and capabilities that enable a foreign entity to develop countermeasures.

(v) Information disclosing U.S. systems and weapons capabilities or deployment.

(w) Information on research, development, and engineering that enables the United States to maintain an advantage of value to national security.

(x) Information on technical systems for collection and production of intelligence, and their use.

(y) U.S. nuclear programs and facilities.

(z) Foreign nuclear programs, facilities, and intentions.

(aa) Contractual relationships that reveal the specific interest and expertise of the CIA.

(bb) Information that could result in action placing an individual in jeopardy.

(cc) Information on secret writing when it relates to specific chemicals, reagents, developers, and microdots.

(dd) Reports of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) (— Branch, -Division) between July 31, 1946, and December 31, 1950, marked CONFIDENTIAL or above.

(ee) Reports of the Foreign Documents Division between 1946 and 1950 marked RESTRICTED or above. (ff) Q information reports. (gg) FDD translations. (hh) U reports.

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§ 159.2 Applicability and scope.

(a) This part applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies (hereafter referred to as "DoD Components").

(b) This part covers all information that is owned, produced by or for, or is under the control of the Department of Defense that shall be protected from unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national security under Executive Order 12356 and ISOO Directive No. 1 and all such information received by the Department of Defense from other sources, including that received from or produced pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or international organization.

§159.3 Policy.

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to assure that information that warrants protection against unauthorized disclosure is properly classified and safeguarded as well as to facilitate the flow of unclassified information about DoD operations to the public.

§ 159.4 Procedures.

To carry out this policy, there is established a DoD Information Security Program that shall be administered to ensure that:

(a) Information requiring protection in the interest of national security is properly classified and safeguarded.

(b) Overclassification and unnecessary classification are avoided.

(c) Information is classified as long as required by national security considerations.

(d) Unnecessary expense to the Department of Defense, industry, and the U.S. government, resulting from protection of information no longer requiring classification, is eliminated.

(e) Declassified information is made available to the public under 32 CFR part 285.

(f) Classified inventories are reduced to the minimum necessary to meet operational requirements, thereby affording better protection to that which remains.

(g) DoD military and civilian personnel, who require access to classified information in the conduct of official business, are familiar with the requirements of DoD 5200.1-R and E.O. 12356 and 32 CFR part 2001, and that they comply with those requirements.

$159.5 Responsibilities.

(a) The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) shall:

(1) Direct and administer the DoD Information Security Program, establish policy, standards, criteria, and procedures to comply with E.O. 12356, except its section 3.4.

(2) Conduct an active oversight program to ensure effective implementation of DoD 5200.1-R, Executive Order 12356, and 32 CFR part 2001, to include security education and training.

(3) Consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the government regarding the DoD information Security Program.

(b) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) shall direct and administer a DoD Mandatory Declassification Review Program under section 3.4., E.O. 12356, and establish policies and procedures for processing mandatory declassification review requests, including appeals, under section 3.4(d) of E.O. 12356 and section 2001.32(a)(2)(iii) of Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) Directive No. 11 that make

1 Copies may be obtained, if needed, from the Director, Information Security Oversight, General Service Administration. Washington, DC 20405.

maximum use of DoD Component resources and systems established to implement 32 CFR part 285.

(c) The Head of each DoD Component shall:

(1) Designate a senior official who shall be responsible for the direction and administration of the Component's Information Security Program, to include active oversight, and security education and training programs to ensure implementation of DoD 5200.1-R within the Component.

(2) Ensure that funding and resources are adequate to carry out such oversight, and security education and training programs.

(3) Consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the government regarding the Component's Information Security Program.

(4) Establish procedures to limit access to classified information to those who need to know.

(5) Develop plans for the protection, removal, or destruction of classified material in case of fire, natural disaster, civil disturbance, terrorist activities, or enemy action. These plans shall include the treatment of classified information located in foreign countries.

(d) Pursuant to E.O. 12356, the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, as the designee of the Secretary of Defense, is authorized to impose special requirements with respect to the marking, reproduction, distribution, accounting, and protection of and access to classified cryptologic information. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, will develop special procedures for the declassification review of cryptologic information. This authority may not be redelegated.

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159a.42 Cryptographic and sensitive compartmented information.

159a.43 Responsibility of discoverer.

159a.44 Preliminary inquiry.

159a.45

Investigation.

159a.46 Responsibility of authority ordering

investigation.

159a.47 Responsibility of originator.

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