INDEX

ABORTIONS. See Constitutional Law, II, 2.

ABSTENTION.

State employee's discharge-Federal constitutional rights.—In suit
raising question whether federal constitutional rights of respondent
state employee were violated by her discharge from employment over
her request for a pretermination hearing, District Court properly
abstained from deciding that question pending state-court construc-
tion of relevant state statutes, because it appears that statutes may
require hearing demanded, thus obviating need for decision on consti-
tutional grounds. Boehning v. Indiana Employees Assn., p. 6.
ADDICTIVE DRUGS. See Controlled Substances Act.

"ADDITIONAL DUTIES" OF MAGISTRATE. See Federal
Magistrates Act.

ADEQUATE WARNING OF CRIMINAL OFFENSE. See Con-
stitutional Law, II, 1, 4.

ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE. See Certiorari; Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969; Judicial Review.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE. See Constitutional Law, III;
IV, 2.

AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXES. See Constitutional Law,
V.

AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION PROGRAMS. See Stays, 4.
AIRLINE TICKETS. See Seamen.

ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT. See Internal Revenue Code, 2.

APPEALS.

Criminal contempt conviction-Final decision.-Petitioner's con-
viction of criminal contempt under 18 U. S. C. § 401 for refusing
to testify and to produce business records subpoenaed by Internal
Revenue Service in connection with an inquiry into possible viola-
tions of Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 was a final decision of
District Court appealable to Court of Appeals, and petitioner's ap-
peal was not within Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals' exclu-
sive jurisdiction. Bray v. United States, p. 73.

APPELLATE REVIEW OF REMAND ORDERS. See Manda-

mus. 2.

ARRESTS. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1, 3.

ASSESSMENT OF PENALTIES. See Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969.

ASSESSMENT OF TAXES. See Internal Revenue Code.

ASSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. See United
States.

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION. See Judicial Review, 1.
AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1–2.
BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF SECURITIES. See Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.

CANON OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL STAT-
UTES. See Controlled Substances Act.

“CAPABLE OF REPETITION, YET EVADING REVIEW”
DOCTRINE. See Mootness.

CARRIERS.

Vehicle lease-Indemnification agreement-Compliance with In-
terstate Commerce Commission regulations.-Agreement between
petitioner and respondent motor carriers wherein respondent agreed
to indemnify petitioner for claims arising out of respondent's negli-
gence with respect to vehicle leased by respondent to petitioner to
be operated by respondent's driver even though vehicle was to be
under petitioner's control and responsibility, does not contravene
ICC regulation requiring that such lease agreements contain an
undertaking that "control and responsibility for the operation of the
equipment shall be that of the lessee." Nor does indemnity provi-
sion conflict with ICC safety regulations, because such a provision,
which places ultimate financial responsibility on negligent lessor, may
tend to increase rather than diminish protection of public. Trans-
american Freight v. Brada Miller, p. 28.

CASE OR CONTROVERSY. See Constitutional Law, I.
CERTIORARI. See also Judicial Review, 2-3; Procedure.

Court of Appeals' interlocutory order-Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion. Although interlocutory, Court of Appeals' order directing
Federal Power Commission in action for review of FPC order re-
jecting proposed interim natural-gas curtailment plan, to investigate
respondent pipeline company's claims of reduced gas reserves and to
report result of investigation directly to court, is properly reviewable

CERTIORARI-Continued.

by this Court on certiorari pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (1), since
its effect is immediate and irreparable and any review by Court of
its propriety must be immediate to be meaningful. FPC v. Trans-
continental Gas Pipe Line Corp., p. 326.

CHILDBIRTH. See Constitutional Law, II, 3.

CHOICE OF LAW. See Conflict of Laws.

CIRCUIT JUSTICES. See Supreme Court, 12.

CITIZEN COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE. See Constitu-
tional Law, I; Federal-State Relations, 2.

CIVIL PENALTIES. See Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871. See Federal-State Relations, 2.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964. See Stays, 4.

COAL MINES. See Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969.

COLLECTION OF TAXES. See Internal Revenue Code.

COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWERED GENERATING PLANTS.
See Judicial Review, 1.

COMMUTATION OF DEATH SENTENCES. See Constitutional
Law, VI, 1; Federal-State Relations, 1.

COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. See False Claims Act, 1.

CONCEALABLE FIREARMS. See Constitutional Law, II, 1;
Criminal Law, 1.

CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS. See Constitutional Law, II, 3.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

Rules to be applied by federal court.-Conflict of laws rules to be
applied by a federal court in Texas must conform to those prevail-
ing in Texas state courts. Hence, in affirming judgment for respond-
ents (plaintiffs below) based on Texas law of strict liability in a
diversity action in a Federal District Court in Texas for death and
injury from an explosion occurring in a foreign country, Court of
Appeals erred in declining to apply Texas choice-of-law rules for
determining what substantive law governed case. Day & Zimmer-
mann, Inc. v. Challoner, p. 3.

CONNECTICUT. See Constitutional Law, II, 2.

CONSENTED SEARCHES. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1.

Ordinarily a stay application to a Circuit Justice on a
matter currently before a court of appeals is rarely
granted, and were it not for the fact that this Court on
November 11, 1975, granted certiorari on a related peti-
tion of applicants, Pasadena City Board of Education v.
Spangler, No. 75-164, ante, p. 945, I would deny this ap-
plication. But one of the issues presented in No. 75-164,
is whether "a unitary school system which has been in
compliance with a school desegregation decree for four
years remain [s] subject indefinitely to the control of the
trial court which entered the decree." In my opinion,
should this Court reverse or significantly modify the con-
clusion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
with respect to the above-quoted "question presented" in
No. 75-164, there would be serious doubt as to the cor-
rectness of the order of the District Court which appli-
cants now seek to stay.

Because under my analysis the critical event will not
be the decision of the Court of Appeals on applicants'
presently pending appeal, but rather the disposition by
this Court of No. 75-164, IT IS ORDERED that the
order of the District Court in this case entered on Octo-
ber 8, 1975, is stayed pending disposition of No. 75-164 by
this Court.

Application granted.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

does due process standard of giving sufficient warning that men may
so conduct themselves as to avoid that which is forbidden. Rose v.
Locke, p. 48.

III. Fifth Amendment.

Privilege against self-incrimination-Miranda warnings-Admis-
sibility in evidence of incriminating statement.-Where respondent,
who had been arrested in connection with certain robberies, was
given Miranda warnings and declined to discuss robberies, where-
upon detective ceased interrogation, but more than two hours later,
after giving Miranda warnings, another detective questioned re-
spondent solely about an unrelated murder and respondent made
an inculpatory statement, admission in evidence of such statement at
respondent's murder trial did not violate Miranda principles. Re-
spondent's right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored,
police having immediately ceased robbery interrogation after re-
spondent's refusal to answer and having commenced questioning
about murder only after a significant time lapse and after a fresh set
of warnings had been given respondent. Michigan v. Mosley, p. 96.
IV. Fourth Amendment.

1. Searches and seizures-Consented search of car.-Since war-
rantless arrest of respondent in restaurant, having been based on
probable cause, comported with Fourth Amendment, respondent's
consent to search of his nearby car, contrary to holding of Court
of Appeals, was not the product of an illegal arrest, nor were there
any other circumstances indicating that respondent's consent was not
his own "essentially free and unconstrained choice" because his "will
ha[d] been . . . overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired." United States v. Watson, p. 411.

2. Searches and seizures-Warrantless search of automobile-Prob-
able cause. Where police officers had probable cause to search re-
spondent's automobile at scene immediately after arresting him for
attempting to pass fraudulent checks at a bank drive-in window,
such probable cause still obtained shortly thereafter at station house
to which automobile had been taken so that officers could constitu-
tionally search automobile there without a warrant; hence incrimi-
nating checks seized during search were admissible in evidence at
respondent's trial. Texas v. White, p. 67.

3. Warrantless arrest-Probable cause.-Warrantless arrest of re-
spondent in restaurant, having been based on probable cause and
made by postal officers acting in strict compliance with governing