As

any interest in such lands, minerals, and resources. used in this decree, the term "coastline" means the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters.

2. As against the United States, each defendant State is entitled to all the lands, minerals, and other natural resources underlying the Atlantic Ocean extending seaward from its coastline for a distance of three geographic miles, and the United States is not entitled, as against any of the defendant States, to any interest in such lands, minerals, or resources, with the exceptions provided by § 5 of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 32, 43 U.S. C. § 1313.

3. Jurisdiction is reserved by this Court to entertain such further proceedings, including proceedings to determine the coastline of any defendant State, to enter such orders, and to issue such writs as may from time to time be deemed necessary or advisable to give proper force and effect to this decree. The United States or any defendant State may invoke the jurisdiction so reserved by filing a motion in this Court for supplemental proceedings.

Per Curiam

DAY & ZIMMERMANN, INC. v. CHALLONER ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-245. Decided November 3, 1975

The conflict of laws rules to be applied by a federal court in Texas must conform to those prevailing in the Texas state courts. Klazon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487. Hence, in affirming judgment for respondents (plaintiffs below) based on the Texas law of strict liability in a diversity action in a Federal District Court in Texas for death and injury from an explosion occurring in a foreign country, the Court of Appeals erred in declining to apply the Texas choice-of-law rules for determining what substantive law governed the case.

Certiorari granted; 512 F. 2d 77, vacated and remanded.

PER CURIAM.

Respondents sued petitioner in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas seeking to recover damages for death and personal injury resulting from the premature explosion of a 105-mm. howitzer round in Cambodia. Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. The District Court held that the Texas law of strict liability in tort governed and submitted the case to the jury on that theory. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of respondents. 512 F. 2d 77 (1975).

The Court of Appeals stated that were it to apply Texas choice-of-law rules, the substantive law of Cambodia, the place of injury, would certainly control as to the wrongful death, and perhaps as to the claim for personal injury. It declined nevertheless to apply Texas choice-of-law rules, based in part on an earlier decision in Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 433 F. 2d 884 (CA5 1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 909 (1971), which it

summarized as holding that "[w]e refused to look to the Louisiana conflict of law rule, deciding that as a matter of federal choice of law, we could not apply the law of a jurisdiction that had no interest in the case, no policy at stake." 512 F. 2d, at 80 (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals further supported its decision on the grounds that the rationale for applying the traditional conflicts rule applied by Texas "is not operative under the present facts"; and that it was "a Court of the United States, an instrumentality created to effectuate the laws and policies of the United States." We believe that the Court of Appeals either misinterpreted our longstanding decision in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941), or else determined for itself that it was no longer of controlling force in a case such as this. We are of the opinion that Klaxon is by its terms applicable here and should have been adhered to by the Court of Appeals. In Klaxon, supra, at 496, this Court said:

"The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's state courts. Otherwise, the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, [304 U. S. 64, 74-77 (1938)]." (Footnote omitted.)

By parity of reasoning, the conflict-of-laws rules to be applied by a federal court in Texas must conform to those prevailing in the Texas state courts. A federal court in a diversity case is not free to engraft onto those state rules exceptions or modifications which may commend themselves to the federal court, but which have not commended themselves to the State in which the federal court sits. The Court of Appeals in this case

3

BLACKMUN, J., concurring

should identify and follow the Texas conflicts rule. What substantive law will govern when Texas' rule is applied is a matter to be determined by the Court of Appeals.

The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.

Left to my own devices, I would deny the petition for certiorari. Inasmuch, however, as the Court chooses to emphasize and correct certain misapprehensions in the Court of Appeals' opinion and to vacate that court's judgment, I merely point out that, as I read the Court's per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals on remand is to determine and flatly to apply the conflict of laws rules that govern the state courts of Texas. This means to me that the Court of Appeals is not foreclosed from concluding, if it finds it proper so to do under the circumstances of this case, that the Texas state courts themselves would apply the Texas rule of strict liability. If that proves to be the result, I would perceive no violation of any principle of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941). I make this observation to assure the Court of Appeals that, at least in my view, today's per curiam opinion does not necessarily compel the determination that it is only the law of Cambodia that is applicable.

BOEHNING, CHAIRMAN COMMISSIONER, STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, ET AL. v. INDIANA STATE EMPLOYEES ASSN., INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 74-1544. Decided November 11, 1975

In this suit raising the question whether the federal constitutional rights of respondent state employee were violated by her discharge from employment over her request for a pretermination hearing, the District Court properly abstained from deciding that question pending state-court construction of the relevant state statutes, because it appears that the statutes may require the hearing demanded, thus obviating the need for decision on constitutional grounds.

Certiorari granted; 511 F. 2d 834, reversed and remanded.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent Musgrave, an employee of the Indiana State Highway Commission, was dismissed for cause, her request for a pretermination hearing having been denied. She then brought this 42 U. S. C. § 1983 suit asserting hearing rights rooted in the Federal Constitution and seeking damages and injunctive relief. The District Court held that the controlling state statutes, as yet unconstrued by the state courts, might require the hearing demanded by respondent and so obviate decision on the constitutional issue. It therefore abstained until construction of the Indiana statutes had been sought in the state courts. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding nothing in the language of the relevant state statutes that would support a claim for a pretermination hearing and then resolving the federal constitutional question in respondent's favor.

We reverse.

Where the Indiana Administrative Adjudication Act is applicable, "[t]he final order or