DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 4, 1957.

The Honorable J. W. FULBRIGHT,

Committee on Foreign Relations,

United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Your subcommittee has asked for clarification of certain testimony given by representatives of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission during the course of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and on the policy to be pursued in connection with United States participation in the Agency. I am glad to provide this clarification.

It has been asked whether the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, if ratified by the United States, would supersede the procedures for the transfer of special nuclear material required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. It would not. Section 124 of the Atomic Energy Act and related sections 123 and 54 would govern the transfer of special nuclear materials to the Agency, including the 5,000 kilograms of U-235 which the President offered to make available to the Agency last October. The United States cannot, under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act, transfer materials to the Agency until the conditions of the Atomic Energy Act are met, including the following: (1) The Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to the President a proposed agreement for cooperation with the Agency, including among other provisions the terms of the transfer of materials to the Agency; (2) the President has approved and authorized the execution of the agreement after making a determination in writing that the performance of the agreement will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security; and (3) the proposed agreement has been submitted to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy and the period of time prescribed in the act has elapsed. It should be noted that article IX (C) of the statute of the International Agency provides that any member making materials available will do so in conformity with the laws of that member state.

It has also been asked whether amendments to the statute would be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. I can assure you that this would be the case. Amendments to the statute come into force for all members only after they have been accepted by two-thirds of them in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. However, the interests of the United States are protected since it would have the right provided in article XVIII (D): "Whenever a member is unwilling to accept an amendment to the statute it may withdraw from the Agency by a notice in writing ***" There have been questions as to whether the President would act to effectuate withdrawal of the United States from the Agency if the Senate did not consent to the ratification of an amendment that had been accepted by two-thirds of the members of the Agency. We believe that he would and should do so if a majority of the Congress were of the view that the amendment so altered the nature of our treaty obligation as to render our continued participation in the Agency inconsistent with the interests of the United States. However, in my opinion, and as I said in my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the participation of the United States is so vital to the existence of the Agency that I cannot visualize a situation in which an amendment would be ratified by two-thirds of the members of the Agency that would impair or endanger the continued wholehearted support of the United States.

The subcommittee has asked whether the statute is self-executing and whether implementing legislation is needed to enable the United States to participate in the Agency. Effective United States participation will require three types of legislation: (1) The existing Atomic Energy Act of 1954; (2) a participation act; and (3) annual appropriations.

The internationally binding character of the limited obligations contained in the statute is, of course, not conditioned on the enactment of legislation by the governments of Agency members. Within the United States, the payment of this country's share of the administrative expenses of the Agency will require both authorizing legislation and annual appropriations by the Congress. However, the other obligations contained in the statute of the Agency (to act as depositary, to afford the Agency certain limited privileges and immunities) do not require implementing legislation.

To cover the administrative details of United States membership in the Agency, a draft participation act has been submitted to the Congress; a copy of this legislation is attached. It will provide for the appointment of United States representatives to the Agency and authorize the appropriation of funds needed for United States participation.

It should be reemphasized that nothing in the statute of the Agency obligates the United States to provide materials, equipment, or facilities to the Agency. As article IX states, the furnishing of special nuclear and other materials is to be in conformity with the laws of each member. For the United States, this means the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, which already provides procedures for cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. There is no conflict between the statute of the Agency and the United States Atomic 'Energy Act.

During the course of my testimony there were inquiries as to whether the United States would donate the special nuclear material we make available to the Agency and its projects. Article IX provides that material shall be made available on terms to be agreed with the Agency. Article XIII provides that supplying governments will be reimbursed by the Agency for such materials unless otherwise agreed. The intention and policy of the United States Government is to apply the principles now prevailing for the bilateral program which require reimbursement for the cost of special nuclear materials except in special instances when limited quantities may be transferred for research or medical purposes. If future developments should make a basic change in policy with respect to donation desirable and in the interests of the United States, appropriate congressional approval will be sought.

A question has also been raised as to what steps can be taken to encourage other governments to make material available to the Agency. In our judgment, the initial United States offer of a substantial quantity of special nuclear materials constitutes an earnest of our desire for an effective Agency and, as such is the best method of encouraging substantial offers from other countries. The scope and degree of our further support for the Agency will be decided upon, of course, in the light of the cooperation given by other governments. While the furnishing of material by any member of the Agency is entirely voluntary, the United States hopes and expects that cooperation will be forthcoming and will use its best efforts to encourage wholehearted support of the Agency by its members to the extent of their capabilities.

While only 2 or 3 countries are now in a position to sell, lease, or otherwise make available special nuclear materials, other countries could make available equipment and other useful materials, such as natural uranium which is also a reactor fuel. When the Agency, in accordance with the provisions of article IX (B), has determined its needs for such materials, facilities, and equipment, we are confident that these countries will make offers to supply them. In fact, once the Agency has been established and its safeguards system is in force, its members will have an incentive to use the Agency as a channel for marketing nuclear materials.

Questions have been raised with regard to the extent and nature of the United States commitment to deliver special nuclear material to Agency projects or to the Agency itself. Can the United States be required to deliver materials before there is need for their use in approved specific projects? Will ratification of the statute commit the United States to deliver special nuclear materials to the Agency without prior knowledge of the projects to which these materials will be allocated?

The United States presently has no legal commitment to deliver any material to the Agency. We plan to carry out the President's offer of 5,000 kilograms of U-235 plus a sum equal to all quantities of such materials made available by other nations prior to July 1, 1960, subject to an agreement being concluded with the Agency on the terms and conditions under which it will be made available in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. After such an agreement has been concluded, the Agency may request delivery of specific quantities of this material as it is needed for specific projects which have been approved by the Board of Governors or for use by the Agency itself. Until that time, the United States will retain special nuclear material made available to the Agency within its own boundaries.

No member has the right to designate the specific projects in which the material made available to the Agency will be used. However, the United States, through its membership on the Board of Governors, will have full knowledge of

the Agency's projects and programs when we reach decisions in the future on amounts of material which we may subsequently make available to the Agency. Our decisions will be guided by our judgment of the needs and policies of the Agency and the security interests of the United States. Even with respect to the 5,000 kilograms, the United States will have ample opportunity beginning with the initial application for an Agency supported project, to be informed of the circumstances surrounding a proposed project and to be assured that the principles and objectives of the Agency are respected.

We were asked to clarify the interpretation of the word "terms" in the light of the negotiating history of the statute. The word "terms" as used in article IX (A) of the statute is not limited by the negotiating history. In our interpretation the word "terms" means "terms and conditions." It will be our policy to include in any agreement with the Agency under article IX (A) of the statute a provision that no materials will be shipped from the United States until they are needed for specific projects approved by the Agency. The Agency could not, of course, properly agree to the inclusion of any conditions in such agreements that were in conflict with any provision of the statute. For example, it could not agree to a term in such an agreement that was inconsistent with the provision in article IX (J) that "No member shall have the right to require that the materials it makes available to the Agency be kept separately by the Agency or to designate the specific project in which they must be used." In the case of the United States, special nuclear materials cannot be made available to the Agency except in conformity with an agreement for cooperation negotiated under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

For purposes of evaluating the President's offer, it may be noted that 5,000 kilograms is approximately the amount of U-235 required to fuel 2 or 3 mediumsized reactors throughout their useful lives. Moreover, the degree of enrichment of this uranium will be far below the level required for weapons-grade materials. As Chairman Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission has testified, the United States will not supply the Agency with material enriched in excess of 20 percent.

Some questions were also raised concerning the dividing line between adminis trative and other expenses. Article XIV (B) (1) of the statute, entitled “Finance," identifies those expenses which may properly be included in the administrative budget. Furthermore, it is the accepted practice in international organizations in which the United States participates to confine administrative expenses to those which are for general support, such as salaries of the Secretariat staff, conference or meeting costs, travel, etc. Also included in administrative expenses are costs of implementing safeguards for Agency projects and certain costs related to the handling of Agency materials. In the light of the provisions of article XIV (B) (1), and of the practice followed generally in international organizations, the Agency's administrative budget will not include or provide for physical facilities such as reactors or "universities." Such expenses would be financed by charges voluntarily agreed to by members benefiting from the projects concerned, and should the United States decide to participate therein the United States dollar share of these amounts would have to be authorized and appropriated.

Finally, a question often asked was whether we are contemplating furnishing the Agency classified information. No secret or classified information will be provided to the Agency.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES.

Senator PASTORE. Now, I take it from the experience we have had on the ratification of the statute itself that the part that needs to be crystallized in the record at this point and comprehensively and intelligently explained, is this feature of control of the material that is furnished by the United States to the agency itself, with particular reference to section 124, section 123, and section 54 of the Atomic Act of 1954.

All this was pointed up emphatically and vividly by the proposed reservation that was suggested by the distinguished Senator from Ohio, Mr. Bricker.

I think we ought to develop the record on that particular point very extensively and very clearly for the understanding of Members of the Senate and Members of the House.

If there are any questions, Senator Bricker, you may proceed. Representative COLE. Before you proceed, Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt for a moment to call to your attention the presence of a member of the Japanese Diet, who is also interested in atomic energy and who is visiting this country for a short while, Mr. Saito. I wonder if he will stand so that the members of the committee might see him. Senator PASTORE. We are very happy to have you here today. Senator BRICKER. I have only a question or two.

First, of Secretary Wilcox: You mentioned on the first page of your testimony that the proposal of the President and this organization was greeted with great enthusiasm throughout the world. Will you furuish for the record any statements or communications which underlie that statement?

Mr. WILCOX. I shall be glad to do that, Senator. (The material referred to follows:)

STATEMENT ON WORLDWIDE REACTION TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

At the close of the 8th session of the U. N. General Assembly, on December 3, 1953, President Eisenhower announced his "Atoms for Peace" proposal, including the suggestion that an International Atomic Energy Agency be established. This proposal was not formally discussed by the General Assembly until its 9th session in the fall of 1954. At that time many delegations warmly commended the President's initiative. General Assembly Resolution 810 (IX), which was adopted unanimously, included the following: "Recalling the initiative of the President of the United States of America, embodied in his address of December 8, 1953 * * * Expresses the hope that the IAFA will be established without delay ***”

Less than 2 years later, the Conference to draft the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute was convened at the United Nations. It was attended by representatives of 80 states and 7 specialized agencies. At the conclusion of the Conference, the statute was unanimously approved, and 80 states subsequently signed the statute.

This record of unanimity in voting is probably the best indication of the great and universal appeal of the President's proposal. As further evidence of the great acclaim accorded the President's proposals, I am submitting the official records of the opening debate in Ninth Session of the General Assembly. If the committee so desires, I will be glad to supply the complete and voluminous verbatim records of the Ninth General Assembly, both of the plenary and first committee meetings, and the summary records of the October 1956 IAEA Conference. The many speeches in praise of the President's proposal contained in these records are further proof of the enthusiasm with which the world received the President's proposals.

Senator BRICKER. Then on page 5 you say appropriate officers of both agencies will be available on request to furnish information and answer questions.

There will not be any requirement in this statute, as I understand it, which would require the agency representatives of the United States to keep this committee currently informed of all the developments. Mr. WILCOX. No, sir; there is not any specific language except on page 4, where it provides that the President shall from time to time as the occasion may require make reports to the Congress, and so on. But there is no specific language that requires informal consultation. Certainly it is the desire of the executive branch to keep the members of this committee and other interested committees informed of major

developments and we shall be glad to do that in any way that the committee would deem appropriate and desirable.

Senator BRICKER. Would there be any objection to putting into this statute a requirement such as in the Atomic Energy Act that this committee be kept currently advised of all developments?

Mr. STRAUSS. Might I respond to that?

Senator BRICKER. Yes.

Mr. STRAUSS. I think, Senator Bricker, that the obligation of the Atomic Energy Commission to keep the joint committee fully and currently informed would certainly apply to any information that reached the Atomic Energy Commission.

Senator BRICKER. There is no doubt about that.

Mr. STRAUSS. And since no material could be provided or anything involving the Atomic Energy Agency be agreed upon without our knowledge, I think the joint committee could under those circumstances expect to be fully and currently informed.

Now, an obligation placed by an amendment to this act on the Secretary of State, I think would involve a duplication of information, that is all.

Senator BRICKER. There would be no objection, if there were certain areas in which there would be information of value to this committee to be furnished by the Secretary of State, that that be put in the statute.

Mr. STRAUSS. I see none except the fact of duplication.

Chairman DURHAM. Do you not think section III covers that? Senator BRICKER. That was my question if it did. I am so advised it did not except the President's annual report.

Chairman DURHAM. Reading the language I believe it will cover

that.

Senator BRICKER. I wanted to get the attitude of the State Department in regard to that.

Chairman DURHAM. That provision is set forth in the original statute in 1954.

Senator BRICKER. Mr. Wilcox said they felt there was no obligation except the annual report to the President.

Chairman Strauss said there was no obligation except the Commission must reveal to us fully and currently all information which it receives.

And it would receive, as he says, the information in regard to the supply of material which would be, of course, presented to us immediately.

Mr. STRAUSS. I have this further observation, that just occurs to me. If there is a provision in this participation act that places the responsibility on the State Department to keep the Joint Committee informed of these negotiations and the Commission is relieved, let us say, to that extent, there is the possibility that in both agencies the presumption might arise in some matter that the other agency is informing the Joint Committee.

I would assume, were I otherwise situated, that you will get a more consistent line of information if the responsibility is in one direction, to 1 agency, rather than to 2.

Senator BRICKER. I would feel it would be just as consistent and achieve my objective as well if we placed that obligation on the Atomic