much shorter time. Granted, it won't give you all that you want, but I believe it can be done in a much shorter time, and time is of the essence, I think, for this country to be prepared to handle a potential disaster.

Senator NUNN. You might take that as a first step and then build on that at the local level?

Mr. SEWELL. Yes.

Senator NUNN. Ambassador Busby?

Mr. BUSBY. If I could just comment on that, I think, first, the creation of a C/B team along the lines of NEST is an excellent idea, and I think the suggestions that Dr. Richardson has put before us really are something that should be followed up on.

Secondly, on the broader issue of what does the Department of Defense and the military have that could be used at the local level, there is some work being done on that. I had the opportunity to sit on a panel that was chaired by General Alavre, who used to be the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in which we looked at dualuse technologies. What is there currently in the hands of the military that could be used by local law enforcement?

The results of that study were that there is a lot of technology which the military has which, with some adaptive engineering, could be used by local law enforcement. There were a number of recommendations that came out of that, not the least of which was to create some regional centers that local law enforcement and local responders could go to for the kind of expensive expertise that they can't afford themselves. But, clearly, that got into a lot of political problem, the idea of using DOD to help local law enforcement, but I think it is an excellent thing to follow up on.

Chief EWELL. Senator, may I just make one final comment?
Senator NUNN. Yes, sure.

Chief EWELL. Thank you, sir. First of all, I again want to thank this distinguished body for allowing us the opportunity to speak on this subject. I can tell you-and I know that I speak clearly for all of the firefighters throughout this country and the fire chiefs throughout the world who have an equal stake and concern in this matter. If there is any sense of urgency that I can exhibit, it is the fact that at the local level we are not prepared, and because we are not prepared we perhaps have a greater sense of urgency than others above us. It is because we are that first line of defense and we realize that in rolling into these incidents, we are just not going to be capable of properly protecting the public.

Senator NUNN. Chief Ewell, when did you come to this conclusion? Is this something that was reinforced by the Aum Shinrikyo attack in Tokyo? Have you all been worried about for years and years? What has heightened your concern?

Chief EWELL. Certainly, the most recent incidents have heightened that concern, but it is not something that has been foreign to us. We have been concerned about such incidents and the need for training at the local level for many, many years, and it wasn't until recent that—and it is unfortunate, because of these incidents, that we did, in fact, get that support that we have been asking for for a number of years.

But even if we focused on the 120 largest departments in this country, I would urge you to keep in mind that they actually pro

tect up to 60 to 70 percent of this Nation's populace, and so we would be covering-just by focusing on those 120 largest departments, we would be covering a large percentage of our population in this country.

A woman in the back of me did some quick figures and they pointed out that if we were just to fund 50 people within each of the 120 major departments of this country with respect to outfitting them for chemical or biological suits, it would cost about $2.5 million to outfit the 120 largest cities.

Senator NUNN. How much?

Chief EWELL. $2.5 million, so we are not really talking about a great deal of money when you consider the potential of better protecting a number of people so that they can, in fact, provide protection to a large number of people.

Senator NUNN. We need to check that arithmetic. We up here aren't accustomed to dealing with millions. [Laughter.]

Senator NUNN. It sounds like it is a rather low figure, but we would like to get those numbers from you.

Chief MARRS. Feel free to add any zeroes you want to the end of that. [Laughter.]

Mr. RICHARDSON. I told him more money falls off the table here than that amounts to.

Senator NUNN. Senator Lugar, do you have any other questions? Senator LUGAR. No. I think this is a tremendously important panel and discussion, and hopefully it will stimulate our activities to try to follow through on that.

Senator NUNN. Senator Lugar, I have got to step out for about 10 or 12 minutes. Would you like to go ahead and convene the next panel and let me come back in? Could you stay for that period of time?

Senator LUGAR. I would be very pleased to do that, Mr. Chair

man.

Senator NUNN. That would be very good.

I thank all of you for being here. Senator Lugar and I are going to join Senator Roth and try to get our friend, Senator Domenici, who has worked so much on the lab-to-lab program, and others and try to put together a legislative framework for all of this, plus some suggestions to the executive branch that don't require legislation. So as we move along with this over the next few weeks, we would welcome any of your further comments that you may come up with. We have been the beneficiaries of your whole testimony this morning, as has the whole Senate. Thank you.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Let me now call our distinguished panel that will follow. Mr. Robert Blitzer, Section Chief for Domestic Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Mr. Victor Reis, Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, Department of Energy; Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict of the Department of Defense; and Clay Hollister, the Deputy Associate Director for Response and Recovery of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA.

Gentlemen, would you come to your positions? Gentlemen, before you are seated, let me ask you to take the oath as witnesses. [Witnesses sworn.]

Senator LUGAR. We will proceed with the testimony, first of all, of Mr. Blitzer. As Chairman Nunn has suggested to the previous panel, we have extremely complex matters and you have already submitted extraordinarily important testimony. If you could summarize that as much as possible, we would be most appreciative. Mr. Blitzer, would you please proceed?

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT M. BLITZER, CHIEF, DOMESTIC TERRORISM/COUNTERTERRORISM PLANNING SECTION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. BLITZER. Good afternoon, Senator Lugar. Thank you for this opportunity to address the Committee on our ability to respond to a nuclear, biological or chemical incident should one occur in the United States.

Last week, we discussed the threat posed by NBC weapons-and I will refer to it as "NBC"-to the security of the United States. Today, as part of this hearing, we will address the FBI role as part of the hearing as the lead Federal agency in the crisis management of a domestic NBC incident.

One of the things that I wanted to indicate at the beginning of my testimony is, in talking about the Mirage Gold exercise, that exercise was devised as a crisis management exercise, not a consequence management exercise. I wanted to tell you that, not that there weren't a lot of things in that exercise that needed correcting, but just to set the tone on it, at least from our perspective.

In June of 1995, President Clinton signed a presidential decision directive regarding "U.S. policy on counter-terrorism," which reaffirmed the FBI's lead law enforcement and crisis management role in response to a domestic terrorist incident. While this directive encompasses all aspects of the U.S. Government's role in counter-terrorism, it also specifically addresses terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and requires the FBI to organize and manage an interagency domestic emergency support team (DEST).

Pursuant to the PDD, the FBI is finalizing guidelines for the deployment of the DEST team and we have enhanced our interaction with other Federal agencies who have a role in responding to a major terrorist or WMD incident either in support of the FBI for crisis management or FEMA for consequence management.

A WMD terrorist incident involving nuclear/radiological, or chemical/biological (C/B) agents or weapons would result in the FBI activating its nuclear incident contingency plan or its chemical/biological incident contingency plan. In addition to other FBI crisis management plans, these documents identify Federal interagency support which is being encompassed in the DEST concept.

The primary agencies who would be called upon for assistance in the event of a major domestic terrorist or WMD incident include the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Health and Human Services, the Public Health Service, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Environmental Protection Agency.

On recent occasions, the FBI has responded to communicated threats of NBC terrorist attacks. The FBI's responsibility entails the initiation of a threat credibility assessment in accordance with

our guidelines as set forth in the operational nuclear and chem/bio incident contingency plans. If warranted, the FBI directs an operational response. The threat assessment process entails close coordination with other entities of the U.S. Government who possess expertise in NBC matters to examine available information on the threat and determine its viability from a technical, operational and behavioral standpoint. To date, all of the threats we have encountered have been determined not to be credible.

As an example, in April of last year, a videotape was delivered to the security department of a large private complex. This tape forecasted a poison gas attack to be dispersed on the grounds of the complex in the near future. The FBI opened an investigation of the threat and immediately coordinated the interagency threat assessment based upon the videotape information.

In accordance with the FBI's C/B incident contingency plan, our interagency team of specialized assets was deployed and pre-positioned near the alleged incident site. That was done, Senator, within about 24 hours of receipt of the initial information. Fortunately, the attack did not occur. The deployment did, however, illustrate the effectiveness of our incident plan and the fact that we could marshall the effective resources quickly and deploy them.

These contingency plans which have been in effect since the late 1980's are continually updated and revised, most recently in February of 1996. The plans are designed to marshall the appropriate Federal tactical, technical, scientific and medical support resources needed to bolster the FBI's investigative and crisis management abilities.

It just made me think, Senator. On the incident that we responded to, one of the key things that the Public Health Service did is immediately contact local authorities and organize that aspect, that consequence management aspect, should we have needed to have ambulances, hospitals and some kind of effect. So we did engage immediately with local authorities for the medical support resources needed to bolster the FBI's investigative and crisis management abilities and to augment local and State resources in addressing consequence management in an NBC incident.

The contingency plans emphasize coordination between all participants and are particularly concerned with the bridge between the law enforcement crisis management activities and the consequence management implications of the crisis. Many of the things that we have learned since the Mirage Gold exercise I am going to go into now and basically discuss many of the things we have done to try and improve from the standpoint of the FBI's lead agency responsibilities.

With respect to our proactive programs and initiatives, earlier this year FBI headquarters tasked its 56 domestic FBI field offices to conduct C/B terrorism exercises in each of their regions in accordance with guidelines set forth in the C/B contingency plan. This includes coordination and participation by other public safety agencies who would be involved in a C/B incident, including first responders, regional offices of supporting Federal agencies, and State emergency management agencies who would be involved in consequence management in such an incident. Each of these 56 field offices has taken action in response to this tasking and are

in the process of planning and conducting C/B exercises. To date, 37 of our field offices have completed these exercises, which are tabletop-type exercises.

Additionally, all FBI field offices with DOE or Nuclear Regulatory Commission facilities within their territories maintain sitespecific nuclear contingency plans which are updated annually. These plans ensure that the FBI possesses all necessary information regarding each DOE or NRC site to enable an effective FBI response to an incident at any of these sites.

The DOE, as we have heard, manages the nuclear search team (NEST), which supports the FBI as lead Federal agency in providing technical expertise in a malevolent nuclear threat or other criminal act involving nuclear material. To date, 30 FBI field offices, including the largest metropolitan divisions, have received NEST briefings, with additional field offices being briefed each month.

A current training initiative planned by FBI headquarters is for over 100 FBI field agents and supervisors to attend a one-week inservice to be held in the fall of this year on NBC proliferation and terrorism matters. Additionally, the FBI is mandated to participate in the planning and operation of interagency nuclear crisis management training exercises. The FBI participated in a series of exercises which culminated in a major multi-agency full field exercise involving close to 1,000 participants in New Orleans in October, which was identified as Mirage Gold.

Following the completion of Mirage Gold, the FBI, in coordination with other participating agencies, prepared an after action report. This report critically evaluated the FBI's performance as crisis manager for a nuclear incident. Twenty-six recommendations were made based upon identified shortfalls in FBI operations. I have grouped those into three major categories Senator; number one, interagency coordination in intelligence flow; number two, interagency coordination of forensic matters; and, number three, information management and technical support.

These recommendations have served as the building blocks for revising and updating the FBI crisis management plans, particularly as they relate to the FBI's management and coordination of a multi-agency response to include consequence management elements.

To address interagency coordination on intelligence flow, the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), which is headquartered at Quantico, has implemented a comprehensive crisis management training program for senior FBI officials which emphasizes the Joint Operations Center concept, and this is one of the important points that I wanted to make that we clearly recognized there were some breakdowns at the command level in New Orleans and this group had been developed not only for that, but for several other crisis management-type problems. One of the key things we wanted to do was improve drastically on how we interact at the command level in a crisis, and I believe we have made a heck of a lot of progress in that area.

Secondly, the FBI laboratory, in conjunction with the Department of Energy, has developed a forensic operations standard oper