• It requires moderate funding, mission assignment, and mission acceptance. IMPLEMENTATION Development and implementation could begin immediately upon mission assignment and funding. Initial pilot training courses could be taught within 90 days. A rudimentary deployment system could be available within 6 months. A fully functional, routinely operating system can be in place within 3 years. Depending on the pace desired, $12 million is a reasonable level of funding for the start-up year, $60 million over 3 years, and $28 million per year on a continuing basis. On the principle that money is most efficiently used when it is placed as near as possible to the user, such funding might best be handled in the Defense authorization and appropriation_bills, for management by OSD Acquisition, secretary level, with input from OSD Policy. Direct management should be by means of a civilian program director appointed by the lead performing organization. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION The Congress has been evolving toward definitive action of the sort described here, e.g., • In the 1994 Defense Authorization Act, under the Title XVII portion of the Act dealing with chemical and biological weapons defense, you expressed the sense of Congress that “. the President should strengthen Federal interagency planning by the FEMA and other Federal, State, and local agencies for development of a capability for early detection and warning of and response to (1) potential terrorist use of chemical or biological agents or weapons; and (2) emergencies or natural disasters involving industrial chemicals or the widespread outbreak of disease." • In Sections 378 and 379 of the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act you clarified United States Code on provision of assets in emergencies involving chemical and biological agents, and you required a joint report from the DOD and DOE on DOD preparedness to respond to emergencies resulting from a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack. A logical next step would be authorization and appropriation of funds, with language defining the purpose of those funds for direct support such as Í have described. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I respectfully suggest you ask your staff to consult with Administration officials and craft appropriate language to table an approach such as this one for legislative action. You will hear others say that we have never had such a chemical or biological event. You yourself, Mr. Chairman, have stated that even one terrorist event is unacceptable. I have no doubt that the actions I have recommended to you can significantly contribute to ensuring that we will not meet at some future time in hearings to assess the aftermath of such an event. Thank you for your attention. REFERENCES CITED 1. Terrorism and New Technologies_of_Destruction: An Overview of the Potential Risk, for the National Advisory Task Force on Disorder and Terrorism. R. W. Mengel, May 25, 1976. 2. Letter, William M. Moultrie, Deputy Coordinator of Emergency Services, Arlington County, Virginia, Fire Department, March 14, 1996. Senator NUNN. Chief Lamont Ewell is the President of the International Association of Fire Chiefs and will testify, I guess, on their behalf, but also as the fire chief in Oakland, California. Chief, we are glad to have you today. TESTIMONY OF P. LAMONT EWELL, PRESIDENT, Chief EWELL. Thank you, Senator, and with my colleagues let me also thank you on behalf of the IAFC, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, for the opportunity to be here to address you on what we believe to be a very critical subject. Let me also take the opportunity to just thank you on behalf of the 32,000 fire depart ments throughout this country who also are concerned about this issue. The fire and emergency service community realizes that our security and intelligence will not always be successful in preventing a terrorist attack, but it is equally clear to us that the local fire and emergency services agencies are neither trained nor equipped to deal with a chemical, biological or nuclear terrorist incident. Clearly, there is a new generation of science and the increase of use and accessibility of chemical and biological agents as tools for mass destruction now pose significant problems to the fire service community, and it is because we serve as the first line of responders and America's first line of defense in terrorist activities. We have heard some comments regarding FEMA, and just for the record I would, in fact, like to just state that as a user of FEMA's system in 1991, the City of Oakland suffered perhaps one of the worst fires in U.S. history, with over 3,000 homes lost and 25 deaths. We waited a few days before we were able to get FEMA assistance, but if we compared that ability to today, it is like night and day. So I really want to underscore the fact that FEMA has made a dramatic change in their ability to respond to the needs of the fire service and I don't want to minimize that. Yet, I have to also say that when the national and international terrorist preventive intelligence-gathering efforts are subverted, local and fire emergency services organizations are going to be the ones who have to pick up the pieces. With that in mind, as I said before, it is unfortunate that it is the local fire and law enforcement agencies who are the least prepared to deal with these types of disasters. As demonstrated in Tokyo, London and Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, the public has very high expectations for the government's response after a terrorist incident. In the first few critical hours after a terrorist incident, the public perception of the overall government anti-terrorist response depends entirely on the organization and effectiveness of the local emergency services provider and their actions during the incident. There is an urgent need for appropriate institutions of the Federal Government to take immediate and decisive actions to proactively train and equip local fire and emergency service agencies so that we may be better able to deal with chemical and biological terrorist incidents. The traditional Government approach to problem-solving through existing funding and training programs will not provide adequate preparation before terrorism occurs on American soil again, and I think we are all in agreement it is just a matter of time before that does, in fact, happen. For this reason, we believe that a rapid solution is therefore necessary. The identification of targets for terrorist activities shows that the Nation's 120 largest cities are at greatest risk for terrorism, and they should therefore be the focus for rapid, short-term response solutions. We believe that by adequately preparing these 120 metropolitan areas, the majority of the United States population base will be covered. In the fall of 1995, fire and emergency service leaders from 75 of such cities and counties joined together at a worldwide conference to strengthen the fire and emergency response to terrorism at Mt. Weather Emergency Assistance Center. This conference was sponsored by FEMA and by the International Association of Fire Chiefs. A number of recommendations emerged from that meeting and I would like to very briefly share them with you and at least share the top five priorities that we believe are important to this morning's discussion. Number one, we believe that the Federal Government should fund intensive and immediate anti-terrorist chemical and biological training for the fire and emergency services agencies in the 120 largest cities and counties within the United States. This training should focus on enhancing the capabilities of existing hazardous materials emergency response teams with new information and equipment for response to chemical and biological incidents. We believe that this could be accomplished by the passage of the comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Act of 1995, H.R. 2703, which includes Representative McCollum's firefighter and emergency services training amendment. It is this amendment that authorizes primary funding for appropriate terrorism response, training and equipment for metropolitan fire and emergency services organizations. Number two, we believe that military and non-military Federal agencies should provide local fire and emergency services access to training and resources through existing chemical and biological training programs to further prepare for specialized terrorist threats, such as decontamination procedures for nuclear, biological and chemical agents; for deployment and training with military chemical and biological units; and direct provision of chemical and biological detection and protective equipment to local fire and emergency services agencies after appropriate training has occurred. Appropriate Federal agencies must move to be proactive in providing both chemical and biological training and equipment to the targeted jurisdictions. The current burden is on the local fire and emergency services agencies to work the system the best way that they can to attempt to pry this training and equipment out of the Federal agencies. Appropriate Federal agencies should also be directed to provide a rapid assessment and technical consultation of chemical and biological concerns. Ideally, this resource should be available within the first hour of a suspected chemical or biological incident. The Federal Government should continue to promote a new generation of research and development based on existing military and commercial systems which focuses on customizing and improving research tools and techniques which will be helpful to the local fire and emergency response agencies. We believe that this effort should include the distribution of critical information to end users at local fire and emergency service departments. For example, personnel from the Edgewood Research Development and Engineering Center within the United States Army spoke to this Subcommittee in the fall of 1995 and they are currently working on a number of specialized projects that will allow local fire and emergency service departments to respond to incidents of chemical and biological terrorism. The third recommendation is that the Federal Government continue to advocate the integrated emergency management system and the use of the unified command structure to properly prepare and manage acts of terrorism. Terrorism response requires the coordination of many agencies at many levels of government, including the local, the State and the Federal levels, but I should just say to you this morning that irrespective of those integrated levels of participation, it is also important to remember that it is the local agency that will be that first responder. So it is critical that we have the training so that coordination can, in fact, take place, but that immediate action takes place on behalf of the constituents that we are serving. The fourth area is that the Federal Urban Search and Rescue Program should continue to receive support from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. We believe that the urban search and rescue teams should be adequately trained for response to terrorist activities and should be equipped with the necessary knowledge and equipment to operate at terrorist incidents where explosions, building collapses and structural failures have occurred. This may involve an expansion of the current program and would require additional Federal funding, but we have something that works. We have seen it works, as Chief Marrs will speak to later with respect to Oklahoma, and as we can attest to other incidents throughout this country where the urban search and rescue teams were utilized. So in maximizing on what is already in place, we believe that additional training would also assist in this regard. The fifth and final area is the November 1995 "Worldwide Conference on Strengthening the Fire and Emergency Response to Terrorism," the one that was jointly sponsored by FEMA and the International Association of Fire Chiefs, should be followed by annual educational updates. The conference would include participants from the 120 largest cities and counties, with specific representation from fire and emergency services organizations, law enforcement agencies and emergency management organizations. This educational event should also include participation from foreign fire and emergency service professionals who can offer pragmatic teaching based on their expertise with terrorism experience. On behalf of the fire and emergency services across the country, I too again want to thank you for the opportunity to address you. I would ask that if you will indulge us after Chief Marrs speaks, we would actually like to show you the visual equipment that we have brought with us today to demonstrate to you our inability to respond at the local level based on today's capabilities to any type of chemical or biological event. Thank you, sir. Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Chief Ewell. PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHIEF P. LAMONT EWELL, PRESIDENT, The fire and emergency service community must face the stark reality that our security and intelligence will not always be successful in preventing a terrorist attack. It is equally clear that local fire and emergency service agencies are neither trained nor equipped to deal with a chemical, biological or nuclear terrorist incident. A new generation of science and the increased use and accessibility of chemical and biological agents as tools for mass destruction pose significant problems to the fire and emergency service community as first responders and America's first line of defense in terrorism attacks. After all national and international anti-terrorist preventive intelligence gathering efforts are subverted, local fire and emergency service organizations are going to be the ones who pick up the pieces after terrorist incidents. Of the overall government efforts to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents, these local fire, law enforcement and emergency medical services agencies are the least prepared to respond to a chemical or biological terrorist incident. As demonstrated in Tokyo, London and Tel Aviv-Jerusalem, the public has very high expectations for the government's response after a terrorist incident. Once a security failure or penetration has occurred, and civilian casualties have resulted, the public demands an extraordinary effort be put into the initial emergency response. In the first three critical hours after a terrorist incident, the public perception of the overall government anti-terrorist response depends entirely on the organization and effectiveness of the local emergency service providers and their actions during the incident. There is an urgent need for appropriate institutions of the Federal Government to take immediate and decisive actions to pro-actively train and equip local fire and emergency service agencies to deal with chemical and biological terrorist incidents. The traditional government approach to problem-solving through existing funding and training programs will not provide adequate preparation before terrorism occurs again on American soil. A rapid solution is necessary. Identification of targets for terrorist activities shows that the nation's 120 largest cities are at greatest risk for acts of terrorism. They should, therefore, be the focus of attention for rapid, short-term response solutions. By adequately preparing these 120 metropolitan areas, the majority of the United States' population base will be covered. These 120 major metropolitan areas also contain the largest fire and emergency service departments with specialized resources, such as hazardous materials and bomb disposal units. Fire and emergency service leaders from 75 of these cities and counties joined together at a Worldwide Conference to Strengthen the Fire and Emergency Response to Terrorism at the Mt. Weather Emergency Assistance Center in the fall of 1995. This conference was sponsored jointly by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the International Association of Fire Chiefs. From this conference came a number of recommendations from many different groups, including the fire and emergency service community, the law enforcement community and the Federal Government. We have reviewed the results from the Mt. Weather conference. The five priority recommendations are: 1. The Federal Government should fund intensive and immediate anti-terrorist chemical and biological training for the fire and emergency services agencies in the 120 largest cities and counties in the United States. This training should focus on enhancing the capabilities of existing hazardous materials emergency response teams with new information and equipment for response to chemical and biological incidents. This can be best accomplished by the passage of The Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995 (HR 2703), which includes Representative McCollum's Fire Fighter and Emergency Services Training Amendment. This amendment authorizes preliminary funding for appropriate terrorism response training and equipment for metropolitan fire and emergency service organizations. 2. Military and non-military federal agencies should provide local fire and emergency service agencies access to training and resources through existing chemical and biological training programs to further prepare for specialized terrorist threats such as: a. decontamination procedures for nuclear/biological/chemical agents; b. deployment and training with military chemical and biological units; and Appropriate federal agencies must move to be pro-active in providing both |