able and mobilized quickly, and Federal, State and local components appeared well coordinated. Oklahoma City, however, involved responding to the aftermath of a conventional explosion, a far different situation than one involving nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. We will also have that distinction made very vivid to us today.

Recognizing this, in June of last year President Clinton, to his credit, issued Presidential Decision Directive 39, in which he declared that the United States will give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological and chemical materials or weapons used by terrorists. The directive also delineated the roles and responsibilities of the various Federal agencies in the areas of crisis and consequence management in response to a terrorist incident.

As a result of this directive, the Federal Government has been charged with developing a wide-ranging review of its capabilities in these areas. In addition, a number of agencies now routinely conduct exercises to test the effectiveness of their response capabilities. Such exercises are probably the best indicator of the level of our preparedness or lack thereof. Unfortunately, these exercises have brought to light serious weaknesses and deficiencies, particularly in the area of interagency coordination and cooperation, and the staff will outline some of these deficiencies this morning.

I want to make it clear that I recognize that the purpose of these exercises is to spot weaknesses before they arise in an actual event, and so we ought to commend those who are carrying out these exercises, and commend the assessments and commend the candor of those who made these assessments. I am concerned, however, that we are not learning as much over the years from these exercises as we ought to. I am particularly concerned that many of the problems after a 1994 full field exercise were identified in a similar exercise 8 years earlier. So the real question will become what do we do once we find out about deficiencies. Are we moving in an effective way to deal with those deficiencies and to correct them?

I am also concerned when I hear that there are inadequacies in our integrated plan to manage the consequences of a nuclear, biological or chemical attack at the State or local level. As the staff will report, and as we will have testimony from some of our local officials this morning, training is inadequate, equipment is lacking, and planning is almost non-existent at the State and local level. This is a situation where the Federal Government has to play a role and it is one that we cannot allow to persist.

It is for these reasons that today's hearing is so important. Preparing for what has always been considered an unthinkable kind of event is a very difficult task. Often, our Government will only direct attention and resources in the wake of an incident like Oklahoma City. We cannot, however, afford to wait for an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction. We cannot afford to be unprepared at any level. We must ensure that we have the appropriate response mechanisms, Federal, State and local, in place, that they have been properly exercised, and that they function effectively and efficiently.

I thank our witnesses for appearing today and I commend all of you for your efforts. I believe that all of our witnesses are working to improve this Nation's preparedness and we look forward to receiving their thoughts and their comments.

We will start with a staff report by Mr. Sopko and Mr. Edelman, and as we do with all of our witnesses before this Subcommittee, I will ask each of you to stand and let me give you the oath. [Witnesses sworn.]

Senator NUNN. Senator Lugar, we are delighted to have you and we will be pleased to have any opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LUGAR

Senator LUGAR. I have an opening comment, Mr. Chairman, and let me just say I appreciate the fact that this is the Subcommittee's fourth hearing dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Today's witnesses, as the Chairman has pointed out, will comment on the preparedness of the United States to deal with nuclear, chemical and biological weapon release, or threat thereof, at home or abroad.

The task of stemming the flow of weapons of mass destruction in the United States and any other open, democratic society is clearly a daunting one, a task some may characterize as impossible and hopeless. Nevertheless, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense and the law enforcement agencies of the United States are working diligently to beef up their capabilities and proficiency to counter those rogue nations and terrorist networks who are contemplating the unthinkable; namely, to engage in acts of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism.

As I have explored the weapons material leakage and proliferation problem, one point has become increasingly clear. If the United States is to have any chance of stopping the detonation of a weapon of mass destruction on our soil, we must stop the leakage at the source -the weapons and materials depots in the former Soviet Union.

We have found that the former Soviet storage facilities are unsafe and insecure. We have learned that there are people and organizations in the world who are attempting to acquire these weapons and materials for terrorist purposes. A group with the right materials and the willingness and determination to construct a weapon must look no further than the Internet to find the recipe for destruction.

The key United States agencies have testified that they are working the problem. They are cooperating with foreign governments and their peers abroad

to stem the flow, but it is difficult to measure their success. Indeed, as we have heard so many times, we will most likely not hear of a successful diversion.

Steps to enhance the security of the people of the United States against these threats must commence with efforts to cut off the flow at the source. Various agencies have told us of the great strides they are making with their Russian counterparts. They have warned that this type of cooperation takes time and must be nurtured. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program of the NunnLugar Act, along with the Department of Energy's lab-to-lab pro

gram, have provided a foundation for our work, but we must transcend our current levels of cooperation and move to the next stage. The price of inaction couldn't be higher.

I look forward to our witnesses' testimony. I am hopeful that members of this Subcommittee and the media will not relax when we hear of the extraordinary efforts and progress our agencies are making in the areas of detection and counter-proliferation. I think our witnesses here today will agree the most dangerous and important link in the proliferation chain is at the source, and this is where the United States must concentrate the great bulk of its energies.

Mr. Chairman, after I composed those remarks I read, I think, a truly important editorial in the Washington Post this morning by Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center, entitled "The Last 15 Minutes," and I simply want to make note of that by saying that Mr. Krepon says, “. . the illicit purchase of nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union constitutes a clear and present danger, as does the acquisition and use of chemical and biological weapons by rogue states or sub-national groups.”

He writes that before spending large sums of money on the last 15 minutes of the problem-namely, defense against ballistic missile attack-supporters of the Defend America Act would do well to shore up, in addition, the front line of defense, and the front lines are the sum total of the non-military means our country employs to reduce the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction. They include the United States intelligence efforts, diplomacy, export controls, arms reduction treaties and non-proliferation regimes, and the Nunn-Lugar program.

The most direct line of defense against nuclear danger is negotiated, verified reductions in nuclear forces. It makes no sense to be for missile defense and against the START treaties. Likewise, the defense spending that facilitates threat reduction in the former Soviet Union is a wise investment. This is the essence of the NunnLugar program, which Secretary of Defense William Perry calls. "defense by other means."

By all means, we should pursue defenses against ballistic missile threats, but meanwhile, as Mr. Krepon points out, I would advocate the DOE budget request to increase nuclear safety and security at Russian facilities is only $95 million, and for an additional $25 million security could be measurably increased at six other facilities. If the Senate consents to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States share to fund verification and other activities will be less than $20 million. Last year's budget request for cooperative threat reduction funding was, in fact, cut 20 percent.

I favor a prudent approach to strengthening our third line of defense-namely, defense against ballistic missiles-but not at the expense of shoring up the front lines of defense which I suspect are equally as productive.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Senator Lugar, for your excellent work in this whole area. It has been a great pleasure to be partners in this crucial venture for our national security with you. We

have been for the last 5 years, and we will certainly continue to be as long as I am here, and I know you will continue thereafter.

I would agree with the reading of that editorial. I thought that was right on the mark. Somehow, we have got to put together a broader view of what the threat is. A ballistic missile against the United States by a Third World country or rogue country is one part of the threat; it is not the most likely. That doesn't mean we won't deal with it and don't have to deal with it, but for us to lock ourselves into gridlock, which we probably will do again this year if we are not careful over the ABM debate and how rapidly to develop a missile defense against the least likely threat, while cutting funds for the most likely threat, would be a tragedy.

I hope that you and I can focus together to try to avoid that and to put this whole question in a broader context so that we really deal with the whole continuum of the threat rather than simply one part of it. So I would certainly be looking forward to working with you and Senator Roth and others in that regard.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Thank you for being here.

Mr. Sopko and Mr. Edelman, again, we appreciate all the work you have done, which is truly a staggering amount of work, and we will be the beneficiaries again of your testimony this morning and some of the recommendations you will share based on many, many hours and many, many interviews and travels.

We appreciate your being here, and fire away.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. SOPKO, CHIEF COUNSEL TO THE MINORITY, AND ALAN EDELMAN, COUNSEL TO THE MINORITY, PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

Mr. SOPKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have a longer staff statement with appendices that we would ask to be offered into the record at this time and we will summarize the statement at this time.

Just how well prepared is the United States to respond to events of chemical, biological or nuclear terrorism is the subject of today's hearing. The hearing today, which is the fourth hearing since we started in October of last year, is the last part in a logical progression in the series of hearings. We have looked at the sources of such material and weapons-nuclear, biological and chemical; the potential for the use of such weapons and material; and now we are looking at what happens if that material, that technology, those weapons actually are used against the citizens of the United States.

The need for such a review of the United States Government's counter-terrorism programs and policies was actually highlighted at our first hearing last October by a number of witnesses. In particular, Admiral Frank Young, the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness at the U.S. Public Health Service, raised serious concerns about the effectiveness of the current Federal programs, and in particular the effectiveness of the local first responders. Those are the people from the State and local governments who will be the ones on the scene when a weapon of mass destruc

As indicated, Senator Nunn tasked the minority staff to conduct a survey of our Nation's ability to respond to a nuclear, biological or chemical terrorist incident. Our inquiry examined two aspects of this response-how equipped the government is to manage the crisis posed by a credible threat of deployment and, second, how the government is able to manage the unthinkable consequences, or consequence management, of the use of a weapon of mass destruction.

The staff believes that despite tremendous improvements made within the last 5 years in preparation for such incidents, overall our Nation is not adequately prepared for a WMD, weapons of mass destruction, event. Much improvement is necessary in support of our country's first responders, the local fire, police, rescue and emergency room personnel. Government efforts need to be better coordinated, and the intelligence and law enforcement communities must make greater strides in information-sharing.

The staff's report, as I mentioned, is a culmination of this study. It, by no means, is the final word on the subject. It could not, because of time, be totally comprehensive. One of the things that the staff today will be recommending is that our government actually conduct a comprehensive review, a government-wide, comprehensive, top-to-bottom review of such capabilities. Nevertheless, the findings that we make today are shared by most of the experts in the field.

Our first finding is that the threat of a terrorist group using a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon of mass destruction is real. In the staff's opinion, it is not a matter of “if”, but rather "when" such an event will occur.

Secondly, government efforts on the Federal, State and local level need to be better coordinated, despite Presidential Decision Directive 39. Although intelligence is our best and first line of defense against terrorism, the staff found that problems with coordination and information-sharing among government agencies continue despite recent efforts to resolve them at the highest levels of the CIA and the FBI.

More importantly, the staff found that local government entities such as the fire, police, ambulance, rescue and emergency rooms who will be called upon to respond in the first critical hours of a terrorist event are generally inadequately trained and ill-equipped to handle these difficult challenges; in particular, the difficult challenges related to a chemical or biological event. Our ability to respond to a nuclear incident, although significantly improved within the last 2 years, still needs greater attention. Lastly, Senator, the staff found that, overall, funding needs to be increased to prepare for the consequences of weapons of mass destruction in our country.

The staff found numerous agencies at the local, State and Federal level involved in responding to a WMD terrorist threat. The staff was able to identify at least 40 on the Federal level alone, and there are innumerable others at the State and local level.

Through a series of presidential determinations, this administration and prior administrations have tried to coordinate the response to an event. PDD-39, as previously indicated, was issued on June 21, 1995. It enunciates various agency responsibilities. The