dent and the Congress need to come together. I think you need to work to try and develop it into a true bipartisan issue and one which occupies a place of priority on our national agenda.

If you do that, you need to put some money against it and you need to have some structure to the budget. The way things are currently done, it is somewhat of a hit-or-miss operation. Each of the individual agencies who have responsibilities are taking little bits of money here, there and elsewhere. If you are going to have an effective counter-terrorism program on the national level, you need to decide who you are going to give that money to, have it structured in an appropriate way, and above all, once you have done that, hold them accountable for what they do, which is a classic role of the Congress.

Sir, I would like to thank you once again. It is always an honor to appear before the Congress and it is a particular pleasure to be here today with you.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. We appreciate you being here.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Busby follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MORRIS D. BUSBY

I am pleased to appear before this committee today to offer my personal thoughts on the capability of our government to deal effectively with the threat of terrorism. Although I have testified before Congress many times in an official capacity I appear today as a private citizen. My comments are my own, based on my previous experience. I served in the U.S. Navy and in the U.S. Department of State, for a combined total of 34 years of government service. My last assignment was as the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia (1991-1993) where I directed complex inter-agency operations, including the hunt for the drug kingpin, Pablo Escobar. Prior to that assignment I was in charge of the U.S. Government's international policy to combat terrorism (U.S. State Department's Coordinator for Counter Terrorism 1989–1991). I am of the firm view that solid and consistent policies, good intelligence, proper coordination and preparation, and competent operations are the key elements in defending our nation against terrorists and organized crime. The successes we have enjoyed, and there have been many, have been a direct consequence of good coordination and teamwork

When terrible incidents occur, such as the recent terrorist bombings in Israel or last year's horrific attack in Oklahoma City, it is natural and appropriate for the American people to ask whether or not the U.S. Government is doing everything in its power to protect its citizens and help other democratic nations defend themselves.

The answer to this question in my judgment, is a qualified yes. I say qualified because I am concerned that people have the mistaken belief that there is a magic technology or program that can end such threats. Simple solutions do not exist. Our country has the best technology and most highly trained security personnel in the world. We surely should continue working to develop new technologies, especially explosive detection equipment, and ensure that we have sufficient military, intelligence, or law enforcement personnel dedicated to the mission. Yet, if we are to remain strong to meet the threat of terrorism we should avoid the temptation to throw money at programs and focus more attention on ensuring that this issue is a priority for our national leaders.

What is the Threat?

The threat of terrorism, whether domestic or international, has changed fairly dramatically since I worked in the field and especially over the last 3 years. To remain strong, we must constantly assess whether we are doing the right things and how we are organized to deal with the threat.

During the 1980s terrorism was fueled in large measure by groups linked directly and indirectly to the former Soviet Union and countries closely aligned with it. Starting in 1987 the United States made cracking down on state sponsors of terrorism a top priority of its counter terrorism policy. Through a combination of diplomacy, intelligence operations, military strikes, and law enforcement we made substantial gains in reducing the ability of outlaw states, such as Iraq, North Korea,

Cuba, Syria, and Libya, to engage in terrorism. Statistically, we have seen significant declines in the number of active terrorist groups and in the number of international and domestic terrorist incidents. As well, groups such as the Irish Republican Army or the Basque Terrorist Organization (BTA) have reduced their level of activity. Things indisputably are better today than they were in the mid-eighties when we saw airplanes blown from the sky, embassies bombed, and ships hijacked. Yet citing statistical declines offers no comfort to those who lost loved ones in terrorist bombings in Israel, Argentina, and Oklahoma City, or the sarin gas attack in Tokyo. For these people terrorism is a terrible reality. It is a reality we must remain prepared to confront.

In my opinion we are witnessing a fairly significant shift in the terrorist threat. Ten years ago there were six states actively sponsoring terrorist acts. Today there are seven states identified as sponsors of terrorism-Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Cuba, North Korea. Fortunately the number that are willing and able to aggressively promote terrorism has declined. Iran is the prime culprit, continuing to fund and harbor vicious, violent terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. These groups are fueling enormous bloodshed in places like Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, and Pakistan.

We should take little comfort in the narrowing of the threat because the violence today seems less predictable and more dangerous. I am referring to extremist groups that are guided by millennial expectations and which cite religion as justification for their actions. While conventional wisdom unfairly tars Islam, we have seen this kind of terrorism carried out in the name of Christianity, Judaism, and Buddhism. We have seen this phenomena with the Aum Shinryko in Japan, with the IRA in Ireland, with Hamas and Kach in Israel, and with the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria.

What do we Need to Meet the Threat?

The foundation of our counter-terrorism policy, which was erected in 1986, remains solid. There are four basic pillars:

1. Intelligence collection and analysis; 2. Law enforcement and prosecution; 3. Diplomacy and coordination;

4. Operations and training.

Although we generally think of these as relevant to international terrorism, I believe we should also use these principles to guide our approach to domestic terrorism. Collecting information on terrorist groups is an essential element in our ability to track and defeat them. We need to identify the members of these groups, learn how they get their money and who provides them with training and support, track their capabilities, and preempt their plans. The task goes beyond simply gathering facts. Raw intelligence also must be assembled, analyzed, and used for operational or other purposes. The process is the same whether the targets are Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon or domestic terrorists in the U.S. The value of this process was illustrated by the Tiny Star incident. Tiny Star was a ship used by Libya in planning and carrying out a sea borne attack against Israel in 1990. We learned the details of the operation through intelligence methods, but we used this information to convince skeptical U.S. allies in Western Europe to toughen sanctions against Libya.

Along with intelligence we must have law enforcement. Arresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating terrorists has occupied center stage for U.S. efforts in recent years. Last year, for example, the FBI, working in tandem with the State Department and the CIA captured and returned to the United States the alleged mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing. In addition, Sheik Abdul Rahman was convicted as part of a conspiracy to commit a series of terrorist acts in the New York City area. Using law enforcement as a tool to implement counter terrorism policy produces several benefits. First, I believe it has a clear deterrent effect. At a minimum it sends a signal to all terrorists that attacks against the United States will not go unpunished, and that if identified and caught they will personally pay the price. Second, it provides a clear demonstration of what separates us from terrorists. Our goal as a country is to seek justice rather than vengeance. When we afford terrorists the right of due process we are making a powerful statement to our citizens as well as the terrorists. We hold them accountable for their actions.

Finding and arresting terrorists outside the United States is a significant undertaking. It requires the permission of foreign governments and coordination among a variety of agencies. The arrest of the alleged mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing, Ramsi Yousef, is a case in point. The U.S. Government first learned of his whereabouts thanks to a collaborator who walked into our Embassy in Paki

stan. Elements of several U.S. Government agencies were involved in vetting the information provided by the source and putting in place an operation to apprehend Yousef. In addition, the United States asked for and received the full assistance of the Government of Pakistan to arrest and extradite Yousef. This type of coordination and cooperation is characteristic of what happens when things go well. But these events do not happen of their own accord. It takes preparation and often years of work to put the mechanisms in place. Securing such cooperation is the nuts and bolts of diplomacy.

The use of diplomacy in fighting terrorists encompasses more than assisting law enforcement. It includes reaching international consensus on how to handle issues ranging from aviation security to tagging explosives to imposing sanctions on state sponsors. Most importantly, it involves developing and implementing policy responses to terrorism or the threat of it. In many cases we know beyond a reasonable doubt who the terrorists are and who bankrolls and sponsors them. But, we have no chance of ever apprehending or trying them in a court of law. Other, sometimes aggressive, responses are necessary.

The principle of diplomacy and coordination also is relevant to counter-terrorism efforts inside the United States. Interactions between Federal, state, and local officials can be just as complicated and sensitive as any operation conducted overseas. Because of Constitutional protections that exist within the United States ensuring proper coordination among the different law enforcement agencies can play a critical role in whether or not a prosecutable case against a terrorist can be obtained.

Finally, to rein in terrorists we must have personnel with the skills to detect and stop them. At the Munich Olympics in 1972 the world learned a painful lesson. The German Government, despite having one of the best military and police forces in the world, were unprepared and ill-equipped to deal with the Black September terrorist group that stormed the Israeli apartments at the Olympic complex. As a result of that experience we and other developed nations embarked on a fairly extensive campaign to develop and maintain counter terrorism strike forces and police SWAT teams.

We enjoy a wealth of resources in the United States, both at the national and state level, for dealing with terrorists. The U.S. military special operations forces are the best in the world and provide the President with enormous capabilities for dealing with a variety of terrorist contingencies. Closer to home we have seen the remarkable capabilities of state and local agencies to handle the aftermath of terrorist incidents at the World Trade Center and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City. While we have excellent capabilities for dealing with some terrorist contingencies we are sorely lacking on other fronts. We are very good at resolving hostage barricade situations but, fortunately, these have become increasingly rare occurrences. They are especially scant on the international front. One of the critical areas where our country's readiness is lacking, one highlighted by this committee in a previous hearing, is our ability to handle a chemical or biological attack domestically. The U.S military is equipped and organized to deal with this outside the United States but internally we are, in my judgment, ill-prepared. Another area where more is needed is explosives detection equipment that works reliably and efficiently at commercial airports.

What are the Problems?

The four general areas I have highlighted above represent a formidable package to prevent and deter terrorism if used in a focused coordinated way. Unfortunately there are some significant obstacles that hinder the cooperation and coordination of these elements. I see three key areas of weakness that, if left uncorrected, make this country very vulnerable to terrorists and hamper our ability to detect:

1. Sharing information between intelligence and law enforcement;

2. Obtaining and recognizing critical intelligence on internationally based groups that are operating within the United States;

3. Conducting multi-agency operations;

The different missions of the intelligence community and the law enforcement community create a natural friction that makes it difficult to fully exploit the information that each collects about the activities and plans of terrorist groups. The intelligence community enjoys the luxury of being able to gather information without having to worry about it meeting evidentiary standards for use in a court case in a U.S. jurisdiction. While the CIA and other intelligence organizations face some constraints in collecting information internationally, e.g. not targeting U.S. citizens unless there is clear evidence that the person is involved in terrorist or narcotics activities, the only real limitations are those imposed by the quality of the informa

tion. The intelligence collected is dictated primarily by requirements established through a comprehensive inter-agency process.

The FBI, although it considers itself part of the intelligence community, is an investigative law enforcement organization. The information it collects must be part of an open case that is intended to lead ultimately to the arrest and trial of the suspects. Because of its concerns about how information is handled—improper handling could cause a good case to be thrown out in court-the Bureau has exercised extreme caution in sharing this information.

Unfortunately the legal constraints placed on it, and the FBI's natural caution have created a situation in which valuable intelligence often is not in the hands of the intelligence community. There is strong concern among intelligence professionals about the lack of information flow from the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to the intelligence community.

This is an issue that goes beyond bureaucratic turf battles. We must find a way to bridge the gap between the way law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies view their respective tasks and collect and handle information. The law enforcement agencies are very good at investigating cases and bringing them to trial but lack expertise and analytical perspective that the national intelligence agencies can bring to bear on issues. A good example is the fact that the law enforcement community had information about Aum Shinryko activities in the U.S. to acquire material for chemical warfare but did not have a system in place for flagging this as a potential threat. That information never made its way into the hands of the intelligence analysts who were better prepared to assess it and bring it to the attention of policy makers.

Related to the problem of sharing information is the more difficult issue of tracking international terrorists who move their operations to the United States. There is a clear demarcation at the water's edge. Notwithstanding the Hollywood myth of intelligence agencies acting unfettered within the United States, the reality is quite different. The CIA operates overseas and the FBI is in control domestically. In my view this is as it should be, but we need to have a broader view than we have about groups and individuals operating domestically.

The FBI and other law enforcement agencies collect information in field offices or, when there is an attack against Americans overseas, through the agents dispatched to investigate the crime scene. FBI analysts spend most of their time servicing the needs of the Special Agents in Charge in the field rather than combing through the information that is collected in case reports for strategic intelligence. At present there is neither the incentive nor system in place to routinely generate intelligence that could be used to warn policy makers about developing threats, such as groups like Aum Shinryko.

I recognize that putting in place a system to collect and analyze domestic intelligence in the manner the rest of the intelligence community does raises some legitimate constitutional and civil rights concerns. I am not suggesting trampling on the rights of our citizens. However, our current system is clearly inadequate. International terrorist groups exploit loopholes in our laws that essentially makes them untouchable.

The final problem I see on the horizon, particularly with respect to our domestic readiness, is the training and preparation to conduct multi-agency operations. On the international front our counter terrorist forces regularly plan and conduct exercises with other departments, such as the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the CIA. These exercise programs serve several purposes. First, they give the agencies a chance to test their readiness to handle future contingencies. Second, they allow the various departments and forces to become familiar with each other and to learn how to coordinate and work together under a stressful situation. In my experience you cannot wait until an incident occurs to figure out how you will collectively respond. Finally. these kinds of exercises flag problems and conflicts that require a solution while there is still time to fix them.

To my knowledge we do not have such a system in place to prepare a coordinated response to domestic events. This is not to say there have been no exercises—there have been. My concern is that we do not see the type of planning and exercising domestically, among multiple agencies and jurisdictions at the state and federal level that will truly prepare us to handle the unexpected.

How Do We Make the System Work?

As I said at the outset there is no magic bullet or program that can get this country fully prepared to face potential threats. But I do believe that there are some practical steps we could take that would improve our nation's overall level of readiness. First, national leaders must make preparing for terrorism and putting in place

coordination mechanisms a national priority. The direction for taking this kind of action must come from the President and from the Governors of the 50 states. It is foolish to think you can legislate away turf battles. As long as you have different agencies and departments you will have different missions and conflicts over who does what.

The second recommendation is to clarify who is in charge of different parts of the process and assign clearly defined missions. There must be accountability built in to this process. You should not simply commission one or more departments to handle a potential threat, such as thwarting chemical and biological terrorism, without also ensuring that they are required to give an account of their efforts.

Third, we should look at putting in place new mechanisms to bridge the gaps between the domestic and international arenas. Ultimately such a mechanism should probably reside in the White House rather than being put in one of the major departments. These mechanisms should address procedures to share intelligence information and to conduct planning and training for multi-agency crisis response.

Finally, I believe that policy offices for combating terrorism, whether domestic or international, should have the budget authority to match resources to policies. Under the current system there is no such thing as budget item for counter terrorism policy, either domestic or international I think we are poorly served as a nation by relying on an ad hoc system of budgeting money to deal with this problem. We should consider instead a more disciplined approach where we identify needs and policies and clearly define required to meet these.

Let me reiterate in closing that I remain relatively optimistic about our national capabilities to combat terrorism. Prevention and preparation can pay important dividends when the unexpected occurs. I want to thank this committee for taking the time to explore this issue and for working to ensure the safety and well being of the citizens of the United States.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Sewell, we are delighted to have you here. You have a sense of history about this entire problem. You have been one of our real leaders and we are proud to hear what is on your mind and any suggestions you have.

TESTIMONY OF DUANE C. SEWELL, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND ORIGINATOR OF THE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM CONCEPT

Mr. SEWELL. First, I want to commend you, Senator Nunn, and Senator Lugar and other members of the Committee for holding these hearings. I think one of the key things that needs to be done is to educate the people in this country of the possibility, in the first place, of these events happening with these weapons of mass destruction, and secondly not to go into a complete panic if and when-and it is really when in my mind-we are faced with a serious disaster of this kind.

I look at this business of the New York bombing of the Trade Center, and people were telling me today and I observed there was very little furor over that in this country. It was interesting for a day or two and then the interest turns to, "what is the headline for the next day," and not much feeling of, "my gosh, this could happen here and what would I do if I was caught in such a situation?"

Let me comment, I have seen over 100 nuclear weapons explode and I will tell you, every time I have seen one it puts an empty feeling in the pit of my stomach. They really scare you; they are big. You look at New York, for example, a few pounds of explosive and the damage it did; the same is true of Oklahoma City.

A lot of people now think, as far as I can tell-they talk about one kiloton; well, it is only one. That is 2 million pounds of highexplosive equivalent and that can really do a lot of damage. There would have been hundreds of thousands of people killed in New