Annex B, 52D OD GRP (EOD), to SA AAR, Exercise Mirage Gold, 16-21 OCT 94.

1. General. The 52D OD Grp (ECD) SIED Task Force deploys to provide EOD support to neutralize and render safe Sophisticated Improvised Explosive Devices. Efforts are coordinated with DOD, DOE and DOJ. The SIED Task Force deployed 103 soldiers in support of Exercise Mirage Gold. Two LNOS were provided to the DOD CP:

CPT Antonio Aragon

CPT Thomas S. Little

2. Issue. DTRG Equipment

a. Discussion. Doctrine for SIED needs to be standardized, thus driving equipment requirements. Much of the DTRG equipment is aging and needs to be replaced by state of the art equipment. Example: There is a need for secure SATRAN capability, PIR detection and kill capability. Collars are not available for

training sustainment.

b. Conclusion. DTRG equipment should be upgraded.

C. Recommendation. Commander 52D 30D find funds for DTRG and work Army acquisition system for authorization to purchase non-MTOE/CTA equipment.

a. Discussion. Throughout the exercise, the FBI (as the lead agency) placed priority on prosecution of the subjects. The DOE/BOD intel priority should be for intel on the device and technical capabilities of the threat. The purpose of this technical information is to prevent the device from functioning as designed and save the lives of EOD personnel.

b. Conclusion. Preventing a device from achieving nuclear yield should be as high a priority as capturing the subjects.

C. Recommendation. Interagency MOU be established with the FBI to establish priority intelligence requirements.

a. Discussion. DOE coordination center/plans and operations cell is not passing information to other agencies.

b. Conclusion. Chance of success would be improved if information flow were better

C. Recommendation. Obtain joint agreement on what essential elements of information DOE should automatically pass to EOD; insure LNOS actively follow up or required information.

5. Issue. S2 Staffing of 52D OL Grp (EOD)

a. Discussion. There is no intelligence officer in the 52d OD Grp or the DSR staff. The only intelligence person 52d Grp staff is a 96B (Analyst). Intelligence is an important part of the response to an IND.

b.

type.

Conclusion.

Current staffing is inadequate in number and

C. Recommendation. Recommend filling the Intel Officer (MI) position at Group HQ and the addition of two mora 96Bs.

6. Issue. Presence of controllers/observers

a. Discussion. Occasionally controllers were absent from the site when players needed questions answered.

b. Conclusion. Exercise play would be enhanced is controller functions were adequately staffed.

C.

Recommendation.

Exercise Director should ensure that:

(1) Rules of Engagement (RCE) are published in advance and distributed to the players.

(2) Controllers are present to answer questions and control play at all times, not just when a MESL event is scheduled.

7. Issue. Lack of Communications for EOD LNO

a. Discussion. The EOD LNO cell does not currently have sufficient communications resources to cover all aspects of EOD operations. A lack of communications during the early EOD operations (search) limited the LNO's ability to keep the DSR

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updated.

b. Conclusion.

Shortages in communications should be fixed.

b. Recommendation. Ensure the following communications equipment is provided:

(1) 1 ea CNWDI/Q cleared info Workstation at the EOD LNO desk. This would allow EOD LNCs access to Work Point actions being recorded by the EOD S3 section as they occur. During an actual operation, this staff would be separated from the BOD staff and not allow face to face coordination.

(2) 3 ea Video Monitors. These monitors should be connected to the Search CP in the early phases and then connected to the Work Point.

Reminder, the DSR staff during a real call-out will not be collocated with the 52D OD G (EOD) as they were for this exercise.

8. Issue. Need for Department of Defense Contingency OPLANS

a. Discussion. There are no DOD Contingency OPLANS to be executed in the event of an IND.

b. Conclusion. Lack of an CPLAN would make an actual deployment harder.

(1) DOD needs to develop a series of contingency CPLANS to be executed in the event of an IND. This family of plans could use the OPLAN and efforts of 5A in support of Exercise Mirage Gold as a start point.

(2) Each CONUSA HQS should be required to have a trained DSR staff element to include a general officer.

9. Point of Contact for this annex is CPT Aragon, 546 OD Det, (210) 221-2457 or DSN 471-0511.

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Annex C, DNAAT, to 5A AAR, Exercise Mirage Gold, 16-21 Oct 94

1.

General. The Defense Nuclear Agency provides a team of knowledgeable individuals to advise the DSR and his staff in nuclear matters. Defense Nuclear Agency Advisory Team (DNAAT), is composed of individuals who work in the nuclear arena on a daily basis, and have considerable experience and training through classes and exercises. As the DNAAT team the following deployed:

2. Issue. Separation of IND Response Requirements and MSCA.

a. Discussion. Although the CONUSA experience in providing Military Support to Civilian Authorities is an extremely valuable asset in responding as DSR and staff to an Improvised Nuclear Device incident, the two roles are not the same, and must be kept separate, especially in chain of command, approval process and reimbursement of costs. In IND response, some actions, such as EOD decisions, intelligence requirements and radiological monitoring, the military, although not Lead Federal Agency, is acting because we have unique capabilities needed by our nation to prevent catastrophic damage to life and property. These actions must be conducted by the OSR and coordinated directly with National Military Command, must be approved through the direct channels to the NMCC, and must be funded by the guidelines in DOD Dir 3150.5. This ensures the most timely response necessary to prevent detonation, if possible. Other support, requested by state and local authorities, through FEMA, may be handled through normal MSCA channels, approved at the appropriate subordinate and intermediate levels of command, and reimbursed under Economies Act or Stafford Act as applicable. These two roles of the DSR staff should be kept separate, based on the need and the requester, not based solely on the type of support. For

example, technical support, such as EOD and radiation control, can always be safely categorized as IND response support.

b. Conclusion. Support for IND response should be separate from Military Support to Civilian Authorities, and processed, approved and reimbursed separately.

C.

Recommendation. Establish procedures whereby IND response requirements are not considered as MSCA, even though a civilian agency (FBI) is the LFA.

3. Issue. Increase Manning for DSR Staff

a. Discussion. Efficiency of DSR staff could be increased by the addition of some billets. For example, a PAO rep and an SJA rep need to be available on each shift. Also, Intel should be a part of DSR's staff

staff.

b.

Conclusion.

Additional slots are required on the DSR's

C. Recommendation. Add billets to DSR Staff, especially additional PAO, SJA and Intel representatives.

4. Issue. Improve Information Flow from the FBI

a. Discussion:

Flow of information from FBI needs

improvement. At early stages, flow was non-existent. The only real interaction appeared at the DSR level. Several problems seemed to contribute: FBI did not grant clearance/access to DCD personnel; FBI did not seem to hold many meetings to pass on information to supporting organizations at the action officer level; the close ties that exist between key DOD and DOE players have not been developed with FBI players.

b.

Conclusion: The amount of information released by the FBI should be increased to improve the support provided by DOE and DOD.

Recommendation: FBI should hold routine "worker-level" update meetings, and invite DOD and DOE counterparts to attend.

5.

C.

Issue. Fifth U.S. Army Provided an Excellent DSR Staff.

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