SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS Letter on Counterterror Response Just recently, my staff received a letter from a senior federal official who has spent most of his professional career involved in counter-terrorism and government preparedness. He asked that we not identify him but he wanted us to use this letter if it was useful. Let me read to you from it and get your reaction: "The points I would like to stress are: Question 20b: "Continuing to build a strong, well trained state and local infrastructure is key." "More training for the locals, starting in cities with higher probabilities, is Answer 20b: The Department concurs with these points. Training for local and state officials in handling the immediate response to an act of terrorism is required to get through the initial response phases. An act of terrorism that is not anticipated will require similar responses from local disaster preparedness personnel and agencies that would be required by other natural or man-made disasters. Prior training and exercises can be facilitated by the federal agencies but there must be a commitment on the local level to maintain an adequate level of preparedness in order for that training to be effective. As an example, local bomb squad members are required to attend the Hazardous Devices School at Redstone Arsenal in Alabama but there is no requirement for such personnel to continue to train in this specialty to an acceptable level. Many local bomb squad personnel are assigned regular law enforcement duties when not actually responding to a bomb call. Additional field training for first responders, supported by federal funding through a national counter-terrorism training program, could assist local governments in maintaining the first responder training levels required and set minimum standards for these personnel. The Department of Energy has the counterterrorism and emergency response expertise as well as the technological base to establish such a training program and act as the coordinator for the interagency community if such tasking is deemed appropriate. SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS Letter on Counterterror Response Just recently, my staff received a letter from a senior federal official who has spent most of his professional career involved in counter-terrorism and government preparedness. He asked that we not identify him but he wanted us to use this letter if it was useful. Let me read to you from it and get your reaction: "The points I would like to stress are: Question 20c: "Money for Federal Agencies to pre-deploy assets to local area when an actual event has not yet occurred, such as Atlanta for the Olympics, is problematic." Answer 20c: The interagency counterterrorism posture in place for the Olympics is being tailored to the threat involved and has been thoroughly coordinated between the appropriate agencies. The Department is using funds from the NEST operational and training budget to support this posture. SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS Letter on Counterterror Response Just recently, my staff received a letter from a senior federal official who has spent most of his professional career involved in counter-terrorism and government preparedness. He asked that we not identify him but he wanted us to use this letter if it was useful. Let me read to you from it and get your reaction: "The points I would like to stress are: Question 20d: "Money to 'clean-up' after a terrorist incident is also a problem for some agencies unless a Presidential declaration is received and mission assignment under the Stafford Act are issued." Answer 20d: The Stafford Act is invoked for disasters on a fairly regular basis. The system in place for this is adequate to mobilize federal support in response to disasters. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Law-Intensity Conflict 1. Q: Are we learning from our mistakes? For example, in FEMA's After Action report on Mirage Gold [1994), a number of problems are listed, I will read each one of them and ask you what FEMA has done or any other agency done to address each problem. On page 8, it is noted, "there is no specific FEMA plan, agreement, procedure or other formal guidance detailing the relationships between the Agency and these organizations for the type of incident depicted in the exercise scenario." What have you done about this? On page 11 of FEMA's report, it is noted that "There were questions regarding command and control of DOD tactical forces; however they are outside the sphere of this report." What does that mean? What has DOD done to fix this? On page 12, it is noted, "The interface between FEMA, DOD, DOE and the State was generally good. The interface between FEMA, the State, and the FBI was initially nonexistent and it wasn't until the State aggressively elevated its play to the Presidential level that the FBI acknowledged the validity of State (and probably FEMA) involvement. It was obvious that consequence management planning was not an FBI item of interest." That is pretty strong language, in essence, the FBI would not share any information with anyone until the President got involved and told them to do so? What would that mean in terms of a real incident? Does that mean we would never be prepared for the possible consequences if a nuclear device went off? A: It is inappropriate for me as an Assistant Secretary of Defense to comment on specific actions by other government agencies or address their alleged shortcomings. Those questions should be addressed to each agency in question. That notwithstanding, from a DoD prospective of the interagency process, I believe we are making steady improvements. a. Since MIRAGE GOLD, there have been a series of interagency table top exercises supported by my office that have focused on noted shortcomings identified by the interagency counterterrorism (CT) community. Resulting from these exercises and subsequent actions taken by the interagency CT community the following has occurred: 1) FEMA is now a permanent member of the interagency counterterrorism working group that provides recommendations to the senior Washington leadership and the President on counterterroism responses; 2) Presidential Decision Directive/ PDD-39 has been published which revised standing counterterrorism responsibilities; 3) interagency CT coordination and operational guidelines for responding to |