(d) How can a rewards program be a valuable tool if it is not publicized?

Our German colleagues were severely criticized for their conduct in causing nuclear material to be transported into Germany in the Munich case. While the FBI will aggressively investigate all allegations of illicit nuclear trafficking and will employ the rewards program at every opportunity, we will not engage in operations to cause or encourage this illegal and particularly hazardous activity. Health and safety issues have precedence in developing investigative strategy in these cases. Publicizing the rewards program could create a market where one does not exist.

Question 1:

Answer:

Are we learning from our mistakes? For example, in FEMA's After Action report
on Mirage Gold (1994), a number of problems are listed, I will read each one of
them and ask you what FEMA has done or any other agency (has) done to address
each problem.

We are not only learning from our mistakes, we are able to validate new
procedures and revalidate old procedures. We believe that mistakes are a normal
circumstance of any realistic and challenging exercise scenario. It has been our
experience that an exercise that enjoys flawless performance probably wasn't
pushing the limits of challenge for the participants. Since Mirage Gold (1994),
for example, we participated in two major joint interagency overseas full field
exercises in 1995, one of which was no-notice. In both exercises our assets
successfully incorporated many of the lessons learned during Mirage Gold. So far
in 1996 we have participated in 2 field exercises and have 3 more planned before
the end of FY96. Of these, 2 will be no-notice interagency nuclear
counterterrorism field exercises and the other will be a joint interagency full field

exercise. The exercise scenarios for all the above exercises involve, where

possible, inclusion of lessons learned from previous exercises.

SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS

SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

Lead Federal Authority

My staff tells me that DOD representatives noted the following:

"The initial focus of the federal response is law enforcement and counterterrorism, with the FBI as the Lead Federal Authority. Should a detonation occur, the FBI is no longer the appropriate Lead Federal Authority. The procedures to conduct the transfer of Lead Federal responsibility are lacking."

Question 2a: What was the impact on your mission?

Answer 2a:

None. The statement attributed to DOD that "the initial focus of the federal response is law enforcement and counterterrorism" does not adequately address the complexities of the issue. While most of the significant attention may appear to be geared toward law enforcement and "tactical" counterterrorism operations there is a tremendous amount of activity by technical personnel from DOE supporting the FBI and FEMA throughout the incident. Planning for consequence management is an integral part of the technical operations associated with attempting to render safe a device. While disablement and device assessment personnel are trying to determine the best way to render a device safe the effects prediction teams are computing blast and fallout information for consequence managers should there be a detonation.

As an agency tasked with providing unique technical support, DOE has a
significant presence and role in the consequence management organization
regardless of who the lead federal agency may be at the time. DOE is always
in a supporting role to the lead federal agency and we have command and control

architectures in place to support both crisis and consequence management.

SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS

SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

Lead Federal Authority

My staff tells me that DOD representatives noted the following:

"The initial focus of the federal response is law enforcement and counterterrorism, with the FBI as the Lead Federal Authority. Should a detonation occur, the FBI is no longer the appropriate Lead Federal Authority. The procedures to conduct the transfer of Lead Federal responsibility are lacking."

Question 2b: What have you done about this problem?

Answer 2b:

A OSD/SOLIC sponsored, interagency exercise series known as Interagency

1

Terrorism Response Awareness Program (ITRAP) has addressed this specific issue in a table-top format with senior members of the effected agencies to address the details of transition of authority. The implementing guidelines of the Presidential Directive for combating terrorism are being drafted with details on crisis to consequence management transition to ensure the lessons learned from previous field exercises are addressed.

SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS

SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

Lead Federal Authority

My staff tells me that DOD representatives noted the following:

"The initial focus of the federal response is law enforcement and counter terrorism, with the FBI as the Lead Federal Authority. Should a detonation occur, the FBI is no longer the appropriate Lead Federal Authority. The procedures to conduct the transfer of Lead Federal responsibility are lacking."

Question 2c: Has it been fixed?

Answer 2c:

This is an item that can only be "fixed" by development of procedures that are routinely validated through exercises. This particular item has been exercised at the national level, and the national policy will reflect the lessons learned at the ITRAP series, but it will take field-level exercises being conducted on a regular basis to truly "fix" the field coordination problems. We are working toward this goal utilizing interagency exercises, and anticipate a series of field level exercises ranging from table-top to full field deployments that will address consequence management with the same level of enthusiasm previously given to tactical, or crisis management operations.