SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD Hearings before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations EXHIBIT # U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ROBERT M. BLITZER Section Chief, Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism 33 For example in 1. Are we learning from our mistakes? FEMA's After Action report on Mirage Gold (1994), a number of problems are listed. I will read each one of them and ask you what FEMA has done or any other agency done to address each problem. On page 8, it is noted, "there is no specific FEMA plan, agreement, procedure or other formal guidance detailing the relationships between the Agency and these organizations for the type of incident depicted in the exercise scenario." you done about this? What have The FBI is actively involved with coordination with Additionally, last month the FBI met with FEMA On page 9, it is noted, "However, the FBI SAC opted to organize and operate the (Joint Operations) center in such a way that the Senior Federal officer and other senior persons (except the ESO) were not collocated there... As a result the flow of information regarding the overall incident and the current situation was almost nonexistent." What was the consequence of this? What has the FBI done about it? Mirage Gold was not planned as a consequence management real incident or in an exercise that was planned to include consequence management. On the same page (p.9.), it is noted that "The FBI response also reflects an exercise in artificiality, i.e. a conscious decision not to include local law enforcement personnel as exercise participants." Why was this done and what were the consequences? The decision not to involve local law enforcement was not an FBI players' option. This was a limitation on the exercise imposed by the exercise planners. It goes on to state "In short, the FBI stayed focused on the investigative and tactical aspects of the incident with little or no regard or interest in the actions that would have to be taken in the event of a radiological emergency as they related to consequence management." Why did that happen? What have you done to ensure the FBI agents that may be involved in a real incident are aware of the importance of preparing for the consequences? As stated above, the exercise was not planned to FBI contingency plans for response to nuclear, On page 11 of FEMA's report, it is noted that "there were questions regarding command and control of DOD tactical forces: however they are outside the sphere of this report." What does that mean? What has DOD done to fix this? These questions should be directed to FEMA and DOD. If the comment referred to the command and control of DOD tactical forces used in support of an FBI led operation, procedures for the use of DOD tactical forces to assist in a domestic terrorism incident are included in the FBI's N/B/C response plans, as directed under the recent Presidential Decision Directive on terrorism. On page 11, it is noted that, "The release of public information was the sole responsibility of the FBI...Initially, there was a reluctance to release any information regarding the incident, not only to the public but to the State and FEMA. Repeated requests for information by the media was essentially stonewalled by the Bureau due to its concern with operational security and possible adverse effects the release of any information could have on the investigative, tactical and technical process." This seems to mean that your people did not start sharing information with anyone including FENA? What have you done to change this attitude? Following the completion of Mirage Gold, the FBI prepared a detailed after-action report. This report critically evaluated the FBI's performance as crisis manager for a nuclear incident. Twenty six recommendations were made based on identified shortfalls in FBI operations. The major shortfalls were in the following areas: 1) interagency coordination and intelligence flow; 2) interagency coordination of forensic matters; and 3) information management and technical support. These recommendations have served as building blocks for revising and updating the FBI crisis management plans, particularly as they relate to the FBI's management and coordination of a multi-agency response, to include consequence management elements. To address interagency coordination and intelligence flow, the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), headquartered at Quantico, Virginia, has implemented a comprehensive crisis management training for senior FBI officials, emphasizing the Joint Operations Center concept. In addition, the FBI procedures for response to major incidents have been rigorously reviewed as a result of Mirage Gold recommendations and the recent Presidential Decision Directive on terrorism. The FBI's NBC contingency plans for responding to such incidents stress the joint operational aspects. The plans call for a Joint Operations Center which will include representatives of the participating agencies and will include command, operations, consequence management, On page 12, it is noted, "The interface between FEMA, DOD, DOE and the State was generally good. The interface between FEMA, the State and the FBI was initially nonexistent and it wasn't until the State aggressively elevated its play to the Presidential level that the FBI acknowledged the validity of State (and probably FEMA) involvement. It was obvious that consequence management planning was not an FBI item of interest." That is pretty strong language, in essence, the FBI would not share any information with anyone until the President got involved and told them to do so? What would that mean in terms of a real incident? Does that mean we would never be prepared for the possible consequences if a nuclear device went off? The problems in Mirage Gold were generally due to the limitations of the exercise, which had not been planned to include implementation of consequence management. However, as stated in the response to the question above, the current plans call for including consequence management in the Joint Operation Center from the start of an incident so that planning can be initiated effectively in anticipation of adverse consequences. On page 12, it is further noted that, the FBI Special Agent in Charge opted to organize the Joint Operations Command without the presence of senior representatives from DOD and FEMA. What have you done to ensure that something like this does not happen again? See response to above questions. 2. It looks like from all of the comments of your fellow participants at the Mirage Gold, that your agency had some problems in October 1994 in running such an operation. Is that an accurate assessment? Tell us what those problems were? What has the FBI done in response? See response to above questions. 3. My staff tells me that DOD representatives noted the following: "The initial focus of the federal response is law enforcement and counter terrorism, with the FBI as the Lead Federal Authority. Should a detonation occur, the FBI is no longer the appropriate Lead Federal Authority. The procedures to conduct the transfer of Lead Federal responsibility are lacking." What was the impact on your mission? What have you done about this problem? Has it been fixed? The first question should be directed to FEMA or DOD. Based on the specific details of an incident, when law enforcement responsibilities are resolved or are no longer the first priority, FEMA will assume consequence management responsibility for the incident. The FBI's NBC contingency plans address this issue and provide guidance regarding the federal management transition from the FBI to FEMA in this context. 4. The Sewell Report stated that "there have been a number of command and control problems as well as difficulties in establishing effective working interfaces at the deployment site which have existed for several years." The Report goes on to say that: .the intensity seems to ebb and flow depending upon who is serving in the lead role in FBI Headquarters and which SAC is in command of a specific field exercise. Workable agreements are often reached and included in a draft MOU which are subsequently interpreted differently by the SAC at the field level during a deployment. For example, the current draft agreement with the FBI calls for the establishment of a Joint Operations Center and a Joint Information Center. However, the FBI SAC at the Mirage Gold exercise made a decision not to implement those provisions of the draft agreement." Does a SAC have the authority to overrule a Memorandum of Understanding between the FBI and other agencies? Why was it done during Mirage Gold? What has the FBI done to ensure that future inter-agency cooperation is not dependent on who happens to be the SAC in a given deployment? Current FBI plans and training have been developed with consideration of the lessons learned in Mirage Gold and other incidents. They include heavy emphasis on joint operations and consequence management. They are meant to establish effective and consistent approaches to incidents with weapons of mass destruction. We have full confidence that in such an incident, the Special Agent in Charge will have the necessary training and understanding of current FBI policies and procedures to ensure a fully effective and coordinated response. Mirage Gold was designed as a crisis not a consequence |