Actions that FEMA Can Take to Prepare the US Fire & Action #1 Conduct an invitation-only anti-terrorist symposium held for the top five people from the fire & emergency services agencies in the major terrorist target cities (as determined by a current FBI threat assessment) This symposium would bring together both US and international fire & emergency services leaders for an open exchange of lessons learned from the actual management of terrorist incidents (especially Israel. United Kingdom & France) Action #2 lising the symposium discussions as a basis of knowledge, fund the development and delivery of a special short anti-terrorist familiarization course. in a hand-off format, for fire & emergency services agencies in selected high threat locations Further use the symposium discussions to develop support audio-visual materials (such as videotapes) for use as hand-offs for further indepth training of fire officers, fire fighters and emergency responders in highthreat jurisdictions Action #3 Direct the USAR Group to begin examining the differences in building collapse rescue techniques from buildings that have been blown-up by a bombing rather than shaken down by earthquake Action #4 Involve the primary Federal law enforcement agencies in discussions to emphasize the very real role of the fire & emergency services agencies play in responding to terrorist incidents and pursue the development of inter-agency agreements to clarify how the fire & emergency services agencies will be kept informed and involved in counter-terrorist MEMORANDUM THRU Commanding General, 5th US Army SUBJECT: Exercise Mirage Gold After Action Report (AAR) The 1. Exercise Mirage Gold was a jont FBI/DOE/DOD exercise 2. The exercise was conducted in New Orleans during the period 16-21 Oct 94 with about 1400 part:cipants. During this time, the scenario progressed through receipt of a credible threat, search for multiple Improvised Nuclear Devices (IND), access to the devices, diagnostic operations, device assessment, render safe procedures, containment and reent::y operations. The scenario did not progress to detonation and peut detonation activities, due to the need to limit the scope of the exercise. Transition to consequence management was studied but not played. 3. 5th Army exercise objectives and a general evaluation: a. Evaluate the ability of the DSR to provide support. to the lead federal agency, to include: Policies, plans, procedures and training for on-site coordination between DOD and other agencies. Adequacy of the MSCA and ACDIS models, as modified by a NEST situation, АРКИ-ОР SUBJECT: Exercise Mirage Gold After Action Report Ability to support the initial LFA was adequate. Plans and procedures to transition LFA responsibility from IND response to consequence management are absent. b. Evaluate the adequacy of DOC Dir 3150.5 and any DA, USACOM, PORSCOM policy, doctrine, plans, procedures or guidance, to include command and control and DER tasking authority. Suspected deficiencies in DOD Dir 3150.5 and DOD policies and planning were confirmed, particularly with respect to C2 and tasking. C. Evaluate the adequacy of the DSR staff to include: FIFTH US ARMY INDOPLAN plane and procedures for control of DOD assets, making key decisions and supporting other føderal agencies. The effectiveness of integrating DNA, EOD and tactical forces within the DSR staff. The OPLAN and staff model used were adequate but require minor fixas. d. Evaluate the ability of the DSR to communicate with supported agencies, OPCON forces and higher headquarters. The DSR communications capability appears too light in the early stages of a response, in spite of necessary exercise design constraints which made communications artificially easy. 4. Summary of Findings. a. National Level Command and Centrol. Information for tha President would come from three sources: the Attorney General. che Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense. As the IND situation unfolds, each of the major players would be providing reports to the President, creating the potential for confusion. See Annex A, para 2. b. Department of Defense Command and Control, Current DOD command and control arrangements involve the Joint Staff, che APKB-OP SUBJECT: Exercise Mirage Gold After Action Report Defense Nuclear Agency and the Director of Military Support acting on behalf of the Secretary of the Army. The chains of command from these organizations run parallel, with a high potential for conflicting operational guidance. See Annex A, para 3. c. Transfer of Lead Federal Agency Responsibility. The initial focus of the federal response is law enforcement and counter terrorism, with the FBI as the LFA. Should a detonation occur, the FBI is no longer the appropriate LPA. The procedures to conduct transfer of LFA responsibility are lacking. See Annex A, para 4 and Annex E, para 3. . Conflicting DOD Directivea. When taken together, DOD Dir 3150.5, 3025.1 and 5100.5 create a confusing situation for the DSR trying to command the DOD effort during an IND situation. policy revision is required to permit the DSR and DSR Staff to obtain the needed support without unnecessary delay. See Annex A, para 5. A Contingency Planning. Forming and deploying a DOD IND response is complex, requiring extensive coordination across levels of command and different agencies within DOD. At chis poinc SA has an OPLAN without the necessary higher level plans for an IND response. An actual mission tasking for this or another CONUSA would result in the mission timelines not being met. Development of appropriate contingency plans is essential to ensure DOD can meet its responsibility for IND response. See Annex A, para 6. f. The DSR's Tasking Authority over Base Support Installations (BSI) and Prior warning. In the conduct of an IND incident it is likely that FORSCOM, as the USACOM MSCA Lead Operating Authority, will designate one or more BSIs. To insure timely response to the LFA's request for support, th:: DSR must be able to directly task the BSI and the BSI must be given a warning order to that effect. See Annex A, para 8 and Annex D, para 7. g. Resourcing the DSR mission. DOD response to an IND incident with a DSR on a four hour response must be resourced, including communications and a robust, trained staff, Sec Annex A, para 12. AFXB-OP SUBJECT: Exercise Mirage Gold After Action Report DTRG Equipment. Defense Techn..cal Response Group equipment is aging and should be updated. See Annex B, para 2. H. i. DOD Resource Data Base (DODRDB; . The DODRDB is the key program for researching DOD capabilities. It needs to be updated and made easier to use. See Annex D, para 5; Annex H, para 2; Annex J, para 4. Detailed discussion of these and other issues are listed by functional staff area in the enclosed annexes. 5. Sth Army point of contact for Exercise Mirage Gold; MAJ Swackhamer/Mr Mangum, AFKB-OP-P, CSN 471-0504, commercial 210221-0504, FAX 471-9485. Annex I. Nuclear Security and Safety 10. Annex J, Regional and State EXLO 11. Annex K, Contracting 12. Msg, AFKB-DCG, 241700z Oct 94, Subject: Initial Impressions, Exercise Mirage Gold CF: CINC USACOM, Norfolk VA, attn: J3 Headquarters, Department of the Army; attn: DAMO-OD Headquarters, Department of the Army, attn: DAMO-SS |